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Abstract
The thesis examines the effectiveness and relevance of the social fund bottom-up 
development model in promoting community participation and enhancing local 
institutional capacity within the social, political and institutional context of post-Soviet 
Armenia. The thesis uses a case study of the World Bank supported Armenia Social 
Investment Fund (ASIF) project. One of the objectives of ASIF was to promote 
participation of local communities in their own economic and social development and to 
build their capacity for effectively addressing local problems. The research was 
conducted in seven rural communities in Armenia. The research found that ASIF was 
not successful in promoting community participation and institutional capacity at a 
community wide level. It benefited the rural elite, and hence contributed to the 
perpetuation of the exiting power structures and inequalities in the local communities.
The research demonstrates that the extent and nature of participation and local 
institutional capacity in Armenia are determined by the broader institutional, social and 
political context within which communities live and function. In particular, participation 
and local capacity are constrained by the governance environment at the macro and 
micro levels and high levels of material and social deprivation in local communities. 
The research findings question the effectiveness and relevance of the social fund 
bottom-up development model. The bottom-up model is based on the cultural view of 
institutional change, presuming that changes in the mentality, behavioural patterns and 
human capabilities can result in greater participation and enhanced local capacity. The 
research concludes that community based interventions may not be effective in fostering 
sustainable civic institutions without addressing the structural factors that determine the 
ability of individuals to realise their potential and become active agents.
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Chapter One. Introduction
This chapter sets out the rationale for the study and provides an overview of the thesis. 
It consists of four sections. The first section presents the objective of this research. The 
second section provides the essential contextual background to the study. In particular, 
it describes the objectives and principles of community-driven development initiatives 
and the economic and social conditions of post-Soviet transition in Armenia. The third 
section defines the contribution of the research and introduces the reader to the key 
themes of the thesis. The final section provides an overview of the structure and main 
arguments of the thesis.
1.1 The Research Objective
This research examines the effectiveness and relevance of the World Bank supported 
Armenia Social Investment Fund project (ASIF) in promoting community participation 
and enhancing local institutional capacity within the social, political and institutional 
context of post-Soviet rural Armenia. The ASIF project supported small-scale projects 
(micro-projects) for the rehabilitation of schools, potable water supply networks, 
irrigation systems, health care facilities and other small-scale social infrastructure. One 
of the objectives of the ASIF project was to promote participation of local communities 
in their own economic and social development and to build their capacity in order to 
enable them to effectively solve local problems. In assessing the success of meeting this 
objective, I assessed micro-project service delivery outcomes and the nature of 
institutional responses and social processes stimulated by the ASIF micro-project 
interventions at various stages of the micro-project cycle. I then examined how the 
ASIF micro-projects influenced the existing levels of community participation and local 
institutional capacity in the sample communities.
The central focus of this research is upon the interface between the ASIF’s 
developmental interventions and the specific socio-economic, institutional and political 
environment of local communities in post-Soviet Armenia. Thus the research identifies 
broader socio-economic, institutional and political factors that influence community 
participation and institutional capacity in rural communities in Armenia and examines 
how ASIF’s bottom-up development model addressed these socio-economic,
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institutional and political factors. The detailed exploration of the interplay between the 
ASIF interventions and the local context helped me assess the effectiveness of ASIF 
interventions in promoting participation and capacity building in Armenian and distil 
specific contextual factors that affected the ASIF micro-project processes, service 
delivery outcomes, and participation and capacity building impacts.
In addition to contextual factors, the research identifies broader conceptual issues that 
accounted for the specific participation and capacity building impacts of the ASIF 
micro-projects. Thus the thesis examines how the key variables of the social fund 
model, such as community participation, empowerment, social capital and social 
inclusion were understood, conceptualised and operationalised in the ASIF project. The 
thesis also focuses on project implementation related issues. In particular, it examines 
the extent to which ASIF’s implementation methodologies supported the objectives of 
participation and capacity building.
1.2 Situating the Research: Promoting Community Driven Development in 
Armenia
Since the mid-1990s, international aid agencies have been advocating and supporting 
various decentralised and participatory programmes and projects as a means to improve 
service delivery, enhance local self-reliance and empower the poor. At the World Bank, 
these programmes and projects are often promoted under the Community Driven 
Development (CDD) paradigm. Most commonly, CDD refers to development 
interventions that provide local community groups with resources and decision-making 
responsibility in order to enable them to pursue their immediate priority needs. CDD is 
viewed as a mechanism to support local community groups in delivery of local goods 
and services, promote citizen participation and empowerment, and enhance local 
governance and local institution building (Dongier et al 2003). CDD encompasses a 
broad range of development projects and initiatives, including social investment funds 
and similar demand-driven projects, community based natural resource management 
schemes, group-based micro-credit programmes and social safety net targeting 
initiatives.1 CDD initiatives are often intended to complement state reforms to
1 The CDD paradigm originated within the World Bank, at the same time, ‘community-driven’, 
‘community-based’ or ‘community-linked’ development has also been actively supported by other 
development agencies such as the UNDP, IADB and USAID and many international and national NGOs.
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decentralise the delivery of public services to the lower levels of government. CDD has 
become a cornerstone of the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework 
and poverty reduction policies.
As of date, the main model designed and used by development agencies, such as the 
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), to promote local 
development in many transition and developing countries have been represented by 
social investment funds or social funds. Social funds are intermediary institutions that 
provide grant financing for small-scale projects (micro-projects) generated and managed 
by local agents, including community groups, local governments, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), local offices of line ministries and other local actors. Social 
funds pursue multiple objectives that vary from country to country. Most commonly, 
social funds provide finance for construction and rehabilitation of essential social and 
economic infrastructure, including schools, clinics, irrigation systems, water supply and 
sanitation, roads and communal areas. Social funds have been increasingly seen as 
important instruments for strengthening local social capital and institutional capacity 
and empowering the poor. In the last decade, the World Bank has financed 108 social 
funds and similar demand-driven, multi-sectoral projects in 57 countries. Total World 
Bank financing to FY05 (planned) is $3,716 billion; with donor and government co­
financing included, the total is estimated at $8.9 billion.2 In the Europe and Central Asia 
(ECA) region alone, the World Bank has supported sixteen social fund projects in 
eleven countries. Social funds represent “one of the first large-scale attempts to 
implement a bottom-up model based on locally generated initiatives” (Rawlings et al 
2004: 2).
CDD projects and programmes, including social funds, have become popular in the 
ECA region since the mid-1990s. In 2000, the World Bank developed a strategy to 
‘scale up’ CDD in the ECA region as part of its poverty reduction and good governance 
agenda.3 CDD activities in the ECA region pursue several objectives.4 Firstly, CDD is
All these programmes and projects share similar bottom-up, community-based institutional arrangements 
for service delivery and capacity building.
2 Available from < www.worldbank.org/socialfunds> [Accessed on 10 June 2005].
3 The pilot countries and a pilot sub-region chosen for scaling up CDD include Armenia, Albania, 
Romania, Russia, and Central Asia.
4 This section synthesises CDD objectives laid out in the World Bank’s CDD Strategy Notes (World 
Bank 2000a; 2001a; 2001b) and official publications (World Bank 2000b; 2001c; 200Id).
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promoted to build local institutional capacity, increase local self-reliance and improve 
people’s living standards. The administratively and financially weak state institutions in 
the region, especially in the low income countries of the South Caucasus and Central 
Asia, have been unable to effectively deliver essential services and provide adequate 
social protection for the newly impoverished population. Participation of communities 
in development efforts is promoted to reduce dependence on central or local 
governments and to ensure the delivery of essential services. It is thought that 
community-driven service delivery can contribute to local economic and social 
development by “filling a gap in poverty reduction efforts that market-driven operations 
and national public sector programs alone cannot cover” (World Bank 2001c: 1). 
Secondly, it is thought that community participation can reduce the cost of service 
provision and improve the quality and sustainability of local services. Finally, CDD is 
promoted in the ECA region for empowering individuals and vulnerable groups, for 
building inclusive institutions and for improving local and national governance.
A commonplace assumption behind CDD initiatives is that most post-Soviet countries 
lack genuine civic participation and that post-Soviet local institutions are weak and 
underdeveloped (World Bank 2000a; 2000b; 2001b, 200Id). It is thought that 
ideological restrictions and public sector domination in Soviet times enforced ‘citizen 
passivity’ and expectations that authorities should be responsible for the community 
welfare. Implicit in this assumption is the idea that the cultural and normative 
orientations of citizens, i.e. the ‘Soviet mentality’ factor, present a serious obstacle to 
developing active, self-organising communities. Thus, generally assuming that 
community level institutions and social capital are weak, CDD initiatives are aimed at 
building new community institutions, strengthening social capital and promoting greater 
community involvement in local development. This objective of CDD is believed to be 
achieved through bottom-up interventions at the local level. It is believed that by 
devolving resources and decision-making responsibility to local communities and 
supporting their participation in development projects, CDD interventions can enhance 
their capacity and willingness to act collectively to pursue their common interests.
In Armenia, the need for poverty reduction policies and effective service delivery and 
capacity building institutional arrangements became pertinent after the break-up of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Armenia experienced a
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virtual collapse of its economy, which has had a serious long-lasting effect on the living 
standards of the population. Between 1990 and 1993, the country lost about 60 percent 
of its GDP (World Bank 2003c: 20). The collapse of the socialist economy resulted in 
the fall in real wages and widespread unemployment. At the end of 1993, real average 
wages had fallen to about 6 percent of their 1991 level (World Bank 1996b: 2). The 
economic growth resumed in Armenia in 1994 at an average GDP growth rate at about
7.5 percent. Although positive growth has allowed a slight economic recovery, real 
wages in Armenia are very low and unemployment is widespread. Between 1998 and 
2001, the actual unemployment increased from 27 percent to 30 percent of the labour 
force (World Bank 2003c: 44). Material poverty in Armenia is severe and persistent, 
with about 50 percent of population below the official income poverty line.5 The poor 
governance environment and social exclusion contribute to the widening of income 
inequality and further impoverishment of households and individuals unable to adjust to 
the conditions of the market economy (Babajanian 2004). Some of the manifestations of 
poverty in Armenia include deteriorating health, decline in fertility and marriage rates, 
decreasing school attendance, psychological stress, social dislocation due to economic 
migration and human trafficking.
As part of the Soviet Union, Armenia had a highly centralised state dominated by the 
Communist Party. The socialist state took full responsibility for the provision of public 
welfare.6 The foundations of social welfare policy were based upon Marxist-Leninist 
ideology. The system of socialist welfare was supposed to be the practical expression of 
class solidarity (Dixon and Kim 1992: 4). The promotion of the well-being of the nation 
was officially seen as the primary objective of the socialist state, and social security was 
a guaranteed ‘constitutional’ right for all Soviet citizens (Wiktorow 1992: 184). 
Financial security was provided to all individuals equally through employment, which 
was guaranteed to all citizens by the state. An important role in supporting people’s 
welfare was played by the pricing structure that subsidised housing, essential public 
utilities, and food. The Constitution provided citizens with the rights for free education 
and health care. In addition, the Soviet state provided an extensive web of cash transfers 
and in-kind benefits, including social assistance for mothers and children, old age and
5 This refers to the overall or general poverty line defined by the National Statistical Agency of Armenia 
and the World Bank. More discussion on poverty lines follows in Chapter Six.
6 For discussion of the socialist welfare system see McAuley (1979; 1981; 1991); Deacon (1983); Dixon 
and Kim (1992); and Andrews and Ringold (1999).
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disability pensions, and preferential benefits and services for privileged groups (e.g., 
Party members, model workers, etc.). Despite inefficiencies inherent in the socialist 
planned economy,7 the Soviet welfare system achieved substantial progress in the 
alleviation of poverty and the reduction of inequality (McAuley 1991: 207).8
The break-up of the Soviet Union has had important political, economic and social 
repercussions for Armenia. It has brought an end to the authoritarian Communist regime 
and offered an opportunity to form political institutions based on principles of 
democratic pluralism. At the same time, the collapse of the socialist economy resulted 
in the decline in official income and living standards of the population (World Bank 
1999b: 3). Many of the functions of the socialist welfare state stopped or were reduced 
‘by default’. The end of open-ended subsidisation of enterprises and the emerging 
competition as a result of privatisation meant an end to life-long guaranteed 
employment. A wide array of benefits and services that were channelled through state 
enterprises and farms were abandoned. The decline in government revenues resulted in 
massive cuts in social transfers and the inability of the public sector to sustain essential 
social services and infrastructure (World Bank 1999b: 3). The inadequate capacity of 
the state to ensure operation and maintenance of important economic and social 
infrastructure led to the deterioration of the physical condition of many schools, health 
facilities, potable water and irrigation networks throughout the country. This in turn had 
disastrous effects with regard to the quality of the services delivered by these 
infrastructures and access to these services by the population.
In addition to the ‘natural’ break-down of the socialist welfare state, the stabilisation 
and structural adjustment reform programme introduced in 1994 further dismantled the 
existing welfare institutions. One of the objectives of the programme was to remove the 
inefficiencies of the Soviet planning system and adjust the Armenian economy to the 
needs of the market. These reforms entailed reduction in the amount and coverage of 
social assistance benefits, rapid removal of subsidies on prices, housing and utilities,
7 See, for example, Komai’s (1992) comprehensive analysis of the socialist planned economy.
8 It is diffuclt to assess the extent of real poverty in the Soviet Union because of restrictions on data. 
There are estimates suggesting that poverty did exist in the Soviet Union (McAuley 1979; Matthew 1986; 
Atkinson and Micklewright 1992). For example, using family budget survey data, Atkinson and 
Micklewright (1992: 241) estimate that 14 percent of the population of Armenia fell below the official 
minimum consumption basket in 1989 (this estimate may not capture income from informal economic 
activities). They also point out that social and regional inequalities of varying degree existed in all Soviet 
Republics.
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privatisation and decentralisation of important public services and introduction of user 
charges for many public services and utilities. It is likely that such measures 
exacerbated social problems and further eroded living standards in Armenia (World 
Bank 1996b: 2-3; Babajanian 2004).9
A number of external shocks have also induced high social cost for the population and 
created an enormous social and economic strain on the Armenian state. The devastating 
earthquake of 1988 left one fourth of the country in ruins and 100,000 people 
homeless.10 The continuing effects of the earthquake still present a major challenge to 
the economic and social recovery of Armenia. Currently, 14,000 households still live in 
temporary housing (domiks) in the earthquake area. The 1988-94 military conflict with 
Azerbaijan over Nagomo Karabakh induced more than 300,000 ethnic Armenian 
refugees from Azerbaijan and an estimated 60-70,000 internally displaced people from 
border areas. More than 10,000 refugees still live in temporary shelters and experience 
extreme material and social deprivation. Many important infrastructure facilities, such 
as schools, clinics, hospitals, potable water networks and irrigation systems in the 
earthquake area and the bordering areas with Azerbaijan suffered significant damages.
It was against this backdrop of extreme material, human and social deprivation, that the 
World Bank supported the Armenia Social Investment Fund (ASIF) project. The ASIF 
project provided grant finance for small-scale micro-projects for the rehabilitation of 
schools, potable water supply networks, irrigation systems, health care facilities, village 
access roads and other local infrastructure. In 1996-2000, ASIF supported 300 urban 
and rural communities in Armenia. The ASIF project was financed through a $20 
million World Bank concessional credit. In January 2001, it was followed on by the $30 
million ASIFII project. The key mission of ASIF was to help local communities quickly 
and effectively rehabilitate important local infrastructure and gain or improve access to 
essential services. Another important objective of ASIF was to promote local self- 
reliance through promoting community participation, building the capacity of local 
communities and strengthening partnerships between local governments and community
9 There is currently little literature documenting the social impact o f structural adjustment reforms in 
Armenia. See Babajanian (2004) on the impacts o f cost recovery measures in health and utilities sectors.
10 According to the October 10, 2001 population census, Armenia’s permanent population is 3.2 million 
and the present population is 3 million. The census suggests that more than 700,000 Armenians emigrated 
between 1993 and 2000 (NSS 2002:115).
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groups. ASIF was conceived to serve as a ‘vehicle’ for community development in 
Armenia. Armenia was the first country in the former Soviet Union to introduce a social 
fund, and it served as a model for other social funds in the region. The ASIF project was 
considered one of the ‘success stories’ of the World Bank, and it was one of the ten 
‘flagship’ projects, the status of which was directly reported to World Bank President 
James Wolfensohn.
1.3 Key Themes and Contributions of the Research
This research makes a number of original contributions to knowledge. Thus, it 
specifically contributes to the existing knowledge about the ASIF project and expands 
the empirical and theoretical knowledge about social funds and other community-driven 
projects generally.
This research contributes to expanding the knowledge base about the ASIF project. It 
examines the processes of community participation in the ASIF micro-project cycle, 
micro-project service delivery outcomes and the impacts of the ASIF micro-projects on 
community participation and institutional capacity. ASIF’s impact on community 
participation and institutional capacity has not been sufficiently explored and 
understood. ASIF has carried out two beneficiary impact assessments (ASIF 1997, 
2000). These assessments mostly focus on ASIF’s contribution to improving quality of 
and access to essential social and economic services. These assessments do not provide 
rigorous evidence for making definitive conclusions about the specific effects of the 
ASIF micro-projects. It is not clear from these how ASIF micro-projects exactly 
affected community participation, social organisation and local institutions in 
beneficiary communities. In addition, these studies do not identify important contextual 
factors that account for the specific micro-project outcomes. They do not contain in- 
depth analysis of local social relations, power dynamics and institutional structures of 
local communities in Armenia. Thus this thesis fills that gap.
More generally, this research allows theoretical generalisations and ‘lesson-drawing’ 
about the effectiveness and relevance of social funds for inducing institutional change in 
particular development contexts. Lewis and Ritchie (2003: 267) suggest that there are 
various interpretations of theoretical generalisations. Some researchers believe that such
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generalisations must be truly universal and context-free, others stress the importance of 
contextually bound theories. Careful context-specific studies that establish patterns of 
success and failure in particular social, political and cultural settings can help building 
theoretical generalisations and drawing lessons for more general application. This 
research generalises to theories of social funds and of other community-driven projects 
and contributes to theory building in the field of social development. In particular, the 
research distils types of impacts, patterns and processes, which social funds and similar 
community-driven interventions can incur within specific contextual settings. These 
theoretical generalisations have immediate relevance for policy and practice.
This research expands the existing empirical and theoretical knowledge base about the 
participation and capacity building effects of social funds. There has been little research 
carried out to understand the participation and capacity building effects of social funds. 
In particular, the long-term impact of social funds on existing forms and nature of 
participation, social organisation and local institutions has not been sufficiently 
explored. The main instrument for assessing the impact of social funds is beneficiary 
impact assessments (BAs). BAs are commissioned by most social funds as part of their 
on-going project monitoring and evaluation efforts. Social fund BAs are mostly 
concerned with the assessment of micro-project processes and beneficiary perceptions 
of micro-project benefits, and have limited focus on long-term social and institutional 
impacts. Many BAs are based on quantitative surveys, and do not reveal the complexity 
of institutional and social relations at the local level. BAs are normally conducted 
during the life of the social fund project and/or shortly after its completion, and they are 
most likely to document the most immediate effects of social funds. The World Bank’s 
review of social fund BAs did not generate much information about the participation 
and capacity building effects of social funds. It suggests that “the longer-term effects of 
social fund projects on community capacity are little understood and deserve further 
research” (Owen and Van Domelen 1998: 32).
The World Bank has conducted two major cross-country evaluations of social funds, 
which have limited focus on participation and capacity building effects of social funds. 
The World Bank’s 2001 cross-country evaluation of six social funds (Rawlings et al 
2004) mostly concentrates on social fund impacts on infrastructure sustainability, 
poverty targeting, cost-efficiency and human welfare. As of date, the evaluation of
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social funds by the World Bank’s Operations Evaluations Department (OED) (OED 
2002) is the main study that explicitly discusses the effect of social funds on local social 
capital and organisational capacity. The OED evaluation is based on the results of 
household surveys, and a synthesis of findings of qualitative assessments of several 
social funds, including OED’s evaluation of FOPAR in Argentina and the study of the 
Jamaica Social Investment Fund (Rao and Ibanez 2003). The OED evaluation provides 
some interesting indications about the impacts of social funds on social capital and 
organisational capacity. The findings of the OED evaluation are discussed in this thesis.
This research contributes to our understanding of participation and capacity building 
impacts of CDD and other community-driven projects. In particular, many of the 
research findings can be relevant to other types of community-driven initiatives that 
share the social fund bottom-up model for promoting participation and capacity building. 
Participation and capacity building effects of CDD and other community-driven 
projects have not been sufficiently researched and understood. Cleaver (2001: 36) 
argues that “there is little evidence of the long-term effectiveness of participation in 
materially improving the conditions of the most vulnerable people or as a strategy for 
social change”. She concludes that while there is some evidence for efficiency, the 
evidence with regard to empowerment is rather “reliant on assertions of the rightness of 
the approach and process rather than convincing evidence of outcomes”.
The World Bank’s review (World Bank 2002a) of CDD in Central Asia concludes that 
the types of impact of these projects are not clear, and there is no evidence to indicate 
whether the CDD approach is more effective than traditional approaches. One of the 
reasons for the lack of clarity is the lack of systematic and rigorous impact evaluation. 
The review maintains, “Neither documents nor interviews yield many lessons regarding 
what works, what does not work, and what was the result of an activity or series of 
activities. Analysis seems to be limited to descriptions of field challenges as they 
emerge, it is not clear that there has been much effort made to understand the social 
origins of the challenges or their implications, or to articulate insights gained from the 
experience of dealing with them” (World Bank 2002a: 9). Mansuri and Rao (2003: 22) 
in their review of the evidence on CDD activities for the World Bank conclude that 
“few studies have attempted a rigorous and credible evaluation of the social impact of
20
CDD projects”, and that there is little evidence available on the propensity of CDD to 
enhance sustainability and improve social capital.
The central focus of this research is upon the contextual setting of rural communities in 
post-Soviet Armenia. Thus, the research assesses the impacts of the ASIF micro­
projects on participation and capacity building within the specific institutional, social 
and political context of Armenia. Williams (2004: 95) argues that there is a need to 
research the institutional impact of participatory techniques and programmes within a 
broader contextual environment. He goes on to say, “Both proponents and critics alike 
have perhaps focused too much on the minutiae of participatory methods and events, 
and too little on their wider context”. Donor evaluations of CDD and other community- 
driven projects are often preoccupied with technical issues concerning design, planning 
and implementation methods. They tend to explain project outcomes by shortcomings in 
the design and implementation, with little focus on the specific interface between the 
design and implementation issues and the existing contextual environment.
This study adopts an institutional approach. It presumes that in order to promote 
participation, development interventions must induce institutional change. Thus, in 
order to become a ‘normal’ way of getting things done, participation must be 
institutionalised. This implies that development interventions must promote a change in 
the existing institutional and organisational arrangements for service delivery, problem­
solving and decision-making in the contexts where participation is not an accepted or 
usual way of getting things done. This research challenges the cultural theory of 
institutional change. In particular, it finds that the bottom-up development model alone 
may not be an effective policy instrument for promoting institutional change to support 
meaningful participation and enhance local institutional capacity. The bottom-up model 
is based on the cultural theory, which presumes that changes in the mentality, 
behavioural patterns, social norms, and technical and organisational skills and abilities 
can translate into greater community participation and self-reliance. The research 
concludes that other factors, such as the institutional environment and socio-economic 
conditions, play an important role in affecting participation and shaping local social 
relations.
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The thesis critically reviews the current conceptualisation and application of the notion 
of social capital in development practice. The thesis argues that the ‘social capital’ 
framework used by development agencies is not adequate for analysing conditions 
affecting participation, but mainly suggests a framework for analysing co-operation. In 
particular, the research shows that the availability of social capital (i.e., relations of trust 
and reciprocity and social networks) in a community may not necessarily translate into 
community participation. The thesis suggests that development interventions that focus 
on building social capital as a means to promote participation may not be effective 
without addressing broader structural factors affecting participation.
This research contributes to expanding the existing knowledge base and theories on 
civil society and community participation in Armenia and in other post-Soviet countries. 
The dominance of the Western model of civil society and the compartmentalisation of 
the study of civil society and community participation have contributed to the rigid and 
superficial understanding of the concept and the substance of civil society and 
participation in post-Soviet countries. Western views and perceptions, which often 
significantly influence local views and perceptions, dominate the academic and 
professional spheres.11 The prevailing opinion is that civil society was subjugated by the 
Soviet regime, which suppressed any civic activism and initiative in its citizens. As a 
result, the regime produced passive citizens, reliant on the state and unable to undertake 
independent action to solve their problems. This thesis demonstrates that community 
participation in Armenia exists, although its forms and manifestation are different from 
the Western model of citizen participation and civil society. This thesis provides 
explanations for the specific forms, nature and limitations of participation in Armenia. It 
disproves the cultural argument, and asserts that the limits to civil society are rooted in 
the post-Soviet institutions.
11 Thus, there are ‘parallel’ narratives about community participation in Armenia. Many Armenian civil 
society and community development practitioners repeat the Western assertions about the lack of civil 
society in Armenia, either because they find the logic behind the Western argument compelling, or 
because advancing the ‘local’ understanding of the concept with their foreign counterparts can be difficult. 
When I asked an experienced Armenian community development specialist whether there is such a thing 
as ‘community participation’ in Armenia, he replied: “Well, if you were asking me this question as a 
foreign consultant, I would have said ‘no’. As you are Armenian, I can tell you that there is community 
participation in Armenia, and it has various manifestations in different communities, but foreigners would 
not really understand it”.
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This research provides rich description and analysis of institutional and social relations 
in rural communities in post-Soviet Armenia. What are the existing forms and nature of 
community participation, social capital and local institutions in Armenia? How do 
people pursue their interests and identities and influence important decisions that affect 
their lives? How do people get things done in local communities? What are the norms 
and values that govern relations among community members and between community 
members and their leaders? Local institutions in Central Asia historically have been 
more visible and discernible than those in Armenia. This is perhaps one of the reasons 
that local institutions and communal practices in Central Asia have received some 
international attention (Roy 1999, 2000; Kandiyoti 1998a; Freizer 2004; Earle 2004) 
and have been explicitly recognised by development agencies. The locally existing 
ethnographic knowledge about Armenian communities has not been adequately 
systematised and framed so as to be useful for informing development projects and 
policies. This study unpacks the notion of the Armenian community from the 
institutional social development perspective. Thus, it views communal practices not as 
traditional legacies, cultural attributes or coping mechanisms, but rather as local 
institutions that perform important social, economic and political functions.
This study adopts an in-depth qualitative approach. In her review of the analytic 
approaches to the study of post-socialist Central Asia, Kandiyoti (2002) argues that 
ethnographic approaches to post-socialism can provide especially valuable information 
about pathways of transition. In particular, studies of how local practices and 
institutions respond to macro level institutions and policies can reveal a nuanced picture 
of the strains and complexities of post-socialist reality. By documenting the existing 
institutional and social relations in post-Soviet Armenian this thesis contributes to the 
understanding of the governance system in the country and the effects it has on the local 
communities’ functioning and livelihoods.
This thesis has drawn upon a number of various literatures to develop the theoretical 
bases and conceptual framework for the research. It uses literature produced within 
various disciplines, including development studies, transitology, new institutional 
economics, and political science. This study places the theories of post-socialist ‘social 
networks’ within the social development framework o f ‘livelihoods’ and ‘participation’. 
In particular, it considers informal social networks not simply as Soviet legacies, but as
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part of the civic sphere that provides citizens with a means to sustain livelihoods and 
pursue their objectives. This thesis also builds on global theories of social development 
and political science in order to locate the research. In particular, its conceptual 
framework is based on the synthesis of current debates on participation, empowerment, 
social capital, civil society and institutional change.
1.4 Thesis Structure and Main Arguments
Chapter One situates the research question and describes the objectives and key foci and 
contributions of the research.
Chapter Two outlines the theoretical and conceptual foundations of the research. 
Drawing on global literature, it focuses on theories of participation, empowerment, 
social capital and collective action. The chapter discusses a number of agency related 
and structural factors that can influence the design and implementation of community- 
driven projects. It argues that a key factor affecting the outcomes of community-driven 
projects is associated with the specific understanding and interpretation of participation 
by a donor agency and methodologies employed for promoting participation and 
capacity building.
Based on the review of theories and concepts, this chapter constructs a conceptual 
framework for situating this research. This thesis adopts the wider definition of 
participation as empowerment, which can be understood as a state of social and 
institutional organisation in which citizens are enabled to influence and control 
decisions that affect their lives. This conceptualisation of participation is based on the 
notions of citizen rights, inclusiveness and democratic accountability. I use the term 
‘civic participation’ to refer to empowered participation, and use it as a normative 
benchmark in analysing and interpreting the research data. Having set a broader 
conceptual framework in this chapter, the thesis then examines how the key variables of 
the social fund model, such as community participation, empowerment, social capital 
and social inclusion were understood, conceptualised and operationalised in the ASIF 
project.
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The chapter examines the commonplace assumptions by Western donors and scholars 
about civil society and community participation in post-Soviet countries, and reviews 
evidence on the existing forms and manifestations of civil society in the region. The 
chapter demonstrates that despite the existing misconceptions, both associational and 
communal forms of civil society indeed existed in the Soviet Union, although their 
substance and manifestations were different from the commonly accepted Western 
notions of civil society and participation. The research then tests the existing 
preconceptions about the post-Soviet civil society and community participation by 
exploring the nature of institutional and social relations and patterns and nature of 
community participation in the sample communities.
Finally, the chapter examines theories of institutional change and their implications for 
promoting community participation and civil society. It suggests that the cultural view 
of institutional change, which underpins community-driven projects, including social 
funds, does not attach importance to broader political and governance issues that affect 
local participation. The chapter maintains that the governance environment, the quality 
of public institutions and strong state-society linkages are crucial for fostering civic 
institutions. This raises questions about the effectiveness and relevance of social fund 
projects based on the cultural view of institutional change. The thesis then investigates 
whether the ASIF project based on the cultural model of institutional change promoted 
change in the existing institutions and local social organisation in the sample 
communities.
Chapter Three reviews the key design features and operating procedures that most social 
funds share. Based on agency and project literature, this chapter deconstructs the key 
hypotheses and assumptions underlying World Bank supported social fund projects. In 
particular, it presents the main hypotheses and assumptions behind the social fund 
bottom-up model for promoting participation and capacity building. This model 
assumes that participation in the micro-project activities can improve knowledge, skills 
and abilities of community members, contribute to individual empowerment, and 
enhance local social capital, which will translate into increased participation and 
institutional capacity of local communities. I use these assumptions to construct the 
research framework and define the key indicators for assessing the processes and 
impacts of the ASIF micro-projects in the sample communities.
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Chapter Four reviews the objectives, design, micro-project implementing principles and 
operational procedures of the ASIF project. Based on project documents and interviews 
with the ASIF staff, this chapter provides an overview of ASIF’s participatory 
mechanisms, appraisal criteria and performance indicators. The chapter shows that 
participation and capacity building were among the stated objectives of the ASIF 
project. ASIF required beneficiary participation throughout the micro-project initiation 
and identification, planning and preparation, implementation, and evaluation and 
monitoring. ASIF developed a number of participatory implementing principles and 
operating procedures to ensure the involvement of community residents on the micro­
project cycle.
Chapter Five provides an account of the research design, key methods and the process 
of this research. The chapter presents the central research question, and how I set about 
answering it. Based on Chapters Three and Four, this chapter distils the main 
hypotheses and assumptions underlying ASIF as a development model for promoting 
community participation and capacity building, and identifies indicators for measuring 
the impact of the ASIF micro-projects in the sample communities. It presents the 
methodological, ethical and moral challenges that I faced during my research.
Chapter Six examines the socio-economic, institutional and policy context of the 
research. Using documentary sources, it highlights the existing poverty situation and the 
general institutional and governance environment in Armenia. The chapter provides an 
overview of decentralisation in Armenia, with a particular emphasis on the irrigation 
decentralisation reform. The chapter argues that in addition to the low economic 
productivity, other factors such as poor governance, structural inequalities and social 
exclusion are key determinants of poverty and income inequality in Armenia. It 
maintains that the weak financial and institutional capacity of the Armenian state 
prohibit it from designing and financing effective social policy measures that would 
enhance people’s welfare. The chapter shows that decentralisation of local management 
and service delivery tasks to local governments in Armenia was not accompanied with 
delegation of full discretionary power over local development, sufficient administrative 
capacity and financial resources.
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Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine present the analysis of the main empirical findings of 
this research and form the core of this thesis. Chapter Seven examines socio-economic 
conditions, patterns of national, regional and local governance, the existing local 
institutions, forms and nature of participation, the intensity of empowerment of local 
residents, social capital, and institutional capacity in rural Armenia. It concludes that 
‘participation’ in the sample communities was not accepted as a ‘normal’ or ‘usual’ 
method for service delivery, problem-solving and decision-making. The prevailing 
institutional arrangements for getting things done in the sample communities were 
reliance on authorities, social networks and informal payments. The chapter 
demonstrates that the limited community participation in the sample communities was 
not conditioned by the weakness of social capital and/or attitudinal factors. It suggests 
that the nature of governance both at the macro and micro levels largely affects the 
existing local institutions, the forms and nature of community participation and the 
intensity of empowerment in Armenia.
Chapter Eight discusses the service delivery outcomes and processes of the ASIF micro- 
projects in the sample communities. This chapter shows that the ASIF interventions did 
not alter the existing local institutions, which determined the existing forms and nature 
of participation and problem-solving mechanisms in the sample communities. The 
existing local institutions themselves determined the processes and service delivery 
outcomes of the ASIF micro-projects.
Chapter Nine provides analysis of the impact of the ASIF micro-projects on community 
participation and local institutional capacity in the sample communities. The research 
findings presented in this chapter indicate that the intensity of empowerment and the 
existing forms and nature of participation of community members in development 
activities remained unchanged after the ASIF micro-projects. This chapter shows that 
the ASIF interventions did not induce a change in the existing institutional service 
delivery, problem-solving and decision-making mechanisms in the sample communities. 
The ASIF micro-projects helped strengthen and reinforce the existing local institutions 
and social relations in the sample communities.
Chapter Ten provides interpretations and explanations of the research findings and 
implications for policy and practice. The chapter discusses the relevance and
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effectiveness of the social fund bottom-up model in promoting community participation 
and capacity building within the specific contextual setting of the sample communities. 
It presents the key factors that accounted for the specific participation and capacity 
building impacts of the ASIF micro-projects. Firstly, the chapter argues that the design 
of the ASIF project did not adequately address the local institutional, political and 
socio-economic context of Armenia. Thus, ASIF’s bottom-up development model 
overlooked the importance of the broader structural and institutional constraints that 
shaped local institutions and affected people’s decisions to participate. Secondly, the 
chapter argues that the concepts of participation, empowerment, social capital and social 
exclusion were not adequately understood and operationalised in the ASIF project. 
Thirdly, ASIF’s implementation methodologies did not adequately support the 
objectives of participation and capacity building. The chapter then discusses the 
implications of the specific participation and capacity building impacts of the ASIF 
micro-projects for local development in Armenia. Finally, it draws implications and 
challenges for development policies and practices.
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Chapter Two. Theoretical Underpinnings and Conceptual Framework
This chapter provides the conceptual framework and theoretical foundations for the 
research question. It comprises five sections. The first section reviews the key concepts 
and theoretical assumptions that underpin community-driven initiatives. In particular, it 
reviews theoretical debates around the notions of participation, empowerment, social 
capital and collective action. The second section discusses some of key agency and 
context related factors that influence the design, implementation and outcomes of 
community-driven projects. The third section discusses the concept of civil society and 
its current application by Western donors, and examines the existing overlap between 
the concepts of community participation and civil society. The fourth section examines 
how civil society and community participation in the former Soviet Union have been 
conceptualised and understood in the existing literature and development projects. It 
provides a review of empirical evidence about the existing forms of social organisation 
and participation in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. The fifth section reviews 
theories of institutional change and their implications for promoting community 
participation and civil society. Finally, based on the review of theories and concepts, 
this chapter constructs a conceptual framework for situating this research.
2.1 Community Driven Development: Concepts and Theories
This section reviews the existing theoretical debates around the notions of participation, 
empowerment, social capital and collective action. The particular understanding and 
conceptualisation of these terms have immediate relevance for the design, 
implementation and outcomes of development projects supported by donor agencies and 
governments. These debates have formed the theoretical and conceptual foundations of 
this research, and have helped me conceptualise and operationalise the main variables of 
the research. Chapter Ten revisits the main debates presented in this chapter in the light 
of the fieldwork findings.
2.1.1 Community Participation
The World Bank’s CDD as well as other community-driven or community-based 
development initiatives are based on the theories of community participation. The
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notion of participation stems from Western political theories and reflects the notion of 
democratic governance, in which ordinary citizens can participate in decision-making. 
According to the Western model of pluralist democracy, formal democratic institutions, 
such as multi-party systems, parliamentary structures and mechanisms of representative 
democracy, should also be supplemented by strong civil society, a network of 
participatory institutions at all levels and vertical consultation mechanisms. Midgley 
(1986a: 15) suggests that the notion of ‘community participation’ was originally 
influenced by the theory of ‘neighbourhood democracy’ (Dahl and Tufts 1974) in its 
advocacy for the creation of small-scale institutions for the realisation of political 
aspirations in the villages and urban neighbourhoods in developing countries. 
Community participation was also influenced by the populist ideas stating that virtues 
reside in the simple people, who are often neglected or suppressed. In particular, the 
community-based approach to development was influenced by the work of populist 
radicals Saul Alinsky (1971) and Paulo Freire (1970; 1972; 1974) in the early 1970s. 
The work of Robert Chambers (1983; 1997) was crucial in promoting the participation 
agenda in the 1980s and 1990s.
Community participation became a mainstream development tool with the ‘community 
development’ movement in the 1950s and 1960s. These programmes and projects, 
which were administered by national governments and regional authorities, were 
heavily criticised for their top-down approach and the lack of sensitivity to local needs 
(Korten 1980: 482; Hall and Midgley 2004: 74-75). The criticism of community 
development initiatives and the recognition of state failures to address the needs of the 
poor, resulted in the emergence of a ‘community participation’ approach, which placed 
a greater emphasis on the ‘bottom-up’ or grassroots-driven development. This approach 
was largely influenced by international NGOs, which argued that generating local self- 
sufficiency and self-reliance would allow people to look after their own welfare rather 
than to rely on the state (Nelson and Wright 1995: 3). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
international donor agencies supported infrastructure and social services projects with 
‘community participation’ components. This approach delegated tasks for project 
design and delivery to local community groups or NGOs. These projects too were 
criticised for their superficial conceptualisation and usage of participation. In particular, 
critics claimed that participation in these projects was restricted to the execution phase 
of projects and took the form of voluntary labour contribution and resource mobilisation
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(Oakley 1991). In the mid-1990s, the notion of participation was revamped and 
reintroduced as a major development paradigm under the CDD agenda.
The theories and practices of community participation have traditionally made a 
distinction between social and political forms of participation. In its emphasis on the 
local affairs, community participation is considered different from the notion of 
‘popular participation’, advocating involvement in the political and socio-economic 
affairs of the nation (Midgley 1986a: 23). Gaventa and Valderrama (1999: 2) 
distinguish between two forms of participation: community or social participation and 
political participation. The notion of community or social participation refers to direct 
beneficiary participation in development, mostly outside the political and governance 
sphere.12 Political participation focuses on the interactions of citizens with the state 
through the mechanisms of indirect participation (for example, through voting, political 
parties, campaigning, contacting power holders, lobbying, attending meetings, group 
action and protest movements).
The concept of community participation by itself has historically accumulated various 
meanings, which are imbued with different ideologies and influenced by people and 
organisations. In terms of its origin, one can classify participation as ‘spontaneous’ and 
‘induced’ (Oakley and Marsden 1984: 18), or as ‘voluntary’ and ‘coerced’ (Cohen and 
Uphoff 1980: 224). Spontaneous participation is grassroots-driven, and it is based on 
local initiative and voluntary action. It occurs when people organise without the 
involvement of external agents. The induced form of participation is sustained due to 
the project requirements and funding support of donor agencies.
One can distinguish between participation in development projects and programmes, 
and participation in local development. The latter extends beyond the boundaries of 
development projects and programmes. I refer to it as ‘institutionalised’ participation, as 
it represents a feature of social and institutional organisation of a society. These two 
types of participation can overlap as individuals can participate in development projects 
and programmes as part of institutionalised participation in local development. At the 
same time, community members may be given full control over resources and decision-
12 In this form of participation, beneficiaries may also be represented by a group or a person selected to 
act on their behalf.
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making through donor intermediation over the period of a project’s duration. This, 
however, does not necessarily imply that the extent and nature of their participation 
would remain the same after the completion of the project. In this case, participation 
tends to have short-term ‘donor or project-driven’ character.
According to the nature of people’s involvement in development projects, participation 
can be classified as ‘passive’ and ‘active’ (Oakley and Marsden 1984: 22). The passive 
form refers to the involvement of local people in the contribution of resources and 
labour (Oakley 1991: 8). It is often described as ‘pseudo-participation’, as community 
involvement is limited to implementation or ratification of decisions already taken by 
external bodies (Midgley 1986a: 26). Active participation refers to community group 
authority and control over decisions and resources (Narayan and Pritchett 2000: 285). 
Midgley (1986a: 26) describes such participation as ‘authentic’. According to the World 
Bank’s definition (World Bank 1996a), participation is the ability of people to influence 
decisions that affect their lives. In this definition, participation by its intensity can vary 
from ‘listening’ and ‘consultation’ (weak intensity) to ‘collaborative decision-making’ 
(high intensity) (World Bank 1996a: 11).
According to its objectives, participation in development projects has been classified as 
a ‘means’ and as an ‘end’ in itself (Oakley and Marsden 1984: 27; Nelson and Wright 
1995: 1; UNDP 1997: 4). Participation as a means is viewed as an input to a 
development activity. For example, participation can be a means to accomplish the aims 
of a project more efficiently, effectively and cheaply (Nelson and Wright 1995: 1). 
According to Midgley (1986b: 9), such participation is ‘instrumental’, as its goals are 
limited to identification of people’s needs and mobilisation of local resources. 
Participation as an end denotes “a process, the outcome of which is meaningful 
participation” (Oakley and Marsden 1984: 27). In this approach participation in projects 
has a ‘developmental’ objective (Midgley 1986b: 9). It is promoted to empower people 
to participate in local development.
There are three main stated objectives for which community participation in local 
development is currently promoted through the World Bank’s CDD initiatives. Firstly, 
participation in local development is often viewed as a tool for effective and efficient 
service delivery (Dongier et al 2003: 6). It is thought that participation of community
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groups in the delivery of certain goods and services can lead to successful development 
outcomes (more detailed discussions follows further in this chapter). Secondly, 
participation is promoted to increase local self-reliance and self-sufficiency and promote 
local development. It is believed that community-based development can effectively 
compliment market and public sector activities and contribute to poverty reduction 
(Dongier et al 2003: 4). These objectives of participation are often associated with the 
neo-liberal strategies of international development agencies to “roll back the state” and 
promote alternative solutions to service provision and delivery based on the private 
market and voluntary sectors (Mayo and Craig 1995: 4). Finally, participation is 
promoted for enabling people to exercise voice and control their own development and 
for making development more inclusive (Dongier et al 2003: 7). Participation in this 
view is seen as the ability of individuals to be involved in the social, economic and 
political life of their communities and have long-term access to resources and decision­
making. This definition of participation is often equated with the concept of 
empowerment (discussed in detail in section 2.1.3).
2.1.2 Community Participation in Service Delivery
Participation is often viewed as a tool to improve service delivery outcomes. The 
growing interest among development professionals, academics and government officials 
in alternative service delivery and poverty reduction mechanisms has been triggered by 
the renewed awareness of the failure of centralised state methods and traditional top- 
down development approaches to effectively deliver essential services and respond to 
the problems and needs of individuals and communities. Local communities are thought 
to be in a better position than the markets and central governments in providing certain 
goods and services and delivering economic benefits to the poor (Dongier et al 2003: 4- 
5). The potential of local communities is thought to be especially great for the delivery 
of goods and services that are small-scale and that require local co-operation, such as 
many common pool goods and public goods. For example, there is evidence that 
participation of community groups and organisations in delivering and managing local 
potable water, sanitation and irrigation services can lead to successful development 
outcomes, such as more customised results, greater cost effectiveness and enhanced 
sustainability (Narayan 1995a; Isham et al 1995; Katz 1997; Lam 1998; Uphoff 1996; 
Subramanian et al 1997).
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A number of arguments have been put forward as to why communities can be more 
advantageous in delivering certain local goods and services (Esman and Uphoff 1984: 
24-26; Ostrom, 1990,1992; Bardhan 1996: 140-141; Dongier et al 2003: 5). It is argued 
that due to their on the ground presence communities may enjoy informational 
advantage that outsiders lack. Firstly, local communities are assumed to have far more 
complete knowledge regarding local conditions and needs than a bureaucratic agency. 
Such knowledge is necessary for the customised design and planning of services, the 
effective and efficient conservation of natural resources and the maintenance of local 
infrastructure. Secondly, in community-based delivery systems, the local agents who 
make key decisions and carry out decentralised tasks are often the users themselves, or 
they are selected and are held accountable by the users. Therefore, there is a higher 
likelihood that goods and services delivered reflect local priorities and preferences. 
Thirdly, the involvement of beneficiaries in the design, planning and management of 
local investments can also help to ensure local ownership and enhance sustainability of 
investments. Finally, the availability of local social capital (defined as relations of trust 
and reciprocity) can help effectively resolve collective action problems and successfully 
perform decentralised tasks.
In community-based development, the task of delivery (production) of goods and 
services can often be combined with the provision (financing) responsibilities (Ostrom 
et al 1993: 74-75). Decentralisation of provision responsibilities to local communities 
through user charges and contributions of voluntary labour, cash or materials has been 
especially encouraged by aid agencies and governments in potable water and irrigation 
sectors. It is believed that local co-financing and cost-sharing can improve the quality 
and sustainability of services. Community contributions are thought to ensure that 
investments are responsive to the local demand; the fact that people have a financial 
stake in a project will result in appropriate cost and service level choices being made - 
all of which can enhance community ownership and the commitment to provide 
necessary operation and maintenance (Dongier et al 2003: 20; Binswanger and Aiyar 
2003: 13).
A significant motive for decentralisation of service provision is to diminish fiscal 
burden of central governments and increase public sector efficiency (Rondinelli et al
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1989: 70-71; Mayo and Craig 1995: 4). Co-financing arrangements are seen as a 
mechanism to “stretch scarce public financial resources over a grater number of 
communities and subprojects” (Dongier et al 2003: 19). Binswanger and Aiyar (2003: 
29), for example, suggest that in order to reduce the fiscal costs when scaling up CDD, 
communities can be asked to contribute 15-40 percent of subproject costs. On the other 
hand, it is believed that cost-sharing arrangements can ensure the delivery of local 
services by mobilising the necessary resources for operation and maintenance and 
reducing dependence on central, regional or local governments that are often unable to 
meet these costs (Dongier et al 2003: 20).
2.1.3 Community Participation and Empowerment
The World Bank’s Empowerment and Poverty Reduction Sourcebook (World Bank 
2002b: 11) defines empowerment as “the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor 
people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable 
institutions that affect their lives”. The key elements of empowerment are access to 
information, inclusion and participation, accountability and local organisational capacity 
(World Bank 2002b: 14). The World Bank (2003a: 6-7) defines four sequential forms of 
empowerment, ranging from weak to intense. These include: (a) passive access defined 
as the capacity to be present (but not necessarily exercise voice), (b) active participation, 
in which people can exercise voice (but not necessarily exercise influence), (c) influence, 
defined as the capacity to influence an agenda, and (d) control, a position of ‘ultimate 
power’, when people are free to make choices and transform them into desired actions 
and outcomes. The extent to which actors are empowered is thought to depend on their 
asset base (agency) and the institutional context (opportunity structure) at the local, 
regional and national levels (World Bank 2003a: 3; Holland and Brook 2004: 94). 
Assets include skills, education, information, local organisational capacity, 
psychological resources, and financial and material resources of individuals or groups. 
The institutional context refers to formal and informal rules that determine access to 
assets and the use of those assets.
Development agencies in their rhetoric have been actively advocating empowerment as 
a poverty reduction instrument. The new approach to poverty outlined in the World 
Development Report 2000/2001 (World Bank 2000c) is based on promoting
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opportunity, facilitating empowerment, and enhancing security. This approach is based 
on the acknowledgement by the World Bank of the multidimensional nature and 
structural causes of poverty. In particular, this view assumes that poverty is not just a 
lack of material resources, but powerlessness or the inability to influence the forces that 
shape people’s livelihoods. It is argued that by devolving resources and decision­
making responsibility to communities and supporting their participation in development 
projects, community-based approaches can enable the poor and socially excluded with 
greater voice and more opportunities to more actively participate in and control their 
own development (Dongier et al 2003: 7). It is also believed that enhancing citizen 
participation and strengthening local associations can increase people’s voice and their 
engagement in the public sphere, and improve the responsiveness and accountability of 
authorities and the overall governance environment (World Bank 2003b: 2).
The notion of empowerment is linked with the issue of citizenship and rights. The 
concept of citizenship has been fundamental to understanding and justifying the 
functioning of the modem welfare state in Europe.13 The work of T.H. Marshall (1950) 
linked fulfilment of social rights with the obligation of the state towards its citizens. The 
growing acceptance of the rights-based approach to poverty reduction has been largely 
influenced by the works of Amartya Sen. Sen’s (1981) work on entitlements and 
capabilities stresses that what counts is not what (poor) people possess, but what it 
enables them to do. The entitlement concept draws attention away from the mere 
possession of certain goods, towards rights, the command people have over goods, 
using various economic, political, and social opportunities within the legal system. In 
his Development as Freedom work, Sen (1999) argues that freedom is the major 
precondition for enhancing the well-being of the poor, and views expansion of freedom 
as both the end and means of development.
The ‘rights-based approach’ to development emphasises the importance of human, 
political and social rights and the commitment by states to ensure those rights (Moser 
2004: 35).14 This approach demonstrates a shift from a needs-based approach to poverty 
reduction, in which provision of support was justified by the needs and not entitlements
13 For a comprehensive review of the concept o f citizenship in development see Jones and Gaventa (2002) 
and Kabeer (2002); and for a discussion of citizenship from a feminist perspective see Lister (1997).
14 The conceptual foundation for the rights-based approach was laid in UNDP (2000a) and DFID (2000).
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(Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall 2004: 2). The rights-based approach has a political 
nature. Lister (1997: 38) conceptualises citizenship through the idea of ‘human agency’, 
which views individuals “as autonomous, purposive and creative actors, capable of 
choice”. For Lister, citizenship is a dynamic process, which embraces individual rights 
and political participation. Being an active citizen implies not only carrying certain 
rights, but also using these rights to express human agency in the political sphere in 
order to obtain new rights. Gaventa (2004: 34) goes on to argue that as citizenship in 
this approach is understood as participation in political, social and economic life, the 
“right to participation”, or “participation as freedom”, becomes a pre-condition for 
claiming and fulfilling citizenship rights. Rights in this approach are understood not 
simply as formal laws and regulations, but as a “political tool for use in the dynamic 
process of claiming resources and ensuring justice” (VeneKlasen et al 2004: 10). Thus 
participation in this approach is conceptualised as a process in which individuals are 
empowered to take part in decision-making over resources, claim their rights and hold 
the authorities responsible for ensuring their rights.
Central in the concept of participation as empowerment is the notion of power. Oakley 
and Marsden (1984: 25) describe participation as a process of ‘achieving power’, in 
which power refers to “access to, and control of, the resources necessary to protect 
livelihood”. The concept of power has been extensively discussed in social and political 
theory.15 The notion of power can be conceptualised in different ways,16 and it can be 
applied in relation to an individual, household, community and a wider economy. Power 
is about “access to resources, control of the elements and processes of production, and 
rights to dispose of products” (Nelson and Wright 1995: 7). Power can be experienced 
in face to face relations, for example, within a household, and also as part of systemic 
relations. One of the conceptions of power is the idea of ‘power as structure’. According 
to Mosse (2004: 54), the concept of power structure denotes the distribution or balance 
of power in a society. Power relations become institutionalised when they repeat 
themselves and form a pattern (Eyben 2004: 23). Individuals can have different degrees 
of power at a household, community, regional and national levels. Power structures 
determine how resources are distributed in a society, and determine the extent to which 
individuals can access decision-making and opportunities.
15 See, for example, Lukes (1974), Foucault (1980), Bourdieu (1989), and Giddens (1984).
16 Mosse (2004), for example, distinguishes between six different conceptions o f power.
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Power structures determine how and on what basis people participate. The interrelation 
between power and participation can be conceptualised within the framework of spaces 
for citizen participation (Cornwall 2002; Gaventa 2004). Participation is concerned with 
establishing spaces or arenas for community functioning. There are differences between 
the closed, invited, and claimed/created spaces of participation. Closed spaces refer to 
decision-making made by elite, without or with limited inclusion of citizens; invited 
spaces, where citizens are invited to participate in by donors, governments and other 
authorities; and claimed or created spaces, which claimed by civil society groups from 
or against powerful actors through grassroots mobilisation. In order to understand the 
nature of people’s participation, it is important to examine the features of power 
relations that surround and operate within these spaces. Thus the boundaries and scope 
of public participation would largely depend on by whom these spaces are opened and 
filled. In other words, the framework of ‘spaces’ can help determine who is involved, 
how, and on whose terms. Cornwall (2004: 9) maintains that the spaces for public 
engagement “need to be understood as embedded in the particular cultural 
understandings and political configurations that constitute governance in any give 
context”.
There are criticisms of the current understanding and conceptualisation of 
empowerment by donors. In particular, it is suggested that although since the 1990s 
empowerment is no longer viewed as a ‘radical’ strategy, participation is not 
operationalised and implemented by donors in its wider, empowerment sense. Cleaver 
(2001: 37) concludes that since the radical empowerment discourse has become a 
‘buzzword’ in development, “its radical, challenging and transformatory edge has been 
lost”. Development projects do not associate the term with structural changes and 
political action. Eyben (2004: 18) argues that the World Bank’s approach to 
empowerment still derives from a neo-liberal position, in which participation is 
understood in instrumental terms, as a means of enhancing efficiency in service delivery. 
According to VeneKlasen et al (2004: 5), “[PJarticipation is often framed narrowly as a 
methodology to improve project performance, rather than a process of fostering critical 
consciousness and decision-making as the basis for active citizenship. Rarely is 
participation implemented as a mutual decision-making process, where different actors 
share power and set agendas jointly”. Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall (2004: 24-26) in
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their review of donor programmes and policies assert that the World Bank’s efforts to 
pursue a rights-based agenda are half-hearted and incomplete.
There is some, albeit limited empirical evidence about the existing operational practices 
of donor agencies that support CDD projects and programmes. The World Bank’s 
review (World Bank 2002a: 12) of sixty community-based and community-driven 
projects supported by various agencies in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
concludes that “few projects are designed to promote increased participation over time, 
either by a broader group or more increasing the level of involvement, such as moving 
from a stage of collaboration to empowerment”. The study then goes on to argue that 
“[T]hese findings reflect a pattern found in CDD projects Bank-wide, that is, CDD 
tends to be top-down driven development when it comes to budgets, management, 
monitoring and evaluation, and bottom-up when it comes to the construction and 
maintenance phases, especially when physical labor is involved” (World Bank 2002a: 
12).
There is evidence that participatory projects and programmes often have a shallow 
understanding of the complexity of gender issues, fail to take into account women’s 
needs and promote meaningful involvement of women in development processes (Guijt 
and Kaul Shah 1998; Cornwall 2000). It is argued that participatory research practices, 
such as participatory rural appraisal (PRA), often fail to include voices of marginal 
actors and incorporate ‘local knowledge’ into planning (Mosse 1995; 2001), neglect 
‘structural’ issues (Francis 2001), and that they can often be patronising and subjugated 
by power relations between the ‘insiders’ and the ‘outsiders’ (Mohan 2001).
2.1.4 Social Capital
Since the mid-1990s, the concept of social capital entered mainstream development 
thinking and practice. The term social capital commonly refers to norms and networks 
that facilitate collective action (Woolcock and Narayan 2000: 226). It is believed that 
social networks based on shared norms, values, beliefs, knowledge and understanding 
can significantly enhance people’s capacity to organise in their own collective interest, 
co-operate to perform collective tasks and achieve mutual benefits. There are multiple 
levels at which social capital can be identified and measured. Thus one can talk about
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the degree of social capital of an individual or household, of a community or other 
socially defined group; or of a geographically or politically defined society (Narayan 
and Pritchett 2000: 279). Social capital provides an alternative framework for 
conceptualising participation in development projects and programmes. On the one 
hand, the availability of social capital is thought to be a necessary precondition for 
successful project outcomes. Thus many initiatives, such as group-based micro-finance 
schemes, community based infrastructure delivery projects or safety net targeting 
programmes, draw on existing stocks of social capital in order to enhance their 
development effectiveness. On the other hand, development interventions seek to build 
and strengthen networks of trust and reciprocity within and across communities as a
17means to improve poor people’s access to resources and services.
The literature on social capital is multifaceted, and the concept of social capital itself 
has been imbued with multiple meanings and connotations. This thesis does not intend 
to provide a comprehensive review of social capital theories and their critiques, but 
rather highlights specific conceptual understanding of social capital underpinning many 
community-driven projects. Social capital can denote resource that individuals have at 
their disposal for achieving their personal objectives. Thus social networks analysts 
(Burt 1992) equate social capital with individual connections and access to favourable 
personal networks. Other researchers such as Loury (1977), Bourdieu (1983) and 
Coleman (1988; 1990) refer to social capital as a set of resources and endowments 
inherent in families and communities that facilitate access to jobs, education and 
communal interaction. Coleman’s analysis of social capital bridges this concept of 
social capital as a personal resource with the current understanding of social capital as a 
public good. Thus according to Coleman (1990), diverse forms of social capital (trust 
and norms inherent in social structures) help individuals achieve not only their personal 
gains but also collective objectives. In his Making Democracy Work study Putnam 
(1993) further developed the concept of social capital as a public good. Putnam argues 
that high levels of social capital in the form of intermediary groups and associations can 
improve levels of democratic governance and economic prosperity.
17 Available from: < vyww.worldbank.org/povertv/scapital> [Accessed on 3 March 2001],
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Putnam’s (1993) analysis has greatly influenced the commonly accepted 
operationalisation of social capital in terms of norms of trust and reciprocity and 
‘networks of civic engagement’, measured as membership in and density of voluntary 
organisations, clubs, co-operatives and political parties. For Putnam, interpersonal trust 
is the key variable that facilitates societal co-operation, and hence it is the key element 
of social capital. The definition of trust used by Putnam stems from game theoretical 
assumptions, in which trust is an assessment by an individual of whether or not the 
behaviour of other individuals is trustworthy.18 This definition is based on the belief that 
expectations about other people’s behaviour influence how individuals choose to 
behave in a given situation (Gambetta 1988: 217; Krishna 2000: 75). Overlapping 
positive expectations about other individuals’ actions can lead to co-operation and 
collective action. According to Putnam, interpersonal relations based on norms of 
reciprocal exchange increase the level of trust and the likelihood of co-operation. 
Membership in ‘horizontal’ voluntary associations fosters norms of reciprocity and trust 
and promotes the transference of trust from one domain to another, hence increasing the 
level of generalised trust in a society.
There are considerable overlaps between the terms social capital and social exclusion. 
Narayan (1999: 5) suggests that “social groups and networks only work by including 
some and excluding others”. In analysing the ‘excluding’ aspects of social capital, many 
theorists of social capital draw upon Granovetter’s (1973) concept of the ‘strength of 
weak ties’. According to this theory, ‘strong ties’ within a group are important for the 
group’s cohesion and survival, but they may produce social fragmentation at a wider 
community level. It is the ‘weak ties’ linking different groups in a society that are 
indispensable for accessing opportunities and integration into a wider community. 
According to Putnam (1993), social networks created in horizontal associations produce 
‘weak’ ties that cut across social cleavages and foster wider co-operation. Following 
Gittel and Vidal (1998), Narayan (1999: 2) refers to primary social group solidarity as 
‘bonding’ social capital, and to the linkages between social groups as ‘bridging’ social 
capital. Narayan suggests that social inclusion requires “dense, though not necessarily 
strong, cross-cutting ties among groups” that would help them access resources, 
information and opportunities. This framework was further developed with the
18 Seminar with Robert Putnam organised by the LSE Social Capital Working Group, LSE, 19 May 2003.
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introduction of the notion of ‘linking’ social capital, which refers to ties of individuals 
to people in the position of authority, such as government representatives and private 
institutions (Grootaert et al 2004). In addition to the horizontal dimension of social 
capital, this concept introduces a vertical dimension, which refers to linkages to political 
resources and economic institutions across power differentials (Grootaert et al 2004: 4).
The conceptualisation and usage of social capital by development agencies has been 
much criticised. Fine (2001), for example, criticises the World Bank’s ‘romanticised’ 
view of social capital as the ‘missing link’. Thus social capital “fails to address properly 
either capital or the social; it tends to set aside issues of power and conflict; it 
compartmentalises capital into its economic and social components; and it places 
emphasis on civil society at the expense of state and politics” (137). Fine asserts that the 
introduction of the concept, which was meant to bring about engagement between 
economists and social scientists within the World Bank, does not seriously challenge the 
World Bank’s ‘economistic’ approach to development. Harriss (2002) argues that social 
capital ‘de-politicises development’ by obscuring issues of class politics, existing power 
relations and property rights. Harriss maintains that the current usage of the term by 
development agencies helps “represent problems that are rooted in differences of power 
and in class relations as purely technical matters that can be resolved outside the 
political arena” (Harriss 2002: 2). He contends that without focusing on political and 
redistributional issues, social capital is not a useful tool for making development 
policies more effective.
2.1.5 Collective Action
Community participation in mutually beneficial activities requires a concerted effort -  a 
collective action. The literature on collective action draws on public choice and game 
theories, and is often described as institutional rational choice approach (Olson 1965; 
Hardin 1982, 1995; Ostrom 1990, 1992; Ostrom et al 1993). It has primarily developed 
in the context of common pool resources, which include irrigation systems, grazing 
areas, inshore fisheries, forests and conservation parks. Decisions to co-operate in 
irrigation systems depend on a series of collective action problems determining who 
will share in the costs (for example, material and time costs related to construction and 
operation and maintenance (O&M)), how the benefits will be distributed, and the
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activities will be monitored and sanctioned to avoid opportunistic behaviour, such as 
free-riding, shirking and corruption (Ostrom 1990, 1992). It is possible to overcome 
collective action problems by developing operating strategies, rules and constitutions, 
i.e., by establishing local governance procedures. These ‘self-governance rules’ can help 
farmers effectively govern the use and O&M of the irrigation system. In particular, 
these rules are important for determining access to and allocation of water (who, when, 
where, and how can withdraw water); O&M responsibilities (who, when, where and 
how maintains the system); monitoring arrangements (who monitors the actions of 
irrigators and how); and sanctions (what rewards or sanctions will be assigned to those 
who obey or disobey the rules) (Ostrom 1990,1992; Kahkonen 1999).
Drawing on Coleman’s theoretical elaboration, Ostrom and other collective action 
theorists incorporated the notion of social capital in the framework of collective action 
(Ostrom 2000; Ostrom and Ahn 2001). It is thought that social capital can determine 
community capacity to effectively resolve collective action problems and successfully 
perform decentralised tasks. Social capital (defined in this literature in broad terms as 
shared knowledge, norms, rules and expectations about patterns of interactions) can 
facilitate co-ordination of activities, information sharing and collective decision-making 
and help diminish opportunistic behaviour and free-riding, reduce conflicts and 
maximise joint utility. Drawing on the existing social networks, conventions and norms 
of reciprocal relationships, local knowledge and practices, groups can be in a better 
position than government officials in developing and enforcing effective self- 
governance rules and complying with those rules in local projects. A number of studies 
in irrigation demonstrate that farmers can establish and enforce fair water allocation 
systems, effectively monitor service delivery, create mechanisms to prevent illegal use, 
share responsibility for the future O&M of project investments, and identify appropriate 
institutional arrangements to reduce local conflicts (Ostrom 1990, 1992; Tang 1992; 
Lam 1996,1998; Uphoff 1996; Kahkonen 1999).
The collective action literature is mostly concerned with the understanding of 
institutional foundations of self-governance, i.e., determining conditions that affect 
community capacities for self-governance. In addition to the Putnamian 
operationalisation of social capital in terms of trust/norms of reciprocity and networks/ 
civic engagement, it advances the importance of formal and informal rules or
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institutions as a third dimension of social capital (Ostrom and Ahn 2001: 6-10). 
Although this approach recognises the importance of macro level structures and patterns 
of governance, its main stress is on the institutional arrangements that establish rules, 
incentives systems and co-operation mechanisms within users’ organisations and 
communities. Being “mechanistic” in its essence (Shepherd 1998: 63), the collective 
action approach tends to neglect broader underlying social, economic and political 
factors in its analysis of collective action problems. Thus this approach often fails to 
explain when and how specific institutional arrangements can emerge and persist.
This section has reviewed the key concepts and theoretical debates that underpin 
community-driven initiatives. In particular, it has examined various meanings of 
participation and their implications for development projects and development 
outcomes. It has also discussed conceptual assumptions behind the notions of social 
capital and collective action. The next section reviews some of the key factors that 
affect design, implementation and outcomes of community-driven projects.
2.2 Participation and Project Design and Implementation
This section discusses key agency related factors and structural complexities that 
influence the design and implementation of community-driven projects. I reflect on 
these issues later when analysing the processes and outcomes of the ASIF micro­
projects in Chapter Eight and when interpreting and explaining the research findings in 
Chapter Ten.
2.2.1 External Agency’s Approach
This section examines factors associated with an external agency’s interpretation of the 
concept of participation and methodologies used for promoting community participation 
and capacity building.
Participation. Oakley (1991) emphasises two aspects that can have an impact on the 
outcomes of community-based projects. One is the agency’s understanding and 
operationalisation of the meaning of the term participation and the basic objective of the 
agency’s support for participation. The second is the methodology of participation,
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which stems from the specific interpretation of the concept of participation. This relates 
both to the formal methodologies employed by agencies and to the approach and style 
of work of the agency.
Whilst there is a “fairly broad consensus” around the concept of participation in donor 
rhetoric, the division appears when the concept is put into practice. Thus there are “two 
worlds of practice” (Oakley 1991: 269). There can often be a mismatch between the 
stated objectives and actual design and implementation. A project may appear to be 
participatory in the empowerment sense in its stated objectives, but it may not be 
systematic and rigorous because of the shallow conceptualisation of the term and the 
methodologies employed. Thus, participation in practice is often conceptualised in its 
narrow definition and employs limited methodologies for its promotion, and projects are 
largely task-based and functional in nature. In such projects, participation is limited to 
information sharing and consultation, rather than participation in decision-making or 
management.
Documented evidence suggests that many participatory projects achieved success when 
supporting agencies adopted a ‘learning process’ planning approach (Korten 1980; 
Krishna et al 1998: 20-22). In the learning process approach, planning evolves from the 
specific experience, needs and preferences of the local community (Korten 1980). This 
approach aims at building continuous dialogues between planners and beneficiaries and 
promoting shared understanding and consensus in the search of most appropriate 
strategy. It is contrasted with the ‘blueprint approach’, in which development action is 
driven by specified project goals, tasks and inputs, definite time-frame and order, and 
which assumes that development outcomes are “terminal” (Korten 1980: 497).
Capacity Building. Some of the key ingredients required for effective organisational 
capacity are resources, technical knowledge and social capital (World Bank 2002b: 18). 
The capacity of various groups to engage in community-driven activities can be highly 
variable. ‘Higher levels’ of participation such as decision-making and management 
require adequate level of skills, knowledge, experience and managerial capabilities 
(Gaventa and Valderrama 1999: 8). Thus some communities may lack the adequate 
organisational, managerial, proposal writing, fund raising, and accounting skills for 
complying with funding agency requirements and for effectively carrying out project
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design, implementation and evaluation related tasks. Different groups within 
communities may also be endowed with varying stocks of social capital, which can 
determine the degree and forms of co-operation and collective action. As part of their 
capacity building objective, many external interventions establish formal or informal 
organisational structures, which are believed to facilitate co-ordination of activities and 
serve as a vehicle for promoting community interests and objectives (Esman and Uphoff 
1984; Oakley 1991: 189; Uphoff 1996). Development projects typically offer specific 
training to local community groups and their leaders to enhance their skills and 
technical knowledge.
Community capacity building is an educational process. Oakley (1991: 194) 
distinguishes between two types of education: ‘education as information’ and 
‘education as awareness’. Education as information refers to informing people about a 
project and preparing them to participate in it within already defined parameters. 
Education as awareness seeks to involve people in a process of conscientisation, in 
which they are encouraged to understand, analyse, critically interpret issues that affect 
their lives and design their own solutions to their problems. This method builds upon 
the work of Paulo Freire (1970; 1974), which postulates that awareness created in the 
process of education can help poor people break patterns of dependency and become 
subjects of their own development. In current development practice, the educational and 
capacity building role of external agents is often referred to as ‘outreach’. Narayan 
(1995b) distinguishes between the ‘extension’ approach and the ‘empowerment’ 
approach to outreach. In the extension approach, field agents serve as channels of 
information and technical advice. In the empowerment approach, field agents serve as 
“facilitators, catalysts, and organizers for empowerment”, who can motivate and 
strengthen local groups to achieve self-reliance (Narayan 1995b: 21).
2.2.2 Complexity of Local Reality
There are challenges to the successful design and implementation of community-driven 
projects that are associated with structural and institutional relationships at the national 
and local level. For example, it is often difficult to cater to diverse interests and needs 
within a community, prevent elite capture, ensure inclusion of all social groups in
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development processes and create incentives and conditions for meaningful and 
sustainable community participation.
Defining Community. Many development projects tend to idealise communities as 
groups of people that are homogenous, lack conflict, and have similar beliefs, needs and 
preferences. Typically, this is not the case. Communities are composed of diverse 
individuals, with different degree of control over and access to economic resources and 
modes of production as well as possessing different social status, religious and cultural 
characteristics. Despite the commonalties in interests, different groups, households and 
individuals within a geographic community have a variety of criteria, preferences and 
priorities (Friedmann 1992: 7; Chambers 1997: 183-187; Cleaver 2001: 44-45). This 
heterogeneity of communities makes it difficult to reconcile various interests and 
increases the likelihood of social exclusion, conflicts, oppression or violence. 
Friedmann (1992: 7) argues that the scarcity of resources reinforces tension and 
conflicts within communities, “Each of the several social groups within a territorial 
community is likely to see its situation from its own perspective and contend over the 
same and always limited resources. Territorial communities are thus necessarily also 
political communities, rife with the potential for conflict”.
This poses difficulties for identifying project beneficiaries and allocating development 
resources. How can then the heterogeneity of community interests and preferences be 
taken into account? Should we involve all groups in a geographic community, including 
the well-to-do members? Who can be able to represent the whole community so as each 
group’s interests are taken into account? Should the local community be considered to 
be formal village councils, school boards and water users, or perhaps ethnic groups and 
traditional or religious leaders? Whaites (2002: 124), for example, suggests that the only 
community groups that should be supported by external donors are those that “span 
primordial identities” and “promote the idea of association in a way which cuts across 
any continuing divisions, such as local geography, gender, and even political loyalty”. 
One can argue that most communities are defined by their members within specific 
geographic, socio-economic and political boundaries, and resource allocation based on 
the criteria of inclusiveness may leave out many needy communities.
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Another important question is who defines the community. A World Bank review of 
sixty CDD projects in Central Asia (World Bank 2002a: 10) distinguishes between the 
‘project concept’ of community and ‘demand-driven concept’ of community. The study 
concludes that the view of community adopted in most studied projects was largely 
driven by donors and reflected the needs of the project (e.g., community was defined as 
users of infrastructure or services). The study suggests that the concept of community 
must emerge from the community itself and reflect the actual social, political and 
governance structures and boundaries of the community.
Local Accountability. Community participation requires a representative process, i.e. 
community interests and preferences need to be represented by an agency, which may 
include local government officials, other formal and informal leaders or development 
committees. This raises the issue of accountability. Accountability is defined as “the 
obligation of power holders to account for or take responsibility for their actions” 
(World Bank 2003b: l) .19 Due to the lack of close monitoring over the local processes, 
local communities may have little accountability to central authorities; there may also 
be little accountability of the local leaders/elites towards the public (Paul 1992; Ostrom 
et al 1993: 65-67, 96; Litvack et al 1998; Manor 1999; Conning and Kevane 1999). 
There are no automatic guarantees that local leaders who live and interacts with the 
local population will be any more or less accountable to or representative of local 
community interests than a central government official.
Weak accountability can give rise to the possibility of ‘capture’, in which local 
leaders/elites can misuse public resources, appropriate project or service benefits and 
engage in rent-seeking. Decisions about the allocation of local goods and services can 
be made without much regard for the desires of the powerless and disadvantaged 
community members. The local elite/leaders may represent narrow interests and exclude 
individuals and households who do not belong to the elite or dominant groups from 
participation in development processes and accessing development benefits. Thus, a 
local agent may express the preferences and act in the interests of the elite and powerful 
community members, the dominant caste, ethnic or religious group. The possibility of 
capture is equally pertinent with regard to formal authorities as well as informal
19 Newell and Bellour (2002) provide a comprehensive overview of the uses and applications of the term 
accountability in development discourses and practices.
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community leaders and development committees elected by community members as 
their as representatives. The extent of local accountability largely depends on the 
community heterogeneity, the degree of inequality and social stratification, and the 
strength of democratic orientation of the representative institutions.
Social Exclusion. Societal institutions (including state, law, religion, kinship and 
family), social structures and norms and policies shape the power structures in a society 
and thus play crucial role in excluding individuals from full participation in the social, 
economic, cultural and political life of the societies (Gore and Figueiredo 1997: 10-11). 
Given differences in resources and power, people do not participate in development 
decision-making equally, nor do they automatically benefit from development 
initiatives. Chambers (1995: 39) notes that participatory projects and programmes often 
fail to identify and involve the poorest of the poor and other marginalised social groups 
in participatory processes. He warns that these people often live far from centre, may 
not be easily reached, they are often weak, voiceless, and can be easily left out of 
empowering processes. Such projects can end up reinforcing the status quo through 
stratification by ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religion, cultural traditions, as 
those with the power may continue to maintain it by influencing the decisions that are 
made. Thus, one of the challenging questions in development projects is how to ensure 
that the poorest and marginalised participate in development processes and have access 
to development benefits.
Participation Costs and Incentives. Participation incurs specific costs and may not be 
affordable to the poor. Oakley (1991: 13) notes that the preoccupation with their 
survival consumes most of the time of the poor people and does not leave any time for 
participation. Many community-driven projects require mandatory community cash or 
in-kind contributions which may prohibit poor communities or community members 
from participation. In some cases, the poorest do not possess enough information on 
how specific projects or activities can benefit them. It is thought that for community 
action to take place, the perceived benefits of a collective action must be greater than 
the perceived costs (Rondinelli 1991: 419-421; Ostrom et al 1993). Immediate material 
benefits are thought to be instrumental in driving local participation in projects. Some of 
the incentives include benefits from project activities (cash and time savings, improved 
access to services, increased production and income), moral satisfaction, position of
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influence and leadership, and reduced conflicts (Narayan 1997: 10). Cleaver (2001: 48) 
argues that personal psychological motivations, for example, the need for recognition, 
respect or purpose, may be equally important as material benefits.
Sustainability of Participation. The question of sustainability of participation over 
time is important. Project-driven participation may only work in the short term. A 
critical factor for sustaining local participation is the availability of resources and assets. 
Oakley (1991: 18) suggests that “the externally motivated development projects 
frequently fail to sustain themselves once the initial level of project support or inputs 
either diminish or are withdrawn”. Community groups and organisations may not be 
able to secure access to financial resources in order to carry out local initiatives and 
pursue organisational objectives. Binswanger and Aiyar (2003) maintain that in order to 
ensure true empowerment and to scale-up CDD, communities and local governments 
must have stable and continuous flow of funds from central government and a local 
revenue base. They go on to argue that “short-lived donor programs and ad hoc central 
grants cannot lead to empowerment” (Binswanger and Aiyar 2003: 11).
Another question concerns what the realistic scope of authentic participation should be. 
It is questionable whether there can be a total control of local people over local affairs 
and equally active involvement of all members of the community. Hardiman (1986: 65) 
maintains, “It is a myth to assume that everybody wants to be actively involved in 
decision-making, or even in the hard work of implementation. The majority of people 
are usually content to accept the decisions and actions of others so long as their interests 
are served”. Midgley (1986a: 36) asserts that achieving ‘permanent activism’, i.e., 
indefinite and total involvement of communities in political affairs is unrealistic. Oakley 
and Marsden (1984: 18) argue that achieving a “totally participatory society” is not 
possible. In my view, participation as empowerment does not necessarily imply 
permanent participation of all individuals, but rather it must be understood as the 
creation of structural opportunities that enable the poor to exercise effective influence 
over the issues that affect their lives and benefit from development.
This section has focused on some of the key agency and context related factors that 
influence the design, implementation and outcomes of community-driven projects. The 
following two sections of this chapter discuss how civil society and community
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participation in the former Soviet Union have been understood and operationalised in 
the existing literature and development projects.
2.3 Community Participation and Civil Society
This section discusses the concept of civil society and its current application by Western 
donors. It demonstrates the existing normative and organisational bias of the concept 
that has translated into domination of the Western model of civil society in development 
thinking and practices. Section 2.4 of this chapter discusses how this has contributed to 
the conceptual rigidity and misperceptions about the existing forms and manifestations 
of civil society and community participation in the former Soviet Union. This section 
suggests that the study of civil society and participation has been compartmentalised 
between disciplines, and the concepts themselves have been stripped of their key 
ingredients.
Civil society is defined in this study as the autonomous social sphere in which
individuals and social groups can articulate and pursue their individual and collective
interests and express their identities. The theories of civil society are rooted in the
writings of such political philosophers as Adam Ferguson, Antonio Gramsci, G W F
Hegel, John Locke, Thomas Paine and Alexis de Tocqueville. Civil society has been
predominantly a subject of scrutiny for political theorists.20 The concept of civil society
was re-invigorated and became an inseparable part of the contemporary reality and
public discourse with the East European revolutions of 1989. It is not accidental that the
term civil society re-emerged at that time as an antidote to the totalitarian communist
state. The intellectuals and activists in Eastern Europe who nurtured the idea of civil
society were concerned about changing the relationship between the society and the
state, calling for the creation of an autonomous and self-organising society that could
1 1counterbalance the totalitarian state. In its theoretical underpinnings, civil society is 
conceived as a form of political and social organisation that has the potential to limit the 
power of the state, refine its actions and enhance individual freedoms and interests.
20 See, for example, Seligman (1992), Cohen and Arato (1992), Gellner (1994), and Keane (1988).
21 See, for example, Michnik (1985), Havel (1985), and Konrad (1984).
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Since the mid 1990s, the concept of civil society has acquired new strength when used 
by development agencies and donors. Thus a so called ‘mainstream’ (Howell and 
Pearce 2001) or ‘neo-liberal’ (Freizer 2004) concept of civil society was advanced by 
development agencies and donors as a major developmental paradigm. In its practical, 
organisational form, this idea is represented by the Tocquevillian model of civil society 
based on the idea of civic engagement and independent associational life (Howell and 
Pearce 2001: 42-44). Alexis de Tocqueville was the first to describe and praise the U.S. 
model of civic engagement in the public arena through free associations of citizens as a 
defence against despotism of the state and a guarantee of individual freedoms and 
interests. The ‘mainstream’ notion of civil society has both political and social 
objectives (Van Rooy and Robinson 1998). The political mission aims to promote good 
governance and democratic culture, and foster the rule of law and human rights through 
supporting local NGOs, civic associations, think tanks, advocacy and human rights 
groups, media and research and educational institutions. The social objective has been 
promoted by development agencies in order to enhance social and economic 
development and poverty reduction. Given the weak state capacity in many transition 
countries, NGOs have been seen as alternative mechanisms for channelling 
development assistance and delivering public goods and services that the state could no 
longer supply in an efficient and effective manner (Mandel 2001: 281).
Theories of civil society have a normative bias, and “tend to be used in moral and 
normative ways, confusing what is with what should be” (Van Rooy 1998: 29). Such 
“normative lenses” often impede identification of “all relevant events, actors and 
process because we are not looking for them”. In addition, theories of civil society have 
an organisational bias (Van Rooy 1998: 29). They are often preoccupied with 
organisations, without taking into account the broader context within which they 
develop and function. As a consequence, the mainstream approach prescribes the 
Western or the U.S. model of civil society, and it often rejects or ignores other forms of 
social life and social organisation that exist in various ethnic, cultural and regional 
contexts. This view overlooks the ‘alternative’ (Howell and Pearce 2001), ‘communal’ 
(Freizer 2004) or ‘post-modern’ (Kaldor 2003) forms of civil society - important ways 
in which people in non-Westem societies organise and pursue their interests. Howell 
and Pearce (2001: 118-199) maintain that the mainstream model assumes that there is
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only one civil society in the world, and that it is represented by the U.S. or 
Tocquevillian vision of civil society with its idea of self-association.
Values and networks of mutual support and solidarity and informal associations have 
historically played an important social function in non-Westem societies. Hann (1996), 
for example, suggests that ethnographic studies of social networks and interpersonal 
practices can reveal that civil society was always present in socialist societies of Eastern 
Europe. He argues against narrow preoccupation with the dominant Western model of 
civil society, and warns against using the Western models of civil society as “universal 
templates" (Hann 1996: 24). There is a growing literature documenting various 
communal forms of social organisation and processes of civic life in Central Asia, 
Africa, India and the Islamic world.22
There has been very little experience sharing and cross-fertilisation between political 
scientists, development specialists, economists and anthropologists, who have studied 
the issues of civil society and participation in the former Soviet Union (Babajanian et al 
2005). This separation reflects the divide between political and social conceptions of 
participation that exists in theory and practice globally.23 This has contributed to the 
rigid and superficial understanding of the concept and the substance of civil society in 
the region. The term civil society used by political scientists and transitologists 
overlooks important ways in which people at the local level organise and pursue their 
interests. It ignores the importance of the community and household as forms of social 
organisation. The dominant focus of political scientists specialising in post-Soviet 
countries has been to study processes of ‘democratisation’, political institutions and 
formal organisations. At the same time, development specialists have been reluctant to 
employ the concept of civil society with its emphasis on political participation in 
designing projects and programmes in the region. They have preferred to talk about 
‘community development’ and ‘social capital’, and conceived the concept of
22 See, for example, Roy (2000), and Earle (2004) on civil society in Central Asia; Varshney (2002) on 
civil society in India; Bayart (1993), and Comaroff and Comaroff (1999) on civil society in Africa; 
Kamali (1998) and Sajoo (2002) on civil society in Islamic societies.
23 See, for example, Gaventa and Valderrama (1999) and Gaventa (2002). Gaventa (2002: 4) notes that 
political issues such as accountability, legitimate representation, rights education and political 
mobilisation have been “underplayed” in the community participation literature. Conversely, the political 
participation literature has insufficiently addressed issues o f local knowledge, participatory processes and 
forms o f engagement by marginalised groups.
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participation in neutral terms as participation in social and economic development.24 
This has translated into the compartmentalisation of development objectives in 
practice.25
2.4 Participation and Civil Society in the Former Soviet Union
This section discusses how civil society and community participation in the former 
Soviet Union have been conceptualised and understood in the existing literature and 
development projects. It then provides a review of the literature on the existing forms of 
social organisation and participation in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. The section 
maintains that the existing forms of participation and civic life in post-Soviet countries 
are often ignored or considered ‘uncivil’. It offers explanations for why the existing 
forms of participation, often studied as ‘social networks’, are not normally classified as 
part of civil society. Conceptual clarity and accurate understanding about local 
institutions in the former Soviet Union have immediate repercussions for the design and 
implementation of development policies and projects. In Chapter Seven, the thesis tests 
the existing preconceptions about community participation in the former Soviet Union 
through the examination of the fieldwork data, and provides analysis on the substance, 
origins and limits of the existing forms of participation and local institutions in post- 
Soviet Armenia.
2.4.1 Preconceptions about Post-Soviet Civil Society
Most of the existing literature studying post-socialist and post-Soviet civil society is 
concerned with the mainstream or Western model. The predominant view is that civil 
society in post-Soviet countries is weak and underdeveloped as the realm of voluntary 
associations remains limited. Civil society in post-Soviet countries is usually 
operationalised in terms of two indicators: levels of civic engagement and interpersonal 
trust.26 It is most common to measure social capital and civil society by studying
24 The reluctance to explicitly engage with political issues has partly to do with the World Bank’s 
obligation stipulated in its Articles of Agreement to maintain a politically neutral stance.
25 For example, Earle (2005a) based on her research in Kyrgyzstan notes the duality of objectives of 
USAID, which on one hand supports democratisation and political agenda through civil society 
strengthening programmes, but remains highly apolitical in its community development projects.
26 See, for example, Marsh (2000), Raiser et al (2001), Badescu (2003), Uslaner (2003), and Howard 
(2003).
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membership and participation in associations and groups and measuring levels of 
generalised trust (as opposed to particularised trust). The World Values Survey 
(conducted in 1990-93 and in 1995-97) measured participation in voluntary
77organisations, people’s interest in politics and levels of generalised trust. According to 
its results, total associational membership and levels of generalised trust in transition 
countries are almost half those in the OECD countries.28 Using statistical data on 
organisational membership, Howard (2003) concludes that the low rate of participation 
in voluntary organisations indicates the ‘weakness’ of civil society in post-socialist 
countries.
The ‘cultural’ legacies of the repressive communism regime, such as attitudinal norms 
and behaviour patterns, are often cited as one of the main obstacles to civic participation 
in post-communism transition. Smolar (1996: 33), for example, concludes that “the 
shakiness of independent organizations, including political parties [in Central and 
Eastern Europe], suggests the lack of a culture of free collective activity”. He argues 
that “communism actually bred atomized, amoral cynics good at doubletalk and 
“working the system,” but not at effective enterprise” (33). It is thought that the 
repression of independent organisations by the communist regime created ‘distrust’ of 
people in representative institutions, which impedes the development of new democratic 
institutions in post-communist era. Raiser et al (2001: 4) argue that that communism 
created distrust in public institutions and “left as legacy the perception that while each 
individual might profit from informal social capital, private returns to civic participation 
and other forms of “formal social capital” would be low”. Howard (2003) explains the 
low levels of organisational activity in terms of people’s mistrust of organisations in 
communist times that was carried over into the post-socialist period, by the ‘persistence 
of private friendship networks’ and by the ‘increased passivity’ and ‘disengagement’ of 
the population disappointed in post-communist reality.
As civil society is equated with NGOs and formal associations, any indigenous forms of 
social organisation that have a different nature and manifestation are either rejected as
27 The World Values Survey measured generalised trust by asking a question: “Generally speaking, would 
you say most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”
Cited in Raiser et al (2001). It is notable that despite the divergence in these indicators, the indices of 
‘civic-mindedness’ and altruism in transition and OECD countries were not found to be significantly 
different (a fact that has passed unnoticed by most analysts of civil society).
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‘uncivic’ or ignored. Huttenbach (1995), for example, asserts that the countries of the 
South Caucasus lack any traditions of civic engagement and associational activity, and 
the prospects for a genuine civil society there are rather bleak. Analysing the rise of 
nationalism and ethnic conflict in the South Caucasus, he concludes that the civic 
dimension is subdued by ‘ethno-nationalistic’ politics. He asserts that “even in Armenia, 
where there is a slightly more mature political and social sphere...society tends to be 
generally passive, unless whipped up by demagogic means” (Huttenbach 1995: 364). 
He views the principles of communal organisation in these countries in negative terms 
as based on “kinship, religious communalism, clan loyalty, ethnicity and paternalistic 
politics” (Huttenbach 1995: 339). Huttenbach argues that civil society is an intrinsically 
European phenomenon, and he rejects the “so-called Asian civil society based on non- 
European traditions and values’ as a ‘non-category’” (Huttenbach 1995: 330). Similarly, 
Carley (1995: 292) applies the Western notion of civil society to the Central Asian 
countries and argues that the Soviet legacies have resulted in the “effective non­
existence of civil society” in Central Asia. Howard (2003) in his study of civil societies 
in East Germany and Russia argues against broadening the definition of civil society to 
include various forms of social organisation and practices in non-Westem countries. He 
maintains that this will only “dilute” and “confuse” the concept of civil society (Howard 
2003: 49).
CDD initiatives apply the Western normative framework in their analysis of post-Soviet 
communities. There are a number of preconceptions about the existing ‘communal’ 
manifestations of post-Soviet civil society that are prevalent among development 
professionals working in post-Soviet countries, and they often serve as a basis for 
designing CDD and other community-driven projects. These assumptions also 
frequently come up in discussions at conferences. A commonplace assumption is that 
due to Soviet legacies, local institutions in post-Soviet countries are weak and 
underdeveloped, and that post-Soviet citizens are distrustful and atomised. Implicit in 
this assumption is the idea that the cultural and normative orientations of citizens, i.e. 
the ‘Soviet mentality’ factor, present a serious obstacle to developing active self- 
organising communities. Hence there is a need to build new institutions in the region. 
CDD initiatives aim to design (or redesign) the existing communal institutions 
according to the Western model of citizen participation (Figure 2.1). Some of the main 
assumptions in the current thinking can be summarised as follows:
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> Ideological restrictions and domination by the Communist party enforced citizen 
passivity and an expectation that authorities should be responsible for 
community welfare. Paternalistic attitudes still prevail and prohibit people from 
taking initiatives and formulating collective solutions to problems. People 
expect the state to deliver important services and provide jobs to the population.
> People do not like collective action. The rhetoric of participation and collective 
action was embedded in the communist ideological and moral context, and most 
people resent it. People participate in collective action only when ‘they do not 
have any other means’ to solve their problems.
> People are only interested in their narrow issues and are not concerned about the 
common or community good. There is very little altruism and solidarity in post­
socialist communities.
> There are very few formal groups and associations. When people take part in the 
economic and social life of their communities, their participation is mostly 
informal. This informal nature of participation is regarded as a constraint.
The World Bank’s CDD Strategy Note on ECA countries (World Bank 2000a: 2) 
suggests that the legacy of the authoritarianism and centralised planning system 
negatively affected “the attitude of the population towards collective action”. A World 
Bank presentation (World Bank 2000b: 18) on community development in the ECA 
region maintains that “successful examples of autonomous local action are few” and 
that “people still depend on the state for resources and guidance”. It goes on to argue 
that in most ECA countries “people lack the trust in one another that is needed to foster 
community action groups” (World Bank 2000b: 18). This is how an agenda setting 
World Bank study on poverty and inequality in the ECA region (World Bank 200Id: 
199) describes post-socialist communities,
29 This power point presentation posted on the World Bank’s official website summarises opportunities 
and challenges for CDD in the ECA region.
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In fact, the existence of communities in transition economies is questionable given the 
deliberate and often heavy-handed attempts by the state to crush local identities and 
solidarities. Numerous qualitative studies undertaken in ECA countries suggest that while 
people are members of many intersecting and locally based social networks (of work 
colleagues, neighbours, and kin), few identity with an abstract ‘community’ or 
demonstrate much commitment to furthering the good of this community. In fact, many 
people view with deep suspicion appeals to support the ‘collective good’.
The World Bank’s CDD Strategy Note for Armenia (World Bank 2001b) maintains that 
the Soviet rule enforced “citizen passivity” and an expectation that authorities or 
external donors should be responsible for community welfare in Armenia. The Strategy 
Note argues that the notion of community in post-Soviet countries, and in Armenia, in 
particular, is “ambiguous, even misleading” (World Bank 2001b: 2):
Decades of central planning, top-down, authoritarian political rule, and the atomization of 
society weakened broader solidarities. At the same time, endemic shortages of goods and 
services encouraged an ‘economy of favours’ within strong social networks o f relatives, 
colleagues, neighbours, and friends. Beyond their loyalty to these networks, people 
demonstrated relatively little concern to the welfare o f ‘society’ in the abstract.
Figure 2.1: Conceptualisation o f Local Institutions in CDD Projects and Programmes in ECA
Post-Soviet Institutions
Trust is limited to family, friendship and 
relatives (bonding social capital) and does not 
extend to the society as a whole (no ‘weak’ ties 
or bridging social capital).
Civic Institutions
Trust extends beyond the limits of family and 
kin relationships to the whole community/ 
society (bridging social capital); and family/ 
kinship ties do not preclude community-wide 
ties.
Social capital mostly serves individual/private 
interests and rarely public interests.
People are distrustful and opportunistic, and 
achieving collective action is difficult.
Limited citizen participation in formal and 
informal groups and associations.
Reliance on the state, informal social networks 
and often illegal practices in solving individual 
and collective goals.
Social capital serves not only narrow 
individual but also collective/public goals.
High levels of generalised trust make 
collective action and co-operation possible.
Citizens participate in formal and informal 
groups and associations to pursue their 
objectives and obtain goods and services.
Co-operation and partnerships with authorities 
(linking social capital) instead of reliance on 
authorities.
Practices are based on the rule of law; and the 
existing informal practices are not illegal or 
exploitative.
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Thus one of the objectives of CDD is seen as promoting institutional change through 
bottom-up interventions at the local level. In particular, based on the assumption that 
community level institutions and social capital are weak, CDD initiatives are aimed at 
building community institutions and strengthening interpersonal relations, as part of 
their empowerment and capacity-building objective. The World Bank’s CDD Strategy 
Note on ECA countries (World Bank 2000a: 2) maintains that there is “an urgent need 
to find new [social] organisation and new forms of interaction between citizens”. Thus 
the task set out by CDD in post-Soviet countries is to change the ‘Soviet mentality’ of 
‘passive and apathetic’ communities, promote active and engaged citizens and ‘civic’ 
forms of participation in the post-Soviet countries (Figure 2.1).
2.4.2 Participation and Social Networks in the Soviet Union
There is extensive evidence that both associational and communal forms of civil society 
existed in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, although their forms and manifestations 
did not resemble the Western model of civil society. Associational civil society in the 
Soviet Union existed but it was “illegal or semilegal” (Shlapentokh 1989: 9). The 
existing formal organisations and associations (such as the party, the trade unions, the 
Young Communist League (Komsomol) and others) were controlled by the authoritarian 
state and were part of the Soviet political structure. Any independent civic associations 
or activities were seen as a threat to the power of the state. This contributed to the 
decline of formal associational civil society. At the same time, as Shlapentokh suggests, 
there were a number of informal ways through which citizens participated in public 
domain -  for example, protest letters, dissemination o f suppressed literature (samizdat), 
organised actions and political gatherings, bard movements, informal or dissident 
movements and support for political activists and dissidents. Shlapentokh (2001: 40) 
maintains that the Soviet state and the party actively encouraged ‘collectivism’ through 
collective units (kollektivi) at work places (factories, collective farms, schools, and 
hospitals). State propaganda reinforced the importance of altruism, friendship, solidarity 
and collective interests over individualist values through media and popular culture. 
Shlapentokh argues that ‘collectivism’ remains an important social value for most 
Russians, and many people are nostalgic for the past times when collectivism was much 
appreciated by most members of society.
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It is thought that the state domination did not stop public organisations from serving 
civic functions. Rigby (1991; 1992) suggests that civil society in the Soviet Union 
existed even during Stalinism, and the domination of the communist state did not 
preclude development of civic associations and civic culture. Rigby notes that although 
the voluntary or public organisations (<obshestvennie organizatsii) officially followed 
the party policies and belonged to the state, they represented alternative social forms to 
state organisations. Through these organisations people often articulated their own 
interests and often contradicted the official line. According to Rigby (1992: 19), the 
state was unable to fully control people’s opinions and behaviours and “a covert market 
of ideas” flourished in the Soviet Union. Earle (2005b) examines different types of 
public organisations and associations, such as trade unions, consumer co-operatives, 
women’s committees, foundations, and various professional associations, established 
during the Soviet period in Central Asia. She maintains that despite the control of the 
authoritarian state, these associations had a significant impact upon social relations and 
served important welfare functions. Some of these associations continue to be 
influential in today’s Central Asia, by performing many civil society functions whilst 
part of the state in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, or having established themselves as 
independent organisations in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
In addition to the unofficial associational civil society, civic life in the Soviet Union 
concentrated in informal social networks (Box 2.1). Both Shlapentokh and Rigby 
explicitly include in their definition of Soviet civil society the whole sphere of 
interpersonal and social relations and the so-called ‘shadow economy’. Informal social 
networks based on relations of trust and reciprocity were an important social space 
through which individuals and groups could pursue their concerns in the absence of 
other legitimate avenues. Lomnitz (1988) maintains that informal social networks in the 
Soviet Union were an important power base for the allocation of scarce resources, the 
opening up of new economic and social opportunities and collective pooling against 
social risks.30 Informal networks also provided citizens with collective security against 
possible threats from the formal structure of the state. Lomnitz argues that the informal 
networks in the Soviet Union were a result of the malfunctioning of the Soviet
30 The official wages in the public sector were rather low and could not provide households with a 
sufficient income to cover all basic needs (Atkinson and Micklewright 1992: 241). The socialist planning 
system, described as ‘shortage economy’ by Komai (1992: 233), produced chronic shortages o f essential 
goods and services and was unable to fully meet consumer demand.
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bureaucratic systems that failed to satisfy social requirements. Thus these networks 
were an ‘adaptive mechanism’ that attempted to compensate for the inefficiencies of the 
formal system.
The literature on social networks distinguishes between friendship and solidarity groups 
and the so called blat networks. Shlapentokh (1989) describes the important role the 
relations of friendship and social connections played in sharing information, providing 
psychological and emotional support, solving problems and helping in obtaining goods 
and services that were not easily accessible. Ledeneva (1998) describes in detail the 
‘economy of favours’ -  informal blat networks in the Soviet Union used by people to 
gain access to institutional resources, obtain goods and services, secure their civil rights 
and influence decision-making. These networks extended friendship and kinship ties, 
and were based on loose social connections and reciprocal ties through which people 
could obtain benefits.
Officially, private sector activities were not allowed in the Soviet Union, however, a 
private sector was established and nourished in the civic sphere. The illegal private 
sector, the ‘shadow’ or ‘second’ economy included provision of technical and 
professional services to private individuals and organisations (for example, through 
private construction teams), and underground production of consumer goods (Grossman 
1977). Katsenelinboigen (1977) describes six types of ‘coloured’ markets of varying 
degrees of legality, which complimented each other and provided Soviet citizens with 
supplementary income and essential goods and services. Various forms of bribery are 
commonly associated with the Soviet informal economy (Grossman 1977; Simis 1982). 
Informal payments, gifts and bribes were frequently used by Soviet citizens as a means 
to pursue both legitimate and illegitimate objectives. The shadow economy was 
especially well developed in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
31 Similar arguments have been made in relation to developing countries. For example, De Soto (1989: 
133) argues that the emergence of a massive informal sector in Peru is due to the inefficiency of public 
institutions. He maintains that “Peruvians’ decisions to conduct their activities informally are in large 
measure the result o f a rational... evaluation of the cost o f formality”. This high ‘cost of formality’ is 
determined by the weakness of the rule of law, and is manifested in difficulties for ordinary people to 
establish businesses, engage in trade and access formal housing, land, and transport.
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The informal or shadow economy was not simply a sphere of illegal economic activity. 
Mars and Altman (1983; 1987) in their study of the informal economy in Georgia 
maintain that the shadow economy in Georgia was deeply entrenched in the Georgian 
cultural and social structures and value system. Strong networks based on trust, 
reciprocity and obligation, together with existing traditional Georgian values such as a 
sense of competition and risk-taking, formed the basis upon which informal activities 
were organised in Georgia. On the other hand, the opportunity to engage in 
entrepreneurial activities and achieve material prosperity was an important way of 
reasserting social and cultural values (e.g., social status and prestige) and expressing 
gender identities (e.g., masculinity).
There are several studies documenting the communal forms of civic organisation in 
Central Asia. Roy (2000) argues that the communist territorial and administrative 
structure and ideology did not uproot the existing solidarity groups and social 
organisation in Central Asia. The traditional structures were co-opted into the new 
social structure. Roy maintains that the existing solidarity groupings translated and 
recomposed into the Soviet kolkhoz (collective farms) structures. The kolkhoz became 
the sphere which mediated social needs and interests of its members, helped them to 
resolve problems and protect against risks. According to Roy (2000: 90-91), the kolkhoz 
was a “socio-economic community”, and “a place of residence, a society”.
Earle (2004) describes various pre-Soviet and Soviet practices and forms of social 
organisation in Kyrgyzstan, including ashar (community voluntary labour), aksakals 
(community elderly), and domkoms (home committees) that continue to be influential 
social institutions during the transition period. Perhaps the most prominent civic 
institution in Central Asia is mahalla in Tajikistan. Mahallas have existed in Tajikistan 
from the pre-Soviet times, and they are considered “a historical example of effective 
Tajik local self-governance” (Freizer 2004: 17). Mahallas are voluntary structures that 
bring together people living on the same territory to pursue their common interests. 
Mahallas perform various functions such as provision of support to the vulnerable, 
delivery of local law and services, mobilisation of people and resources for voluntary 
community works (hashar) and organisation of ceremonial and social events.
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In pre-Soviet rural Armenia, the main social institutions were centred around the family, 
the village and the Armenian Church. Kilboume Matossian (1962) maintains that the 
Soviet regime regarded the traditional Armenian family as a potential source of 
resistance to the regime and as a ‘backward’ institution. The state policies were 
designed to transform the traditional family and to develop loyalties outside the family. 
Collectivisation and the new kolkhoz village organisation contributed to the 
fragmentation of the extended Armenian family. The large landholdings, which were 
necessary to maintain the extended family, were fragmented and distributed as 
household plots among the collective farmers. The kolkhoz replaced the traditional 
village organisation. The regime encouraged participation in Komsomol, trade unions 
and various public associations, such as professional associations, women’s committees 
(kinbazhin) and sports clubs.
These policies, however, did not completely destroy the extended family as a social 
institution in Soviet Armenia. Kilboume Matossian (1962: 183) suggests that sometimes 
“the collective farm family only pretended to split up, but continued in fact to function 
as a unit”. She also suggests that family solidarity in Armenia remained strong, and 
members of extended families continued to support each other and pursue common 
objectives by pooling resources. The role of the Church, however, was significantly 
weakened, and most of its political, social, economic and educational functions were 
suspended by the Soviet regime. Platz (1995) suggests that kinship (azg) as a social 
institution remains strong in post-Soviet Armenia. She describes the so called 
‘Armenian way’ (haykakan dzev) of getting things done, in which kinship provides a 
powerful means for obtaining benefits and expressing Armenian national identity. 
According to Platz, kinship and the state in post-Soviet Armenia are often interrelated 
and overlapping, and that “[KJinship pervades state structure, as much as the state has 
pervaded the family” (Platz 1995: 4).
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B ox 2.1: Ways o f  Getting Things Done in the Soviet Union
> Reliance on the state: based on universal welfare rights.
>  Mutual help and exchange networks: based on kinship, affection and friendship.
>  Blat exchange and reciprocity: based on diffuse social connections, friendship and 
reciprocal exchange.
>  Informal or shadow economy: participation in unofficial private sector economic 
activities; bribery and informal payments; and appropriation of state property.
2.4.3 Post-Soviet Social Networks
Most Soviet informal social networks continued their existence in the post-Soviet era, 
although in modified and reconfigured shape and forms. However, these networks are 
not usually considered to be part of the post-Soviet civil society or civic space. One can 
think of two explanations for why post-Soviet networks are not normally classified as 
civil. The first is linked with the conceptual dominance of the mainstream model of civil 
society. Soviet networks emerged as a form of social organisation against the 
inefficiencies of the Soviet state. It is believed that after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the democratisation of the public sphere, reliance on formal groups and associations 
should be the natural state of organisation of a democratic society. In his study of social 
capital in Russia, Rose (1998; 2000) maintains that the distinguishing feature of a 
‘modem’ society (in the Weberian sense) is the dominance of formal organisations and 
institutionalised collective action. Rose (2000: 42) argues that modem networks are 
characterised by a “generic reliance on the market, belonging to a formal organisation, 
turning to the government for help in dealing with a family problem, or being an 
opinion leader”. Rose considers informal networks, i.e., personalised face-to-face 
associations of people in villages or urban neighbourhoods as an attribute of a ‘pre­
modem’ society. Furthermore, Rose describes the reliance of most Russians on blat, 
connections, and corruption in ‘getting things done’ as ‘anti-modem’ tactics. He 
maintains that “what is normal in Russia is not what is normal in a modem society” 
(Rose 2000: 52). Similarly, Raiser (1998) argues that developing a ‘modem’ market
32 The ‘path-dependency’ and continuity of socialist networks was first examined by Grabher and Stark 
(1997); and Bruszt and Stark (1998) with regard to the issue of restructuring of state-owned property and 
the formation of new business networks. For more discussion on the continuity of Soviet institutional 
legacies in Russia see Segbers (2001).
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economy in post-socialist countries requires transcending beyond the existing networks 
based on family and kinship ties and strengthening generalised trust.
The second argument is that there is an implicit contradiction between the negative 
‘uncivie’ nature of socialist networks and the ethical idea of civility, which continues 
to be a core normative component of the mainstream notion of civil society and an 
important objective of democratic institution building in post-Soviet states. The Soviet 
social networks have been mostly described and characterised in relation to the means 
and strategies they employed for achieving their ends, for example, reliance on 
personalised relations, bribery and breaking the law. These networks often act in their 
individual interest or self-interest at the expense of the public or common good. They 
undermine the legitimacy of the state, as they do not constructively engage with it, but 
subvert and co-opt it. According to Ledeneva (1998), the distinguishing feature of blat 
networks was that they were highly personalised, regulated by unwritten rules, parasitic 
and exploitative of the state resources. Ledeneva (2001: 73) does not consider these as 
spheres of public action, “The networks of mutual help and informal exchange 
developed under the Soviet regime could hardly be considered as embryos of ‘civil 
society’ due to their state-dependency and exploitative use of the state”.
There has been growing literature describing the negative nature and impact of post­
socialist informal networks on democratic institution building and economic 
development. Skapska (1997: 154) uses the term “familial egoism” in her description of 
informal networks in Poland. She argues that these networks are “narrow and egoistic” 
and pursue private interests at the expense of common public interests. Sajo (1998) 
maintains that the clientelistic social networks remaining from socialist times are 
responsible for the existing structural corruption in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
literature on business networks describes the initial dominance of business organisations 
based on ‘old boys networks’ of managers of old state enterprise and members of 
socialist nomenklatura.34 A lot of attention has been devoted to elite or power networks, 
for example, to particularistic and often parochial relations between bureaucratic and 
political elites with oligarchic business and economic interests and even criminal
33 See, for example, Shils (1991).
34 See, for example, a collection of articles in Grabher and Stark (1997), and Raiser (1998).
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groups. These networks pursue narrow self-interests at the expense of wider public 
interests, for example, in cases where political elite makes important economic 
decisions on the basis of clientelistic or corrupt motivations.
There is a need for improved conceptual clarity of post-Soviet networks. Although 
ultimately all types of networks are interdependent and mutually reinforcing, it is 
important to distinguish types of networks according to their role and objectives. Hayoz 
and Sergeyev (2003), for example, differentiate between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
perspectives of post-socialist networks. Thus the top-down perspective is concerned 
with the analysis of ‘power’ networks of the political and economic elite. The bottom- 
up perspective is a “look through the eyes of citizens and voters”, and it looks at 
networks that have a “problem solving” and “social” function (Hayoz and Sergeyev 
2003: 50). One also needs to distinguish between networks that serve parochial interests, 
or have anti-social or oppressive natures, and those that serve public or communal 
benefits. Nuanced studies of local social organisation may reveal that both negative and 
positive facets of interpersonal and social relations often co-exist. The ‘social networks’ 
theories are not adequate for explaining the complexity of social relations in the post- 
Soviet space. It is crucial to understand the processes through which people live their 
lives, relate to each other and organise to articulate their needs and identities within 
specific social, cultural and political environments.
2.5 Promoting Participation and Civil Society
This chapter has discussed the rationale, objectives and some of the agency related and 
structural complexities in promoting participation and civil society. The central question 
is how to effectively promote participation of citizens and build the institutional 
capacity of communities to contribute to local development. There are different views 
on the types of institutional arrangements and policies required for fostering civil 
society and citizen activism. Based on the review of literature, I have distilled four 
different approaches to the issue of promoting participation and civil society. In this 
thesis, I refer to these approaches as theories of institutional change.
35 See, for example, Raiser (1997), Hedlund and Sundstrom (1996), Levin and Satarov (2000), and 
Handelman (1998; 2001).
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2.5.1 Cultural View
The social fund bottom-up development model for promoting participation and capacity 
building is primarily rooted in cultural explanations of institutional change (Putnam 
1993; Fukuyama 1995; Inglehart 1997; Uphoff 2000). The ‘cultural’ view is based on 
the assumption that cognitive and behavioural patterns are the main obstacles to 
institutional change. In particular, it holds that attitudinal and psychological 
characteristics, weak social capital and inadequate institutional capacity are the main 
factors restricting local participation.
Attitudinal characteristics of community residents, such as apathy, passivity and 
paternalistic expectations, are often discussed as a challenge to participation. Oakley 
(1991: 13) notes that the ‘mentality of dependence’ can be a strong obstacle to 
participation, “In many Third World countries rural people for generations have been 
dominated by and dependent upon local elite groups. In practice this meant that the rural 
poor have become accustomed to leaving decisions and initiatives to their “leaders”. 
Friedmann (1992: 33) distinguishes ‘psychological power’ as an important pre­
condition to meaningful participation. He refers to psychological empowerment in 
Freirian terms, as increased self-confidence, sense of self-worth and ability to make a 
difference.
This cultural view has adopted Putnam’s conceptualisation of social capital. As 
described in section 2.1.4, Putnam (1993) describes social capital as a set of social 
networks (networks of civic engagement) and associated norms of trust and reciprocity. 
This view implies that the absence of trusting culture is the main obstacle to achieving 
collective action. It holds that norms of trust and reciprocity predispose people towards 
co-operation and cause social networks to form. It is assumed that social capital can be 
developed by changing existing cultural and cognitive patterns. Individual trust and co­
operative values can be fostered through a process of social learning. As a result of 
positive learning interactions, people would be more willing to co-operate and engage in 
civic networks. In addition to psychological empowerment and social capital, this view 
stresses the importance of enhancing local knowledge, skills and abilities.
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This model presumes that interventions at the local level can change social and 
institutional relations. In particular, it is believed that decentralisation of responsibilities 
and resources directly to local communities can increase interpersonal trust, build local 
capacity, empower individuals and promote collective action as a means to solve local 
problems and enhance local development. Organisations of civil society in their turn 
would make governmental institutions more accountable and effective and improve 
governance. A more detailed discussion on how this view has been incorporated in the 
social fund bottom-up development model follows in Chapter Three.
2.5.2 Institutional View
In the institutional approach, the role of the state is believed to be crucial in inducing 
institutional change. The importance of state institutions has been especially eminent in 
the New Institutional Economics (NIE) literature. The NIE arguments are mostly 
logically and analytically derived rather than based on rigorous empirical evidence. 
Nevertheless, they offer important analytical tools for analysing institutional relations, 
and constructing frameworks for testing through empirical data. The presence of 
efficient government institutions has been argued by Douglass North (1990) as a 
necessary precondition to economic and societal change. North (1990: 3) defines 
institutions as “the rules of the game in a society” or as “the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction”. Institutions consist of formal rules (laws and 
regulations), informal rules (conventions, norms, codes of conduct, traditions and 
values), and arrangements through which these rules are enforced in a society.
The ‘efficiency’ of institutions is associated with the quality and competence of the 
government, political freedoms and the rule of law. Efficient institutions can induce 
successful development outcomes by affecting individual and social behaviour. North 
(1990) maintains that the effectiveness of the state in enforcing economic contracts 
(rights and rules) can largely determine the efficiency of markets. Levi and Sherman 
(1997) argue that effective public institutions are in a better position than corrupt ones 
to secure co-operation and compliance of citizens and hence promote economic 
development and democratic institution building. They stress the importance of 
‘rationalised’ bureaucracy, which is close to the Weberian description of politically
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neutral and relatively competent system, based on impartial treatment of clients and 
promotion by merit. They believe that the quality of public institutions, especially their 
“freedom from corruption”, increases incentives for citizens to comply with state 
policies and participate in the construction of effective institutions (Levi and Sherman 
1997: 322).
A number of analytical studies explore the relationship between the state institutions 
and levels of trust and co-operation in a society (Levi 1998; Hardin 1998; Rothstein 
2000). Levi (1998) argues that the ‘trustworthiness’ of the state influences its capacity 
to generate interpersonal trust and social cohesion. Thus the attitudes and behaviour of 
citizens depend on their perceptions (trust) of the state’s commitment and competence 
to enforce the laws in a fair and predictable manner. The trustworthy states can 
potentially influence the construction and maintenance of both familial and generalised 
trust. Thus by increasing social rights and providing important services, a government 
can reduce personal reliance on a family or community to provide those services and 
thus reduce the likelihood of conflicts. By effectively enforcing contracts associated 
with economic, social and human rights, states can create confidence that individual 
interests can be protected and increase generalised trust and co-operation. Similarly, 
Rothstein (2000) argues that the efficiency of state institutions can positively affect the 
level of generalised trust and social capital of a society. Thus, the strength of 
generalised trust is determined by the trust in the ‘universalism’ or impartiality of the 
government institutions responsible for implementing laws and policies (Rothstein 2000: 
26). Individuals who trust in the impartiality of government institutions would refrain 
from corrupting them. Hence not only government officials but also most people will be 
trusted to play by the rules.
Institutional theories provide an important tool for the analysis and understanding of the 
social and political context in post-Soviet countries. Rose (1998) applies institutional 
theories to explain the presence of Soviet style informal networks in post-Soviet Russia. 
He criticises the cultural view of social capital, and claims that forms of social capital 
are largely influenced by the specific institutional context. Following Weber’s theory 
(1968) on the role of bureaucratic organisations in a society, Rose argues that the 
society in Russia is permeated by ‘organisational failure’, where formal organisations 
are unable to effectively deliver goods and services and “fail to operate impersonally,
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predictably, and in accordance with the rule of law” (Rose 1998: 1). Confronted with 
this organisational failure, the population largely relies in ‘getting things done’ on 
informal alternatives (e.g., growing own food and borrowing), personalised 
relationships and connections, or breaking or bending rules. Conditions of ‘anti­
modem’ society in Russia affect expectations and experience about how ‘things can be 
done’ and determine the choice of social capital networks that individuals rely upon. 
Rose suggests that in order to reverse the ‘anti-modem’ practices in Russia, “the 
immediate need is not to change the values and attitudes of the mass of the population; 
it is to change the way the country is governed” (Rose 1998: 20).
Mishler and Rose (2001) support institutional explanations of the origins of political 
tmst in transition countries. Cultural interpretations mostly attribute people’s distrust of 
political institutions to cultural norms and beliefs, holding that “authoritarian values 
learned through socialization into an undemocratic regime are likely to persist for a 
generation or more beyond the collapse of the old regime” (Mishler and Rose 2001: 32). 
Based on their analysis of survey data in ten transition countries, Mishler and Rose 
argue that the legacies of the communist past and political socialisation have only 
indirect effect on the level of institutional distrust. They suggest that individual 
evaluation of the actual economic and political performance of institutions directly 
affects people’s current attitude towards political institutions. Thus according to the 
institutional theories, behavioural patterns and social attitudes are a consequence, not a 
cause of institutional performance.
Institutions which do not produce effective social or economic outcomes, need to evolve 
or be replaced with new, efficient ones, to become developmentally effective. In order 
to achieve institutional change, it is important to change both formal rules and informal 
belief systems (North 1990; 1995). Institutional change requires not only the 
establishment of new formal institutions such as rules, laws and organisational 
structures, but also a change in the normative orientation, traditions and values to 
support these new structures. According to North (1995), even with a change in formal 
rules, the informal rules and values may persist and reinforce the perpetuation of old 
rules of the game. North (1995: 25) maintains that whilst a change in formal institutions 
can happen quickly, informal institutions change gradually. The survival of informal 
institutional constraints in the face of alterations in the formal institutions is coined by
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North as ‘path dependence.’ One implication of such path dependence is that the 
specific patterns of history and local context can play an important role in shaping 
policy outcomes. North (1995: 25) maintains,
Since it is the [informal] norms that provide the essential ‘legitimacy’ to any set of formal 
rules, revolutionary change is never as revolutionary as its supporters desire, and 
performance will be different than anticipated. More than that, societies that adopt formal 
rules of another society... will have very different performance characteristics than the 
original country because both the informal norms and the enforcement characteristics will 
be different. The implication is that transferring the formal political and economic rules 
of successful Western market economies to Third World and Eastern European 
economies is not a sufficient condition for good economic performance.
Institutional change requires not only establishing progressive organisational structures 
and legislation, but also changing the informal constraints -  i.e., nurture belief systems, 
norms of behaviour and codes of conduct that are supportive of new institutions. Thus, 
in order to promote participation, a number of changes must happen. These changes 
refer to the establishment of formal institutions -  laws and regulations that support 
decentralisation and citizen participation, organisational structures and channels of 
accountability through which people at the local level can express and protect their 
interests. It also implies a change in the informal institutions -  the norms of behaviour 
and values must support the principles of democratic participation and citizen activism.
2.5.3 State-Society Partnership View
This view suggests that state-society partnerships and effective governance procedures 
are key to fostering civil society. There is increasing body of empirical evidence based 
on case studies about the importance of macro-level structures and institutions in
'Xfxaffecting development outcomes at the local level. On the example of her case study in 
Northeast Brazil, Tendler (1997) demonstrates the crucial role that institutions of the 
state government played in building civil society by actively encouraging relations of 
trust and co-operation between civil servants and local communities. Tendler warns 
against heavy reliance on civil society and local government under the ‘decentralisation 
and participation’ schemes and neglecting central government’s key role in making 
decentralised programmes work. She dismisses the hypothesis about ‘one-way 
causality’, where good civil society leads to better government. She suggests that there
36 See, for example, collection of articles in Evans (1997).
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is a ‘two-way causality’, where government causes civil society to form, then the civil 
society is acting ‘independently’ from outside government to challenge its actions and 
demand better services.
Drawing on several empirical studies, Evans (1997) advances a framework for 
analysing state-civil society linkages based on the notions of good governance and 
state-society partnerships. The concept of ‘state-society synergy’ refers to mutually 
reinforcing relations between state and civil society. In synergistic relations, state action 
mobilises local communities and fosters social capital; and strong local institutions 
enhance the efficacy of the government. Evans believes that “[T]he limits to [state- 
society] synergy are located in government rather than in civil society” (Evans 1997: 
193). Evans argues that social networks based on trust and co-operation exist in all 
developing countries, and that only with the support of state institutions can they turn 
into developmentally effective civic organisations. The presence of competent, lawful 
and dependable public institutions is crucial for creating an enabling environment for 
local institutions to emerge and strengthen. The establishment of such a ‘rule-governed 
environment’ is important for fostering the rule of law, providing and enforcing citizen 
rights and civil and political liberties (Evans 1997: 180). The state must also support 
local institutions by providing various tangible inputs that local people cannot provide 
for themselves, as for example infrastructure, agricultural extension and other public 
goods and services. In addition, the committed attitude of public sector officials and 
direct engagement of the state with civil society can produce and strengthen bonds that 
bind together the state and civil society. In this ‘embedded relationship’, public officials 
are enmeshed in local social relations and become part of local communities they serve. 
They not only support local institutions by providing an enabling environment, but also 
work closely with them to achieve shared objectives.
Governance is increasingly becoming part of the formal discourse on participation by 
development agencies. Frameworks incorporating linkages to governance and state 
institutions in CDD and poverty reduction strategies have been adopted by World Bank 
based scholars (Woolcock 1998: 18, 26; Woolcock and Narayan 2000: 238; Das Gupta 
et al 2003). The analytical framework of social capital developed by the World Bank 
researchers incorporates the governance sphere by introducing a ‘vertical’ dimension to 
social capital (defined as functioning of the state and institutional environment) and
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political participation (Narayan 1999; Grootaert et al 2004). The World Bank has 
explicitly accepted the importance of establishing an enabling environment to encourage 
linkages and collaboration between communities, local and central governments (World 
Bank 2002b; World Bank 2004). A World Bank paper on the role of the state in 
community development (Das Gupta et al 2003), for example, views state-community 
synergy as a catalyst for institutional change. The paper suggests that local capture and 
patron-client relations at the local level are the main obstacles to local development. By 
drawing out lessons from several case studies, it argues that the “government can 
potentially bypass local vested interests and make local agencies more responsive to 
local citizens” (Das Gupta et al 2003: 2).
Institutional change in this view has been primarily conceptualised by development 
agencies in terms of ‘partnerships’ and ‘reforms’. It is assumed that community 
participation and civil society can be promoted through institutional arrangements 
encouraging collaboration and partnerships between the state, local governments, 
service providers and local community groups, and through improvements in the legal 
and regulatory framework and sectoral policies.
2.5.4 Structural View
This view conceptualises the issue of institutional change through the framework of 
power relations. It suggests that individual behaviour and actions are largely determined 
by the exiting structural constraints. Migdal (1988: 27), for example, argues that choices 
about the specific ‘strategy of survival’ of an individual are driven by “available 
resources, ideas and organizational means”. Individual strategies, such as reliance on 
patronage networks, are determined by “the existing resources and the control over 
access to resources” (27). Oakley and Marsden (1984: 31) maintain that structural 
constraints represent a major obstacle to achieving participation,
The structure disseminates to the regional and local level and pervades all forms o f formal 
and informal institutions and relationships. The structure dictates the terms o f participation 
and reacts oppressively if those terms are refined; its aim is to keep the rural people in their 
place, as labour power and possibly as consumers. Participation initiatives emanating from 
below, therefore, are faced with the dilemma of attempting to flourish within the context of 
the existing structure or of seeking to positively influence the structure.
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The relationship between power structures and psychological barriers to participation 
has been scrutinised by a number of feminist scholars. Drawing on Lukes’s (1974) 
discussion of power, Kabeer (1994: 228) emphasises the importance of the ‘power 
within’. The lack of the ‘power within’ indicates a state of powerlessness, in which 
individuals accept the existing inequalities and their role in existing order. Kabeer notes 
that the lack of resistance may not necessarily indicate ‘false consciousness’ on the part
^7of women. Thus, women may be aware of the restricted nature of their lives without 
knowing what to do about it. The acceptance of subordinate positions can be also driven 
by strategic choices of women (as well as men), who recognise the prevailing ‘rules of 
the game’ and realise that confrontation can be costly and can jeopardise their security 
and personal well-being. Kandiyoti (1988) maintains that women in patriarchal societies 
are rational actors, and that their livelihoods strategies, life choices and forms of 
resistance are determined by existing institutional constraints, which she calls 
‘patriarchal bargains’. Kandiyoti argues that these constraints are not static and they are 
subject to historical transformations, in which gender relations are re-negotiated and re­
defined. At the same time, Kandiyoti (1998b: 142) stresses that the scope of resistance 
of subordinates is normally restricted by existing power relations, and that “the 
powerful are much better placed to change the rules of the game unilaterally”.
It is thought that promotion of participation (or empowerment) implies a redistribution 
of power. Nelson and Wright (1995: 6-7) note that adopting a ‘structural view’ to 
empowerment would require a structural transformation, and not simply behavioural 
changes. Eyben (2004: 21) maintains that institutional change entails challenging the 
existing power hegemony in a society. This brings in an important political dimension 
that has been ignored in other views of institutional change. The attempt to change 
existing power relations is an inherently politicised task, and hence building the political 
agency or ‘political capital’ of the poor is as important as strengthening social capital. It 
is thought that in order to become an effective tool for poverty reduction, empowerment 
must be viewed as a combination of social and political participation. Gaventa (2004) 
suggests that effective political rights are necessary for people to claim their social and 
economic rights. He argues for the need to extend the concept of participation to ‘citizen
37 One interpretation of ‘passivity’ is based on the ‘false consciousness’ argument, which rests on the 
assumption that “elites are able to impose their own image of a just social order, not simply on the 
behaviour of non-elites, but on their consciousness as well” (Scott 1985: 39). It assumes that marginalised 
people accept their situation “as normal, even justifiable part of social order” (Scott 1985: 39).
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participation’ to encompass not only direct forms of participation in communal life and 
social spheres, but also indirect forms of political participation. Such ‘citizenship’ 
approaches directly link micro-level processes and institutions to broader issues of 
politics and governance (Gaventa and Valderrama 1999: 4).
The structural view suggests that effective societal transformation depends on poor 
people’s political capabilities and their capacity to mobilise for political action to tackle 
the wider structural causes to local problems. Friedmann (1992: 33; 67-68) in his 
“(dis)empowerment model of poverty” argues that in addition to economic and 
psychological empowerment, effective political power is required for people to be able 
to engage in polity, and control their “life space”. Hickey and Mohan (2004: 168) based 
on a review of a selection of participatory initiatives and programmes, conclude that the 
success of development policies and practices largely depends on “being part of a 
broader project that is at once political and radical”. Mosse (2004: 56-57) suggests that 
the capacity building and bottom-up approaches to empowerment employed by 
development agencies are not adequate for changing the existing power structures and 
the institutions through which they are expressed. In fact, development interventions, 
even those with explicit goals of participation and empowerment, tend to affirm or 
reproduce the existing power relations. Mosse believes that power relations are shaped 
by wider political systems, and successful empowerment depends on the political 
representation of poor people.
In terms of policy prescriptions, this view suggests that empowerment should imply 
increasing people’s political capabilities, i.e., support their ability to mobilise politically 
and influence public policy. Moore and Putzel (1999) argue that participation in 
community based organisations can help certain groups promote their interests; 
however, what matters for effective anti-poverty policies is the ability of the poor to 
influence the political system. Moore (2001: 324) goes on to argue that effective 
empowerment is about taking a direct political action of a “major collective dimension”. 
A measure of empowerment is whether the poor are organised politically and whether 
local organisations are integrated at regional and national levels. In most donor 
programmes and policies, the idea of empowerment is closely linked with the notion of 
community. According to Moore, this by definition emphasises the ‘local’ dimension 
and limits the ‘collective dimension’ of political action. Moore argues that the state
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capacity can have a significant impact on the scope and nature of civic engagement. 
Thus the propensity of “social groups to organize to influence the state depends on 
whether they believe the state has the authority and capacity to meet their demands” 
(Moore 2001: 326). He maintains that in order to increase political capabilities of the 
poor, donors should contribute to enhancing the capacity of the state, designing 
effective public policies and establishing an enabling environment, in which people 
would have the incentives to organise.
The main agents of change for these scholars are local citizens, who claim and negotiate 
their rights ‘from below’. At the same time, this view advocates the need for the state 
and donors to empower the poor by supporting an enabling environment in which the 
poor can organise politically. It considers participation as a politicised arena, in which 
citizens form partnerships with progressive state and societal agents in order to function 
in opposition to the oppressive institutions of the state. According to Fox (2004: 71), 
empowerment represents “institutionally recognised opportunities”. In order to trigger 
institutional change, both formal and informal institutions of the state need to encourage 
opportunities for participation, and the civil society actors should be willing and capable 
to engage with these opportunities. The change in the existing power structures can be 
induced through “cross-sectoral coalitions”, which would exercise pressures from both 
above and below (‘sandwich strategy’) (Fox 2004: 70). Similarly, Mohan and Hickey 
(2004: 69) see the change agent in coalitions that emerge between the state and society 
around “certain forms of exclusion and subordination”, and that transcend local 
communities to forge alliances with regional, national or global movements.
This approach is critical of the ‘reformist’ view of institutional linkages and policy 
improvements of the state-society partnership approach. Mohan and Hickey (2004: 69), 
for example, view state-citizen alliances in more radical terms than the state-society 
partnership view, “This is not in the sanitized and simplistic sense of state-civic 
synergies as promoted under the rubric of partnership (Evans 1997), but in the more 
political sense of party-social movement dynamics and within the context of a shared 
socialist-inspired project”. Thus whilst the state-society partnership view advocates 
building the asset base of the poor and removing institutional and structural constraints 
to participation through reforms and improvements, scholars of the structural approach 
propagate a direct action by the poor as a means to overcome the existing power barriers.
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Conceptualised within the context of structure and power, this view attributes the 
transformatory power of citizens to their political capital and the ability to mobilise for 
a radical political action.
2.6 Conceptual Framework of the Research
This chapter reviewed various meanings of participation and their implications for 
development projects and development outcomes. Participation in development projects 
can be conceptualised, operationalised and promoted in different ways and for different 
objectives. Participation in development projects is often conceptualised narrowly, and 
it is often restricted to contribution of cash, materials and labour. Such participation is 
different from authentic or empowered participation, where local people assume 
important decision-making roles and responsibilities. In terms of its objectives, 
community participation is often promoted for improving project and/or service 
delivery outcomes and promoting local self-reliance. Participation in development 
projects can also be promoted as a means to local empowerment. The concept of 
participation as empowerment is radical, and is concerned with promoting structural 
change to enable citizens exercise and claim their rights and benefit from existing 
development opportunities.
This thesis adopts the wider definition of participation as empowerment. Following the 
wider definition of participation presented in this chapter, this study conceptualises 
participation as a state of social and institutional organisation in which citizens are 
empowered to influence and control decisions that affect their lives. Such 
conceptualisation is different from the narrow definition of participation, in which 
participation of citizens in local development is constrained to the provision of 
voluntary labour and resources. Thus, it implies that community members become 
active agents not only in terms of their physical and material contribution. It refers to 
the ability of individuals to take part in decision-making, hold officials accountable and 
claim citizenship rights. This view implies that participation is broad-based - not 
dominated by local leaders and elites; bottom-up - driven by the community members 
themselves and not by top-down directives; and inclusive -  whereby all members have 
equal opportunities to take part in development processes. This conceptualisation of 
participation is based on the notions of citizen rights, inclusiveness and democratic
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accountability. I use the term ‘civic participation’ to refer to empowered participation, 
and use it as a normative benchmark in analysing and interpreting the research data 
(Box 2.2).
Civic participation effectively implies institutionalisation of participation, in which 
citizens’ involvement in local development becomes the “normal way of conducting 
community affairs” (Midgley 1986a: 29). In other words, this implies that participation 
becomes not only “role-based” but also “norm-based” behaviour (Uphoff 1997: 9). As 
discussed in section 2.5.2 of this chapter, institutions are ‘the rules of the game’ that 
provide the overarching framework for political, social, and economic exchange in a 
society. In order to institutionalise participation, development interventions must induce 
institutional change, i.e., alter the nature of the existing institutions so as they support 
participation. In particular, development interventions must promote a change in the 
existing institutional and organisational arrangements for service delivery, problem­
solving and decision-making in the contexts where participation is not an accepted or 
usual way of getting things done.
B ox 2.2: Attributes o f  Civic Participation
> Participation in collective initiatives and networks is broad-based (not dominated or driven 
by leaders and elites) and inclusive (with non-priority groups).
> All members have equal opportunities to take part in development processes.
>  Community members have the discretionary authority to convey their voice, influence 
important decision-making, and hold their leaders accountable.
> The role of leaders is important; at the same time, decision-making usually involves public 
participation, including prior dissemination of information, opportunity for debate and 
dissemination of results.
In the post-Soviet context, this implies that the existing Soviet-type institutions or 
networks must be replaced with ‘civic’ institutions. Thus, the prevailing institutional 
arrangements for getting things done, such as the reliance on the state, informal social 
networks and illegal activities (Box 2.1), must be replaced with a different, ‘civic’ forms 
of social and institutional organisation (Box 2.2). In this new institutional arrangement, 
participation in formal and informal groups and community activism become a 
legitimate and effective means for obtaining goods and services and governing local
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development. Participation in the post-Soviet context can become institutionalised when 
both formal and informal rules and values support it.
In this thesis, I examine the effectiveness of the social fund model in promoting 
participation and capacity building from an institutional perspective. Thus, I investigate 
whether the ASIF micro-projects promoted change in the existing institutions and local 
social organisation in the sample communities to support meaningful participation and 
enhance local institutional capacity.
This chapter reviewed different approaches to promoting participation and civil society. 
The cultural view, which underpins many CDD and community-driven projects, implies 
that constraints to citizen participation are rooted in behavioural patterns, human 
abilities and social attitudes. It stresses the importance of strengthening social capital 
(defined as interpersonal trust and norms of co-operation), enhancing local knowledge 
and skills, and reducing psychological barriers to participation, such as the ‘mentality of 
dependence’ and paternalistic expectations. The institutional and state-society 
partnership views hold that the governance environment, the quality of public 
institutions and strong state-society linkages are crucial for fostering civil society.. 
Depending on the character of the regime, the shape of public policy and the nature of 
governance, states can enhance or prohibit opportunities for individuals to participate. 
The structural view suggests that the promotion of participation as empowerment 
implies redistribution of power. It holds that changing the existing power relations is an 
inherently political task, and hence building the political agency or ‘political capital’ of 
the poor is as important as strengthening their social capital. These views raise 
important questions about the effectiveness and relevance of development interventions 
based on the cultural model. This research examines the effectiveness of ASIF’s 
bottom-up development model, which it will be argued is based on the cultural view of 
institutional change.
This chapter argued that a key factor affecting the outcomes of community-driven 
projects is associated with the specific understanding and interpretation of participation 
by a donor agency and methodologies employed for promoting participation and 
capacity building. There are also complexities associated with existing structural and 
institutional relationships at the national and local level. Some difficult questions that
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development professionals face are how to define ‘community’ in development projects 
so as to reflect the heterogeneity of local needs and preferences, how to counter the 
possibility of elite capture of development benefits, how to ensure the inclusion of all 
social groups in development processes and how to create incentives and conditions for 
meaningful and sustainable community participation. Some of these complexities are 
discussed in this thesis with regard to the ASIF project. In particular, this thesis 
examines ASIF’s conceptualisation of participation and the effectiveness of ASIF’s 
outreach and social mobilisation methodologies and operating procedures in promoting 
participation and capacity building. It explores how the ASIF micro-projects addressed 
the issues of diversity of local interests, inclusion, local capture, and accountability.
This chapter discussed the existing preconceptions and understanding about the Soviet 
and post-Soviet civil society and community participation. The weak associational life 
in most Soviet countries has been interpreted as reflecting the weakness of civil society 
in general. The existing communal forms of social organisation in post-Soviet society 
have been either overlooked or considered ‘uncivic’. It is a commonplace belief that the 
‘Soviet mentality’ and weak social capital prevent community members from initiating 
solutions to local problems and actively managing local development. This chapter 
demonstrated that both associational and communal forms of civil society indeed 
existed in the Soviet Union, although their substance and manifestations were different 
from the commonly accepted Western notion of civil society. This research tests the 
existing preconceptions about the post-Soviet civil society and community by exploring 
the nature of institutional and social relations and patterns and nature of community 
participation in the sample communities.
The next chapter, Chapter Three, reviews the key objectives, design features and 
operating procedures that most social funds share. The chapter presents the main 
assumptions behind the social fund bottom-up model for promoting participation and 
capacity building.
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Chapter Three. Social Funds as a Development Model
This chapter reviews the key objectives, design features and operating procedures that 
most social funds share. Based on agency and project literature, this chapter 
deconstructs the main hypotheses and assumptions underlying World Bank supported 
social fund projects. In particular, it presents the main hypotheses and assumptions 
behind the social fund bottom-up model for promoting participation and capacity 
building. These hypotheses and assumptions have been used to construct the research 
framework and define the key indicators for assessing the processes and impacts of the 
ASIF micro-projects in the sample communities (Figure 5.3).
3.1 The Growth and Evolution of Social Funds
One of the main models of community-driven development are social funds or social 
investment funds. Social funds are perceived to be more effective than traditional 
government instruments in improving local service delivery and promoting participation 
(Rawlings et al 2004; Jorgensen and Van Domelen 1999; Narayan and Ebbe 1997; 
Schmidt and Marc 1995). First, social funds are thought to be effective and efficient 
providers of essential social and economic infrastructure to the poor (Box 3.1). They 
have a reputation for fast disbursements and low costs and low overheads in delivering 
infrastructure. Second, social funds are considered flexible and adaptable instruments 
that can be applied in a variety of circumstances and for various objectives. Thus, it is 
thought that they can provide temporary safety nets during crises and natural disasters 
as well as longer term social protection and policy support; serve as effective 
procurement agents for construction of local infrastructure and act as catalysts for 
community development. Finally, as bottom-up and decentralised delivery instruments, 
social funds are thought be in a better position to promote community participation, 
empower the poor and vulnerable, generate trust and strengthen local institutions and 
community groups.
The objectives and strategies of social funds have evolved over time. Social funds 
originated as temporary emergency mechanisms to reduce the negative impact of the 
economic crises and structural adjustment programmes of the late 1980s in Bolivia,
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Honduras, Ghana, Zimbabwe and some other countries. A common characteristic of 
the early emergency funds was that they were “supposed to disappear” once the crisis 
situation was over (Schmidt and Marc 1995: 5). Over time, however, the mandate of 
social funds as providers of temporary social safety nets has changed. Since the mid- 
1990s, social funds have been increasingly aspiring to achieve more sustainable 
developmental effects. Today, social funds place greater emphasis on long-run 
improvements in living conditions and institutional development. It is thought that 
social funds can be important instruments in social risk management strategies 
(Jorgensen and Van Domelen 1999). It is believed that in addition to their risk coping 
function, social funds can be “potentially important vehicles for risk reduction and 
mitigation” (Jorgensen and Van Domelen 1999: 21).
Social funds pursue diverse mandates adapted to different country circumstances. 
Development of social and economic infrastructure is the core activity of most social 
funds. In about 80 percent of their projects world-wide, social funds provide grant 
funding to local communities, local governments and other local agents for improving 
priority infrastructure (Rawlings et al 2004: 1). Social funds finance social and 
economic infrastructure in various sectors, including education, health, irrigation, water 
supply and sanitation. Besides infrastructure projects, some social funds provide 
financing for improving the delivery of important social care services, including support 
for persons with disabilities (Egypt, Yemen and Honduras), school feeding programmes 
(Panama), programmes for youth and the elderly (Chile), family counselling (Jamaica), 
teacher training (Moldova) and targeted interventions for vulnerable groups (Panama). 
In several countries (Chile, Honduras, Bolivia and Zambia) social funds provide support 
to local governments in order to build their capacity to effectively identify and manage 
local level investments. Many social funds (Chile, Yemen, Egypt and Albania) support 
income generating activities by facilitating access of the poor and disadvantaged to 
financial services and providing technical assistance to encourage development of 
micro-finance institutions. Empowerment, social capital and capacity building are 
increasingly becoming the explicit goal of many social funds. In the OED review of 
social funds, about one third of social funds (21 of 66) included capacity building 
among their objectives (OED 2002: 41). Community empowerment was stated among
38 The first, ‘emergency’ social fund was established in Bolivia in 1987.
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social fund objectives in twelve percent of funds. Five percent of relatively recent funds 
mention social capital and social cohesion among their objectives.
B ox 3.1: Social Funds as Service Delivery Instrum ents
The primary impact of social funds on human welfare has been in terms of improved quality of 
social infrastructure and the level of service provision. Social funds have been successful in 
construction of infrastructure in health, education, water, irrigation and other important sectors. 
The findings o f the World Bank’s cross-country evaluations (Rawlings et al 2004, OED 2002) 
suggest that creation of facilities by social funds increased access to essential services and 
improved welfare outcomes. How sustainable are social fund benefits? The existing evaluations 
point out that infrastructure sustainability remains a key challenge for most social funds (IADB 
1998: 6; Carvahlo et al 2002; Rawlings et al 2004). Some of the key issues that have been found 
to affect the probability of sustaining the infrastructure benefits include inadequate arrangements 
for ensuring technical quality of micro-project facilities (e.g., inadequate standards and designs 
and poor supervision); lack of clarity and awareness of maintenance roles and responsibilities of 
different parties; and inadequate local financial and technical capacity to undertake O&M 
(Carvahlo et al 2002: 8).
3.2 The Design and Operating Procedures of Social Funds
It is difficult to make generalisations about social funds as they all have different 
organisational models and methods of operation. Based on the review of the literature 
on social funds, I have identified a number of important design features and operational 
characteristics that most social funds share. These characteristics make social funds 
different from and allegedly superior than traditional service delivery instruments. 
These include decentralised and participatory micro-project implementing principles, 
demand orientation and organisational autonomy.
3.2.1 Community Participation
Social funds operate in a decentralised and participatory fashion as distinct from over- 
centralised public sector programmes. The tasks of investment selection, design, and 
construction are carried out by community groups and/or local governments, NGOs and 
private firms, and not by a specialised public agency. Social fund micro-projects are 
implemented through a project implementing agency (or implementing committee). 
Such implementing agencies (IAs) can be a locally elected community committee 
authorised by the beneficiary community to act on its behalf (Armenia, Peru and 
Zambia). In many social funds (Honduras and Nicaragua), beneficiaries may be
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represented by a variety of local intermediary agents, including local representatives of 
national and regional authorities, local governments, and NGOs and CBOs. In others 
(Bolivia), funding requests are primarily channelled through municipal governments. Of 
60 social funds reviewed in the World Bank’s OED study, 23 percent worked only with 
communities, 8 percent worked exclusively with local governments, and 60 percent 
allowed participation of both communities and local governments (Carvahlo et al 2002: 
17).
Social funds aim to transfer control over resources and decision-making to micro­
project beneficiaries. This is different from the top-down project planning and 
implementation programmes that ignored user preferences and incentives and that were 
mainly geared towards providing engineering solutions. Beneficiary participation in all 
stages of a micro-project cycle is considered to be an important factor in influencing the 
appropriateness, impact and sustainability of social fund micro-projects (Schmidt and 
Marc 1995: 6). It is believed that participation can ensure that micro-projects are more 
likely to reflect local priorities and are more likely to be used by the local population. It 
can also engender community ownership and greater willingness to take responsibility 
for the O&M of the investments. The World Bank’s review of social fund BAs found 
that the effects on the project relevance, quality, transparency and capacity building 
were greater in the social funds where the beneficiaries took part in micro-project 
activities through community committees as opposed to other intermediaries (Owen and 
Van Domelen 1998: 33, 37). The World Bank’s cross-country evaluation of social funds 
(Rawlings et al 2004: 151-153) suggests that community participation in the micro­
project activities ensured greater utilisation and sustainability of services. Community 
participation is also promoted by social funds as a means for empowering communities 
and building local capacity (more detailed discussion follows in section 3.3).
Most social funds differ in their operating procedures and implementation mode and the 
extent to which they encourage community participation. This section provides a 
general description of some of the mechanisms that social funds use to promote 
community participation (Box 3.2).
Most social funds undertake a promotion campaign to make potential beneficiaries 
aware of the funding opportunity and to elicit local demand. Promotion usually includes
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dissemination of information about the work of the social fund, the requirements and 
procedures to follow to access social fund resources, the types of investments that the 
social fund may finance and the expected costs and responsibilities the micro-project 
may incur.
Beneficiaries are required to identify and prioritise their most immediate needs and 
decide on the micro-project proposal. The identification is carried out at an open 
community meeting, in which different groups have a chance to discuss and reach 
consensus on community problems and possible solutions. It is only possible to request 
micro-projects that have been accepted by the majority of the community.
Social funds often formalise participation by requiring communities to elect locally- 
based community committees as a micro-project I A. The IA is delegated with the tasks 
of project preparation, implementation and management. To ensure that the selection of 
the committee is fair, a certain percentage of the community’s households (from 30 to 
50 percent) are required to be present at the meeting and sign the minutes of the meeting.
Construction works are usually executed through small private sector contractors. In 
some social funds (Ethiopia), communities are encouraged to execute civil works 
themselves. In these funds, implementing agencies contract labour directly from the 
community.
In some social funds (Malawi, Zambia and Peru), procurement and financial 
management throughout the project cycle are decentralised to the community level. This 
is thought to be especially crucial for promoting local control and ownership (Narayan 
and Ebbe 1997: 17; De Silva 2000: 7). In these social funds implementing agencies 
select and hire contractors and purchase necessary goods and materials. They can hold 
bank accounts, handle funds and make payments to the contractors and suppliers. In 
many social funds, financial management remains with the social fund (Armenia, 
Yemen and Moldova). In this scenario, the community participates in identifying and 
selecting a contractor; contractors are hired by the social fund on behalf of the 
community, and funds are channelled from the social fund to the contractor.
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The IA members are required to supervise the micro-project themselves or to hire local 
supervisors from outside. In case community is not satisfied with the contractor’s 
performance, it may be able to withhold payments. Community can also be granted with 
the authority to certify satisfactory completion of works.
In order to ensure community involvement and encourage transparency and 
accountability, the IA is required to regularly share information with the public on the 
implementation and financial progress. This may include scheduling public meetings, 
posting reports and making announcements in public places. For transparency purposes, 
it may be required that the accounts books be accessible to the community.
>
B o x  3.2: Social F und  Micro-Project Implem enting Principles 
Beneficiaries attend a community meeting and select a micro-project
> Beneficiaries elect a community committee (implementing agency)
> Community is involved in micro-project design and planning
> Community prepares and submits proposals to social funds
> Community is required to commit to O&M
> Community makes in-kind, cash and/or labour contribution
> Community directly participates in execution of civil works
> Community is legal signatory in agreement with social fund
> Community opens bank account and handles funds
> Community has the authority for procurement o f goods and services
> Community organises work schedules
> Community has supervisory authority
> Community reports on physical progress and financial status
> Community can withhold payments to contractors
> Community certifies satisfactory completion of work
> Community participates in evaluation
Adapted from Narayan and Ebbe (1997)
The level of direct beneficiary participation can vary throughout the micro-project 
cycle. The World Bank’s review of social fund BAs found that the highest level of 
community participation was at the micro-project identification stage, and the extent of 
participation narrowed during the preparation and design stage (Owen and Van 
Domelen 1998: 23). Participation of beneficiaries during micro-project execution was 
mostly limited to resource mobilisation and manual labour contributions (Owen and 
Van Domelen 1998: 24). Community participation weakens after the identification 
phase, as the task of micro-project preparation and execution is transferred to the 
implementing agency formally acting on behalf of the greater beneficiary community.
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One of the dilemmas of the social fund participatory approach is the trade-off between 
the need for rapid implementation of micro-projects and the objectives of promoting 
participation and building local institutional capacity (Schmidt and Marc 1995: 6; 
Khadiagala 1995: 27). Achieving meaningful participation requires effective social 
intermediation, which can be time and resource consuming. Pressures for quick 
disbursements and micro-project completion that many social funds face can often 
undermine community participation (World Bank 1999a: 10;Bigio 1998: 123).
It is believed that social funds are relatively successful in reaching the poor, especially 
compared with traditional line ministries (IADB 1997: 15; Owen and Van Domelen 
1998: 22; Rawlings et al 2004: 51). The World Bank’s cross-country evaluation 
concludes that although the poorest of the poor were well-represented among social 
fund beneficiaries, the non-poor also benefited from social fund interventions (Rawlings 
et al 2004: 64). At the same time, it is argued that social funds use a broad focus on 
poor communities, without proactive efforts to reach out to socially excluded 
communities, households and individuals (Jorgensen and Van Domelen 1999: 18). 
DFID’s evaluation of social funds mentions that “there is little evidence that particularly 
vulnerable groups and individuals within communities are included or supported to 
formulate projects” (Fumo et al 2000: 17).
3.2.2 Demand Orientation
Social funds are intended to be demand-driven. They have a decentralised, community- 
based way of investment selection as distinct from traditional supply-driven 
technocratic resource allocations. This assumes that decisions about service provision 
are not made by governments based on their definitions of ‘needs’, but are taken by the 
users themselves. The demand-driven mechanism is believed to ensure that the selected 
investments reflect beneficiary priorities. The availability of local demand is thought to 
be crucial for determining community’s support for the micro-project and motivation to 
participate. A better match between community demand and service delivery is thought 
to increase community satisfaction, further encourage community ownership and 
support, and help mobilise community’s involvement in the O&M (Narayan and Ebbe 
1997: 45; Rawlings et al 2004: 139).
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Social funds usually establish the types of activities and sectoral areas which are eligible 
for financing. Most social funds use a so called ‘closed menus’, in which communities 
are given a range of possible investment options from which to choose micro-projects 
(as well as a list of ineligible micro-projects). Proponents of this approach claim that 
closed menus have targeting advantages. They only allow investments in services that 
are more likely to be demanded by and benefit the poor (Weissman 2001: 21). Closed 
menu micro-projects are simple to design, prepare and implement by using standard 
project plans, predefined operational procedures, sets of objectives and outcome 
indicators. They also help to ensure that beneficiary preferences are in line with national 
priorities. A strong criticism of this approach is that closed menus constrain community 
choice and the opportunity to express their actual felt needs. Social fund BAs show that 
closed menus have often been exclusive and narrowly defined (Owen and Van Domelen 
1998: 21). Closed menu micro-projects do not leave much scope for innovation and 
creative problem-solving (Weissman 2001: 21). The ‘true’ community demand may 
also be distorted by the nature of the investment. For example, not all desirable micro­
projects may be feasible to implement and operate because of logistical and/or financial 
considerations (Rawlings et al 2004: 142). In their micro-project proposals communities 
are often guided by ‘feasible’ objectives that may not necessarily represent their top 
priority choice.
Most social funds require some form (monetary, labour and/or in-kind) of contribution 
from beneficiaries as the evidence of community commitment. Community contribution 
is usually required by social funds up-front, before construction or release of funds. 
Contributions usually comprise at least ten percent of the micro-project cost. The 
willingness to provide a contribution by beneficiaries is believed to indicate that the 
micro-project responds to the local demand. Community contribution can ensure that 
communities have some financial stake in the micro-project and would be willing to 
sustain micro-project benefits. The contribution of money and labour by the 
communities is also seen as a means to “free up public resources for other uses” (Bigio 
1998: 25). There are concerns that the contribution requirement may be an obstacle for 
many poor to participate. In practice, communities often fail to fully comply with the 
contribution requirement. There is a consistent discrepancy between target rates and 
actual levels of contribution in many social funds (World Bank 1999a: 20). It may also 
be much heavier burden for the poor rather than the better-off community members. For
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example, some beneficiaries of social fund micro-projects had a perception of unequal 
burden sharing within community (Owen and Van Domelen 1998: 25).
There is an inherent contradiction between the demand-driven nature of social funds and 
their effectiveness in reaching the poorest and marginalised communities. Due to the 
demand-driven mechanism of social funds, their ultimate targeting success depends on 
the ability and willingness of poor communities to participate. The poorest communities 
may often lack the necessary administrative and technical skills, resources and linkages 
to official networks to design viable micro-project proposals and to articulate their 
demands (Schmidt and Marc 1995: 6; Stewart 1995: 128; Jack 2000: 12; Tendler 2000: 
117). This implies that the targeting effectiveness of social funds may be limited, and 
they may mainly benefit the “better-off, better organised, or less remote” communities 
(Tendler 2000: 120). Several beneficiary assessments indicate that due to the lack of 
effective leadership or geographic isolation, many poor communities in targeted regions 
were not able to take part in social fund micro-projects (Owen and Van Domelen 1998: 
22). Some social funds adopt flexibility with regard to community contribution by 
requiring different levels and types of beneficiary contribution depending on the 
beneficiary ability to pay.
3.2.3 Organisational Autonomy
Social funds are generally considered to be part of the public sector; at the same time, 
they enjoy considerable organisational autonomy. First, social funds have an 
independent legal status, and they are most often established as new agencies outside 
line ministries. In many countries, social funds report directly to the President or the 
Prime Minister. Second, they have relative independence in annual program planning 
and budgeting and in formulation of the policies and administrative procedures. Most 
social funds are overseen by a Board of Directors or a Steering Committee which are 
normally composed of representatives of the government and NGOs. Third, social funds 
are usually exempt from the national public sector rules with regard to recruitment and 
salary structures, as well as procurement and disbursement procedures. Even when 
social funds are set up within a line ministry (Zambia and Armenia), they enjoy 
independence from many public sector restrictions.
89
One of the reasons for successful performance of social funds is attributed to the fact 
that, due to their autonomous status, they bypass existing institutional structures (Bigio 
1998: 27). Their status is thought to safeguard against likely political interference and 
ensure that social funds are accountable to their main beneficiaries (Schmidt and Marc 
1995: 9). The autonomy of social funds is intended to protect social funds from the 
inefficiencies that are associated with the government agencies. It is argued that in order 
to effectively deliver essential assistance to the neediest groups, social funds should 
bypass the existing official institutions, especially when the latter are inefficient and 
corrupt (Jack 2000: 14-15). Autonomy can ensure operational speed and flexibility of 
decision-making in planning, financing and implementation. For example, it allows 
social funds to disburse funds to the needy communities in a more rapid manner than 
public sector agencies (Khadiagala 1995: 25). Due to their flexibility in planning and 
budgeting processes, social funds can make modifications and adjustments in their 
investment programs on a recurrent basis and adapt their operational procedures to the 
changing circumstances (Weissman 2001: 36). As social funds are exempt from the 
civil service salary schedule, they can offer competitive salaries and hence tend to 
attract highly qualified staff.
Such an autonomous institutional set-up can also have its downsides. As social funds 
operate outside the government realm, there is often little interaction between social 
funds and central government, which results in little capacity building of the 
government. There has been marginal success in training and transferring the experience 
and techniques of social funds to line ministries (Jorgensen and Van Domelen 1999: 12; 
Carvahlo et al 2002: 13). There are only very few cases of a line ministry or agency 
changing its operational methods under the impact of a social fund (Weissman 2001: 
13). The DFID review maintains that in most cases social funds create parallel 
institutional structures rather than work to reform existing government agencies (Fumo 
et al 2000: 11). The operational autonomy of social funds may not be conducive to 
effective co-ordination of their activities with existing macro-economic and sectoral 
policies. There are no safeguards that social funds be moving in the same direction as 
national policies and strategies (Fumo et al 2000: 12; Jorgensen and Van Domelen 1999: 
12). The autonomy does not necessarily assure that social funds are truly independent in 
their resource allocation decisions. Social funds are not immune from political
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manipulations, and they still remain vulnerable to outside influences (Tendler 2000: 118, 
121).
3.3 Social Funds as Agents of Institutional Change
As described earlier, social funds are increasingly adopting empowerment and social 
capital building as their explicit objectives. The concepts of empowerment and social 
capital have become popular in the development discourse and the social fund language 
since the late 1990s. Participation in development projects as a means to empowerment 
and capacity building was promoted in community development projects and some 
social funds before the concepts of empowerment and social capital entered the 
mainstream development. For example, Oakley (1991) based on his analysis of project 
literature concludes that the involvement of people in economic or physical activities 
was promoted to develop group cohesion, solidarity and local capacity throughout the 
1980s. The ASIF project belongs to the second generation of social funds, which were 
conceived in the mid-1990s. The second generation of social funds is different from the 
early, or ‘emergency’ funds of the late 1980s-early 1990s. As Chapter Four shows, in 
addition to its emergency infrastructure rehabilitation objective, ASIF also had 
developmental objectives of promoting participation and capacity building.
Most second generation social funds use the term ‘capacity building’ to refer to the 
objective of promoting community participation and local self-reliance. A community’s 
capacity is the ability to effectively and consistently perform such crucial functions as 
decision-making, resource mobilisation and management, communication and co­
ordination, and conflict resolution (Uphoff 1997: 9). Narayan and Ebbe (1997: 33) 
define organisational capacity in social fund projects as “the ability of people to trust 
one another, work together in solving problems, mobilise resources, resolve conflicts, 
and network with others”. The terms ‘organisational capacity’ and ‘institutional 
capacity’ are often used interchangeably in the social funds project literature, despite the 
difference in those two terms. The social fund bottom-up model is based on a de facto 
framework and has not been manifested in the literature in a consolidated manner. This
39 The term institutional capacity is broader than organisational capacity, although the two overlap. 
Institutions are complexes of norms and behaviours that persist over time and serve collectively valued 
purposes, while organisations are structures of recognised and accepted roles (Uphoff 1993: 16-17). 
Organisations can become institutionalised once they acquire legitimacy as a complex o f norms and 
behaviours that people feel obliged to accommodate and comply with.
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section presents the bottom-up model drawing on project literature and practices of 
international development agencies and on its theoretical foundations in the global 
literature. This section also draws on the analytical framework of the OED evaluation 
design paper (OED 2000), based on the main hypotheses and assumptions behind the 
World Bank supported social fund projects.
Social funds are based on the ‘bottom-up’ development model for promoting 
participation and institutional capacity building. This model presumes that participation 
and capacity building effects can be achieved in several ways. First, social fund micro­
projects are said to have a ‘learning by doing’ effect (Narayan and Ebbe 1997: 33). 
Participation in social fund micro-project activities can enhance community’s access to 
information and experience. Through their participation in the micro-project cycle, 
community members learn new ways and methods of tackling local problems. In 
particular, the positive experiences of interaction may enable community members 
appreciate the benefits of a collective action and community-based solutions to local 
problems. Participation in the micro-project can also help develop and/or improve 
technical, organisational and administrative skills of community members.
Second, participation in decision-making and problem-solving can have an empowering 
effect on individuals. It can lead to changes in attitudes, behaviour, and confidence and 
can enable people to become more actively engaged in local affairs, take initiative and 
exercise voice and leadership (Narayan 1995b: 26).
Finally, it is thought that social fund micro-projects can enhance social capital by 
assisting communities in developing structures and norms. Thus, social funds help 
establish community-based institutional structures (e.g., implementing agencies) that 
can continue functioning to solve other problems after micro-project completion and 
can become a focal point for the community activity in the future. By establishing 
institutional structures and promoting formation of community groups, social funds 
create spaces for community participation and interaction. Frequent interactions among 
community members and positive problem solving experiences reinforce and cultivate 
norms of trust and relations of solidarity.
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The literature on social funds defines social capital following Putnam’s 
conceptualisation as “trust influencing collective action” (Kammersgaard 1999: 2). In 
order to examine how social capital is conceptualised and operationalised in the 
discourse and practice of development agencies, this chapter draws on the framework 
offered by Uphoff (2000).40 Uphoff (2000: 218-219) suggests that there are two types 
of social capital: structural and cognitive. Structural social capital is manifested through 
formal and informal networks and institutions. Within an institutional context, specific 
(formal and informal) roles and their accompanying (implicit or explicit) rules, 
precedents and procedures guide individuals’ behaviour and regulate activities. 
Cognitive social capital is a result of mental processes reinforced by culture and 
ideology. It is comprised of norms, values, attitudes and beliefs. Some of the 
manifestations of cognitive social capital are reciprocity and trust, solidarity and 
generosity (Uphoff 2000: 241-242).
The two forms of social capital are complimentary and mutually reinforcing. Cognitive 
processes predispose people toward collective action. Norms, values, attitudes and 
beliefs create expectations about how people in certain roles should and will act under 
various conditions. Thus shared norms (or expectations) of trust and reciprocity make 
co-operative behaviour of people more likely. Relationships of trust increase likelihood 
of acceptance of responsibilities; and social networks facilitate enforcement of 
responsibilities. In their turn, elements of social organisation establish patterns of 
communication and co-operation, co-ordinate individual behaviour and facilitate 
collective action (Uphoff 2000: 218, 229).
How does social capital grow? Social capital exists in the relations amongst people and 
can come about through changes in these relations (Coleman 1988: 19). Such changes 
can be promoted through processes of interaction between people in a community. In 
particular, the process of building social capital depends on the quality and quantity of 
social interactions (Falk and Kilpatrick 1999: 16). Intensive and positive interactions 
can establish a process of social learning and produce changes in attitudes, skills and 
knowledge of people. Such learning has the potential to change expectations about 
people’s behaviour and hence cultivate norms of reciprocity and trust through which
40 UphofFs categorisation of social capital is widely used at the World Bank in relation to social funds.
For example, see Serrano (2003).
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actors can become more willing to work collectively with one another. Social structures 
with underlying roles, rules and procedures can reinforce expectations of supportive 
behaviour and strengthen cultural traits that may have led to co-operation in the first 
place (Krishna 2000: 76). Successful co-operation and performance that match 
empirical and normative expectations of benefits can have reinforcing effect on both 
forms of social capital. This can create expectations that future behaviour will be 
positively rewarded, make the probability of future collective action more likely and 
encourage future collaborative efforts in new areas.
It is assumed that the improvements in people’s skills and abilities, attitudinal changes 
and strengthened social capital would enhance community’s institutional capacity 
(Jorgensen and Van Domelen 1999: 20). Institutional capacity is operationalised in 
social funds as the ability of communities to actively participate in local development, 
undertake mutually beneficial development initiatives and effectively solve collective 
action problems. Thus, it is thought that after participation in the micro-project activities 
individuals will be more willing and able to participate in local development and initiate 
new development projects or activities in order to solve community problems (Schmidt 
and Marc 1995: 6; Narayan and Ebbe 1997: 33). In these projects and activities, they 
may collaborate and form networks with other individuals, and hence contribute to 
further widening of social networks within and outside their communities. The role of 
social fund micro-projects as ‘vehicles’ for community development has been described 
by Narayan and Ebbe (1997: 33) as follows,
Development projects can be instrumental in helping local groups to organise themselves 
to solve their own problems and to network with others to mobilise resources and design 
solutions. Once a particular set o f project-related challenges has been met, such groups 
often move on to addressing other problems. Their new skills result in continued 
development that can be sustained beyond the lifetime of particular micro-projects.
The enhanced institutional capacity can also be manifested in the ability of local 
communities to effectively resolve collective action problems. In particular, relations 
based on shared norms and values can enhance the likelihood of establishment, 
acceptance and enforcement of rules and responsibilities for effective O&M of local 
infrastructure and governance of common resources (OED 2000: 11-12).
It is argued that in order for social funds to succeed in building community capacity, 
they should explicitly incorporate capacity building assistance into their goals and
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budgets (World Bank 2000d: 6, 19). This first of all implies that social funds should 
pay greater attention to developing human capital. In particular, the ‘learning by doing’ 
approach should be complimented with specifically tailored training/capacity building 
exercises in order to improve the technical knowledge and organisational skills of 
individuals.
3.4 Conclusions
This chapter described the main objectives and operational characteristics of social 
funds. Most social funds share similar design and operational features, including 
decentralised and participatory method of micro-project identification, preparation and 
implementation, demand orientation and organisational autonomy. The chapter 
highlighted the trade-off between the need for rapid implementation of micro-projects 
and the objectives of promoting participation and capacity building. The chapter also 
discussed the contradiction between the demand-driven nature of social funds and 
effectiveness in reaching the poorest and marginalised communities. The chapter 
suggests that the operational autonomy of social funds may not be conducive to 
effective co-ordination of their activities with existing macro-economic and sectoral 
policies and for building the institutional capacity of the central government.
The chapter reviewed the theoretical and operational assumptions behind the social fund 
bottom-up development model for promoting participation and capacity building. This 
model assumes that participation in the micro-project activities can improve knowledge, 
skills and abilities of community members, contribute to individual empowerment, and 
enhance local social capital, which will translate into increased participation and 
institutional capacity of local communities. I have used these assumptions to construct 
the research framework and define the key indicators for assessing the processes and 
impacts of the ASIF micro-projects in the sample communities (Figure 5.3).
The next chapter, Chapter Four, reviews the objectives, design, micro-project 
implementing principles and operational procedures of the Armenian Social Investment 
Fund (ASIF) project.
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Chapter Four. The Armenia Social Investment Fund Project
This chapter examines the objectives, micro-project implementing principles and 
operating procedures of the ASIF project. In particular, it reviews ASIF’s participatory 
requirements, appraisal criteria and performance indicators that were designed to 
promote community participation in the micro-project cycle and enhance local 
institutional capacity. I have used this information in Chapter Five to distil the main 
hypotheses and assumptions underlying ASIF and design the research framework and 
key indicators for this study (Figure 5.3). The chapter is based on my review of the 
World Bank ASIF Project Staff Appraisal Report (World Bank 1995); ASIF’s 
Operational Manual (ASIF 1998) and Beneficiary Impact Assessments (ASIF 1997, 
2000), and the World Bank supervision reports. The chapter also draws upon my 
interviews with the ASIF staff members, which helped clarify ASIF’s institutional 
design and micro-project implementation methods.
4.1 ASIF’s Objectives and Contribution
The Armenia Social Investment Fund Project (ASIF) carried out its activities from 
January 1996 until December 2000. The objective of ASIF was to support vulnerable 
groups in Armenia through the improvement of basic social services, employment 
generation and capacity building. ASIF was founded by the Government of Armenia, 
with the support of the World Bank. ASIF’s status and organisational structure are 
presented in Box 4.3. The total cost of the project was US$17.45 million. The World 
Bank provided most of the funding; the project also included financial contributions 
from the Dutch government, Armenian Diaspora organisations, the Armenian 
government and local communities. ASIF provided grant finance for the rehabilitation 
of essential economic and social infrastructure in response to requests by local groups in 
both rural and urban areas. In particular, ASIF supported small-scale projects (micro- 
projects) for the rehabilitation of schools, potable water supply networks, irrigation 
systems, health care facilities, village access roads and other small-scale infrastructure.
In total, ASIF received 726 micro-project proposals and funded 259 micro-projects. The 
approximate average cost of each micro-project was US$50,000. The promotional 
activities were completed by the end of the second year in all regions of Armenia, and
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the bulk of the proposals (close to 500) were received by then. Of the total 259 micro­
projects, 35 percent were small-scale school rehabilitation, 32 percent were potable 
water projects, 11 percent were irrigation rehabilitation micro-projects and 5 percent 
were health facilities. The remaining 17 percent of micro-projects included works on 
community centres, orphanages, roads, sewage and waste, and landscaping. In terms of 
micro-project distribution, about 38 percent were carried out in the earthquake zone 
(Lori, Shirak and Aragatzotn regions (marzes), 25 percent were in Yerevan, 21 percent 
in the regions bordering with Azerbaijan which suffered during the Karabakh conflict 
(Tavush and Syunik), and 15 percent in the remaining five marzes. ASIF’s poverty 
targeting approach is presented in Box 4.1.
Box 4.1: ASIF’s Poverty Targeting
In allocating resources ASIF primarily targeted areas of poor infrastructure, and not necessarily 
those of poorest income. In order to cover the whole territory o f Armenia, each of forty former 
administrative districts (shrjan) was allocated US$90,000. The distribution of the rest o f ASIF’s 
funds was based on the assessment of a district’s socio-economic development and the number 
of its population. To determine the level of socio-economic development and classify districts, a 
poverty ranking and prioritisation of districts was conducted during the ASIF project 
preparation. Additionally, in order to assess and prioritise the infrastructure needs in specific 
villages and urban neighbourhoods, ASIF’s promotion officers conducted on-site needs 
assessment (local study) during their field visits. The priorities o f the Armenian Government 
played an important role in the ASIF allocations. Based on the Government’s economic 
development priorities, ASIF reallocated some of the unspent resources to the areas with the 
poorest infrastructure: the earthquake zone (Shirak, Lori and Aragatzotn) and to the regions that 
suffered most during the conflict with Azerbaijan (Tavush and Syunik). -
The ASIF micro-projects generated a visible development impact in terms of social and 
economic benefits to the communities. The ASIF activities improved the essential social 
and economic infrastructure and facilitated access to essential services (ASIF 1996; 
1997). During the period of ASIF’s implementation, 5,160 persons received 
employment for the duration of five months, of which 1,720 were skilled jobs. Most of 
these jobs were temporary, lasting only through the construction phase of a micro­
project. The wages for the unskilled labourers were at the level of minimum poverty 
wage (1, 000 to 2, 000 drams or US$2-4 per day), and did not provide significant means 
for coping with poverty. ASIF was crucial in fostering private sector development by 
introducing competitive procurement and providing training to small-scale contractors 
(178 contractors in total). ASIF played a key role in introducing and consolidating 
transparent competitive bidding in Armenia’s construction industry.
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Promoting community participation and capacity building was an important objective of 
ASIF, which was reflected in the micro-project implementing principles and ASIF’s 
operating procedures (World Bank 1995: 14, 26, 39). Participation was thought to help 
better identify priority needs, enhance community’s sense of ownership and provide 
incentives for beneficiaries to commit to the maintenance of the rehabilitated 
infrastructure. ASIF was expected to “reinforce a sense of ownership and involvement 
at the community level contributing to the change of attitude necessary for successful 
transition at grassroots”, and to “demonstrate the importance of beneficiary participation 
in poverty reduction and provide an efficient and effective model for implementation” 
(World Bank 1995: 39). It was envisaged that ASIF would “increase local initiatives in 
the area of social support” (World Bank 1995: 26). ASIF’s Operational Manual states 
“encouragement of the attitude of self-help” as one of its main objectives (ASIF 1998: 
6).
The ASIF micro-projects were expected to generate traditions of self-reliance and self- 
help through involving communities in decision-making processes and management of 
rehabilitation activities. Thus, it was assumed that participation in the micro-projects 
could strengthen the administrative, technical and institutional capacity of local 
communities and local governments to prepare and implement projects, undertake 
competitive bidding, and manage contracts. In addition, it was thought that the 
experience of participation in the micro-project cycle can raise the awareness and 
understanding of community members and local governments in new ways of 
identifying and managing local projects, demonstrate the benefit of participation in local 
affairs and support communities to become more active and initiative-taking.
4.2 ASIF’s Micro-Project Cycle and Implementing Principles
ASIF developed a number of participatory micro-project implementing principles to 
ensure beneficiary participation in all stages of the micro-project cycle (Box 4.2). 
ASIF’s micro-project cycle comprised the following stages: micro-project initiation, 
identification, planning and proposal preparation, and implementation.
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4.2.1 Micro-Project Identification
ASIF only accepted those proposals which were identified by the benefiting community. 
This was to ensure that the micro-projects were demand-oriented, i.e., that they reflected 
the real urgent needs of the community. Community identification was also considered 
crucial for ensuring that beneficiaries were involved in the micro-project from the on-set. 
Beneficiaries were expected to initiate and select micro-projects at a general community 
meeting. In rural areas, ASIF considered the level of community support acceptable 
when: (i) the community held a meeting where at least thirty percent of the adult 
population of the community attended (attendees were required to sign in and the 
meeting’s minutes were to be kept); or (ii) any person or group within the community 
organised a petition supporting a micro-project, which was signed at least by at least 
fifty percent of the adult population of the community.
Micro-project identification was based on the ‘closed menu’ approach. The ASIF 
beneficiaries were offered a range of possible investment options from which they could 
choose their priority micro-projects. Minutes of the community meeting or the meeting 
of the group organising the referendum were to be enclosed in the proposal, together 
with the list of participants and their signatures.
4.2.2 Micro-Project Preparation and Implementation
Micro-project preparation and implementation was delegated to the beneficiary 
community. From this stage beneficiary participation was mostly exercised through an 
intermediary agent -  the Implementing Agency (IA). Any registered or unregistered 
local group and community based organisation could serve as the IA. Most commonly, 
the community elected the LAs at the general community meeting or on the basis of the 
results of the referendum. At least four community members were required to be 
included in the IA.
ASIF required communities to provide community contribution which was thought to 
indicate the ‘true’ community demand and enhance local support. A contribution of at 
least ten percent of the micro-project cost was required for the micro-project acceptance 
by ASIF. When a community was unable to provide a contribution of ten percent due to
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extreme poverty, ASIF could use its discretion to reduce it up to five percent. The 
contribution could be in-kind (e.g., construction materials or design plans and 
drawings), labour or cash. Any person, organisation or local government could 
contribute to the micro-project on behalf of the community. The contribution was 
required to be paid after the micro-project approval but prior to the initiation of the 
bidding process.
After the community identified the micro-project and elected the I As, the tasks of 
micro-project planning, proposal preparation, implementation and management were 
formally transferred to the IAs. At the micro-project planning and proposal 
preparation stage, the IAs were required to undertake the following activities:
> Ensure that resources and/or local labour were available for the required 
community contribution.
> Secure permits for construction works from authorised organisations, and from 
individuals concerned.
> Provide description of works and a simple tentative budget with the micro­
project estimated cost.
> Secure O&M commitments from the authorities concerned and prepare a 
Sustainability Plan for the micro-project facility.
> Complete standard proposal forms and enclose all the necessary attachments, 
including the resolution of the general community meeting and the list of 
signatures of the meeting.
The IAs were responsible for general management of the implementation of the micro­
project. This included the following aspects:
Civil works. The construction was mostly conducted by small-scale private contractors. 
The contractors were chosen through competitive bidding. The contract was awarded to 
the qualified contractor that had offered the lowest evaluated bid price. The contractor 
itself organised its work schedule. For small and simple micro-projects of under 
US$30,000 value, and when no contractors were available, the IAs themselves could 
carry out civil works.
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Procurement and financial management. The IAs were formally responsible for 
preparing bidding documents, drafting invitation to bidders, conducting the bidding, 
analysing the bids and contracting the winning company to carry out construction works. 
The IAs did not have any authority over the micro-project’s financial management. 
ASIF directly paid contractors or suppliers when requested by the IA and after ensuring 
that the requested payment was justified. ASIF itself contracted engineers or design 
firms for the required technical studies and/or technical designs and drawings.
Supervision. The IAs were responsible for monitoring work progress and the quality of 
implementation. The IAs were required to contract an independent local supervisor for 
daily supervision of civil works. The supervisor was expected to work directly with 
contractors to monitor the progress of civil works, identify problems and bring them to 
the attention of the IA and ASIF. Costs for the supervisor services were included in 
micro-project expenses (up to three percent of total costs). ASIF itself made direct 
payments to the local supervisor. The IA had the authority to certify accomplished 
works and approve instalment payments to the contractor. The IA reviewed the 
Statement of Accomplished Works (SAW) submitted by the contractor and certified its 
correspondence with the completed works. The IA then submitted a Request for 
Payment to ASIF so as ASIF could authorise payment to the contractor. The IA had the 
right to fine the contractor for not complying with the contract. A representative of the 
IA was required to take part in the Hand-Over Committee to certify satisfactory 
completion of construction works.
Reporting and Information Sharing. The IA was required to file and maintain copies of 
all micro-project related documents (including financial statements) and make them 
available to any interested community member. The IA was expected to regularly report 
to the beneficiary community members on the micro-project implementation progress 
and financial status. ASIF required the IA to hold information sharing meetings with the 
community members at least once a month throughout the micro-project cycle. The IA 
was also required to place copies of important micro-project related documents on a 
public board, and to put up in a publicly visible place a sign containing the names of 
ASIF, the IA, the benefiting community and the contractor.
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>B o x  4.2: A S IF ’s Participatory Micro-Project Im plem enting Principles 
Community initiates a micro-project at a general community meeting.
> Community elects an IA at the general community meeting.
> LA prepares and submits proposals to ASIF.
> Community makes up-front contribution (cash, in-kind and/or labour).
> Community provides commitments for O&M.
> IA is legal signatory in agreement with ASIF.
> Community can directly execute civil works in small micro-projects.
> IA has the authority for procurement of works, goods and services.
> IA has supervisory authority.
> IA reports to the community on micro-project physical progress and financial status.
> IA verifies state of completed works and approves contractors’ statements (SAW).
> IA certifies satisfactory completion of work by contractors.
> Community participates in the evaluation.
Based on the analysis of the ASIF Operational Manual 1998.
4.3 ASIF’s Participatory Operating Procedures
The implementing procedures of ASIF comprised the following stages: micro-project 
promotion, appraisal and approval, implementation, follow-up, and evaluation and 
monitoring.
4.3.1 Promotion and Micro-Project Initiation
During the micro-project initiation stage, ASIF conducted an outreach {promotion) 
campaign in order to increase awareness among community members and potential 
private sector contractors about ASIF’s activities, selection criteria and procedures that 
must be followed in order to obtain funds. Promotion emphasised the importance of 
community participation in the identification and management of micro-projects. 
Promotion included the following key activities:
The Promotion Unit organised a workshop, or several workshops when necessary, in the 
centre of an administrative district (shrjarif1 for the representatives of district and local 
authorities, agencies responsible for the infrastructure facilities, officials involved in 
local social services and NGOs, where available. During these workshops the promotion
41 Under the Soviet administrative division, Armenia was divided into 29 districts or shrjans. In 1996, 
these districts were merged into 10 larger regions (marzes) (9 plus Yerevan). The old names of shrjans 
are still informally used in Armenia to refer to specific geographic areas. As the ASIF project was 
designed before the territorial reform in Armenia, its planning and operations were based on the district 
(shrjan) level.
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officers disseminated information about ASIF, its activities and methods of operation. 
At the same time, they gathered information about the perspectives and position of the 
district/local authorities on the general situation and needs in the region. These 
workshops were completed in all of the target regions of Armenia within the first two 
years of ASIF’s operation.
After these workshops, the Promotion Unit commenced its activities in the local 
communities. Within one to two weeks’ time, several promotion teams (normally 
consisting of two officers) visited most villages of the district in order to inform them of 
the ASIF’s objectives and procedures and explain the expected roles and responsibilities 
of the communities. In the villages, they were supposed to have meetings with 
community leaders and community members representing various groups of 
stakeholders (women, the elderly, refugees, etc.).
During the same visit, along with the promotional activities, promotion officers 
conducted an informal local study. Through informal interviews and observations they 
gathered information so as to have an idea about the condition of economic and social 
infrastructure of the community, the needs and priorities at the local level and the 
community’s capacity to prepare a micro-project proposal and mobilise resources. The 
local study helped the Promotion Unit to conduct a preliminary selection of 
communities. Those communities that did not adhere to ASIF’s ‘exclusive’ eligibility 
criteria (e.g., adherence to the micro-project menu and the maximum cost ceiling) were 
left out at this stage.
After the local study, all promotion teams together visited the eligible communities so 
as the whole Promotion Unit could take part in the evaluation. The promotion officers 
once again assessed the local social situation, infrastructure needs and priorities and the 
capacity of the communities to formulate and submit a micro-project proposal. They 
advised local leaders about possible avenues for raising the required community 
contribution and ways of mobilising community members.
After this visit, the Promotion Unit conducted a preliminary selection of communities. 
The main criteria used for the pre-selection was the likelihood of submitting a micro­
project proposal by the community. This was determined through the analysis of such
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factors as the availability of financial resources, willingness of community members to 
participate, and the capacity of leaders to raise resources and mobilise a community 
action. After the preliminary selection, promotion officers visited the pre-selected 
communities and arranged for the day of a general community meeting.
At the general community meeting, community members were expected to identify and 
prioritise their needs and select a micro-project to be requested from ASIF. ASIF’s 
promotion officers participated in the general community meeting to support the 
community to conduct the meeting and to reiterate ASIF’s operating principles and 
procedures. In case of a proposal submission by a referendum ASIF helped organise an 
initiating group meeting with several community representatives. In case more than one 
problem area was raised at the meeting, at least two micro-project proposals were 
required to be submitted for the referendum. At the general community meeting (or 
based on the results of the referendum), the community was expected to elect an IA for 
carrying out the proposed micro-project.
After the completion of promotion activities in each district, ASIF accepted proposals 
during a one month period. The proposals were submitted on the micro-project proposal 
forms distributed during promotional activities. Where needed, the promotion officers 
assisted communities to prepare the proposal. The proposals were discussed at the 
Promotion Unit and evaluated against the ‘exclusive’ selection criteria (Box 4.4). These 
criteria included adherence to the ASIF micro-project typology, the micro-project cost 
ceiling and acceptable level of community support for the micro-project. After 
considering the proposals, the Promotion Unit forwarded all of them to the ASIF’s 
Executive Committee with its recommendations. If the proposal failed to meet the 
exclusive selection criteria, the Executive Committee normally rejected the proposal. 
The community was sent a letter of rejection with appropriate justification signed by the 
Executive Director. If the proposal met the exclusive selection criteria, it was then 
forwarded to the Appraisal Unit for appraisal. In those cases when the allocated funds 
for the district were not sufficient to finance a micro-project, the proposal was archived 
until the acquisition of additional resources.
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Box 4.3: ASIF’s Status and Structure
ASIF was established as a public agency. It was reporting to the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance, but it had financial and administrative autonomy. This autonomous status was designed 
to facilitate ASIF’s ability to work with local governments, private sector contractors and 
community groups in an efficient and effective manner. ASIF was governed by the Board of 
Directors, comprising of representatives of the Armenian government and NGOs. The Board’s 
approval was required for the micro-projects to be funded by ASIF. ASIF’s Executive Director 
was accountable to the Board of Directors. ASIF’s Executive Committee consisting of the 
ASIF’s senior staff was responsible for the approval o f all micro-project proposals submitted by 
communities. ASIF had fifty staff members. ASIF consisted of three departments and ten units. 
The following units were directly involved in the actual work with local communities: 
Promotion Unit, Appraisal Unit, Follow-up Unit, Estimation & Bidding Unit and Institutions 
Support Unit.
4.3.2 Micro-Project Appraisal and Approval
Following the presentation to the Executive Committee, the Appraisal Unit received all 
eligible micro-project proposals. The Appraisal Unit initiated field appraisal of the 
proposals. The field appraisal was conducted to verify the need for the proposed micro­
project, establish technical feasibility and possible impact of the micro-project, confirm 
community participation and identify mechanisms and commitment for the O&M of the 
facility after its completion. The ‘exclusive’ and ‘secondary’ appraisal criteria for 
verifying community participation are presented in Box 4.4. The field appraisal was 
conducted by an appraisal engineer. When technical expertise was required, ASIF could 
request consultant services to carry out an assessment in the field. Based on the field 
appraisal, the appraisal engineers scored and ranked all micro-project proposals. The 
proposals were then forwarded to the Executive Committee for approval. Micro-projects 
between US$50,000 and US$150,000 (and as of 1998, all micro-projects), required the 
approval of the ASIF’s Board of Directors. Micro-projects above US$100,000 were also 
subject to the World Bank’s non-objection.
During the appraisal stage, ASIF arranged for the preparation of designs and drawings 
(were applicable) for the proposed micro-projects. These were normally contracted out 
to external experts. ASIF also accepted ready-made designs/drawings that were 
available at a community’s disposal. External experts were asked to estimate the 
quantity of works to be performed for ‘construction’ micro-projects (the quantity of 
works for ‘renovation’ micro-projects was determined by the Appraisal Unit). On the 
basis of the estimated quantity of works, the ASIF Estimator designed a Bill of
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Quantities that defined the quantities and cost of works to be performed. It was designed 
in accordance with the technical specifications and norms on quality adopted by the 
Government of Armenia.
Box 4.4: ASIF’s Appraisal Criteria for Participation
Exclusive Criteria
> Community must hold a meeting in which at least 30 percent of the adult population 
participate.
> A petition supporting the micro-project must be organised by a person or a group within
community and be signed by at least 50 percent of the community.
>  Community presents a written commitment or other evidence for the provision of 
community contribution.
>  Community presents a Sustainability Plan where it elaborates mechanisms for the future 
O&M.
Secondary Criteria
> The percentage of vulnerable group members in the community.
>  The number of women in the IA.
> Participation of women at the general community meeting.
Source: ASIF Operational Manual 1998
4.3.3 Micro-Project Implementation
For each approved micro-project, the IA signed a legally binding Framework 
Agreement with ASIF. The Framework Agreement stipulated the responsibilities of 
each party, procurement methods, implementation schedule, and community 
contribution. After signing the Framework Agreement, the IA was expected to start the 
process of recruitment of the contractor. ASIF held pre-bidding workshops for potential 
bidders and the IAs. At the workshops, ASIF introduced the basics of competitive 
bidding and ASIF’s requirements and operating procedures for micro-project 
implementation. After selecting a construction company, the IA was asked to prepare a 
contract based on a model contract provided by ASIF. The ASIF Executive Director 
ratified the contract between the IA and the contractor. ASIF authorised the contractor 
only after the community’s cash contribution had been deposited on the ASIF’s bank 
account, or after in-kind/labour contribution had been received. After recruiting the 
contractor, the IA was to proceed with hiring a local supervisor. When the local
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supervisor was hired, the contractor received a letter from ASIF authorising the start of 
works.
4.3.4 Micro-Project Follow-up
The ASIF follow-up engineer was responsible for monitoring the progress of civil 
works and micro-project implementation. The follow-up engineer visited the micro­
project site at least twice a month. During these visits, he was expected to meet with the 
IAs, local supervisor and community members to discuss issues related to the micro­
project implementation and verify the progress and quality of construction works. The 
follow-up engineer was also supposed to identify any technical and managerial 
problems that the IAs faced. Payments to the contractor were made in several 
instalments, in proportion to the quantities of works done. Payments could only be made 
upon satisfactory evidence of accomplished works, after the verification and approval 
by the IAs and the follow-up engineer.
Upon completion of civil works, ASIF held an on-site completion and hand-over 
meeting for each micro-project. The follow-up engineer, the I A, local supervisor, 
contractors and community members formed a special Hand-Over Committee. The 
Committee determined whether the works were completed and the quality was 
satisfactory. After the Committee verified completion of all works, a provisional hand­
over agreement was signed. A retention amount of at least five percent of the micro­
project cost was withheld in case flaws and defects were observed. This amount was 
paid only when the IA and the follow-up engineer certified satisfactory condition of 
works. The micro-project was considered completed when a final hand-over agreement 
was signed. ASIF issued certificates to the LA, contractor and local supervisor about the 
successful completion of works.
4.3.5 Evaluation and Monitoring
ASIF developed key performance indicators for monitoring its overall performance 
effectiveness. These included indicators for monitoring resource targeting, micro­
project portfolio, procurement and disbursement, contracting, civil works progress, 
community involvement and gender participation. On the basis of these monitoring
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indicators ASIF prepared quarterly and annual reviews of the project performance. The 
overall project monitoring was done with the help of a computerised, internal 
monitoring Management Information System (MIS). The MIS allowed monitoring 
progression of micro-projects through the micro-project cycle, collecting and analysing 
all financial transactions and preparing regular progress reports. The MIS also allowed 
tracking the indicators for monitoring community and gender participation (Box 4.5). In 
order to assess the impact of the micro-projects, ASIF commissioned three Beneficiary 
Assessments (BAs). These studies focused on the beneficiary perceptions about the 
ASIF benefits, community participation and micro-project sustainability.
Box 4.5: ASIF’s Indicators for Monitoring Community and Gender Participation
> Proportion of all proposals presented by community.
>  Proportion of micro-projects with less than 10 percent community contribution.
>  Proportion of micro-projects with 10 percent or more community contribution.
>  Proportion of micro-projects for which a maintenance trust fund was set up.
>  Proportion of micro-projects for which an O&M agreement was reached.
>  Women as percentage of total IA members.
>  Average number of women in the micro-project.
Source: World Bank Staff Appraisal Report 1995.
4.4 Conclusions
This chapter provided an overview of ASIF’s objectives, micro-project implementing 
principles and operating procedures. The ASIF project belongs to the second generation 
of social funds, which were conceived in the mid-1990s and were designed to serve not 
only emergency service delivery objectives, both also developmental, capacity building 
goals. As the majority of social funds world-wide, ASIF provided grant funding to local 
communities for improving priority social and economic infrastructure in various 
sectors, including education, health, irrigation, water supply and sanitation. Unlike some 
other social funds, ASIF did not engage in other activities, such as for example, delivery 
of social care services or micro-credit. ASIF is similar to other social funds in terms of 
its design and operational features, including decentralised and participatory method of 
micro-project identification, preparation and implementation, demand orientation and 
organisational autonomy.
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It is argued that the new, third generation of social funds represents more advanced 
features. The newest social funds attach greater importance to empowerment, social 
capital and social cohesion, by explicitly incorporating them in their formal objectives, 
and by introducing targeted capacity building procedures in the project design and 
implementation (OED 2002: 41; Rawlings et al 2004: 6).
The chapter showed that participation and capacity building were among the stated 
objectives of the ASIF project. ASIF required beneficiary participation throughout the 
micro-project initiation and identification, planning and preparation, implementation, 
and evaluation and monitoring. ASIF developed a number of participatory 
implementing principles to ensure the involvement of community residents on the 
micro-project cycle. In particular, these included identification of a micro-project by 
community residents at a general community meeting, election of a community-based 
Implementing Agency (IA), beneficiary co-financing of the micro-project costs in the 
form of cash, in-kind or labour contributions and presentation of Sustainability Plans 
certifying beneficiary commitment to the O&M of the micro-project facility. ASIF 
delegated the IAs with the tasks of micro-project planning, preparation, contractor 
selection and supervision. The IAs were given legal mechanisms to hold the contractors 
accountable and ensure adequate micro-project construction quality. The IA was 
expected to regularly report to the beneficiary community members on the micro­
project implementation progress and financial status.
ASIF’s operating procedures were designed to solicit community participation 
throughout the micro-project cycle. ASIF conducted an outreach (promotion,) campaign 
in order to increase awareness among community members and potential private sector 
contractors about ASIF’s activities. ASIF’s promotion officers participated in the 
general community meeting to support the community to conduct the meeting and to 
reiterate ASIF’s operating principles and procedures. ASIF provided support to the 
communities in preparing micro-project proposals. ASIF’s micro-project appraisal 
criteria reflected the participatory orientation of ASIF and required acceptable level of 
community support for the micro-project. ASIF developed performance indicators to 
track community and gender participation throughout the micro-project cycle.
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The next chapter, Chapter Five, reviews the research design, key methods and the 
process of this research and presents the methodological, ethical and moral challenges 
that I faced during the research.
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Chapter Five. The Research Design and Methods
This chapter reviews the research design, methods and practice. First, it presents the 
research question, and how I set about answering it. Then it provides an account of how 
the research framework was constructed and data collected and analysed. The chapter 
reviews the key research methods and sample design and characteristics. It also 
discusses issues related to the quality of data and transferability of the research findings. 
Finally, the chapter describes the opportunities and challenges I faced during the 
fieldwork, and how they influenced the quality of the data.
5.1 The Research Design and Framework
This section discusses the research objectives and the approach chosen to address the 
research objectives. It presents the research framework and indicators derived for 
gathering data. The section describes the key methods used for assessing change and 
establishing causality.
5.1.1 The Research Design
The objective of this research is to assess the effectiveness of the ASIF project in 
enhancing community participation and institutional capacity in rural Armenia. In 
addressing this objective, the research sets out to investigate the impact of the ASIF 
micro-projects on community participation and local institutional capacity in selected 
rural communities in Armenia. The research identifies key factors that accounted for the 
specific impacts of the ASIF micro-projects. The research is designed as a qualitative 
case study aimed to provide detailed contextual knowledge on seven rural communities 
in Armenia, where ASIF supported irrigation infrastructure micro-projects in 1997-2000.
The case study approach has been defined as an “empirical enquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context” (Yin 1994: 13). It involves the 
development of detailed, contextual knowledge about a particular case or cases (Hakim 
1987: 61). Hence it is particularly well suited for the investigation of complex social 
roles and relationships. Case studies can take as their subjects selected examples of a 
social entity, including communities, social groups, organisations, life stories, families,
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roles and relationships, and use a variety of data collection methods (Hakim 1987: 61). 
The drawback of the case study approach is that since it concentrates on a small number 
of cases, findings cannot be claimed to empirically representative (Silverman 2005: 
127). The issue of transferability of the research findings is discussed in more detail in 
section 5.4.1 of this chapter.
The study uses in-depth qualitative methods of data collection. Qualitative research can 
be particularly well suited for probing and understanding the nature and multiple 
dimensions of social phenomena and for identifying factors affecting these phenomena 
(Snape and Spencer 2003: 4-5). One of the advantages of qualitative research is its 
explanatory nature. Thus it “is concerned with why phenomena occur and the forces and 
influences that drive their occurrence” (Ritchie 2003: 28). This explanatory role of 
qualitative research is achieved due to its facility to allow in-depth and interactive 
exploration of meanings, processes, and contextual characteristics. One of the key 
features of qualitative research is “openness” towards participants (Flick 1998: 5). It 
allows taking into account the diversity of viewpoints, practices and interpretations of 
social meanings. Qualitative research aims to study the complexity of contextual 
conditions, thus generating rich and extensive data for explaining and interpreting social 
phenomena.
It is argued that qualitative methods tend to reflect subjective views and perceptions of 
different individuals and use multiple sources of information, which poses difficulties 
for researchers to verify the validity of findings and integrity of inferences (Ritchie 
2003: 43-44; Robson 1993: 383). Thus due to the variety of sources and types of data, 
triangulation may not be an effective validating method (Ritchie 2003: 44). At the same 
time, the value of qualitative methods is in exposing the multiplicity of realities, 
influenced by respondents’ different perspectives and identities. Qualitative methods are 
often criticised for their reliance on non-probability sampling (Ritchie et al 2003: 78). 
The non-probability samples are not intended to be representative. Thus sampling units 
in this method are purposively selected from population based on prescribed selection 
criteria. Probability sampling, in which units of population are chosen randomly and 
have a known probability of selection, aims to produce statistically representative 
samples, and it is usually considered to be a more rigorous approach (Ritchie et al 2003: 
78). Findings from qualitative research cannot be normally used for providing estimates
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(e.g., statements on prevalence or incidence) and for making empirical generalisations. 
At the same time, some of the advantages of qualitative methods over quantitative 
methods are that they can rely on smaller samples, provide rich contextual data, allow 
focusing on both processes and impacts, and help better explain causal linkages (Patton 
1987: 9-10).
This research was designed as a ‘social policy’ evaluation.42 Its main objective was to 
assess the social impact of a project intervention through examining both project 
processes and project outcomes. 43 The research was not designed to be an 
‘anthropological’ inquiry. The main inferences about the local ‘realities’ in this research 
have been based on the account of personal experiences and perceptions by the 
respondents gathered through interviews at a particular point of time, and not through 
the researcher’s long-term personal engagement with the communities’ everyday life 
and social and institutional relationships and structures. The data was collected through 
the use of in-depth qualitative interviews and focus groups discussions. Limited direct 
observation techniques were also used. The evaluation method chosen may have 
consequently offered less depth of insight into the issues of local politics, power 
structures and social relationships that one could have obtained through 
‘anthropological’ research.44 At the same time, the qualitative methods used in the 
evaluation have allowed soliciting data of sufficient depth to understand the interface 
between the ASIF processes and the local social, political and institutional context. 
Section 5.4.2 provides detailed information on the specific constraints and opportunities 
that I faced during the fieldwork, which may have influenced the quality of the research.
The research consists of two key frameworks. The first framework provides a basis for 
the study of the local context in Armenia (Research Framework 1: Figures 5.1 and 5.2). 
In particular, this framework was designed to obtain data on the broader socio-economic, 
institutional and political factors that influence community participation and
42 More details on the evaluation design and methods follow in sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3.
43 The research was not specifically designed to explore the relationship between project objectives and 
project implementation practices as for example in Mosse’s (2005) ‘ethnography of aid’ approach.
44 Warwick (1993: 283-284) for example suggests that ‘anthropological’ observations can be especially 
suitable for obtaining in-depth information on complex relationships and behavioural patterns, including 
processes of leadership and power structures. At the same time, as Patton (1987: 49) argues, there are no 
general rules determining “how much depth and detail to strive for in qualitative research”, and these 
decisions should be made by a researcher based on available resources, time constraints and specific 
needs of the research.
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institutional capacity in rural communities in Armenia. This framework is discussed in 
detail in section 5.1.2. The second research framework uses the hypotheses and 
assumptions behind the ASIF project to examine the service delivery outcomes, 
processes and participation and capacity building impacts of the ASIF micro-projects 
(Research Framework 2: Figure 5.3). This framework is described in detail in section 
5.1.3. Section 5.1.4 of this chapter discusses how I assessed the impact of the ASIF 
micro-projects.
5.1.2 Understanding Local Context
I conducted a detailed exploration of the local context in order to identify broader socio­
economic, institutional and political factors that influence community participation and 
institutional capacity in rural communities in Armenia. The detailed exploration of the 
local context helped me distil factors that affected the ASIF micro-project processes, 
service delivery outcomes, and participation and capacity building impacts. In Chapter 
Ten, I used these data to explain how the contextual environment of the local 
communities was understood and operationalised in ASIF’s design features, and how it 
affected ASIF’s micro-project processes, outcomes and impacts.
The exploration of the local context comprised two stages. First, I gathered information 
on the socio-economic situation in the sample communities, including information on 
physical and financial assets, access to the essential social and economic infrastructure 
and social services, as well as specific geographical, climatic and cultural aspects of the 
local context that affect people’s livelihoods (Research Framework 1: Figure 5.1). The 
detailed mapping of community assets in individual communities is presented in Annex 
5, and a summary of community assets is presented in Figure 7.1 of Chapter Seven. I 
used these data to examine how the existing fiscal constraints and high level of material 
and social deprivation influence community participation and local institutional capacity 
in the sample communities.
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Figure 5.1: Research Framework 1: Community Assets
Key Themes Data Required for Analysis
Demographic and Social > How many years has this village been in existence?
Characteristics > Where do the inhabitants originally come from?
> Has it grown/got smaller or stayed the same within the last 
10 years?
> Who are the people most likely to come in or to leave the 
community?
> What are the main social groups present (refugees, ethnic 
minorities, etc.)?
> Are there some extremely poor/rich households in the 
village?
People’s Livelihoods > In the last 10 years, how have the living conditions and 
quality of life o f inhabitants changed (job availability, 
material conditions, security, public services, etc.)?
> What are the main social vulnerabilities?
> What are the main coping strategies?
> What is the people’s perception of their well/ill-being?
Geographical and Climatic > How conducive are geographical and climatic conditions
Factors to local economic development?
Financial Assets > What is the fiscal capacity of the local government?
> What are the main sources of funding of local services and 
development activities?
Land > Who has land and who has not? Do they get profit from 
land?
> Do all community members have access to irrigated land?
> Do they have sufficient agricultural inputs and irrigation 
water to cultivate land?
Economic Activities > What are the main economic activities in the community?
> Do community members get their products to the market 
and earn profit?
> Do they have access to credit and loans?
Public Services
> What is the biggest problem facing the community?
> What is the situation with public services (health, 
education, and utilities), housing and important 
infrastructure (water, irrigation, and roads)?
> Who provides important public services?
> Who uses and does not use these services?
Secondly, I explored the existing local institutions, forms and nature of participation, 
the intensity of empowerment of local residents, social capital, and institutional capacity 
in rural Armenia. I paid particular attention to the governance environment at the local,
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regional and national level, and its impact on local institutions and on the existing forms 
and nature of community participation in the sample communities. These data allowed 
me to identify social, institutional and political factors that affect participation and local 
institutional capacity in the sample communities. I collected these data based on the 
indicators developed in Research Framework 1 (Figure 5.2; Annex 2: Interview Guide 
1). These data have been analysed and presented in Chapter Seven.
Figure 5.2: Research Framework 1: Community Participation, Social Capital, Local Institutions 
and Governance
Key Themes Data Required for Analysis
Community Participation (i) the existence of collective initiatives and projects (both 
locally and externally-driven); (ii) forms and nature of 
participation in collective initiatives and projects (the extent 
of empowered participation -  who participates and how); 
(iii) perceptions of residents of their influence, roles and 
ownership; (v) perceptions about the benefits of 
participation; (vi) nature and dynamics of participation in 
the ASIF micro-project.
Structural Social Capital (i) the existence of community groups or organisations; (ii) 
nature of participation in the organisations; (iii) nature of 
local group (externally or locally induced); (iv) leadership 
role; (v) existence of self-governing rules for assigning 
responsibilities and allocating benefits; (vi) perceptions of 
residents of their influence, roles and ownership; (vii) 
perceptions about the benefits of participation; (vii) local 
conflicts and how they are resolved.
Cognitive Social Capital (i) the nature of interpersonal relations; (ii) extent of co­
operation, mutual help and solidarity; (iii) local conflicts 
and how they are resolved; (iv) extent of social exclusion; 
(v) bridging, bonding and linking social capital.
Local Institutions (i) the types of prevailing institutional arrangements for 
service delivery, problem-solving and decision-making 
(e.g., reliance on civic participation; authorities; relatives 
and friends; diffuse connections; breaking the law, other);
(ii) perceptions of residents and local leaders about how 
things can get done.
Political Participation (i) the existing accountability mechanisms (horizontal, 
vertical and social); (ii) people’s voice in local decision­
making and ability to influence policy options and resource 
allocation.
Local Governance (i) local authorities and the nature of local governance 
(accountability, responsiveness; transparency; the rule of 
law); (ii) managing local development (who is managing 
local development, how and how effectively?); (iii) 
relations local leaders with local residents; (iv) opinions of 
residents about local leaders.
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National and Regional Governance (j) community perceptions about the role and effectiveness
of the central and regional government; (ii) the extent of 
support provided by central/regional government; (iii) the 
experience of dealing with regional/central governments.
5.1.3 Unpacking ASIF: Project Assumptions and Impact Indicators
In order to assess the impact of the ASIF project, the study uses the theory-based 
evaluation method.45 This method is often used in project evaluations and is described 
as “systematic assessment of the operation and/or the outcomes of the program or policy, 
compared to a set of explicit or implicit standards” (Weiss 1998: 4). The essence of this 
method is that in order to evaluate a programme it is necessary to understand the 
explicit and implicit theories on which the programme’s objectives, design and 
implementation are based. These theories, or hypotheses, represent a “sequence of 
assumptions that show how program inputs (staff, resources and activities) translate 
through a series of intermediate steps to desired programme outcomes” (Weiss 1998: 
70). These assumptions can be used as a guide to evaluation. Thus, data is collected to 
test the programme hypotheses and examine how working assumptions are unfolding 
during the life of a programme.
One of the advantages of this method is that it allows making inferences about the 
validity of working assumptions underlying programme design. This “may help to 
increase the generalisability of study results from the single case under study to the 
range of programs that are based on similar assumptions” (Weiss 1998: 71). Another 
advantage of this method is that it allows focusing not only on programme outcomes but 
also on the processes leading to those outcomes. Examination of processes can help 
better understand and explain how and why particular effects occur. Thus, linking 
micro-project processes to outcomes (i.e., participation and capacity building impacts) 
can help establish factors that accounted for the specific ASIF micro-project impacts 
(more detailed discussion follows in section 5.1.4). The examination of micro-project 
processes is also important for better understanding of local institutions and social 
organisation in the sample communities. The opportunity to observe the types and 
nature of local responses and processes stimulated by the micro-project interventions at
45 This method was used in the World Bank’s OED evaluation of social funds. The theoretical framework 
of this research builds upon the framework of the OED draft evaluation design paper (OED 2000), July 
12, 2000, which was available on the World Bank’s website in 2000.
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various stages of the micro-project cycle can deepen our understanding of the local 
social, institutional and political environment.
For the purposes of this study, I identified the key hypotheses and assumptions 
underlying World Bank supported social fund projects and the ASIF project in 
particular. In order to do this, I conducted a review of literature on social funds, 
including academic publications, impact assessments and project documents (Chapter 
Three). In addition, I conducted a desk review and analysis of available World Bank and 
ASIF project documents in order to identify ASIF’s objectives, micro-project 
implementing principles and operational procedures (Chapters Four). As part of the 
fieldwork, I conducted semi-structured and conversational interviews with the ASIF 
management and staff members in order to deepen my understanding about ASIF’s 
institutional design and implementation methods.
Based on the analysis of the ASIF project documents and my interviews with the ASIF 
staff, I distilled the hypotheses and assumptions behind the ASIF project and defined 
indicators for assessing the ASIF processes, service delivery outcomes, and 
participation and capacity building impacts (Research Framework 2: Figure 5.3). Then I 
collected data to test these hypotheses and examine whether the assumptions behind the 
ASIF project have been met (Annex 2: Interview Guides 2 and 3). The following are the 
main hypotheses and assumptions underlying ASIF’s objectives, micro-project 
implementing principles and operational procedures, and indicators developed to test 
these hypotheses and assumptions.
Hypothesis 1: Micro-Project Processes. Involvement of community members in the 
social fund micro-projects is seen as the key mechanism for enhancing participation in 
local development and building institutional capacity. Social funds are thought to enable 
local community groups effectively participate in the initiation, identification, 
preparation and implementation of micro-projects. In particular, (i) social funds devolve 
decision-making authority and resources to community groups; and (ii) social funds 
establish organisational structures (IAs) and hence create spaces for community 
participation. It is assumed that the demand-driven investment choice (expressed 
through the selection of the micro-project and provision of community contribution) 
induces local ownership and willingness to participate in the micro-project cycle.
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Indicators:
The extent and nature of participation throughout the micro-project cycle:
> Community members identify a micro-project that reflects its immediate priority 
demand.
> Community members elect an IA.
> Community members provide in-kind/cash/labour contribution.
> The IA is delegated with the tasks of micro-project preparation and 
implementation.
> Community members effectively participate in the micro-project preparation 
and implementation.
> Community members participate in the important decision-making.
> Community members hold the I A, local leaders and contractors accountable.
> The IA regularly consults community members (non-IA) and reports on the 
micro-project progress and financial status.
Hypothesis 2: Social Capital Effect. Social funds can help build positive social capital. 
For the purposes of this study, social capital is operationalised as social norms and 
values (cognitive social capital), formal and informal networks and partnerships 
(structural social capital).
Cognitive social capital. Social fund micro-projects induce frequent positive 
interactions among community members and help establish a process of social learning. 
Such social learning can reinforce trusting relations and attitudes of co-operation. The 
possible effects of ASIF on social norms can be evaluated at two levels: horizontal - 
effects on social norms that regulate interpersonal relations among community members 
(e.g., increased co-operation and solidarity, or distrust and conflicts) (bonding and 
bridging social capital); and vertical - effects on social norms that regulate relations 
between community residents and authorities (linking social capital).
Structural social capital. Frequent positive interactions among community members 
and positive service delivery outcomes can result in strengthening of old and creation of 
new social networks (formal and informal groups, associations and partnerships). Social 
networks and partnerships can be formed at two levels: horizontal (among community
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members only) (bonding and bridging social capital) and vertical (between community 
members and representatives of local/regional government; school/clinic directors, other 
representatives of official institutions) (linking social capital).
Social fund projects presume that positive experience of participation in the micro­
project cycle and positive service delivery outcomes are key preconditions for 
strengthening interpersonal trust and increasing the willingness of community members 
to form associations and to get together in the beneficiary communities.
Indicators:
1. Positive experience of community interaction during micro-project preparation and 
implementation.
2. Positive service delivery outcomes.
3. Changes in the existing social norms and interpersonal relations:
> Change in the relations among community members (levels of trust and co­
operation).
> Change in the relations between community members and local/regional 
authorities and/or school/clinic directors (levels of trust and co-operation).
4. Change in the extent and nature of conflicts in the community.
5. New social networks formed:
> Increased circle of friends and acquaintances, other useful connections acquired 
(both inside and outside community).
> Establishment of formal and informal groups, associations and partnerships, 
possibly with the involvement of local/regional authorities and other officials.
> Increased membership in groups and organisations.
> The IA (or some of its core members) continues to be active after the micro­
project completion.
Hypothesis 3: Learning by Doing Effect. Participation in the micro-project cycle can 
enhance community’s access to information and experience and help develop new 
technical, organisational and administrative knowledge and skills. Community members 
can come to realise the benefits of a collective action and learn new ways and methods 
of tackling local problems. They may then utilise their knowledge and experience in 
other activities in their community.
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Indicators:
Improved skills, abilities, knowledge and practices:
> Improved/new skills, abilities and knowledge (for example, technical, 
organisational and communication skills; ability to deal with donors; fund­
raising and proposal writing).
> Community members’ perceptions about the benefits of the ASIF’s method of 
service delivery.
Hypothesis 4: Empowerment Effect. Participation in the micro-project cycle can 
empower community members, and produce changes in attitudes and behaviour. As a 
result of a positive experience of collective action, community members can become 
more self-confident and self-aware, and paternalistic expectations can be replaced with 
a more self-reliant attitude. Community members may be more willing and able to 
exercise voice and participate in local affairs.
Indicators:
> Individuals who were previously passive and/or socially excluded participate in 
local development.
> Community members exercise voice, take part in local decision-making and 
hold authorities accountable.
> Community members’ perceptions of their role and influence.
Hypotheses 5, 6 and 7: Improved Institutional Capacity. Social funds can strengthen 
local social capital (Hypothesis 2), improve local skills, abilities, knowledge and 
practices (Hypothesis 3), and promote attitudinal changes (Hypothesis 4), and thus can 
help enhance local institutional capacity. Institutional capacity is operationalised in this 
study as the ability and willingness of communities to (i) actively participate in local 
development and undertake mutually beneficial development initiatives and projects 
(Hypothesis 5), (ii) effectively manage, operate, and maintain social fund investments 
(Hypothesis 6), and (iii) effectively resolve collective action problems in governing 
local irrigation systems (Hypothesis 7).
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Hypothesis 5: Participation Effect. It is assumed that participation in the micro-project 
cycle can help build social capital (trusting relations and formal or informal networks), 
enhance people’s skills, knowledge and experience and promote attitudinal changes, as 
a result of which individuals may be more willing and able to participate in local 
development.
Indicators:
Enhanced community participation:
> Community-based initiatives and projects, where community members 
utilised/or intend to utilise their technical and organisational skills and 
experience, gained/improved due to the involvement in the micro-project.
> Increased frequency of development projects (supported by development 
agencies and NGOs) and local initiatives for community improvement 
(supported by the local/regional budget or community members).
> Leadership initiatives by previously passive/excluded community members (e.g., 
community members initiate small projects, take leadership over an important 
issue, mobilise other co-villagers, petition government, etc.).
> Increased scope of participation of community members (e.g., more people 
participate in collective initiatives).
Hypothesis 6: Effective Operation and Maintenance. Social funds can enable
community members effectively carry out their roles and responsibilities with regard to 
the operation and maintenance (O&M). Thus (i) participation in the micro-project cycle 
can engender local ownership and willingness to participate in O&M, and (ii) 
strengthened social capital can increase the likelihood of establishment and acceptance 
of rules and procedures for O&M and facilitates their enforcement.
Indicators:
Effective O&M:
> Physical condition of facilities.
> Effective O&M rules and procedures in place.
> Awareness, acceptance and compliance with O&M roles and responsibilities.
> Community members participate in O&M.
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Hypothesis 7: Effective Self-Governance. Strengthened stocks of social capital can 
allow community members effectively resolve collective action problems in governing 
local irrigation systems. In particular, strong social capital can enhance the likelihood of 
establishment and acceptance of rules and procedures for governing irrigation and 
effective enforcement of these rules and procedures.
Indicators:
Effective self-governance procedures:
> Effective rules and procedures for allocation and distribution of water.
> Awareness by community members of rules and procedures, and the extent of 
compliance with these rules and procedures.
> Existence of monitoring arrangements to prevent free-riding.
> Extent to which water conflicts are prevented and resolved.
> Satisfaction of users with the existing arrangements.
Figure 5.3: Research Framework 2: ASIF*s Im pact on Community Participation and Local 
Institutional Capacity
Hypotheses Assumptions Data Required to Test the 
Hypotheses and Assumptions
1. Social funds 
enable community 
members effectively 
participate in the 
initiation, 
identification, 
preparation and 
implementation of 
local infrastructure 
micro-projects.
Social funds devolve decision-making 
authority and resources to community 
groups.
Social funds establish organisational 
structures (IAs) and hence create spaces 
for community participation.
Demand-driven investment choice 
induces local ownership and willingness 
to participate in the micro-project cycle.
The extent and nature of 
participation throughout the 
micro-project cycle:
Community members identify a 
micro-project that reflects its 
immediate priority demand.
Community members elect an 
IA.
Community members provide 
in-kind/cash/labour contribution.
The IA is delegated with the 
tasks of micro-project 
preparation and implementation.
Community members 
effectively participate in the 
micro-project preparation and 
implementation.
Community members participate 
in the important decision­
making.
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Community members hold the 
LA., local leaders and contractors 
accountable.
The IA regularly consults 
community members (non-IA) 
and reports on the micro-project 
progress and financial status.
2. Participation in the 
micro-project cycle 
builds positive social 
capital.
Changes in local social and 
interpersonal relations.
Extent and nature of conflict 
resolution.
Development of formal and 
informal social networks, 
groups, associations and 
partnerships.
Increased associational 
membership.
Frequent positive interactions among 
community members build/strengthen 
trust.
Frequent positive interactions result in 
strengthening of old and creation of new 
social networks.
Positive experience of 
community interaction during 
micro-project preparation and 
implementation.
Positive service delivery 
outcomes.
3. Participation in the Community members develop technical, Improved/new skills, abilities
micro-project cycle 
enhances
community’s access 
to information and 
experience and helps 
develop new 
knowledge and skills.
organisational and administrative skills. and knowledge.
Community members learn new, 
community-based approaches to tackling 
local problems.
Community members’ 
perception about ASIF’s method 
of service delivery.
4. Participation in the 
micro-project cycle 
empowers
community members.
Changes occur in attitudes and behaviour.
Community members are more willing 
and able to exercise voice and participate 
in local affairs.
Individuals who were previously 
passive and/or socially excluded 
participate in local development.
Community members exercise 
voice, take part in local decision­
making and hold authorities 
accountable.
Community members’ 
perceptions of their role and 
influence.
124
5. Participation in the 
micro-project cycle 
enhances 
participation of 
community members 
in local development.
Community members are more willing 
and able to participate in local 
development and initiate new 
development projects and activities in 
order to solve community problems.
Community members utilise 
their new/improved skills, 
knowledge and experience in 
other activities in their 
community.
Increased frequency of 
development projects and local 
initiatives.
Leadership initiatives by 
previously passive/excluded 
community members.
More community members 
participate in local projects.
6. Participation in the 
micro-project cycle 
enables individuals 
effectively carry out 
their roles and 
responsibilities with 
regard to the 
operation and 
maintenance (O&M).
Participation in the micro-project 
engenders local ownership and 
willingness to participate in O&M.
Social capital increases the likelihood of 
establishment and acceptance o f rules and 
procedures for O&M and facilitates their 
enforcement.
Physical condition of facilities.
Effective O&M rules and 
procedures.
Awareness, acceptance and 
compliance with O&M roles and 
responsibilities.
Community participation in 
O&M.
7. Strengthened 
social capital allows 
irrigators effectively 
resolve collective 
action problems in 
governing local 
irrigation.
Irrigators establish rules and procedures, 
and assign roles and responsibilities for 
managing irrigation systems.
Irrigators effectively enforce those rules 
and procedures.
Effective rules and procedures 
for allocation and distribution of 
water.
Awareness by community 
members o f rules and procedures 
and the extent o f compliance 
with them.
Monitoring arrangements to 
prevent free-riding.
Extent to which water conflicts 
are prevented and resolved.
Satisfaction of users with the 
existing arrangements.
5.1.4 Assessing Change and Establishing Causality
The issue of how to assess change and establish its causality was of key importance in 
the design of this research. First, I needed to assess whether the existing features of
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institutional and social organisation in the sample communities (presented in Chapter 
Seven) were in any way influenced by the ASIF micro-projects. Second, I needed to 
establish whether the observed outcomes could be attributed to ASIF. For example, it 
was crucial to trace whether any newly established networks and groups or community- 
based projects and initiatives were the consequence of the ASIF micro-projects.
A conventional method to explore project impacts is to conduct ‘before and after’ 
studies, in which baseline data is compared with the data gathered after the intervention. 
There was no baseline data available to assess the participation and capacity building 
effects of ASIF. Another method for assessing impacts is the ‘treatment-control’ 
comparison based on the statistical propensity score matching technique. The treatment- 
control comparison method is considered especially ‘reliable’ among many researchers 
in development agencies.46 This method was used by Chase (2002) in assessing ASIF’s 
targeting and welfare impacts in local communities in Armenia. This method compares 
communities in the treatment group (ASIF communities) with communities in the 
control group (non-ASIF communities). The control group communities are selected 
based on household survey data to match the treatment group communities by their 
main social and economic indicators. It is believed that this method allows statistically 
rigorous selection of a control group that is almost identical with the treatment group. 
Any differences in the treatment and control communities are believed to be attributable 
to the studied intervention.
I believe that this method is not adequate for assessing social and institutional impacts 
of development projects. In order to isolate the effects of an intervention, control 
communities must be matched with treatment communities before the intervention. 
Identifying communities with initially identical levels of social capital and patterns of 
institutional organisation through their socio-economic characteristics is difficult. 
Communities may statistically match by their main social and economic indicators, but 
this may not imply that they have identical levels of social capital and similar 
institutional characteristics. Secondly, any observable differences in social and
48 Mansuri and Rao (2003: 38), who conducted a review of CDD evaluations for the World Bank, argue 
that “one of the most worrying findings” of their review of CDD activities was that the vast majority of 
them did not have “reliable evaluations, based on representative samples with treatment and control 
groups, and baseline and follow up data”. They call on to “urgently rectify this situation” (Mansuri and 
Rao 2003:43).
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institutional features between the treatment and control groups may be attributable to a 
variety of factors, which are difficult to control for by using a limited menu of basic 
indicators from household surveys. It is also difficult to isolate the impacts of other 
development interventions that have probably taken place in the community. Finally, it 
is hard to identify statistical indicators that would capture the nature and complexity of 
social life. As highlighted in section 5.1.1, qualitative approaches can be more suitable 
for addressing research questions that require explanation or understanding of complex 
social arrangements and their contexts. This research used in-depth qualitative methods 
to explore ASIF’s impact and establish causality.
As discussed earlier, I used the assumptions underpinning the ASIF project to derive 
the impact indicators in Research Framework 2: Hypotheses 2-7 (Figure 5.3). In order 
to assess possible change and trace causality, I gathered data on these impact indicators 
before and after the ASIF micro-projects. The summary of the key indicators used in 
the ‘before and after’ comparisons is presented in Box 5.1. The ‘before’ data was 
gathered by asking retrospective questions to the respondents (Annex 2: Interview 
Guides 1 and 3).47 Thus, I was able to examine whether ASIF micro-projects induced 
any change in the patterns and nature of community participation, the intensity of 
empowerment of local residents, social capital (social norms and interpersonal relations; 
the extent and nature of conflicts; formal and informal groups and organisational 
membership), skills, knowledge, abilities and experience of community residents, O&M 
arrangements, and self-governance procedures for water allocation and distribution in 
the sample communities. The analysis of these data is presented in Chapter Nine.
>
B o x 5.1: Key Indicators Used in the *Before and After* Comparison 
Social norms and interpersonal relations (both horizontal and vertical).
> The extent and nature of community conflicts.
> Formal or informal groups and organisational membership.
> Skills, knowledge, abilities and practices.
> The intensity o f community empowerment.
> The forms and nature of community participation.
> Operation and maintenance arrangements.
> Self-governance procedures and practices.
47 Lewis (2003: 53) argues that qualitative research allows collection of “fairly detailed retrospective 
accounts”. At the same time, the quality of data collected through retrospective questioning may suffer 
due to “problems with recall, distortion and post-event rationalisation” (Lewis 2003: 54).
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It is possible that the observed outcomes were induced by the existing (pre-ASIF) stocks 
of social capital in the sample communities. This issue is especially relevant as the 
demand-driven nature of social funds implies that communities with already existing 
high levels of social capital are more likely to be successful in obtaining funding and 
managing micro-projects (discussed in section 3.2.2 of Chapter Three). In order to 
isolate ASIF’s effects, I investigated the individual experiences of active community 
leaders and residents (‘tracing back’ technique). Thus, I established what role some 
particularly active individuals (for example, local mayors) played in the community 
before the ASIF micro-project, and whether their roles in the community after the 
micro-project were driven by their participation in the ASIF micro-project or by their 
prior experience, skills and social connections.
B ox 5.2: Establishing A S IF  Effects: *Tracing Forward* (Example)
During A SIF  micro-project
> Did the respondent participate in the ASIF micro-project?
> What was the nature of his/her participation in the ASIF micro-project?
After A SIF  micro-project
> Did the respondent become a member of a group/organisation after his/her participation 
in the ASIF micro-project?
> Did the respondent take part in collective initiatives/projects after his/her participation in 
the ASIF micro-project?
Before A SIF  micro-project
> Was the respondent a member o f any other groups/organisations before the ASIF micro­
project?
> Did the respondent participate in collective initiatives/projects before the ASIF micro­
project?
Another way of assessing the participation and capacity building effects of the ASIF 
micro-projects was through examining individual experiences. I established whether the 
micro-project ‘activated’ previously passive or socially excluded residents by 
examining the experiences of the individuals who were known to be engaged in the 
preparation and implementation of the ASIF micro-projects (‘tracing forward’ 
technique). Thus I identified community members who participated in the ASIF micro­
projects (for example, local leaders, members of the IA and community residents who 
co-operated with the IA), and established whether they continued playing an active role
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in the community after the ASIF micro-project (Box 5.2). In order to establish causality, 
I also identified patterns of their participation and role in the community before the 
ASIF micro-project.
The effects of ASIF were explored through the examination of linkages between the 
micro-project processes and outcomes. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, linking 
processes to outcomes can help better understand and explain the specific project 
outcomes. According to the theory-based evaluation method, in order for a project to 
achieve the desired outcomes, a specific phased sequence of causes and effects 
envisaged by the project assumptions should hold. By comparing working assumptions 
to actual developments it is possible to identify whether the intended linkages occur and 
test the project hypotheses. Any breach in any of the phases in the sequence may 
negatively affect the end result. It is assumed that participation and capacity building 
effects of social funds can occur only when community members have genuine 
involvement in the micro-project cycle (Figure 5.3: Research Framework 2: Hypothesis 
1). Another assumption behind social fund projects is that positive service delivery 
outcomes and positive experience of community interaction during the micro-project 
cycle are key preconditions to building local social capital and increasing local 
institutional capacity (Figure 5.3: Research Framework 2: Hypotheses 2 and 5).
B o x  5.3: Assessing A S IF ’s  Im pact through Micro-Project Processes and Outcomes
1. The extent and nature of participation throughout the micro-project cycle:
>  Community identifies a micro-project that reflects its immediate priority demand.
> Community elects an IA.
> Community provides in-kind/cash/labour contribution.
> The LA is delegated with the tasks of micro-project preparation and implementation.
>  Ordinary residents effectively participate in the micro-project preparation and 
implementation.
> Community participates in the important decision-making.
>  Community members hold the IA, local leaders and contractors accountable.
> The IA regularly consults community residents (non-LA) and reports on progress and 
financial status.
2. Service delivery outcomes.
3. The experience of community’s interaction during the micro-project cycle.
Therefore, I assessed the extent and nature of community participation in the micro­
project decision-making and implementation processes (who and how participated in 
the ASIF micro-project) and made linkages to the micro-project impacts (Box 5.3; and
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Annex 2: Interview Guide 2). I also examined the micro-project service delivery 
outcomes and the experience of community interaction during the micro-project cycle. 
The analysis of the micro-project processes and service delivery outcomes (presented in 
Chapter Eight) allowed a nuanced interpretation of participation and capacity building 
effects of the ASIF micro-projects (Chapters Nine and Ten).
Finally, another method of assessing change was based on the community's assessment 
o f change. I explored the perspectives of the respondents about the impact of the ASIF 
micro-projects in inducing possible changes in the community and in their own roles 
and influence in their communities (Box 5.4; Annex 2: Interview Guides 1 and 3).
B ox 5.4: Individual Assessment o f  Change
> Has the ASIF micro-project left any impact in the community?
>  Has the ASIF micro-project produced any change in the way people view participation in
collective initiatives?
>  Has the ASIF micro-project produced any change in their individual abilities and skills, 
roles and influence?
>  Has the ASIF micro-project produced any change in interpersonal relations?
>  Has the ASIF micro-project produced any change their in relations with local authorities?
The small sample size required for qualitative research did not allow measuring the 
change in the scope of participation on the community-wide level. Thus, I was unable to 
empirically estimate the change in the number or proportion of community residents 
involved in the community-wide initiatives before and after the ASIF micro-projects. 
Survey methods seem more appropriate for such investigation. The small sample size 
and the limited time frame of this research did not allow capturing the individual 
experiences of community members who may have participated and/or benefited from 
the ASIF micro-project, but who were not identified and interviewed during the 
fieldwork.
5.2 The Research Methods
This section first discusses how the research communities and research population were 
selected, and provides information on the sample size and characteristics. It then 
describes the main methods used for data collection.
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5.2.1 Research Sample
The fieldwork research was conducted in seven rural communities, where ASIF 
supported irrigation micro-projects in 1997-2000.1 limited the research to the irrigation 
micro-projects for two reasons. Firstly, focus on micro-projects in only one sector 
allowed a more in-depth examination of issues related to that particular sector and 
obtaining rich data to draw comparisons among different communities. Secondly, the 
time and resource constraints did not allow expanding the research to other sectors, such 
as education, health and potable water, where ASIF supported micro-projects. I chose 
the irrigation sector as it provides an interesting framework for studying complex social 
interactions and institutional relations. Firstly, the actual ‘community’ in the irrigation 
sector comprises all irrigation users. This definition of a community effectively means 
that the ‘irrigation community’ in rural Armenia overlaps with the ‘village community’. 
In its irrigation micro-projects, ASIF considered the entire population of a village as the 
micro-project community. Such broad definition of community allows examination of 
institutional and social relations and obtaining in-depth data on different aspects of 
social arrangements on a village-wide level.
Secondly, due to its ‘common pool’ characteristics, the irrigation sector can help reveal 
rich insights about the dynamics of community participation and patterns of social 
interaction. Thus successful management of irrigation systems depends upon 
participation and co-operation of all irrigators. Conflicting interests and preferences and 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of even a few irrigators can undermine the 
effectiveness of a collective action for the whole community. Such co-operation is often 
less structured, as for example, social relations within a ‘school community’. My prior 
research revealed that formal rules (e.g., the authority of a school director) and 
organisational and physical boundaries (e.g., school building) of the school play an 
important role in regulating collective action and inducing participation. Studying social 
interaction in irrigation allows obtaining particularly insightful data about the conditions 
affecting grassroots co-operation and collective action on a village-wide level, where 
the boundaries and spaces for local action are less structured and formally regulated.
The research used purposive sampling to identify the sample communities. I based my 
sampling design upon the assumption that the study of communities with different
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socio-economic and demographic characteristics in different regions of Armenia would 
enable me to capture a diverse range of contexts and impacts. Features of social and 
institutional organisation in different communities can vary depending on their history, 
social composition, leadership, socio-economic development, and geographic and 
climatic factors. Hence impacts of development interventions can also vary in different 
communities.
Table 5.1: A S IF  Micro-Projects in the Sample Communities
Community Number of Micro-project Dates of S tart Contract Actual
Households Description & Completion cost Community
/Residents Contribution
Ashnak (AK) 429/1450 Construction 28.10.97 $135,866 11%
Talin shrjan of irrigation 19.06.98
Shirak marz pipeline
P aruyr Sevak (PS) 120/730 Construction 06.11.97 $64,712 11%
Ararat shrjan of irrigation 12.03.98
Ararat marz pipeline
Eghegnavan (E) 760/1670 Construction 31.10.2000 $41,674 10%
Ararat shrjan of irrigation 28.12.2000
Ararat marz canal
Khachik (K) 264/1150 Construction 18.11.97 $49,793 21%
Eghegnadsor shrjan of irrigation 31.08.98
Vayots Dzor marz network
Karin (KN) 136/700 Construction 18.11.97 $44,678 9%
Ashtarak shrjan of irrigation 06.05.98
Aragatzotn marz network
Tsilkar (TS) 138/540 Rehabilitation 17.03.98 $31,010 12%
Aragats shrjan of irrigation 15.07.98
Aragatzotn marz network
Arevadasht (AR) 90/120 Rehabilitation 19.09.2000 $67,473 10%
Baghramian shrjan of irrigation 07.12.2000
Armavir marz network
I selected seven communities situated in different administrative regions (marzes) of 
Armenia, including Ararat, Vayots Dzor, Aragatzotn, Armavir and Shirak marzes 
(Table 5.1).48In my selection, I was constrained by practical considerations. ASIF 
supported in total 29 irrigation micro-projects in different regions of Armenia, including 
24 communities in rural areas and 5 communities in urban areas. Of these 24 rural 
communities, 14 communities in Tavush, Syunik and Lori marzes were remote from 
Yerevan, where I was based during the fieldwork. Access to these regions was difficult 
due to poor road condition and long distances. I decided to exclude these communities 
from the sample and to choose more accessible communities in order to allow myself 
flexibility and be able to visit the sample communities repeatedly upon an emerging
48 The majority of these communities are situated in different districts (shrjan).
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need. In order to select diverse communities, I collected preliminary information on the 
remaining communities in the list. First, I reviewed the basic socio-economic and 
demographic indicators of these communities in the ASIF’s management information 
system (MIS). Second, I asked the ASIF promotion officers, who had visited most 
micro-project communities, to highlight the key characteristics of the short-listed 
communities.
5.2.2 Selection of Respondents and Research Methods
I identified three groups of respondents. The respondents in the first group were 
selected from the community members who were most knowledgeable about the ASIF 
micro-projects (key informants). The key informants included local mayors, deputy 
mayors, school directors, heads and members of the Implementing Agency (IA), 
heads/members of Water Users Associations (WUAs) as well as community members 
who were somehow involved in the micro-project initiation and/or implementation (Box 
5.5). These respondents were selected through purposive or judgement sampling, which 
is “a form of non-probability sampling, where informants are selected according to a 
number of criteria established by the researcher such as their status (age, sex, and 
occupation) or previous experience that endows them with special knowledge” (Burgess 
1991: 55). Most key informants were men (in the age range of 40 to 60), which reflects 
the patterns of gender participation in the ASIF micro-projects. The only female key 
informants were the school directors, several IA members, and the head of the WUA in 
Eghegnavan.
The second group of respondents included community residents representing various 
social groups in the chosen communities (and not chosen because of their knowledge 
about ASIF). These respondents were selected through purposive sampling. The 
sampling was stratified so as to reflect the social composition of the beneficiary 
communities and represent a variety of beneficiary views and circumstances. I first 
studied the social composition of the sample communities, and then identified 
community residents with different social backgrounds and characteristics. The 
respondents in this category included men and women; the elderly; indigenous residents, 
new settlers from other parts of Armenia, and ethnic Armenian refugees from 
Azerbaijan; the disabled; the elite and marginally poor and socially excluded
133
households; ethnic Armenians and Yezidi Kurds. In terms of its size, this sample was 
not selected to be statistically representative of the beneficiary population of the 
communities.
B ox  5 .5 ; M ain Respondents and Research M ethods Used
1. Method: In-Depth Semi-Structured Individual Interviews (Key Informants)
> Local Mayor
> Deputy Mayor
> Implementing Agency Head (Local Mayor)
> School Director
> Water User Association Leaders
> Community residents who participated in the ASIF micro-projects (incl. IA members)
2. Method: In-Depth Semi-Structured Interviews (Community Residents)
> Individual Interviews: community residents representing various social groups
3. Method: Focus Groups (Community Residents)
> Focus Group Interviews: group 1 -  men (irrigators) (M); group 2 -  women (W)
As mentioned earlier, this research used qualitative techniques for data gathering and 
measurement. In my interviews with the key informants and community residents in the 
second group, I used in-depth semi-structured interviews (Box 5.5). Semi-structured 
interviews allow participants to relate their experiences and attitudes “on their own 
terms” (May 1997: 111) and ensure a more in-depth exploration of issues. I moderated 
the level of structure of the interviews depending on the specific information that I 
intended to obtain. In general, I adopted a flexible, exploratory approach to semi­
structured interviews. 49 I developed interview guides, which contained separate 
thematic sections with associated open-ended questions (Annex 2). The interview 
guides were developed in accordance to the Research Frameworks 1 and 2. In designing 
the interview guides, I consulted the questionnaires of the OED Evaluation of Social 
Funds50 and the World Bank’s Social Capital Assessment Tool (Grootaert and Van 
Bastelaer 2002). Most questions in the interview guides served as topics. They provided 
indication of the issues to be explored, and the actual questions were formulated during
49 Arthur and Nazroo (2003: 111) suggest that there is inconsistency in the usage of terms semi-structured 
and unstructured interviews, and that “what some commentators describe as ‘semi-structured’ interviews 
may be described by others as unstructured or in-depth”. The boundaries between the two methods are 
often blurred, and the approaches to semi-structured interviews can range from using fixed structure and 
limited probing to more flexible and open models.
501 am grateful to Soniya Carvalho at the World Bank and Howard White at IDS for sharing with me the 
questionnaires o f the OED Evaluation.
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the interview. Depending on the context of the interview, I modified the order of these 
topics. I retained open conversational interviewing style in order to allow the 
respondents to digress towards issues that they deemed to be important. I allowed 
greater probing beyond the answers and entered in a dialogue with the respondents. I 
worded questions in a neutral language and in a way that was accessible to the 
respondents (for example, I refrained from using specific social science terminology). 
The number of respondents in each community is presented in Table 5.2. The key 
informant interviews lasted from one to two hours. The duration of interviews with 
community members varied from half an hour to one hour.
Table 5.2: N um ber o f  Respondents in the Sample Communities
Khachik Karin Arevadasht Eghegnavan PSevak Tsilkar Ashnak
IA
Head/Mayor*
1 T T 1 T T T
Local Mayor 1 l l 1 l l l
Deputy Mayor 1 n/a n/a 1 n/a l l
School
Directors
1 n/a 1 n/a 1 n/a l
WUA Leaders 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
Other key 
informants
2 2 3 2 2 2 2
Residents-2nd
group
7 8 7 7 8 7 7
Total
Individual
14 13 14 13 14 12 14
Focus Group F - 4 F - 6 F - 3 F - 3 F - 3 F - 3 F - 3
Interviews M - 3 M - 3 M - 4 M - 3 M - 4 S 1 ON M -3
Total Group 7 9 7 6 7 9 6
I conducted focus group interviews with the respondents in the third group to better 
contextualise and cross-check the information gathered through the in-depth interviews. 
I carried out two focus group discussions in each community. These group discussions 
were held with homogenous groups of men, mostly irrigators, and women (one group of 
men and one group of women). Focus group discussions were on average one hour 
long. Group interviews are more spontaneous and interactive than individual interviews 
as they take place in a more natural environment (Finch and Lewis 2003: 171). The 
group interviews generated important insights about the social context of my 
communities and helped reveal diverse, often critical views of community residents.
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During my fieldwork, I also engaged in direct observation. In all of the communities, I 
visited the irrigation infrastructure facilities rehabilitated through the ASIF micro­
projects. I also visited community meeting places, schools, medical centres, local clubs 
and potable water infrastructure facilities. I observed public meetings, social activities 
and interaction among community residents and between residents and their leaders.
As part of the fieldwork, I conducted semi-structured and conversational interviews 
with the ASIF management and staff members (including the ASIF Managing Director, 
Heads of Promotion, Appraisal, Follow-Up and Monitoring and Evaluation Units, 
promotion officers and supervision engineers). These interviews helped deepen my 
understanding and ‘updated’ my knowledge of ASIF’s operating procedures and 
implementation mode. I also interviewed representatives of the government’s Irrigation 
Rehabilitation Project Unit and IFAD in order to understand the technical aspects of the 
irrigation decentralisation reform in Armenia. Interviews with the representatives of 
donor agencies and NGOs, including the World Bank, UNDP, GTZ, Save the Children 
and Oxfam, helped me obtain a variety of perspectives and accounts on community 
development in Armenia. In total, twenty background interviews were conducted 
(Annex 1).
5.3 The Practice of Research
This section discusses how I collected and analysed the data. It describes how I 
identified and contacted the research respondents and conducted interviews during the 
fieldwork. It then provides information on the analytical approach and main stages of 
data analysis.
5.3.1 Data Collection
In order to test the methodological and contextual relevance and applicability of my 
research design, in June 2001,1 carried out preliminary (pilot) fieldwork. In particular, I 
conducted in-depth qualitative interviews in three rural communities in Armenia. I 
visited communities where ASIF supported irrigation (Tsilkar), school (Hartagyukh) 
and potable water micro-projects (Nor Khachakap). I chose communities with different
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types of micro-projects in order to understand possible influences that specific sectoral 
issues could have on the micro-project outcomes.
The pilot fieldwork was an important input in my research. Firstly, it provided me with 
important contextual information and invaluable insights necessary for understanding 
local institutional and social dynamics in Armenia. Secondly, it helped me refine my 
research design by contextualising some of the research concepts and topics and 
questions in the interview guides. Finally, my pilot fieldwork was of important practical 
value. It helped me improve my research skills and design communication, interviewing 
and logistical strategies for my main fieldwork. Thus I had an opportunity to practice 
my interviewing skills, test my ability to orientate in the field, engage in a dialogue with 
respondents and pursue the goals of my research in the specific context of an Armenian 
village. In addition to my pilot fieldwork in the rural communities, I interviewed the key 
ASIF staff members to gather specific information about the ASIF operations and 
practices and to refine my research framework based on the ASIF project assumptions.
In July-August 2002, I carried out the main fieldwork in the chosen communities. I 
recruited the help of an Armenian researcher Arusik Grigoryan, a graduate of the 
Department of Sociology of the Yerevan State University. The presence of Arusik was 
of great help. In particular, she helped me in arranging the interviews, taking notes, co­
ordinating focus group discussions and solving many logistical matters. The presence of 
a female researcher proved to be an important factor in breaking social barriers, 
especially in communicating with female community residents. The opportunity to 
discuss and reflect on the research findings and share field impressions with Arusik was 
extremely helpful. Working in a team helped me retain my energy levels and my sense 
of confidence all the way throughout the fieldwork. The presence of our friendly and 
down-to-earth driver Arsen Grigoryan also helped build rapport with the community, as 
it de-formalised the atmosphere during the interviews and at the same time made our 
team look ‘professional’ in the eyes of the community.
I spent three days in each community. Based on my pilot experience, I decided not to 
use tape recorders to record interviews, but rather take notes in a notepad. I found that 
although most respondents did not object to tape recorders, they did not feel 
comfortable to speak their minds and discuss issues openly when they were taped. Both
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I and my assistant took notes during the interviews, which we compared after the 
fieldwork. Most interviews were conducted in Armenian; some interviews in the 
refugee populated Karin and Eghegnavan were conducted in Russian. At the end of each 
day in the field, I discussed the fieldwork processes and findings with my assistant, 
which helped me continuously modify the interview guides and interviewing techniques. 
After each visit to a community, I wrote up field notes to record my observations, 
impressions, and interpretations.
I did not have a prescribed structure for my interviews. In some communities, I started 
with a formal interview with the village mayor. In other communities, I started with 
interviewing random community members, whom I visited in their homes. After 
receiving their, often alternative perspective, I would then conduct a formal interview 
with the mayor. In both cases, I was able to collect some preliminary information about 
the social and demographic composition of the community, its main social and 
economic problems and obtain a general sense about the community, which helped 
develop my further research strategies in that community.
Through the local mayors I had access to the IA members. The latter then helped me 
identify other community members who collaborated on the ASIF micro-project or 
participated in common activities in their community. Through my interviews with the 
key informants, I was able to identify community residents with different social 
characteristics. In some cases, I found them myself through the contacts given to me by 
their co-villagers; in other cases, their co-villagers volunteered to guide me to their 
homes. I also interviewed random community members that I encountered on the 
village square or in the fields.
Most interviews with the key informants were held at the mayor’s office or in their 
homes. By visiting homes of respondents I was able to talk to their spouses and other 
family members, which helped me better understand interpersonal and gender relations 
in the community.
I arranged the focus group discussions with men by identifying and joining natural 
groups of farmers, usually at the village square. In order to arrange focus groups with
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women, I requested female respondents to ask their female friends and neighbours to 
join us for a discussion.
5.3.2 Data Analysis
Robson (1993: 378) distinguishes between informal and formal stages of data analysis. I 
began informal data analysis during the data collection phase. I composed summary 
sheets for each community, in which I noted some of the emerging themes and issues 
and my initial thoughts and interpretations of local processes and the factors that could 
account for the micro-project outcomes. After completing the fieldwork, I started a 
formal systematic analysis of the narrative accounts, field notes and summary sheets.
I started my formal data analysis with organising the data, i.e., sorting the data 
according to the main themes and categories developed in the Research Frameworks 1 
and 2. This process involved “creative cutting and pasting of the data” (Patton 1987: 
146). I did not refer to computer assisted software programmes, but rather organised and 
analysed the data via word processing. I continued organising and re-organising the data 
as I was progressing with my analysis. In addition to using the themes and categories 
developed before the data collection and analysis, I generating new themes and 
categories through the examination of variation in the data. For example, my 
classification of local leaders into ‘developmental’ and ‘predatory’ was based on the 
examination of patterns of leadership and developmental outcomes in the studied 
communities.
The data analysis included four analytical exercises. In the first analytical exercise, I 
distilled the main social, institutional and political factors that affect participation and 
local institutional capacity in the sample communities. This involved understanding of 
socio-economic conditions, patterns of national, regional and local governance, the 
existing local institutions, forms and nature of participation, the intensity of 
empowerment of local residents, social capital, and institutional capacity in the sample 
communities. I first sorted and summarised the data by the main themes and categories 
developed in Research Framework 1 (Figures 5.1 and 5.2). I then used the data to depict 
an in-depth account of local communities, derive patterns, provide explanations, and 
develop typologies. I also grounded the generation of analytical categories and themes
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in the data itself. The output of this exercise is presented in Chapter Seven. These 
findings helped me interpret and explain the processes and participation and capacity 
building effects of the ASIF micro-projects in the sample communities (presented in 
Chapter Ten).
In the second analytical exercise, I analysed the micro-project service delivery outcomes 
and processes. I sorted and synthesised the data in each community by the main 
conceptual themes and measures of micro-project service delivery outcomes and 
processes developed in Research Framework 2 (Figure 5.3 and Box 5.3). In particular, I 
first assessed the quality of rehabilitation/construction and the extent to which the newly 
rehabilitated facilities benefited community residents. I then explored the patterns and 
nature of community participation and leadership roles throughout the stages of 
initiation, identification, preparation and implementation of the ASIF micro-project 
cycle. These analyses are reflected in Chapter Eight. I used these data to test whether 
the assumptions underlying the ASIF project as a capacity building instrument have 
been met. Linking processes to outcomes (impacts) helped me interpret and explain the 
participation and capacity building impacts of the ASIF micro-projects in the sample 
communities (Chapters Nine and Ten).
In the third analytical exercise, I examined the impact of the ASIF micro-projects on 
community participation and local institutional capacity in the sample communities. I 
sorted and summarised the data according to the impact indicators in Research 
Framework 2: Hypotheses 2-7 (Figure 5.3). In particular, I examined the effect of the 
ASIF micro-projects on social capital, skills and abilities of community residents, the 
intensity of empowerment and the nature and forms of participation, operation and 
maintenance (O&M) arrangements, capacity building of Water User Associations 
(WUAs) and the organisation of water allocation and distribution in the sample 
communities. In order to assess possible change and trace the causality, I compared the 
data on these impact indicators before and after the ASIF micro-projects. The summary 
of the key indicators used in the ‘before and after’ comparisons is presented in Box 5.1. 
I also analysed the data to establish any other types of impacts that were not captured by 
the indicators in the research design. In addition, I analysed the linkages between the 
micro-project processes, service delivery outcomes, and the observed participation and 
capacity building impacts. Section 5.1.4 provides greater detail on the analytical steps in
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assessing change and establishing causality. I compared the key findings and drew the 
main commonalties and differences across the communities in the sample. The analysis 
of the micro-project impacts is presented in Chapter Nine.
The fourth analytical exercise involved explaining and interpreting research findings. I 
analysed how the ASIF project hypotheses and assumptions translated into the observed 
micro-project processes and participation and capacity building outcomes. The project 
assumptions were analysed on two levels. First, I analysed how the local context 
(discussed in Chapter Seven) was understood and addressed in the design of the ASIF 
project. Secondly, I analysed how community participation, empowerment, social 
capital and social inclusion were conceptualised and operationalised in ASIF’s design 
and operating procedures. In addition to the project design related factors, I examined 
the key project implementation related issues. At this stage, I revisited and redefined the 
initial conceptual framework according to the emerging themes, concepts and issues. 
The interpretation of key findings of the research is presented in Chapter Ten.
In my analysis, I made every effort to develop explanatory accounts and inferences 
based on sufficient evidence and systematic assessment of all data. Throughout the 
analysis I revisited the original data to verify the substantive and contextual accuracy of 
the analysis. I also linked the analysis to other research to confirm and compare findings 
and interpretations. At the same time, as mentioned in section 5.1.1, it is often difficult 
to verify the trustworthiness of qualitative data derived from diverse sources. In order to 
expose the multiplicity of local ‘realities’, I incorporated a variety of views and 
perspectives in my analysis and interpretations. I adopted a flexible approach to data 
analysis in order not to restrict myself to the examination of already predetermined 
analytical categories, but also to generate new categories from the data itself. I had 
opportunities to check the accuracy of my interpretations through discussions with 
development professionals and feedback received at seminars and conferences.51
51 Includes presentation of my research findings at academic conferences at Harvard University, 
Cambridge, MA, October 2003, and the School of Eastern European and Slavonic Studies, London, 
November 2003; and at a practitioners’ conference on community development in Amman, Jordan, April 
2005.
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5.4 Evaluating the Research
This section discusses key issues related to the quality of this research. In particular, it 
first discusses the reliability, validity and generalisability of the research findings. It 
then presents the methodological, ethical and moral challenges and opportunities that I 
faced during my research, and that affected the quality of the data.
5.4.1 Transferability of Research
The issue of transferability of findings of qualitative research largely depends on the 
framework within which the findings are generalised (Lewis and Ritchie 2003: 263). 
Lewis and Ritchie (2003) distinguish between two levels of generalisation: empirical 
and theoretical. Empirical generalisation can be applied to the population from which 
the sample is drawn (representational generalisation), and to other settings and contexts 
(inferential representation). There are two important aspects of this research that need to 
be considered when discussing transferability: ASIF as a development intervention and 
the contextual environment within which it operated.
Representational generalisation depends on the reliability and validity of data (Lewis 
and Ritchie 2003: 272-274). Reliability can be ensured by the appropriate design and 
conduct of the research, including robust sample design and methodologies, consistent 
fieldwork, systematic and comprehensive analysis and accurate data interpretation. 
Validity can be achieved through minimising sample bias, fully exploring the views of 
participants, reflecting the actual meanings assigned to the phenomena by participants, 
basing explanations on sufficient evidence and portraying findings so as to accurately 
reflect the actual situation. This chapter provides detailed discussion on the research 
design and framework, the research sample and the process of collecting and analysing 
data, which support the research’s claims to reliability and validity.
Representational sampling in qualitative research is different from quantitative research. 
Statistical sampling procedures tend to suggest sample sizes greater than those needed 
for a qualitative assessment (Salmen 1999: 6). Qualitative studies use in-depth 
methodologies, and hence they can provide sufficient understanding from relatively
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small samples. Inferences in qualitative research are not based on the “prevalence of 
particular views or experiences”, but rather on the mapping of the “range of views, 
experiences, outcomes or other phenomena under study, and the factors and 
circumstances that shape and influence them” (Lewis and Ritchie 2003: 269). 
Generalisations to the parent population are drawn “at the level of categories, concepts 
and explanation” (269). Thus, representation in qualitative research “is not a question of 
statistical match but of inclusivity; whether the sample provides ‘symbolic 
representation’ by containing the diversity of dimensions and constituencies that are 
central to explanation” (Lewis and Ritchie 2003: 269). The sample of this research was 
designed so as to incorporate the diversity of views and experiences in the community 
(section 5.2).
The actual empirical findings of my research are specific to the particular geographic 
and temporal context of the communities in the sample, and are influenced by the 
respondents in the studied communities. It would be inaccurate to assert that the 
findings of this research can be universally applicable to all communities in Armenia. 
At the same time, I believe the core findings of this study are representative of many 
other rural communities in Armenia. Despite their geographic, socio-economic and 
historical differences, most Armenian communities share the key features of 
institutional and social organisation described in this study. These features are heavily 
shaped and determined by the patterns of governance at the national and regional levels. 
These patterns of institutional and social organisation are most likely to induce similar 
types of micro-project impacts in other communities. The key findings of this research 
with regard to the specific characteristics of the contextual environment and the impacts 
of the ASIF project have been confirmed by my other research (Babajanian 2002; 
2003).
How relevant are the specific findings from the ASIF case study for other social funds? 
The inferential transferability largely depends on the similarity between the context 
within which the research was conducted and the context to which it is to be applied 
(Lewis and Ritchie 2003: 268). It is the key finding of this research that the specific 
outcomes of development projects are context-specific. The effectiveness of social 
funds largely depends on the specific local institutional, social and cultural context and 
policy environment and may vary from country to country. The extent to which the
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findings of this research can be applicable to other situations will depend not only on 
the specific contextual environment, but also on the specific institutional and 
operational features of social funds. It is suggested that the effects of social funds may 
depend on the priorities that different social funds attach to social capital and capacity 
building (OED 2002: 147).
As mentioned in Chapter Three, there are variety of social funds, which have different 
objectives and operational procedures and employ different implementation 
methodologies. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the ASIF project belongs to the second 
generation of social funds, which were conceived in the mid-1990s. It is thought that the 
new, third generation of social funds represents more advanced features. Thus it is 
believed that the ‘newest’ investment portfolio of social funds is “more likely to be 
integrated with local government programs, pay more attention to sustainability criteria, 
and contain intensive training components” (Rawlings et al 2004: 6). The newest social 
funds attach greater importance to empowerment and social capital building, by 
explicitly incorporating them in their formal objectives, and by introducing specific 
training and evaluation and monitoring procedures in the project design and 
implementation.
The variety of contextual environments and the diversity of social funds restrict us from 
making categorical empirical generalisations about the participation and capacity 
building effects of social funds. At the same time, this thesis allows making theoretical 
generalisation. This thesis analyses the validity of assumptions underlying the social 
fund ‘bottom-up’ model for promoting participation and capacity building. This allows 
generalisations about the effectiveness and relevance of social funds for inducing 
institutional change in particular development contexts. Thus, it is likely that social 
funds based on the ‘bottom-up’ model described in this study may not be effective in 
promoting broad-based community participation in settings characterised by high levels 
of poverty, prevalence of strong informal networks based on patronage, and poor 
governance structures at the micro and macro levels. The research findings can also be 
applicable to other community-driven projects that share the social fund ‘bottom-up’
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model. Many community-driven projects, supported by the World Bank, UNDP and 
international and local NGOs, in their core features are similar to social funds.
The findings of this research are consistent with the findings from a number of other 
studies, which question the effectiveness of the social fund model in promoting genuine 
community participation (Tendler 1999; OED 2002; Rao and Ibanez 2003). The 
findings of these studies are discussed in Chapter Ten. This thesis also uses findings of 
evaluations of the ASIFII operation conducted by the author (Babajanian 2002; 2003) to 
draw comparisons with the ASIF project. The ASIFII project belongs to the newest 
generation of social funds. Commenced in 2001, it explicitly addresses the issue of local 
institutional capacity by delivering special training to local government officials and 
community groups. It has built-in procedures for encouraging partnerships between 
regional and local government officials and community members. Despite the 
differences in the operational procedures of ASIF and ASIFII projects, the core features 
of the ASIF model remained unchanged in the ASIFII operation and resulted in similar 
impacts.
5.4.2 Opportunities, Challenges and Limitations of the Research
My prior work experience in Armenia significantly helped me in preparing for and 
carrying out this research. Having worked as Social Development Specialist at the 
World Bank in Armenia from 1996 to 1999,1 established good working relations with 
government officials and representatives of international agencies and NGOs. As a 
result, I did not experience difficulty in accessing project documents and background 
literature, and in securing interviews with development professionals, who worked on 
rural development issues in Armenia. For three years I was directly involved in the 
supervision and implementation support of ASIF and in the preparation of ASIF II. I 
also conducted three studies of the ASIF project for the World Bank (Babajanian 1999; 
2002; 2003). Thus, I had thorough understanding of ASIF’s design features and 
operational procedures, which helped me in designing the research framework and 
interpreting research findings. Having worked on a number of other World Bank
52 See, for example, Babajanian (1999) on the comparison o f community-based infrastructure delivery 
projects supported by ASIF, Save the Children and Oxfam in Armenia; and Earle (2004; 2005a) on the 
USAID supported community development projects in Central Asia.
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supported projects and research programmes in Armenia, I had good knowledge of the 
socio-economic, institutional and political environment in the country.
My experience of working in the area of social development in Armenia was crucial in 
inspiring and prompting me to undertake this research. My work provided me with an 
opportunity to develop my knowledge and awareness of the country and participate in 
project development and evaluation across a variety of social policy issues. Through my 
work I became exposed to ‘real’ problems that people in Armenia faced. I was involved 
in a number of research projects, which gave me an opportunity to conduct field 
research and become aware of the circumstances in which poor people in Armenia lived 
and sustained their livelihoods. As I carried out regular supervision missions of the 
ASIF project, I frequently visited rural communities and urban neighbourhoods with 
ASIF financed micro-projects, conducted interviews with local leaders and some of the 
poor and marginalised residents, and assessed the sustainability of ASIF financed 
infrastructure.
Whilst working on the ASIF project, I became especially preoccupied with the issue 
whether the ASIF project could promote sustainable changes in the Armenian 
communities. In particular, I observed that on the one hand ASIF was very effective in 
building important social infrastructure, but, on the other hand, it did not succeed in 
promoting much community activism and strengthening local institutional capacity. I 
was keen to identify specific reasons that accounted for these developmental outcomes 
of the ASIF project. Was it because local people were apathetic and disinterested? Or 
perhaps the ASIF staff did not invest sufficient effort in mobilising and reaching out to 
the local residents? Or were the initial working assumptions behind the ASIF model 
unrealistic and contextually irrelevant? I had accumulated substantial knowledge about 
the ASIF project and about the social and economic situation in the Armenian 
communities. At the same time, I found that my ability to answer these questions was 
somewhat restricted by my role as a ‘practitioner’ and programme worker. In particular, 
I felt that my understanding of the project was influenced by the specific programmatic 
objectives, indicators and evaluation criteria of the ASIF project. I felt that in order to 
be able to objectively assess the effectiveness of ASIF as a capacity building 
development model I needed to de-link my role as a ‘practitioner’ from that of a 
‘researcher’, and to develop a rigorous conceptual and theoretical framework that could
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help me systematise my knowledge, ask the right questions and design benchmarks for 
impartial analysis. Hence I decided to enrol in a PhD programme in order to learn about 
key concepts, frameworks and debates in the area of social development and undertake 
my own research project through which I could attempt to answer some of the questions 
I was preoccupied with.
As a ‘native’, Armenian researcher I had several advantages when conducting the 
fieldwork. I was perceived by the communities as one of ‘us’, which greatly facilitated 
my rapport with the respondents and my access to information. The lack of cultural 
barriers allowed me easily ‘understand’ local issues, relate to people’s problems and 
experiences and build trusting relations with community residents. As I speak Eastern 
Armenian dialect (as opposed to Western, or Diaspora Armenian), I was accepted by 
community residents as ‘local’, which removed any possible communication barriers. 
Barsegian (2000: 126), based on his fieldwork experience in Armenia, suggests that 
public self-representation of Armenians, for example, the ways in which many 
Armenians chose to present themselves to the West, and their private behaviour can 
often be different. He stresses the importance of looking beyond the “surface of public 
performances” (Barsegian 2000: 127). My status of an ‘insider’ helped me gain access 
to the actual, private reality of my respondents. As a native Armenian, I was able to 
easily understand and ‘decipher’ the cultural and political meanings of issues and 
contextual factors. I feel that I was able to accurately interpret statements and 
expressions with specific cultural and political references.
My cultural embededness made it sometimes difficult for me to ‘see’ things, especially 
at the beginning of my research. Thus, some aspects of people’s behaviour seemed 
‘usual’ and ‘normal’ to me, which blurred their cultural and social significance and 
deterred me from questioning or exploring them in detail. For example, on my first day 
of fieldwork, I witnessed how the shop assistant in the local shop gave ice cream to 
some children, without taking any money for it. Later I realised that I did not pay any 
attention to such behaviour as I perceived it as ‘something we all do in Armenia’. On 
the other hand, this episode could serve as a reflection of the post-Soviet reality, in 
which market relations become intertwined with tradition, and what is supposed to be a 
purely ‘commercial’ endeavour obtains a ‘human’ face. During my fieldwork I was
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becoming increasingly aware of the need to ‘detach culturally’, and I trained myself to 
be more alert to my fieldwork environment and seemingly ‘trivial’ experiences.
My ability to generate rapport and build trusting relations with the respondents implied 
that most of them were open and did not fear to speak their minds. Most respondents 
were generally critical of their leaders and government officials. Communication with 
local leaders was generally quite open. Some leaders were more formal than others. For 
example, the mayors in Ashnak and Eghegnavan maintained a more official stance and 
preferred to answer my questions without engaging in much dialogue or discussions. 
Other mayors were more communicative and willing to share their issues and problems 
and even ask for advice. The mayors did not explicitly object to my communicating 
with community members, and I did not need their prior approval for speaking directly 
to community residents. I had a formal letter addressed to the mayors, in which the 
ASIF Director explained the objective of my research and requested them to support 
me. The mayors (as well as all other respondents) trusted my verbal explanations, and 
never asked to demonstrate any formal proof of my mission. At the same time, I felt that 
the mayors were not always comfortable with the content and nature of issues raised by 
the discussions I provoked. They discreetly monitored my actions and felt relieved 
when the research team was ready to leave their community. My awareness of the fact 
that the local mayors were the ‘gatekeepers’ in their communities and that my access to 
local residents was largely dependent on their good will, made me very cautious not to 
exceed the limits of their hospitality and tolerance.
This research was conducted within time constraints. I spent three days in each 
community, which seemed to be the maximum time that I could spend in each 
community. I realised that after spending two days in a community, the presence of the 
research team was becoming a burden for the local residents. People were busy with 
their everyday life and work, and they were finding it difficult to devote their time and 
retain their hospitality and attention to our team. As mentioned earlier, the local mayors 
did not seem enthusiastic about the possibility of my lengthy stay in their communities. 
I felt that by extending my presence in the communities I could incur fatigue and 
resentment among community residents and local mayors. Meanwhile, a longer 
presence in the community would have enabled me collect data of much richer depth, 
reflecting a greater diversity of situations, views and perspectives. The interviews
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themselves were subject to time constraints. There is a natural time limit for the 
effective delivery of in-depth qualitative interview. That seemed to be about ninety 
minutes on average. It was not possible to continue most interviews beyond two hours. 
As I had to a cover a vast range of topics and issues, the time constraint implied an 
inevitable level of superficiality in answers to some questions/themes.
In the majority of sample communities, the ASIF micro-projects were completed in 
1998. In Eghegnavan and Arevadasht, the micro-projects were completed in 2000. The 
fieldwork was conducted in the summer of 2002. The significant time lapse provided an 
opportunity to observe whether possible changes induced by the ASIF interventions 
were sustainable and long-lasting. Many impact assessments, for example, social fund 
BAs are usually conducted immediately after the completion of the social fund micro­
project. It is possible that some of the social fund micro-project impacts picked up by 
BAs may only have a short-term nature. On the other hand, this time lapse had its 
downsides. Thus, it was impossible to capture any short-term impacts that ASIF may 
have had on local communities.
The substantial time span between the ASIF micro-projects and the fieldwork created a 
problem with recall. In particular, many respondents had difficulty in remembering 
specific details related to the micro-project identification and implementation processes 
and their participation in communal activities before the micro-project. This has 
certainly limited the depth of the fieldwork data.
Different people have different degree of knowledge and different ways of reflecting on 
their lives and experiences and verbalising them. For example, interviews with some 
community members did not provide rich or substantive information, as these 
respondents either did not have the knowledge of the ASIF micro-projects and 
associated processes, or articulated their ideas in a sketchy and laconic way. Some 
respondents were not motivated to actively engage in a reflective dialogue and share 
their accounts with the researcher.
The information and analyses in this thesis are primarily drawn from the views, 
perceptions and perspectives of the community members. This implies that the 
information obtained is not free from some degree of subjectivity and bias. The issue of
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subjectivity is especially pertinent in the assessment of interpersonal relations and social 
attitudes, which form a core part of this study. In my sampling design and analysis, I 
made all the effort to portray a picture that would objectively reflect the views of all of 
the respondents. At the same time, subjective opinions and perceptions, even if they do 
not reflect the ‘objective’ reality, can provide useful indications of the types of existing 
social and institutional relationships in local communities.
5.4.3 Ethical and Moral Issues
The presence of a researcher is not neutral for a community, and may have its positive 
or negative impact on the community. In particular, I was aware that raising any 
political questions concerning the issues of local governance, power and authority, 
could provoke tension, disagreements and even conflict. I realised that such 
discussions could also jeopardise the success of my research. At the same time, by its 
very nature this research is rather political, and completely excluding discussion of 
governance and power would have made the objective of the research redundant. In 
order to minimise the risk, I framed the interviews so that respondents were given clear 
understanding of the issues which would be addressed. I also made effort to maintain a 
neutral tone, and left it to my respondents to make references to political issues. As I 
explained earlier, Armenian communities are relatively open, and most respondents did 
not fear to discuss their problems and criticise authorities. Thus, most people were 
critical about local and national governance as far as it concerned local economic and 
social affairs and where it was perceived to directly affect individual livelihoods. At the 
same time, most respondents were reluctant to explicitly discuss issues related to formal 
politics of their communities. Therefore, I decided not to accentuate politics in my 
interviews, which explains the limited focus of this thesis on such issues as local 
government elections, voting behaviour, party affiliation of community members, and 
relations between local governments and the Councils of Elders.
Another safeguard I have undertaken to protect my respondents from possible harm is to 
preserve their confidentiality. In order to ensure confidentiality, I concealed the
53 Warwick (1993: 326-327) for example warns that researchers have obligations to their respondents and 
should avoid violating ethical and cultural standards of their respondents and causing physical, social and 
political harm to their respondents.
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identities of community members. I assigned codes to each interview and used these 
codes in referencing the field data (see Annex 8). It would be impossible to conceal the 
identities of the local mayors and some other officials, as they can be identified from the 
names of their communities. In order to protect them from harm, I decided not to quote 
some of their controversial statements that could be used against them. At the same 
time, I did not want to change the names of the studied communities. This research is 
about lives of real people, and it would be unfair to devalue these lives by placing them 
within fictional, non-existing communities.
All interviews were based on the ‘informed consent’ of the respondents. Before the 
interviews I introduced myself and my research team to the respondents. I presented 
myself as an independent researcher, explaining that I was interested in how ordinary 
people lived and how community projects, including ASIF, influenced their livelihoods. 
I explained that interviews were confidential. All respondents of this research 
voluntarily agreed to take part in the interviews. The respondents did not object to my 
using the interviews in my thesis.
The researcher can induce changes without taking a conscious action about it. I did not 
intend to engage in participatory research. It would have required greater 
methodological preparation and more time and resources. Also, I believed that I did not 
have the ethical right to turn up in a community and intervene with my own agenda in 
the space that belonged to the community. I was especially wary of possible negative 
consequences that any ‘conscientisation’ attempts could incur. Although I did not intend 
to induce any changes, my mere presence made an impact in the local communities. As 
described earlier, I was thoroughly engaged with my respondents and was perceived as 
someone who was willing to listen to people’s problems and understand their issues. 
Many respondents commented upon how they valued the opportunity to talk and share 
their problems. Many respondents told me that they had rarely encountered outsiders 
who were sympathetic and understanding to their situation.
The presence of our research team in Arevadasht had an empowering effect on the 
community residents. When we arrived in the community on the second day of the 
research, we saw a group of community members, including some of the marginalised 
residents, assembled on the square in front of the mayor’s office, dressed in their best
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clothes. They explained that they knew that we had made an appointment with the 
mayor and that they were waiting for us. They all came with us to the mayor’s office 
and told him that they were going to be present during our discussion. As the mayor 
rarely interacted with the community residents, the residents took this as an opportunity 
for communication and information sharing. In particular, they were eager to discuss the 
reasons for the poor functioning of the ASIF supported irrigation facility. At the same 
time, the residents were hoping to use our presence to pressurise the mayor and to exact 
accountability. The meeting with the mayor turned into a civic action, in which 
community residents took turns to make public statements. They shared their problems 
and complained about some of the injustices they encountered. Some of them openly 
criticised the mayor in his presence. This incident serves as a vivid illustration for me 
that people in Armenia, even in such a marginalised and impoverished community as 
Arevadasht, do not ‘suffer’ from apathy and paternalism. The potential for civic action 
lives within the community, although it is dormant. Once opportunities arise, people are 
willing to claim and take up their space. The presence of external agents, whom the 
community trusts, can serve an important catalytic role in activating civic potential.
As I mentioned in section 5.4.2, my prior work experience with the World Bank in 
Armenia significantly helped me in preparing for and carrying out this research. It also 
had its downsides. Thus I had established cordial and trusting relationships with my 
former colleagues at the World Bank and ASIF. In fact, my special relationship with 
ASIF helped me gain easy access to the ASIF staff, documents and archival materials 
and to the ASIF supported communities. At the same time, I was sensitive to the fact 
that my fieldwork findings raised critical issues about the appropriateness of the design 
and implementation procedures of the ASIF project. Reflecting on her fieldwork in 
Armenia in the early 1990s, Dudwick (2000: 15) points out the ethical and moral 
dilemma that researchers often face with regard to “loyalty to friends and acquaintances 
versus loyalty to abstract political ideas and notions of professionalism”. Dudwick 
(2000: 25) maintains that this dilemma raises “acute issues of friendship, trust, and 
betrayal” as researchers have to maintain their responsibility to remain objective and 
professional, but also strive not to breach the confidence they receive from their friends, 
gatekeepers and respondents. I was not willing to compromise the objectivity of my 
study and hence retained my critical perspective throughout the fieldwork, data analysis 
and interpretation and in my final reporting of the findings in this thesis. At the same
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time, I felt it was important to maintain transparency in my relations with ASIF and I 
communicated my key research findings to ASIF’s management and key staff members. 
I also gave careful attention to the design of this research and to the analysis and 
interpretations of the research findings in order to ensure that they reflect accurate 
understanding of ASIF’s procedures and practices.
I feel that my presence in the communities was also somewhat disappointing for local 
people. As has been noted elsewhere (Hammerley and Atkinson 1998: 75), research 
respondents are likely to have a variety of expectations from the researchers. Despite the 
fact that I introduced myself as an independent researcher, many respondents still 
perceived me as somehow affiliated with ASIF or donor agencies. The respondents 
were not aware of my previous position in the World Bank and of my involvement in 
the ASIF project. It is common in Armenia to assume that a researcher is likely to have 
amicable ties with the agency whose projects he or she investigates and to generally 
have connections in important institutions. On many occasions, people would share 
their problems with me and hoped for my support or intermediation. For example, some 
local mayors and community members asked me whether I could help them raise finds 
or identify contacts, who could help them with the rehabilitation of infrastructure 
facilities in their communities. It is likely, that these expectations and hopes of the 
respondents affected their interaction with me and some of the responses that I obtained.
People’s expectations were not always material. Thus many respondents felt that I was 
in the position to communicate their problems to the external world and help them 
receive just treatment. Both in Arevadasht and Ashnak, where the quality of civil works 
under the ASIF micro-projects was poor, many community residents were hoping that I 
could raise their issues with ASIF or government authorities. They quite legitimately 
assumed that as I was researching the impact of the ASIF project, then I was in the 
position to also undertake some action about it. I did not have enough leverage and 
authority to become an intermediary between the communities and ASIF or the 
government. I was very careful not to raise people’s expectations by stressing that I had 
little possibilities to help them. At the same time, I was extremely frustrated by my 
inability to help these people.
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Barsegian (2000: 123) suggests that ‘native’ ethnographers can “move between 
observation and participation”, whilst ‘guest’ ethnographers often remain mere 
observers. Barsegian notes that this ability to ‘participate’ implies that native 
ethnographers, especially in the highly politicised and fragmented post-socialist 
societies, cannot easily detach from their fieldwork, and they often become ‘absorbed’ 
in the field or become compelled to take sides. I too felt that it was difficult for me to 
detach from the context of my research. I could personally relate on emotional, cultural 
and intellectual levels to most issues that I discussed with the respondents. It was often 
emotionally difficult for me to detach from my respondents and their stories. I often felt 
anger against the injustice that they were subjected to and great sadness at the 
circumstances they lived in. My visit to Arevadasht, where I witnessed a situation of 
extreme poverty that I had not encountered in my previous field experience, was 
particularly heart-breaking. I often found myself tempted to turn from a passive 
observer into an active participant and advocate for poor people’s issues. For example, I 
could not resist reprimanding the mayor in Arevadasht about the situation in the village, 
clearly taking the side of ordinary residents in the village and urging him to reach out to 
some of the marginalised households.
My fieldwork experience has raised some fundamental ethical and moral issues about 
my own role as a researcher. In particular, it has made me think whether a researcher 
should take up a neutral stance or whether he or she should also be an activist and 
attempt to influence situations based on their knowledge of the issues on the ground. Is 
it moral to enhance expectations and hopes of people and assume a passive role? 
Provided there is little likelihood that research findings would translate into immediate 
action, does such research have any social relevance? Are we in a sense abusing the 
poor and powerless, by using our position of power to extract information from them 
and enhance our careers and not giving them anything in return? At the same time, do 
we have the right to intervene into local people’s space and bring in our own agenda, no 
matter how good and just we perceive our cause to be?
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter presented the research design, methods and practice. This research was 
designed as a qualitative study. It was carried in seven rural communities in Armenia,
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where ASIF supported irrigation micro-projects. The research methods included in- 
depth semi-structured interviews, focus group interviews and direct observation. The 
chapter presented the main research frameworks of the study. The first research 
framework was developed to understand the existing socio-economic conditions, forms 
and nature of community participation, social capital, local institutions and patterns of 
local, regional and national governance in Armenia and to identify factors that affect 
participation and institutional capacity in local communities. The second framework is 
based on the theory-based evaluation method. It presents the key hypotheses and 
assumptions of the ASIF project and defines indicators for assessing the ASIF 
processes, service delivery outcomes, and participation and capacity building impacts
This chapter provided an account of how the data were collected and analysed. The 
outputs of these analytical processes are presented in Chapters Seven, Eight, Nine and 
Ten. It also described some of the logistical, ethical and moral challenges and practical 
opportunities that I encountered during the data collection in the field. These challenges 
and opportunities have undoubtedly affected the quality of my research both positively 
and negatively.
This chapter discussed the extent to which the findings of this study can be generalised 
to other communities in Armenia, other contexts and other social funds. It concludes 
that although the findings of the study are specific to the particular setting of the 
communities in the sample, the case study of the ASIF project allows making 
theoretical generalisation. It is likely that social funds and other community-driven 
projects that share the bottom-up model for capacity building may induce similar 
development impacts and processes in similar social, institutional and political contexts.
The next chapter, Chapter Six, provides background information and analysis on the 
socio-economic and institutional context of post-Soviet Armenia, in which the ASIF 
micro-projects were designed and implemented, and which significantly affected the 
participation and capacity building outcomes of the ASIF micro-projects.
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Chapter Six. The Socio-Economic and Institutional Context of Armenia
This chapter describes the socio-economic, institutional and policy context in Armenia. 
Using documentary sources, it highlights the existing poverty situation, and the 
institutional and governance environment in Armenia. It provides an account of 
decentralisation and local governance in Armenia, with a specific focus on the 
decentralisation of irrigation management to local communities. Examination of the 
general context is central for understanding the opportunities and constraints 
experienced by the local communities and individuals living there. This chapter 
provides grounding for the presentation and analysis of research findings in Chapter 
Seven, which examines the socio-economic situation and institutional and social 
environment in the sample communities. Understanding of the wider context of the 
country is also important for situating the findings of this research on the AISF micro­
project processes, service delivery outcomes, and participation and capacity building 
impacts (Chapters Eight and Nine).
6.1. Poverty in Armenia
This section provides a profile of poverty in Armenia based on the existing poverty 
statistics and qualitative studies. In particular, it discusses the scope, dimensions and 
causes of poverty in Armenia. Section 7.1 of Chapter Seven builds upon this section, 
and provides an account of socio-economic conditions in the sample communities and 
their impact on community participation and local institutional capacity.
6.1.1 Armenia’s Economic Performance
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Armenia's economy 
suffered one of the most severe shocks of all the former Soviet republics. As a result of 
the macro-economic stabilisation of 1994-95 and structural reforms, a steady economic 
recovery has taken place since 1994. The economy has been growing every year since 
then at an average GDP growth rate of about 7.5 percent (Table 6.1). Armenia is a 
small, landlocked country with few natural resources (see map of Armenia in Annex 8). 
It is believed that Armenia has achieved progress mainly through economic reform, and 
due to a well-educated workforce with specialised technical skills (World Bank 2003c:
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20). Despite relatively strong economic performance, real GDP in 2002 still amounted 
to only 70 percent of its pre-transition - 1989 level (about 80 percent of the 1990 level).
Table 6.1: Real GDP Growth in Armenia, 1994-2004
(percent change over the previous year)______________________________________________________
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
GDP 5.4 6.9 5.9 3.3 7.2 3.3 6.0 9.6 12.9 14.0 10.1
Source: National Statistical Service (NSS).
Economic growth has had little impact on job creation and has not led to a sizable 
increase in real wages in the sectors that employ the majority of the population. This 
can be explained by the fact that economic growth is not broad-based, and it is 
concentrated in a few volatile sectors (e.g., construction, food processing and light 
industry), in which investments were possible due to external grants or credits (PRSP 
2003: 17). Little growth was recorded in the labour-intensive sectors, such as
manufacturing and agriculture, which in 1998 employed 58 percent of workers (World
Bank 2002c: 20). The actual unemployment rate in Armenia increased from 27 percent 
in 1998/99 to 30 percent in 2001. In rural areas, it almost doubled, from 9 percent in 
1998/99 to 17 percent in 2001. Wages in Armenia remain extremely low. In 2001, 14 
percent of salaried workers and 12 percent self-employed were in extreme poverty; and 
37 percent of salaried workers and 44 percent of self-employed were below the general 
poverty line (World Bank 2003c: 45).
6.1.2 Income Poverty in Armenia
Income poverty in Armenia remains widespread and severe, and nearly half of the 
population of the country are poor. Income poverty in Armenia is measured by using 
two absolute poverty lines -  a food poverty line54 and a general (or overall) poverty 
line.55 The population below the food line is considered to be extremely poor, and the 
population below the general or overall poverty line is considered to be poor. In 2001, 
the food line in Armenia was defined at 7,979 drams ($14.4) per capita monthly
54 The food line is based on the cost of the food basket that is required to provide the minimum daily 
calorie requirement of 2,100 kilocalories per capita.
55 The general poverty line is the value of the minimum food basket plus expenditure on basic non-food 
products and services of those households at the minimum daily calorific requirement.
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expenditures, and the general poverty line was defined at 11,221 drams ($20.2) per 
capita monthly expenditures (World Bank 2003c: 34).
According to the results of the Integrated Living Conditions Survey (ILCS) conducted 
by the Armenian National Statistical Service (NSS) in 200156, 48 percent of the
e* j
Armenian population was poor and 20 percent extremely poor in 2001. In urban areas, 
some 22 percent of residents were extremely poor and 48 percent were poor. In rural 
areas, 17 percent were extremely poor and 48 percent were poor. The incidence of 
poverty recorded in Tavush (70 percent), Aragatzotn (60 percent), Gegharkunik (57 
percent), Shirak (55 percent), Armavir (52) and Vayots Dzor (50) regions in 2001 was 
above the national average (Annex 3: Table 2). The comparison of the 1998/99 and 
2001 ILCS survey results suggests some decline in poverty in Armenia. Between 
1998/99 and 2001 the aggregate incidence of extreme poverty in Armenia decreased 
from 27 percent to 20 percent, and the incidence of overall poverty decreased from 55 
percent to 48 percent (Annex 3: Table 1).
The decline in poverty between 1998/99 and 2001 is attributed to economic growth 
(World Bank 2003c). Economic growth, however, had uneven impact on poverty 
reduction across different regions. Yerevan, the largest and most economically active 
urban centre in Armenia, experienced a significant reduction in extreme and overall 
poverty between 1998/9 and 2001. The situation of most rural regions remained nearly 
unchanged or worsened. Some rural areas, including Tavush, Armavir, Vayots Dzor and 
Gegharkunik, experienced a massive increase in poverty in 1998-2001 (Annex 3: Table 
2). The population in rural areas faced increased scarcity of jobs, as the total 
unemployment rate in rural areas almost doubled.
The pervasive nature of poverty in most rural regions has been attributed, among other 
factors, to the situation in the labour market, structural issues, access to agricultural 
inputs, and climatic and geographic vulnerabilities (World Bank 2003c). Falling
56 NSS carried out three nationally representative household surveys (Integrated Living Conditions 
Surveys (ILCS)) in 1996, 1998/1999 and 2001. These surveys measured poverty through household 
consumption indicators, which are believed to be more accurate measures of material well-being than 
income indicators. Due to the differences in the methodology and sample sizes, the results of the 1996 
survey are not compatible with the results of the 1998/99 and 2001 surveys.
57 Poverty incidence based on the international poverty line defined at $PPP2.15 (or 10,397 drams) per 
capita per day in 2001 was at about 37 percent in both rural and urban areas.
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producer prices for agricultural products and rising prices for essential agricultural 
inputs have negatively affected farmers’ incomes. The climatic and geographic 
conditions in Tavush, Gegharkunik and Vayots Dzor are not favourable to high 
productivity agricultural activities. These regions are mostly mountainous and pre- 
mountainous areas, where the quality of land is poor and weather conditions are often 
harsh. There are few off-farm employment and economic opportunities concentrated in 
most rural areas, which prohibits most people from engaging even in the most basic 
income-generating activities. As a result, most of the population in these areas is 
engaged in low productivity subsistence agriculture.
Poverty in Armenia has been described as ‘persistent’ (World Bank 2002d: 15). 
Although, the data on poverty incidence before 1998 are not comparable, the available 
indicators suggest that poverty was deep and severe before 1998. In 1992, 1993 and 
1994, living standards fell sharply and poverty became widespread. According to the 
first pilot household survey, 31 percent of urban households and 25 percent of rural 
households were poor in 1993-1994 (World Bank 1996b: 6). According to the results of 
the 1996 household survey, 54 percent of the population were poor and 27 percent - 
extremely poor (World Bank 1999b: 7).
In transitional countries, including Armenia, people have become poor relatively 
recently, and poverty is ‘new’. It is likely that this ‘new’ poverty has already become 
chronic for many poor households. According to Hulme et al (2001: 10-11), ‘chronic’ 
poverty is characterised by extended duration (ten years and more). Poverty that has a 
short-term duration, even if it is severe and multidimensional, can be characterised as 
‘transient’. The reduction in the number of poor throughout 1996-2001 suggests that 
for a small segment of the population poverty was a transient phenomenon (if only
CO
based on income indicators of poverty) (Annex 3: Tables 1 and 2). While one may 
assume that chronic poverty exists in Armenia, there are no data available to draw 
definitive conclusions about the size and characteristics of the chronically poor 
population.
58 As of date, no research has been carried out to document how households move in and out of poverty in 
Armenia.
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An Armenian ethnographer Petrosian (2001) suggests that poverty in Armenia has been 
developing in two stages. The first stage was a ‘mass’ or widespread poverty that 
resulted after the collapse of the Soviet state in 1992-1994. During that period almost 
everybody was poor. After 1995, poverty has started to become ‘structural’. Society has 
become divided into social groups with varying levels of income and an underclass of 
the poor has been formed. However, Petrosian maintains that because people compare 
their current situation to that in Soviet times, the notion of ‘mass poverty’ is still 
applicable in the Armenian context. Thus even some relatively better-off citizens 
perceive themselves as poor, as they compare their lifestyle and standard of living with 
the one they used to have during Soviet times.
6.1.3 Human Poverty in Armenia
Health. One of the manifestations of human poverty in Armenia is the increasing 
difficulty of the poor in accessing medical services and/or receiving services of 
adequate quality. Utilisation of health care, including inpatient and outpatient care 
declined almost three times over the 1990s (World Bank 2003c: 76). The results of the 
ILCS survey show that in 2001 the utilisation of health care by the richest quintile was
1.5 higher than that of the poorest quintile. The main reason for the decline in utilisation 
of health care is the inability of the population to afford the high cost of medical 
services. The introduction of user charges and subsidised health care for the poor has 
not prevented the prevalence of informal payments in the health care system. Informal 
payments to nurses and doctors are still a common practice both at policlinics and 
hospitals. About 90 percent of patients in Armenia reported making informal payments 
(World Bank 2002d: 43).
The deterioration in living standards has had some negative impact on the reproductive 
health of women. The number of births with complications and the number of new­
borns with low weight has increased since 1991. The rate of maternal mortality has 
increased from 40 to 50 (per 100,000 live births) throughout 1990s (Table 6.2). In 2000, 
it was 3.5 times higher than the WHO norm (UNICEF 2002: 14). There are significant 
differences between rural and urban areas: rural infant mortality and under-five child 
mortality rates exceeded urban rates by 47 percent and 22 percent, respectively, during 
the 1990s.
160
Table 6.2: Selected Health Status Indicators
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Female life expectancy at birth (years) 75.2 75.9 76.2 77.3 78.1 75.5 74.5
Male life expectancy at birth (years) 68.4 68.9 69.3 70.3 70.8 70.7 70.5
Maternal mortality (per 100,000 live 
births)
40.1 34.7 20.8 38.7 25.4 32.9 52.5
Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 18.5 14.2 15.5 15.4 14.7 15.4 15.6
Under-5 mortality (per 1,000 live births) 23.8 19.9 19.5 19.5 18.4 19.2 19.2
Source: TransMONEE Database UNICEF IRC, Florence
Education. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the education system of Armenia has 
been drastically deteriorating. One of the biggest achievements of the Soviet welfare 
state was provision of good quality education that was free and accessible to all. Today, 
the adult literacy rates in Armenia are still high: 97.6 percent for women and 99.3 
percent for men. Some other indicators, however, are not very encouraging. The 
enrolment rates for pre-school education are extremely low (on average 16 percent), of 
which the poorest have enrolment at 10 percent and the richest at 28 percent (World 
Bank 2003c: 58). The enrolment rates in compulsory publicly financed basic education 
(age group 7-13; grades 1-8) have consistently declined over the last ten years. Thus the 
enrolment rate dropped from 96 percent in 1996 to 93 percent in 2001 (UNDP 2002: 
section 3.1). Boys tend to drop out of school more than girls. In addition to low 
enrolment rates, many schools report frequent absenteeism among the poorest school 
children (Gomart 1996: 4).
There is growing reluctance among the poor to continue education beyond the 
compulsory eight grades or to enrol in vocational and higher education institutions. For 
many parents, the value of secondary education eroded as it ceased to provide access to 
higher education for the poor or help fulfil the immediate needs of a family (Gomart 
1996: 5). Similarly, many parents do not believe that higher education would result in 
higher earnings or better opportunities in life. These attitudes reflect the fact that 
opportunities for upward mobility are constrained for the poor. Thus the employment 
rates for the university graduates from poor households are 1.5 times lower than those 
of the non-poor (UNDP 2002: section 11.6). The UNDP report (2002) explains this by 
the fact that access to important social networks plays a crucial role in finding jobs.
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Two thirds of the employed young people found their jobs through relatives, 
acquaintances or were involved in a family business.
6.1.4 Social Vulnerabilities
The difficulties of transition have made some groups of the population more vulnerable 
to increasing social risks. Depending on their assets, some households and individuals 
within these groups are more prone to experience material and social deprivation.
Women. Women are particularly vulnerable to social risks. Poverty incidence is 
especially high (55 percent) among single female-headed households with children (15 
percent of total population). There is a significant degree of discrimination against 
women in the labour market. Women tend to work in the ‘secondary’ labour sector, 
characterised by low wages, inferior working conditions, short-term contracts and few 
opportunities for career promotion (UNDP 1999a: 15). The workload of women is often 
double that of men, as women have to combine their work responsibilities with their 
duties at home, including household work and care of children. There are rigid 
stereotypes in Armenia with regard to gender roles, especially in the rural areas 
(CEDAW 2002: 22-24). Traditional norms and customs determine what the 
‘appropriate’ or ‘acceptable’ social roles, behaviour and occupations should be for men 
and women. These stereotypes and expectations create ‘polarisation’ of labour in terms 
of male and female spheres.
Refugees. The 1988-94 conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagomo Karabakh induced more 
than 300,000 ethnic Armenian refugees who fled Azerbaijan and an estimated 60- 
70,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the regions bordering with Azerbaijan. 
Refugees and IDPs experience high unemployment and limited access to housing, 
health care and important social infrastructure (UNDP 1999b; Alaverdyan 2000; 
Kharatyan 2003). About 53 percent of refugees in Armenia were unemployed in 1999 
(UNDP 1999b: section 4.2). Many refugees who moved to Armenia in 1992 were 
already too late to take part in the privatisation of land, livestock and machinery 
(Kharatyan 2003: 14). Most of them survive on remittances sent by their relatives in 
Russia and other CIS countries. Cultural and social adaptation of many refugees to the 
Armenian way of life has proved to be difficult. Alaverdyan (2000) maintains that the
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majority of urbanised and Russian-speaking refugees found it extremely difficult to 
adapt to living in rural areas and build networks with the local population. The cultural 
and language adaptation problems contributed to a significant social exclusion of many 
refugee households, leading to increased out-migration of refugees.
People in the Conflict Area. The population of the regions bordering with Azerbaijan 
experiences high levels of material, social and psychological deprivation (UNDP 2000b: 
46-48). Agricultural activities in these regions are constrained as a substantial portion of 
privatised agricultural land (including vineyards, orchards and pastures) is mined or 
considered ‘unsafe’. Most people in the border areas live in an atmosphere of constant 
insecurity. Their psychological distress is reinforced by the occasional violations of 
ceasefire, mine explosions and kidnapping of cattle.
People with Disabilities. At present, people with disabilities constitute about 3 percent 
of Armenia’s population (110,000 persons). Due to the outdated legislation, societal 
attitudes and the problem of physical accessibility of infrastructure, people with 
disabilities enjoy limited employment, economic and social opportunities (UNDP 2000b: 
81). Their participation in the social life of their communities is limited.
Ethnic Minorities. Ethnic minorities (Yezidi Kurds, Russians, Assyrians, Jews, Greeks 
and others) constitute about 3 percent of Armenia’s population. According to a report 
prepared by the Council of Europe, the rights of minorities in Armenia have been 
traditionally respected. However, as members of minority groups are under-represented 
in the society, they often do not have “the necessary connections and power to improve 
their [socio-economic] situation” (ECRI2003: 13).
6.1.5 Psychological Dimensions of Poverty
The difficulties of transition affected not only people’s material and social conditions, 
but also their psychological well-being. Similar to other post-Soviet countries, Armenia 
experienced ‘sudden’ poverty. This is different from ‘generational’ or ‘inherited’ 
poverty that most developing countries experience (Narayan and Petesch 2000: 43-44). 
People in Armenia were not prepared to find themselves absolutely impoverished after 
long years of material and social security during Soviet times. The collapse of the
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Soviet state brought chaos and uncertainty into the lives of people. All of a sudden, 
thousands of people lost not only their jobs, income and savings, but also social status 
and their place in social networks. For most Soviet citizens, who were used to safe and 
predictable life, their everyday lives and their future have become uncertain and 
insecure.
Material deprivation in Armenia has been accompanied by a state of deep psychological 
distress and loss of faith among the population. Based on a series of qualitative 
interviews with poor households, Kharatyan (2001) concludes that the loss of social 
status and the weakening of social and kinship ties have resulted in a loss of self-respect, 
isolation, or even conscious self-isolation, despair, and a sense of worthlessness and 
inferiority among many poor people. Many new poor started perceiving themselves as 
‘useless’ and ‘redundant’, as they ‘lost’ their former achievements and were unable to 
adjust to the new social and economic conditions. This sense of helplessness and 
uncertainty has been reinforced by lack of trust in the government institutions that fail 
to effectively deliver basic services and often lack accountability and transparency.
6.2. The Institutional Context in Armenia
This section provides analysis of the general institutional and governance context in 
Armenia. In particular, it examines institutional and structural conditions that affect the 
ability of individuals to benefit from existing economic and social opportunities and 
influence their livelihoods. This analysis helps ground section 7.2 of Chapter Seven, 
which provides the respondents’ perspectives on the wider governance environment and 
examines how the institutional and governance context affects community participation 
and local capacity.
6.2.1 Inequality in Armenia
Despite economic growth and some poverty reduction in Armenia over 1998-2001, 
inequality in the country is at an extremely high level. Income inequality measured by 
the Gini coefficient was estimated at 0.54 in 2001 (PRSP 2003: 23). Although 
inequality dropped since 1998/99 - from 0.64 to 0.54, Armenia is one of the former 
socialist countries with the highest income inequality. Inequality is more severe in rural
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areas than in urban areas. In 2001, the Gini coefficient was 0.45 in Yerevan and 0.47 in 
other urban areas, whereas in rural areas it was 0.58.
B o x  6.1: Growing Social Polarisation in Arm enia
“Today being poor in Armenia implies to be deprived of any security and protection. A society 
is being formed, in which human capabilities are determined by wealth and its various 
manifestations -  cash, connections, authority, or all three of them together, as they become the 
social capital that provides security. Various groups start reproducing themselves and become 
entrenched in their sub-culture -  the poor become poorer, they experience not only material 
deprivation, but also social and political apathy, fear, low self-esteem, and perceive themselves 
as inferior and incapable of playing any role in their society. The rich continue to get richer, and 
in addition to their wealth acquiring power and social status and engaging in political activism, 
sometimes without any distinct political or civic agenda”.
Source: H. Kharatyan, in “Stories on Poverty,” Yerevan 2001: 349, translated from Armenian.
The widening income inequality in Armenia and other low income CIS countries59 is 
conditioned by the increasing unemployment and the reduction in incomes generated 
from employment and social transfers (Falkingham 2003: 9-10). The variation in 
income distribution among households is also due to the existing institutional and 
structural conditions that determine the degree of access to formal jobs, information, 
networks and command over economic resources. The poor often cannot take advantage 
of existing economic and social opportunities as they lack status, cash and connections. 
This results in disproportionate distribution of wages and incomes from property, 
business and agricultural activities. As income inequality widens, the society is being 
divided into a small group of rich and powerful, the so called ‘new Armenians’ (inor 
hayer), and the poor who are powerless and marginalised (Box 6.1). The following 
sections of this report discuss some of the existing institutional and social constraints in 
Armenia.
6.2.2 State Institutions and Governance in Armenia
The weak financial capacity prohibits the Armenian government from implementing 
effective social protection policies and programmes. Ferge (2001: 130) describes the 
state in Armenia and in other low income transition countries as a ‘near-collapse’ state. 
She considers the drastic cut in social expenditures as a result of the sharp decrease in
59 The low income or CIS-7 countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
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public revenues as the most “tragic trend” in the welfare policies of these countries. The 
existing social policy programmes in Armenia are not adequate for protecting the poor. 
Family benefits based on a proxy means-tested targeting are the main social assistance 
cash benefit in Armenia. They have replaced the Soviet system of categorical cash 
transfers and privileges. The average monthly amount of a family benefit in 2001 was 
2,255 drams (US$4.5) per individual, or 20 percent of the extreme poverty line (World 
Bank 2003c: 134). From 1999 to 2001, the family benefits budget and the number of 
beneficiaries decreased by one fourth. The average monthly old-age pension in 2001 
was 5,500 drams (US$10), or 65 percent of the extreme poverty line (World Bank 
2003c: 129). Due to the fiscal pressures, pension arrears in Armenia are very common. 
Some 55 percent of pensioners surveyed in ICLS 2001 reported that the state owed 
them an average of two months pensions (World Bank 2003c: 132). As mentioned in 
Chapter One, the inadequate capacity of the state to finance the operation and 
maintenance (O&M) of important economic and social infrastructure resulted in the 
deterioration of the physical condition of many schools, health facilities, potable water 
and irrigation networks throughout the country.
The World Bank’s Institutional and Governance Review (IGR) report (World Bank 
2000e) suggests that the Armenian state has a weak institutional capacity for policy 
development, oversight of policy implementation and policy implementation itself (for 
example, through service delivery) and budgeting. The report notes that policy 
formulation and implementation in the social sectors has been especially weak. One of 
the impediments to effective public service performance in Armenia is the enduring 
legacy of the Soviet nomenklatura system. In particular, the report holds that 
“individual and organisational accountability is lacking, the old command-and-control 
culture is still entrenched, policy development and implementation are still very much 
top-down, and patronage is still a fact of life in public employment” (World Bank 2000e: 
18). The continuing patronage in the public service means that there is difficulty to 
ensure accountability of individual public officials. The IGR report attributes the 
persistence of these legacies to the existing systemic, financial, legal and regulatory 
bottlenecks as well as to the informal norms and behaviour prevalent within formal 
institutions.
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Corruption, both political and administrative, is widespread and affects all spheres of 
economic and social life in Armenia (Hansen 2002; UNDP 2001; Dethier 2003, 
Freedom House 2003). Dethier (2003: 18) argues that a common feature of the low 
income CIS countries is “collusion and alliance between government officials and rich 
and powerful entrepreneurs”. He suggests that these elite groups have a strong influence 
on state institutions and economic policy, which he describes as a ‘state capture’ (12- 
13). The International Crisis Group report (ICG 2004: 16) claims that “[T]he lack of 
rule of law [in Armenia] stems from a general absence of transparency at the highest 
political level, a situation that encourages the spread of the shadow economy and 
opaque decision making”. The Freedom House report (2003: 95-97) suggests that 
corruption in Armenia is pervasive both in the top echelons of the government and in 
the civil service. Ordinary citizens pay bribes to public officials for a variety of services 
and favours. People normally have to pay bribes, for example, to obtain legal 
documents and permits, to obtain a business license, and to prevent harassment of the 
road police.
According to a household survey60 conducted for the IGR report (World Bank 2000e: 4), 
there is a pervasive lack of accountability and transparency at the micro level in 
Armenia. Some ninety percent of respondents felt that complaints or appeals about 
service delivery would not result in any decision, and more than forty percent felt that 
there would be no enforcement. In addition, organisations and services perceived to be 
more corrupt or dishonest were also negatively rated on their overall performance. The 
IGR survey of public officials conducted in parallel to the household survey reveals that 
the underlying reasons for poor public sector performance are “weak and inconsistent 
sector policies”, and “rules for public officials that have little impact, restraints or 
incentives on actual behaviour” (World Bank 2000e: 4).
Corruption contributes to the deepening of social exclusion in Armenia. A survey by the 
Armenian Democratic Forum (ADF 2001: 47) reports that unofficial payments are 
crucial for increasing access to public services and/or enhancing the quality of services 
provided.61 This suggests that those who cannot afford to pay because of material
60 Two surveys were carried out in 1999 to inform the IGR study: a survey of 1,000 households at 
different income levels, and a survey of 300 public officials in 37 organisations.
61 The survey was conducted among 1,000 households at different income levels.
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deprivation may be deprived of access to certain services or may receive services of 
poor quality. The ADF report also maintains that the poor were found to make 
unofficial payments more frequently than the rich. In many cases, the poor had to pay in 
order to receive services, as they often lacked access to influential social networks (that 
the rich had), which could otherwise facilitate their access to these services.
According to the UNDP Human Development Report 2001 (UNDP 2001: 74), 
corruption in Armenia has eroded the trust of the population in the rule of law and the 
“legitimacy of authorities and the current political system”. Similarly, Oxfam (Oxfam 
2003) maintains that the widespread corruption and the weakness of the rule of law have 
resulted in the distrust and disillusionment of the Armenian population with principles 
of democratic governance. Oxfam identifies this as one of factors accounting for the low 
levels of civic engagement in Armenia. People have lost their faith that “political 
participation and civic activism can help resolve their problems” (Oxfam 2003: 4). 
Dethier (2003: 19) maintains that high levels of corruption endanger the progress of 
democratic reforms in the low income transition countries. He claims that the corrupt 
elite in these countries have control over key institutions of governance and law 
enforcement, and they are “unlikely to share power or welcome transparency and 
accountability”.
6.2.3 Social Exclusion in Armenia
Social exclusion affects the ability of the poor to secure jobs, access resources and take 
advantage of existing opportunities. The qualitative study of the poorest of the poor in 
Armenia (Gomart 1998) demonstrates the crucial role of social networks and informal 
connections in ‘getting things done’. Securing a job in the public or private sector 
requires connections and often cash for bribes. Connections, in particular, play an 
important role in accessing formal employment, and it is often the relatives and friends 
of managers of enterprises who receive jobs. According to Gomart, even informal 
employment for unskilled labour requires connections. The lack of connections, 
material resources and productive assets restrict the ability of individuals to engage in 
income-generating activities. The poor often do not have the necessary capital (or 
relatives or friends who have extra cash and could lend them money) to start up an 
income-generating activity. Refugees were found especially disadvantaged in their
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access to important social networks and information, which deters them from obtaining 
jobs and securing benefits (UNDP 1999b; Alaverdyan 2000; Kharatyan 2003).
Most rural residents who have any significant involvement in non-farm activities are 
those who have positions of influence and access to important social networks 
(Kharatyan 2003: 22-23). Most ‘village businessmen’ held administrative posts in 
Soviet times, or were former managers of Soviet enterprises and industries. These rural 
elite today own most local businesses such as shops and food processing industries. 
Most of the managers of the former state-owned enterprises used their positions and 
took control of these enterprises when they were privatised. The rural elite benefits from 
projects supported by international organisations as well as from rural co-operatives and 
credit schemes. The majority of the rural population, on the other hand, perceive 
themselves to be powerless, and do not make any effort to involve themselves in 
economic activities in their area. Most of them are convinced that the market is ‘closed’ 
to outsiders who do not have access to networks and influence.
6.3 Local Governance and Decentralisation in Armenia
This section reviews the local governance and decentralisation context in Armenia.62 In 
particular, it examines the existing local self-governance structures and the main 
functions and responsibilities of local governments. The section examines the 
effectiveness of decentralisation reform in enabling local communities effectively 
perform decentralised tasks. This section also provides information and analysis on the 
irrigation decentralisation reform in Armenia. The background information and analysis 
provide in this section allow mapping out the immediate context within which local 
communities function. Chapter Seven, Eight and Nine will provide specific information 
on the existing local institutions and local institutional capacity in the sample 
communities.
62 Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 synthesise information and analysis provided in Rawkins (2004) and 
Tumanyan (2001). I designed the methodology and co-ordinated the fieldwork for the Institutional 
Assessment by Rawkins (2004). Section 6.3.3 draws on my interviews with the representatives of the 
government’s Irrigation Rehabilitation Project Unit, IFAD and the World Bank.
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6.3.1 Local Governance Structures in Armenia
In Armenia, as in other countries of the Soviet Union, the communist ideology required 
extremely centralised systems of decision-making and policy implementation. The 
central government consisted of 40 ministries, which administered the country's 
economy through 37 different territorial administrative units (shrjan). Three parallel 
hierarchies of administration ran from the central government down to the regional, city 
and district level: the sovets, or elected councils (in practice appointed by the Party 
committees), representing the legislative power; gortskoms, the executives, representing 
the executive power, and partkoms, or party committees, -  representing the Communist 
Party. The centralisation left no room for local polices. There was strict vertical 
subordination of local administrators to the higher levels of governance and the 
Communist Party. The central apparatus exerted strict control over local authorities, 
including direct interference in administrative affairs. The central government 
controlled the local units through the distribution of funds from the central budget.
The decentralisation reform in Armenia started as part of the process of political and 
economic liberalisation after independence. The foundation for the legal framework for 
decentralisation is found in the Constitution of 1995; chapter 7 is entitled Territorial 
Administration and Local Self-Government. In addition, detailed provisions are set out 
in a number of laws, including: the Law on the Administrative and Territorial Division 
of the Republic (December 1995); the Law on Local Government Elections (1996); the 
Law on Local Self-Government (1996), and the new law, of the same title, of 2002. 
Other relevant laws include: the Law on the Budget System (1997); the Law on Local 
Duties and Fees (1998), and the Law on Financial Decentralisation (1998).
There are only two tiers of government in Armenia: central and local. There is no 
autonomous regional level of government. Instead, the central government, through 
deconcentration of administration, has established regional offices of certain 
government ministries and agencies in the 10 regions, or marzes. The marzes are each 
headed by a governor, or marzpet, appointed by the Prime Minister on the 
recommendation of the President. In addition to the 10 marzes, the capital, Yerevan, 
also has the status of a marz. The marzpets and their offices (marzpetarans), along with
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the regional administrative offices of central government ministries, represent central 
government in the regions and carry out central government policy.
Armenia is divided into 930 units of local government, or ‘communities’ (hamaynk). Of 
these, 59 are urban communities, including 47 cities and the 12 districts of Yerevan. 
The latter has a population of 1.1 million and its 12 districts have elected mayors and 
councils, as do all other communities. Rural communities account for 872 of the 930 
units of local government. More than half the population lives in communities with less 
than 1,000 inhabitants.
All local governments have a directly-elected community head (hamaynkapet), or local 
mayor, and an elected council (the Council of Elders, or Avakani), with 5-15 members, 
depending on the population size of the community. Local government elections are 
held every 3 years. As of date, there have been 3 ‘rounds’ of elections, in 1996, 1999 
and 2002. Political parties play a minimal role in the elections, although, the party 
connections of candidates may be important (Rawkins 2004: 15). The Council of Elders 
and mayor constitute the decision-making bodies at a local level. As a representative 
body, the Council acts on behalf of the community and provides guidance on 
community development, improvements in the quality of community life, the delivery 
of public services, and other issues. Rawkins (2004: 25) maintains that mayors tend to 
influence the outcomes of the Council elections and have the decisive voice in meetings 
of Councils.
Community residents have the right to participate in public decision-making (Tumanyan 
2001: 331). Thus, they may submit draft resolutions and attend Council sessions with 
the permission of the Council. The Armenian Constitution allows forms of direct 
democracy, such as referenda and public hearings and meetings. In reality, the level of 
public participation is very low. There are more than 2,200 registered NGOs in Armenia, 
but few of them are involved with local governments. Registering an NGO in Armenia 
is relatively easy, and any citizen can become a founder of a voluntary group or 
association.
According to Rawkins (2004: 25), the general interest and knowledge of the population 
regarding local government may be relatively low, but mayoral elections can attract
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significant interest. He maintains that although citizens have low overall expectations, 
they have informal standards against which to assess the performance of local leaders. 
In several cases, incumbent mayors were defeated by a wide margin, as citizens were 
not satisfied with their performance. In other communities, where there was a general 
appreciation for the efforts made by the mayor, and his responsiveness to citizen 
concerns, incumbent mayors faced little serious opposition.
6.3.2 Decentralisation Reform in Armenia
Local governments in Armenia are responsible for a wide range of local development 
issues. These include formulation of community budgets and local development plans; 
O&M of water supply, irrigation and central heating systems; solid waste collection and 
disposal; construction and O&M of roads, bridges and other related infrastructure; 
management of culture clubs, community centres, kindergartens, sports facilities; and 
issuing permits and regulations for local trade and services. While the Constitution and 
the legal framework appear to allow substantial local autonomy, in practice, there are 
major constraints which limit the effectiveness of decentralisation in Armenia. Manor 
(1999: 55) identifies four important components for successful decentralisation: (i) 
sufficient discretionary power delegated to local governments over local development; 
(ii) sufficient financial resources to accomplish tasks; (iii) adequate administrative 
capacity to accomplish those tasks; and (iv) reliable accountability mechanisms to 
ensure the accountability of bureaucrats to elected politicians, and the accountability of 
elected politicians to citizens.
The first is the limitation on the authority of local government. Central state authorities 
continue playing strong role in local affairs (Tumanyan 2001: 354-55). For example, the 
central government retains the ability to determine community property. The state 
government has the power to remove a mayor from office. The limits to the principle of 
‘self-government’ are also rooted in the orientation of the central government. 
Tumanyan (2001: 354) maintains that local governments in Armenia are “perceived as 
branches of the state government, created by the state and performing state 
responsibilities and duties”. Many officials still regard local governments as extensions 
of the central government that should operate under the close supervision of the 
marzpets and report to the central government. The marzpet has significant power and
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can often exercise administrative methods of control over the local government 
(Tumanyan 2001: 356). Rawkins (2004: 23-24) suggests that the relations between local 
communities and marzpets vary considerably. Some mayors have managed to cultivate 
better relationships with the marzpetaran than others.
The core areas of service provision, including health and formal education, remain 
under central control. Control of power and gas supply systems have not been 
transferred to local governments. Further, in some areas where powers have been legally 
transferred to local governments, practical constraints may prevent the community from 
acting on its responsibilities. In the case of water, sewage, or solid waste disposal, many 
local governments lack either the human resources and/or the financial capacity to 
manage the utilities. In such cases, control has been retained by central government 
through management contracts (Rawkins 2001: 18).
The lack of adequate financial resources is perhaps the most fundamental constraint, 
inhibiting the work of local governments. The main sources of revenue for local 
governments are: (i) local land and property taxes, and, (ii) the ‘equalisation subsidy’ 
provided by central government. The level of the subsidy received by each community 
is determined by a formula, based on population size, but also taking into account other 
factors (i.e. location in the earthquake or conflict area). Communities are heavily 
dependent on the state subsidies, which often comprise fifty percent of their budgets 
(Tumanyan 2001: 346). Due to financial constraints, the state has failed consistently to 
meet its commitments for approved transfers to local governments (Rawkins 2001: 19). 
Quarterly transfers to community budgets are made on an erratic and unpredictable 
basis, and often a substantial proportion of the annual payment is made in the last few 
days of the financial year or transferred into the following year. As a consequence, local 
governments are often obliged to hold off on payments of salaries until the funds are 
received. In addition to the subsidy, central government may also allocate ‘subventions’ 
for capital projects, but only very small amounts have been allocated for this purpose.
Due to the extreme material and social deprivation in Armenia, collection rates for local 
taxes are very low, with actual payments estimated to be at between 40 to 50 per cent of 
required levels (Rawkins 2001: 20). A further problem results from the high cost of 
electricity. Unpaid debts by households to the central government for electricity charges
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are deducted from the subsidy to be paid to the local government. As a result, many 
local government units have accumulated substantial debts, normally in the form of 
unpaid salaries.
Another impediment to successful decentralisation is associated with the weak local 
administrative capacity. There are enormous capacity differences among local 
government units. According to Rawkins (2004: 16), the relative prosperity of the 
community affects its ability to expand staff numbers and to provide a higher level of 
services. Many larger urban communities are able to maintain substantial administrative, 
financial and service departments, and have the means to employ trained professionals 
and procure necessary equipment (Rawkins 2004: 18). Some rural communities may 
lack both the knowledge and the equipment to successfully perform their tasks. Salaries 
of local government officials are low (less than US$10 per month), and payments are 
often late and erratic.
6.3.3 Decentralisation of Irrigation in Armenia
The irrigation reform of 1995 decentralised the management of irrigation networks at 
the community level to community-based Water Users Associations (WUAs) 
(jrogtagortsoghneri miutyun\ later called Water Users Consumers Co-operatives 
(WUCCs). WUAs were given the responsibility for water distribution, collection of 
charges and O&M of tertiary and quaternary canals. WUAs were established in 1996 
(107 pilots) and expanded in 1998 throughout the whole country. In 2001, there were 
476 officially registered WUAs in Armenia. WUAs were independent legal entities, and 
they had the right to manage their funds, raise resources and make independent 
decisions regarding water allocation and distribution. All irrigators were formally 
members of WUAs. The WUA leaders were to be elected by the WUA members at a 
community meeting. WUAs had technical staff, who were responsible for monitoring of 
water distribution and fee collection. The staff were officially remunerated, but the fees 
were usually insignificant and mostly symbolic.
The reform introduced user charges for irrigation water and for the O&M of the 
irrigation infrastructure. WUAs were liable for covering the electricity costs incurred by 
the tubewells under their supervision. The government retained the responsibility for the
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capital costs of construction and non-routine rehabilitation of the irrigation system. The 
extreme economic and social deprivation of farmers resulted in the non-payment of user 
charges, and the annual collection rate did not exceed 40 percent on average between 
1997 and 2001. This resulted in significant arrears accumulated by the WUAs, 
unreliable water delivery and further deterioration of irrigation infrastructure.
In 2001, the government reversed the decentralisation reform. As a result of their 
inability to ensure collection of water charges, WUAs were considered a ‘failure’. 
According to the 2001 governmental resolution, WUAs were to be gradually phased out, 
and more centralised management introduced. The resolution stipulated that those 
WUAs that did not pay annual water charges of at least 60 percent, were to be refused a 
contract by the State Committee for Water Management (SCWM). Instead, these WUAs 
were to be abolished, and the communal irrigation systems were to be transferred to the 
management of the SCWM local branches (District Water Committees) through 
management contracts. Further, according to the Law 582 of July 2002, all WUAs in 
Armenia were to be abolished as of October 2002. The responsibility for the 
management of secondary and tertiary networks was shifted over to the newly 
established Water User Federations (WUFs). WUFs comprised of several WUAs (up to 
10 villages) and covered large areas of 4000 ha on average.
One of the reasons for the failed irrigation decentralisation reform was that community 
participation, empowerment and capacity building were not institutionalised as the 
primary objectives of the reform. WUAs were established by the governmental decree 
in a top-down bureaucratic manner. The decision to decentralise irrigation management 
to communities was influenced by the international agencies and prompted by the 
willingness to ease the burden on the central government’s budget and administration. 
The reform did not attempt to build grassroots organisations that could take control of 
their own development. In addition, the government played limited part in managing 
and monitoring the process of decentralisation and building the capacity of WUAs. It 
restricted its role to dealing with regulatory issues and non-routine rehabilitation and 
construction. Local communities were expected to manage the service delivery on their 
own, without much administrative, financial and organisational support. The lack of 
support and capacity building prevented the WUAs from becoming viable organisations 
that could demonstrate to farmers the importance of participation. Finally, the lack of
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reliable and effective provision of water to the tertiary level also contributed to the 
disincentives of farmers to pay user charges and effectively manage local irrigation 
systems.
6.4 Conclusions
This chapter discussed the general socio-economic situation in Armenia with a specific 
reference to people’s livelihoods in the rural regions. Poverty in Armenia is widespread 
and severe, and over the half of the population of the country are income poor. Poverty 
in Armenia is also manifested in high levels of social and psychological deprivation. 
Social vulnerabilities are especially strong among women, people with disabilities, 
refugees, ethnic minorities and people living in the conflict area.
In addition to the low economic productivity, other factors such as poor governance, 
structural inequalities and social exclusion are key determinants of poverty and income 
inequality in Armenia. The widespread corruption and the weakness of the rule of law 
in the country have immediate repercussions for the poor, by constraining their access 
to health, education, and essential public services. The poor cannot take advantage of 
the existing economic and social opportunities as they often lack status, power, cash and 
connections.
This chapter discussed the role of the state institutions in Armenia. It held that the weak 
financial capacity of the state prohibits it from pro-active and generous social policy 
measures that would enhance people’s welfare. It also showed that the Armenian state 
has a weak institutional capacity for policy development, resource allocation and policy 
implementation. This weak institutional capacity is conditioned by the formal and 
informal legacies of the Soviet system.
The chapter discussed the local governance system and decentralisation context in 
Armenia. In particular, it provided an overview of the administrative division and 
functions and responsibilities of local government units in Armenia. The existing 
legislation and decentralisation reforms have established foundations for autonomous 
local self-governance. Local government units have substantial independence, and 
ordinary citizens are allowed to participate in public decision-making processes. At the
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same time, the chapter showed that decentralisation of local management and service 
delivery tasks to local governments in Armenia was not accompanied with delegation of 
full discretionary power over local development, sufficient administrative capacity and 
financial resources.
This chapter provided a brief account of the 1995-2002 irrigation decentralisation 
reform in Armenia. The reform decentralised the management of communal irrigation 
systems to the community-based autonomous WUAs. The chapter showed that the 
inability of WUAs to ensure adequate collection of irrigation water charges resulted in 
the reversal of the irrigation reform, and abolition of WUAs. Community participation, 
empowerment and capacity building were not institutionalised as the primary objectives 
of the reform, which contributed to the failure to establish sustainable users’ 
organisations.
Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine present the analysis of the main empirical findings of 
this research and form the core of this thesis. The next chapter, Chapter Seven, 
examines socio-economic conditions, patterns of national, regional and local 
governance, the existing local institutions, forms and nature of participation, the 
intensity of empowerment of local residents, social capital, and institutional capacity in 
rural Armenia.
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Chapter Seven. Local Institutions, Community Participation and Social Capital in 
Rural Armenia
This chapter is based on primary data gathered through fieldwork. It examines the 
existing local institutions, forms and nature of community participation, the intensity of 
empowerment of local residents, social capital, and institutional capacity in rural 
Armenia. The chapter distils the main factors that account for the existing forms and 
nature of community participation and local institutional capacity in the sample 
communities. In particular, it examines the existing socio-economic conditions and 
patterns of local, regional and national governance and their effects on community 
participation and institutional capacity.
This chapter consists of five sections. The first section examines how the fiscal 
constraints facing local communities and the high levels of impoverishment amongst 
local residents affect community participation and local institutional capacity. The 
second section explores the impact of the existing formal and informal governance 
norms and practices at the central and regional level on local institutions and 
community participation. Section three analyses the governance environment in the 
local communities, and its effect on the intensity of empowerment of local residents and 
the nature of community participation. The fourth section examines the role of 
community leaders -  local mayors and school directors -  in influencing local 
development and social relations in rural communities. Section five explores the nature 
of local social capital and forms of participation of ordinary community members in the 
local development and the life of their communities.
This chapter represents an examination of the existing local institutions, forms and 
nature of community participation, the intensity of empowerment of local residents, 
social capital, and local institutional capacity in the sample communities after the ASIF 
micro-projects. Chapters Eight and Nine will then explore the extent to which the ASIF 
micro-projects influenced these variables.
The objective of this chapter was to understand factors that influence community 
participation and local institutional capacity in rural Armenia. The exploration of the 
local context in the sample communities helped me identify the main socio-economic,
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institutional and political factors that affected the ASIF micro-project impacts. In 
Chapter Ten, I use this analysis to explain how the contextual environment of the local 
communities was understood and operationalised in ASIF’s design features, and how it 
affected the processes, service delivery outcomes and the specific participation and 
capacity building impacts of the ASIF micro-projects.
7.1 Poverty and Community Participation
Managing local development in Armenia is extremely difficult. The withdrawal of the 
state from important service delivery and provision functions has shifted the burden of 
responsibility onto local communities. As Chapter Six shows, the decentralisation 
reforms in Armenia transferred to local communities the management and financing of 
many local services, including water supply, irrigation and central heating systems; 
solid waste collection and disposal; roads, bridges and other related infrastructure; 
culture clubs, community centres, kindergartens, and sports facilities. At the same time, 
the ability of local communities to effectively manage decentralised tasks and contribute 
to local development remains limited. One of the reasons for this is financial constraints 
of local governments and the high level of impoverishment of local residents. Chapter 
Six highlighted that decentralisation of service delivery functions to local communities 
in Armenia was not accompanied with sufficient financial decentralisation. The 
fieldwork findings presented in this section illustrate material difficulties faced by local 
communities in Armenia, and discuss their implications for community participation 
and local institutional capacity. The state budget has limited resources, and it is unable 
to adequately support local governments. Local governments have limited revenue base 
and administrative capacity for service provision and delivery. Ordinary community 
members in their turn have limited time and cash resources to contribute to local 
development.
7.1.1 Fiscal Constraints
All local governments in the studied communities experienced enormous constraints in 
managing local development as they had a limited financial resource base. In all of the 
sample communities, the actual budgeted resources (and expenditures) were 
significantly less than the planned amounts (Table 7.1 and Annex 4). In Khachik, P
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Sevak and Eghegnavan, the actual expenditures were twice lower than the planned 
amounts, in Tsilkar they were four times lower, and in Arevadasht they constituted only 
4 percent of the planned budget in 2001. During 1999-2001, none of the local 
governments in the sample communities spent any resources on the construction and 
purchase of community assets and agricultural inputs. The actual salaries paid to the 
local government staff in 2001 were twice lower than the allocated amounts in P Sevak, 
three times lower in Khachik, and six times lower in Tsilkar.
Table 7.1: Local Budget Revenues in the Sample Communities
Local Government Revenues
(in thousand drams)
1999
planned actual %
2001
planned actual %
P Sevak 3053 1717 56 6766 3034 45
Eghegnavan 18834 12698 67 22918 13987 61
Tsilkar 6528 1323 20 5296 1074 20
Ashnak 8331 1537 18 4949 4119 83
Arevadasht 85794 14571 17 11127 447 4
Khachik 4946 515 10 5726 2002 35
Source: Ministry of Finance of Republic of Armenia
Such tight budget constraints are conditioned by the minimal. final]
administrative support received from the central government, and by the marginal local 
revenue base of local governments. The equalisation subsidies (or ‘state transfers’) paid 
from the central budget are small in their value and are often paid partially (Table 7.2 
and Annex 4). For example, in 2001, Tsilkar and Arevadasht received from the central 
government 69 percent of the allocated amount, and Khachik -  57 percent of the 
allocated amount.
Table 7.2: State Transfers to Local Government Budgets
State Transfers to Local 1999 2001
Government Budgets
(in thousand drams)
planned actual % planned actual %
P Sevak 650 325 50 1721 1721 100
Eghegnavan 301 301 100 858 857 100
Tsilkar 91 91 100 271 188 69
Ashnak 223 223 100 2694 2694 100
Arevadasht 373 259 69
Khachik 2034 126 6 2929 1690 57
Source: Ministry of Finance of Republic of Armenia
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Tax collection rates remain low in most communities in Armenia (Table 7.3 and Annex 
4). In 2001, the revenues from local taxes were much lower than the amounts planned to 
be raised in all of the studied communities. The amounts of taxes raised were about ten 
percent of planned amounts in P Sevak and Khachik, and 16 percent in Tsilkar. The tax 
gap in Arevadasht was lowest, with just 180,000 drams collected compared to 10 
million drams planned, slightly below two percent. Findings of the fieldwork indicate 
that many residents did not pay taxes as they had limited sources of income and very 
little cash available at their disposal. Some respondents did not believe that the 
fulfilment of their citizenship responsibilities would be reciprocated by the authorities. 
People felt it was unfair to expect them to observe their citizenship duties whilst the 
state did not perform its own duties and abandoned them to deal with their difficulties 
on their own. A resident in Khachik said, “As if it is not enough that we live here 
[border area], we are also expected to pay taxes!” (K-6). Some respondents thought that 
they “paid taxes so that the mayor could receive his salary” (K-Gl).
Table 7 .3: Tax Incom e in the Sam ple Communities
Tax Income
(in thousand drams)
1999
planned actual %
2001
planned actual %
P Sevak 1853 261 14 2964 491 9
Eghegnavan 11117 5758 52 11177 4152 31
Tsilkar 5362 872 16 3344 536 16
Ashnak 4272 1307 30 1350 1078 80
Arevadasht 10746 180 1.6
Khachik 2552 380 15 2753 280 10
Source: Ministry o f Finance of Republic of Armenia
7.1.2 Poverty and Social Vulnerabilities
All studied communities experienced high levels of economic and social deprivation. 
Figure 7.1 in this chapter presents a summary of geographical, physical, financial, social 
and other assets in the sample communities (Annex 5 presents detailed asset mapping 
for individual communities). Most residents within these communities were on a similar 
income level, and had enormous difficulties in generating sufficient income to sustain 
their households. Most cash income was derived from short-term seasonal agricultural 
trade. Very few ordinary community members were engaged in commercial non­
farming activities. Most households struggled to satisfy their basic needs in food,
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clothing, housing, education and health care, and social and cultural participation. All of 
the communities had several extremely poor households, who survived almost 
exclusively thanks to humanitarian aid, formal social assistance benefits and mutual 
help. It was striking that in all of the sample communities most young men between 
twenty and thirty had emigrated to Russia and other CIS countries. The extent of 
impoverishment in Arevadasht was more pronounced than in other sample communities. 
The proportion of extremely poor households seemed to be the highest in Arevadasht 
(about thirty households or one third of the village). The number of people reported to 
have migrated outside Armenia in search of income generating opportunities and better 
life was the highest in Arevadasht. The state of local economic and social infrastructure 
and the extent of access of local residents to important services in Arevadasht were also 
significantly worse than in the other communities.
All of the communities had different sources of vulnerability, which were conditioned 
by their climatic and geographical situation, leadership roles, the extent of access to 
external finance, social composition and characteristics of local social capital. 
Geographic and climatic factors played an important role in determining economic 
outcomes. Most communities in the sample had unfavourable conditions for agricultural 
development. Thus Khachik, P Sevak and, especially Karin and Arevadasht, were 
situated in extremely arid areas. For several years, these communities experienced a 
continuous lack of water supply and severe droughts, and the agricultural yields 
remained minimal. Ashnak and Tsilkar had very harsh cold winters, which often 
damaged crops and fruit trees. The quality of land in Tsilkar, Arevadasht and P Sevak 
was poor. The quality of land was much better in Eghegnavan, which was situated in the 
Ararat valley, the most fertile area in Armenia. Here again, the lack of water in the 
previous years was often cited by the respondents as the major obstacle for them to take 
advantage of the favourable geographic conditions.
The proximity to the border with Azerbaijan, with whom Armenia was in a military 
conflict in 1989-1994, was another important factor that affected economic and social 
outcomes in the sample communities. In Khachik and P Sevak, many land plots were
63 The ceasefire with Azerbaijan was sealed in May 1994. The peace, however, is volatile, and there are 
no mechanisms in place to prevent the conflict from restarting (ICG 2004). There are regular exchanges 
of fire between the two sides.
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trapped in the border zone. Farmers did not cultivate them as they were afraid of 
occasional shelling, kidnapping or land mines in the bordering areas. In P Sevak, the 
residents were only able to cultivate 160 ha from the total of 1,000 ha of land they 
owned. Living on the border also creates a sense of insecurity and vulnerability. As a 
resident in Khachik said, “We do not feel like absolute owners here” (K-7).
Most communities experienced difficulties in communicating with other regions in 
Armenia. Many communities, such as Khachik, P Sevak, Arevadasht, and Ashnak, had 
poor transport links with Yerevan. This made it difficult for the residents to solve many 
issues that required the involvement of officials in the capital. It also restricted their 
access to important agricultural markets in Yerevan. When they needed to travel outside 
their communities, people relied on those few residents who had their own cars. P 
Sevak, Arevadasht and Khachik had poor roads. Khachik was situated inside a 
mountain range, which made communication with the external world even more 
difficult. In winter months, the village tends to become completely isolated. Telephone 
connection was not available in Arevadasht, Tsilkar and P Sevak. Telephone was 
available in other villages, although not all residents had individual connection in their 
homes.
The majority of residents owned land plots outside the village area.64 Most villagers had 
their orchards near their houses where they grew vegetables, herbs and fruit trees. In all 
of the villages, there were several households who did not have access to land. These 
were mostly those residents who gave up their land to the communal reserve funds or 
rented it out to the more ‘better-off residents as they found it difficult to cultivate. 
Typically, it was the local mayor and another one or two relatively affluent residents, 
who were able to buy the land plots from the impoverished residents. As a consequence, 
they were the largest land owners in their communities.
In all of the communities, subsistence agriculture was predominant. Subsistence 
agricultural activities have played an important role in protecting a large part of the
64 The privatisation of land, livestock and agricultural machinery in Armenia took place in 1991. Each 
rural community was eligible to privatise the land, livestock and machinery that belonged to the state or 
collective farms of their community {sovkhoz or kolkhoz property). Each household was allocated land of 
equal size (1,4 ha in total), which comprised a combination o f several, randomly drawn land plots of 
different quality. Although the land reform in Armenia is generally considered successful, it nevertheless 
produced some inequalities. For more discussion see Kharatyan (2003).
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population during the years of economic decline in Armenia (Kharatayn 2003). People 
in the sample communities were largely reliant on wheat, fruits and vegetables they 
grew in their orchards and land plots. Commercial farming existed in all of the 
villages.65 It provided low seasonal income from sales of agricultural produce.66 Thus 
most sales were in summer (fruits and vegetables) and in autumn (wheat and potato). 
Most villagers sold their produce to urban intermediaries, who then resold it in the main 
urban markets. In Eghegnavan, compared to other sample communities, the residents 
had significantly higher income from agriculture, as they had a contract with the cognac 
(brandy) factory and sold their grapes directly to the factory. Again, the income from 
grape sales was only short-term, during the months of August-September. The rest of 
the year, the residents in all of the communities lived on the proceeds from farming, 
which effectively implied limited cash availability.
Most residents found it extremely difficult to cultivate their land plots. Studies (Gomart 
1998, Kharatyan 2003) show that the lack of cash to invest in expensive agricultural 
inputs (irrigation water, seeds, plant protection chemicals, fertilisers, fuel, and rental of 
mechanical services and machinery) prohibits many marginalised households from 
cultivating land. Thus land has become a ‘liability’ rather than an asset for many 
impoverished rural residents. In the sample communities, nearly all respondents 
reported that they could hardly afford purchasing agricultural inputs. As the existing 
machinery deteriorates, only a few farmers can afford purchasing new machines. In 
Tsilkar, for example, the old collective farm equipment was privatised, and people were 
at a loss as how to continue cultivating their plots. Access to credit was limited to most 
residents because of collateral requirements. In Khachik, and P Sevak access to credit 
was facilitated through the intermediation of local mayors. Most farmers were reluctant 
to borrow from micro-finance institutions as they did not feel confident they would be 
able to repay the credit. The respondents were concerned about the growing trend 
amongst the impoverished residents to give up their land plots, and start working as 
agricultural labourers for the more ‘better-off residents.
65 According to a national survey of farms, some 80 percent of Armenian farms report sales of some farm 
products (Lerman and Mirzakhanian 2001: 35). More than half the farm output is used for family 
consumption, but 25 percent is sold for cash and another 5 percent is bartered.
66 Due to the seasonal nature of agricultural activities, much poverty in Armenia is ‘seasonal’ (PRSP 2003: 
25). Thus income and consumption reach the highest level in the 4th quarter (autumn) and their minimum 
level in the first quarter (winter) of the year.
184
Many people largely relied on a range of coping strategies for their survival. Out­
migration was a predominant coping strategy in P Sevak, Eghegnavan, Arevadasht and 
Tsilkar.67 In Arevadasht, for example, some 60 percent of residents (about 120 
households) left the village in the preceding five years. In other villages, many residents 
said they would migrate “if they could”. Migration requires a significant start-up capital 
and social networks in the host country, and not many people can afford to migrate. 
Remittances from relatives abroad were reported to be an important source for 
maintaining people’s livelihoods. Networks of mutual assistance and reciprocity were 
an important social safety net that most residents relied upon (more details follow in 
section 7.5). In Khachik, residents reported that many young men and women did not 
wish to get married and have children, as they did not feel confident they could support 
their families. The residents believed that the rates of marriage and child birth 
significantly decreased in their community in the last five years.
In all of the communities, there were some extremely poor households, who did not 
have income from formal or informal employment and who sustained their livelihoods 
thanks to the support from co-villagers, humanitarian aid and social assistance benefits. 
These households were often exempt by their leaders from paying local taxes, water 
charges and contributions towards community initiatives. The poorest households had 
different characteristics in different communities. These included households with 
single female heads, disabled breadwinner, single elderly (for example, elderly couples 
left behind by migrant children) and households with many children. The number of 
extremely poor households was especially high in Arevadasht (one third of the village’s 
population). Refugee community residents as a rule were some of the poorest. Refugees 
constituted more than half of all households in Karin, and several households in P Sevak 
and Eghegnavan.
Most residents experienced high levels of psychological deprivation. Respondents in all 
communities reported being disillusioned in the new reality and frustrated with the lack 
of opportunities to earn income and ensure decent standard of living for their 
households. A resident in Ashnak said, “People do not believe in tomorrow” (AK-10).
67 More than 700,000 Armenians emigrated in 1993-2000 (World Bank 2002d: 34). A large proportion of 
migrants are working age men who have left Armenia temporarily in search of employment in other CIS 
countries. It is believed that about US$150 million is privately transferred annually to Armenia, and about 
60-65 percent of this comes from these ‘new’ migrants (World Bank 2002d: 35).
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The refugee residents in Karin were especially distressed. They had not yet recovered 
from the shock of losing their homes, jobs, social status and social ‘belonging’ and the 
need to adjust to a different lifestyle. Most refugees came from urban areas in 
Azerbaijan, and had difficulties adjusting to the rural lifestyle. As it was shown in 
Chapter Six, refugees in Armenia have especially limited opportunities because of 
limited connections, language barriers and social stigma attached to the status of a 
refugee. In the communities bordering with Azerbaijan (P Sevak and Khachik) the 
respondents complained of the constant sense of insecurity they lived with every day.
Figure 7.1: The Poor and Their Assets in Rural Arm enia - Synthesis o f  F indings
Dimension of 
Poverty/Well-Being Characteristics of the Community
Community Codes: Khachik (K) P Sevak (PS) Ashnak (AK) Arevadasht (AR) Eghegnavan (E) Karin (KN) Tsilkar (TS)
Geographical Assets: => Poor climatic condition for agriculture (PS, KN, AR)
=> Borders with Azerbaijan (PS, K)
Physical Assets: => Poor quality of land (PS, KN, AR)
=> Land plots in the conflict area (PS, K)
=> Limited access to agricultural inputs (fertilisers, pesticides and 
machinery) (All)
Inadequate housing conditions (PS, AR, TS)
Financial Assets and => Subsistence agriculture predominant (All)
Substitutes: Low/seasonal income from commercial farming (All)
=> Barter widespread (All)
=> Reliance on mutual help (cash, in-kind, lending and borrowing) (All)
=> Reliance on transfers from migrant family members (PS, E, AR, TS)
=> Some households are entirely reliant on humanitarian food assistance, 
social benefits of low value and mutual help (All)
Local leaders often waive taxes, water charges and community 
contribution for the poorest (All but AR)
Access to Economic Inadequate availability of irrigation water (KN, AR, AS)
and Social Services: => Potable water not available (AR)
Potable water available only to some households (K, KN)
=> Restricted potable water supply (E, PS, TS, AK)
=> Electricity not available (AR)
=> Poor roads (PS, K)
=> Poor transport links with the regional centre and Yerevan (All)
No telephone connection (PS, AR, TS)
=> No village shop (AR)
Health Assets: => No health point (AR)
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Education Assets:
Social Assets:
Security Assets: 
Psychological Assets:
Hospital in the regional centre is difficult to access (PS, K, AR)
Secondary school in poor condition (AR, TS, AK)
School absenteeism because of lack of clothes in winter (PS, AR)
Social vulnerabilities:
-  single female headed households (All)
-  households with many children (All)
-  persons with disabilities (AR, AK)
-  single elderly (PS, E, AR, TS)
-  refugees (PS, KN)
High levels of out-migration (PS, E, AR, TS)
Reliance on social capital for survival (All)
Restricted participation in social life (All)
No Water User Association (KN, AR, TS)
Sense of insecurity in the border zone (PS, K)
Distrust of the central government (PS, AR., AK, TS)
Sense o f helplessness and pessimism (KN, AR)
Residents willing to emigrate (K, KN, E, AK, TS)
This framework is adapted from the Poverty Asset Mapping framework in Hulme et al (2002). The 
information on community assets is accurate as of summer 2002, when the research was conducted.
7.1.3 Access to Services
Access to potable water, although somewhat restricted, was available in P Sevak and 
Eghegnavan to most households; and in Khachik and Karin, to less than half of 
community households. In Arevadasht, potable water was not available for two years. In 
Ashnak, although water was available, water supply was sporadic. In Tsilkar, people 
fetched water from a spring. In all of the communities, residents used potable water for 
irrigation needs. The issue of availability of irrigation water is discussed in detail in 
Chapter Eight. The housing conditions of the poorest community members were 
inadequate. In Arevadasht, some of the poorest residents lived in houses which did not 
have glass windows and were seriously deteriorated. I visited a female resident who 
lived together with her three disabled children in a garage. In P Sevak, some refugee 
families still lived in temporary domiks. Electricity was available in all communities, 
except Arevadasht. Both the communities of Arevadasht and Karin were not able to pay 
for the electricity consumed by the communal water pumps, and were indebted to the 
government. In winter months, the relatively better-off residents used electrical, 
kerosene or wood heaters. The most impoverished residents burned wood, rubber and 
rubbish. They often were unable to heat their homes.
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In all communities, except Arevadasht, there was a medical point with a nurse, and in 
some cases, with a doctor. In case of serious health problems, residents referred to their 
regional hospital or to hospitals in Yerevan. The absence of reliable transport links 
made residents rely on private cars to access hospitals in case of emergencies. In 
addition, the villages of Khachik and P Sevak had poor roads, which made travel to 
hospitals more difficult. In Khachik, Eghegnavan and Karin, the medical centres were 
renovated by Oxfam. Here Oxfam set up revolving drug funds, which accumulated 
contributions from community members, and provided cash for the purchase of 
medicine for some of the poorest households. A revolving drug fund was also set up by 
Oxfam in Arevadasht, however, it soon dissolved as the residents were unable to 
contribute cash.
All communities had secondary schools. The state of school infrastructure and quality 
of schooling was different in different communities. In Khachik, Karin and Eghegnavan, 
the schools were renovated and provided relatively good conditions for learning. In 
Ashnak, Arevadasht and Tsilkar, the school buildings needed rehabilitation. In Khachik, 
Ashnak and Eghegnavan, schools were more proactive than in other communities. This 
had largely to do with the leadership skills and personality of the school directors. These 
schools run extra-curricular activities, as, for example, dance classes in Eghegnavan and 
a football team in Khachik. In Ashnak, schoolchildren had the opportunity to engage in 
honey production and contribute the proceeds to the school. In Arevadasht and P Sevak, 
residents complained that the overall performance in their schools decreased in the 
recent years. In these communities, many children missed classes because of the lack of 
shoes and warm clothes. There was an active kindergarten in Eghegnavan. The 
kindergarten in P Sevak was closed down as the community did not have the financial 
capacity to sustain it.
7.1.4 Impact of Poverty on Community Participation and Local Capacity
The lack of material resources significantly constrains the ability and willingness of 
community members to undertake local projects and initiatives (Box 7.1). There are 
only limited activities that community members can successfully implement on their 
own. These are mostly small clean-up works, minor repairs and other activities where
188
limited technical skills and resource investments are needed. Otherwise, solutions to 
more significant problems are more labour and time consuming and require specialised 
workforce and monetary investments. Any local action requires significant resources 
and logistical effort, which local governments and community residents can rarely 
afford. For example, even such relatively small-scale initiatives, such as cleaning up the 
communal areas, require cash for fuel and tractor hire. A villager in Khachik said, “We 
could have done a lot of things, but it all requires money” (K-5). A resident in Ashnak 
said, “In many cases, some maintenance works are very demanding, and we simply 
cannot do them ourselves” (AK-7). A resident in P Sevak said, “The major obstacle for 
solving common problems as a community is financial. Everything requires money, for 
example, even to do some welding or buy electrical cords. If there was money, people 
would be willing to contribute labour to solve problems” (PS-4). Thus local 
participation can often only provide limited solutions, and a lot of problems remain 
unsolved. Section 9.4 of Chapter Nine discusses financial difficulties that local 
residents faced in the O&M of the irrigation infrastructure in the sample communities.
Community residents struggle to sustain their livelihoods and have little time and 
energy to assume leadership roles, initiate collective action and solve problems of 
community-wide nature. In all of the sample communities, men spent most of their time 
cultivating their fields, working at their land plots or taking care of animals. The 
workload of women was often double than that of men, as women had to combine their 
work responsibilities with their duties at home, including household work and care of 
children. Residents in Arevadasht believed that in addition to material problems, 
psychological factors also discouraged people’s participation. A resident in Arevadasht 
said, “People are breathless, the village is dying out, they don’t have money, everybody 
is indebted, and there is no water - what can they do or undertake in this situation?” 
(AR-6). This is how the mayor in P Sevak described the situation, “An ordinary farmer 
does not have the time and the motivation to be involved in community affairs. Such 
involvement requires lots of time and commitment, whilst most farmers are busy 
working on their fields. There must be someone like the mayor who has got the time 
and can set his mind on getting something done and mobilise efforts for achieving that 
goal. And, of course, the status of the mayor is important for getting things done” (PS- 
1).
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The limited financial resources of the local governments and insufficient state support 
for local communities diminish community’s expectations of the local mayors. Most 
respondents were aware of the enormous financial and administrative difficulties their 
leaders face. They accepted that there was a limit to what local authorities could 
possibly do, and were modest in their demands. Residents did not pressurise their 
leaders to deliver things which were beyond the capacity of the local governments. A 
community member in P Sevak said, “A local mayor can work well only when in 
addition to his good reputation he also has financial resources” (PS-5). Many 
respondents thought that some ‘bigger’ issues needed to be solved by the central 
government. A respondent in P Sevak said, “Some global issues require significant 
financial resources. These issues should be solved at the state level” (PS-7).
Many local development decisions in the sample communities were driven by the 
existing funding opportunities. As there were limited funding opportunities, local 
mayors tried to seize any opportunity to attract development resources. For example, 
Ashnak had many priority problems to be solved. However, the mayor managed to raise 
funds to renovate the culture club in the village, which many villagers found 
unnecessary. The mayor did not have an alternative, as the benefactor, who provided the 
funding, prioritised that particular investment. This implies that the available choices 
rather than community priorities may predetermine the types of local projects and 
initiatives undertaken in communities.
B ox 7.1: Poverty Related Constraints to Participation
> Local governments have inadequate resources due to the insufficient financial support by 
the central governments and weak local revenue base.
>  Local communities have inadequate technical and administrative capacity.
>  Local residents find it difficult to raise the required financial resources and contribute their 
time and energy for communal activities, which are often money and labour consuming.
7.1.5 Citizens’ Welfare and State ‘Duties’: Local Perceptions
As discussed in Chapter One, the main responsibility for ensuring people’s well-being 
in the Soviet Union lied with the state. The rights of citizens to social welfare were
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enshrined in the Soviet Constitution and in the Constitutions of the Soviet republics 
(Wiktorow 1992: 184). The relationship between the Soviet state and society is 
conceptualised by some Soviet political economists through the lenses of the ‘social 
contract’ thesis (Cook 1993: 1). According to Cook (1993: 1-2), the ‘social contract’ 
between the state and the workers in the Soviet Union implied that,
[T]he regime provided broad guarantees of full and secure employment, state- 
controlled and heavily subsidised prices for essential goods, fully socialised human 
services, and egalitarian wage policies. In exchange for such comprehensive state 
provision of economic and social security, Soviet workers consented to the party’s 
extensive and monopolistic power, accepted state domination of the economy, and 
complied with authoritarian political norms.
This view of social contract can be challenged. Thus it is debatable whether the political 
compliance of Soviet citizens was stipulated by their consent in exchange for social 
welfare, or as some scholars argue (Zaslavsky 1982 cited in Cook 1993: 11), it resulted 
from a threat of repression and bureaucratic manipulation of citizens by the state.
The ‘social contract’ argument can also be understood as a state-society relationship 
based on the notion of rights and obligations. Thus, citizens were denied their social 
rights in case they did not perform their citizenship ‘duties’. In particular, social 
entitlements were largely based upon employment. The Soviet welfare policies were 
informed by the Leninist distributive principle “from each according to his ability, to 
each according to labour” (McAuley 1991: 193). This implied that Soviet citizens’ right 
to work was also a duty, and those who did not contribute socially useful labour could 
easily be denied their entitlements (for example, cash transfers, and goods and services 
allocated through enterprises).
It is argued that universal public provision of social welfare has had significant social 
and psychological impact upon Soviet people. For example, Cook (2002: 108) argues 
that “[T]he Russian population emerged from the Soviet period expecting that the state 
should provide for basic needs - employment, housing, health care, etc.” Similarly, 
Andrews and Ringold (1999: 10) maintain that “the inheritance of a paternalistic 
welfare state of pervasive benefits and services created high expectations that inherited 
benefits and privileges would be maintained”. In section 1.4.1,1 suggested that some of 
the preconceptions that often inform development policies and projects are based on the
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notion that the socialist welfare system encouraged paternalistic orientation of citizens 
and that people in post-Soviet countries continue considering the state as the key 
provider of community welfare. The remainder of this section explores the views and 
perceptions of local residents in the sample communities concerning responsibilities of 
the state and citizens’ welfare.
The respondents were frustrated with the marginal level of state support to their 
communities. Residents in Khachik complained that “the government does not pay due 
attention to our village” (K-4). In Karin, a refugee village, residents complained that the 
representatives of the State Committee on Refugees never visited this village. The 
mayor in Karin said, “Up until now the government has not spent a single dram on this 
village. Neither has the marzpet. He cannot provide anything, but instead he demands 
things” (KN-1). In Arevadasht and Ashnak, many respondents were frustrated with the 
lack of any support from the state and said they could only “rely on themselves”.
The respondents did not expect ‘charity’ or welfare benefits. Instead, they expected the 
state to provide opportunities to work and generate income to support their families. A 
resident in Ashnak expressed the opinion of many co-villagers, “We want the 
government to give us employment opportunities, and we do not want aid. Instead of 
providing humanitarian assistance, they should give us opportunities to earn money, for 
example, to open a small production line. Small aid is good as there are people who 
cannot survive without it; but as for large assistance, we do not really need it” (AK-4). 
Many people associated opportunities for improving their well-being with the provision 
of essential services. Thus respondents believed that the state should have greater role in 
the provision of basic services such health, education, transportation and irrigation. A 
resident in P Sevak said, “The government should help us and give us opportunities to 
live better. For example, the roads are bad, there is no communication, and 
transportation is non-existent” (PS-7). Residents in Tsilkar suggested that the state 
could provide them with free pesticides and fertilisers, and it would make a huge 
difference in their income-earning possibilities and their well-being.
In my view, these perceptions of local residents are not a manifestation of ‘paternalistic 
mentality’. They are rather indicative of the vacuum in welfare provision that emerged 
after the economic collapse of the Armenian state. People view the state as a provider of
192
important public services and economic opportunities, and they do not expect free 
benefits. The state, however, does not have sufficient capacity to meet the economic and 
social needs of its citizens. At the same time, the market provides limited opportunities 
for ordinary residents to engage in income generating activities and sustain their 
livelihoods. Thus coping strategies and informal social networks become the main 
source for filling the ‘welfare’ gap. As section 7.1 has demonstrated, local residents 
experience high levels of material and social deprivation. They have limited resources 
and time to contribute to local development, and some of the most pertinent local 
problems remain unresolved. This explains their frustration with the lack of any 
meaningful support by the state. Section 7.5 of this chapter examines the nature and 
patterns of local social networks and community participation in the sample 
communities, concluding that ordinary community members were not apathetic or 
patemalistically orientated.
In section 2.4.2, I demonstrate through a review of literature that although the Soviet 
state possessed monopoly in the economic and social spheres, it in fact reinforced 
reliance of citizens on informal networks and alternative channels for welfare provision. 
Low incomes from employment in the public service and scarcity of essential goods and 
services forced citizens to rely on informal economic activities and mutual support 
networks. Sections 7.2-7.4 of this chapter suggest that the inability of the post-Soviet 
state in Armenia to provide essential goods and services to its citizens in a reliable and 
effective manner has further reinforced informal social networks for welfare provision 
and encouraged the development of a clientelistic and personalised system of local 
governance.
7.2 National Governance and Community Participation
The previous section demonstrated how poverty restricts the ability of local 
communities to actively engage in local development (Box 7.1). Another key variable 
that affects participation outcomes and local institutional capacity in rural Armenia is 
the governance environment at the national and regional (marz) levels. This section 
analyses how the governance environment in the country influences local institutions 
and restricts community participation (Box 7.2). As discussed in Chapter Two, local
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institutions are ‘the rules of the game’ that shape the existing institutional and 
organisational arrangements for service delivery, problem-solving and decision-making.
As shown in section 6.2 of Chapter Six, the weakness of the rule of law and corruption 
affect all spheres of economic and social life in Armenia. The old Soviet networks for 
allocating goods and services and redistributing resources have survived and have taken 
new forms in post-Soviet Armenia. Personalised relations, unwritten rules, favouritism, 
misuse of public positions and rent-seeking continue to be part of post-Soviet reality. 
The inability of the state to effectively enforce rules and regulations creates an 
environment where bureaucrats and persons of influence can take advantage of their 
position for personal gains and clientelistic motives. The weak administrative and 
financial capacity of the central government restricts its ability to provide goods and 
services in effective and efficient manner. This enhances opportunities for rent-seeking 
officials, who are in control of the allocation of scarce resources and services. In this 
situation, the allocation of goods and services is not based on fair, transparent and 
predictable rules. Instead, goods and services, information and opportunities can be 
obtained in exchange for friendship and reciprocity or informal monetary or material 
compensation.
People choose forms of participation that are feasible for the effective delivery of goods 
and services in the institutional environment of Armenia (Figure 7.4). Participation in 
formal organisations and informal groups was not perceived by the respondents as a 
viable means for obtaining benefits and getting things done. There were very few formal 
and informal groups or associations established by the residents in order to pursue their 
objectives in the studied communities. The existing formal associations such as 
community-based Water User Associations (WUAs) were established by the 
government, and had a weak participatory basis in most sample communities (detailed 
discussion on WUAs follows in Chapter Nine). Community associations established 
under various development projects sponsored by donor agencies dissolved immediately 
after the completion of the projects. As scarce goods and services in Armenia are often 
not allocated through formalised and legitimate means, community residents need to 
rely on informal channels and intermediaries in order to be successful in obtaining those 
goods and services.
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In a situation when resources are constrained and access to information and networks is 
limited, not everyone can become an intermediary who can be successful in attracting 
external resources and advancing the interests of the community. Ordinary people have 
little power to achieve effective developmental outcomes by undertaking independent 
problem solving initiatives. Leadership roles become limited to those who have a 
position of influence, access to networks and strong organisational skills. Therefore, 
community residents are often forced to rely on local authorities, who can attract 
external resources and advance the interests of their communities using their position of 
influence and personal connections. These local leaders become an intermediary 
between the community and the formal institutions of the state. They facilitate access of 
community residents to public goods, services and regulations. The mayor in Khachik 
said, “Without me, it would have been impossible to solve problems or to manage a 
programme in the village” (K-l). Section 7.4 of this chapter discusses the role of local 
mayors in managing local development and influencing economic and social outcomes. 
Section 7.5 discusses the specific forms of involvement of ordinary residents in the life 
of their communities. It shows that participation of community members was restricted 
to the provision o f ‘physical’ inputs, such as contributions of labour, cash and materials.
Local residents in all studied communities did not feel they had the power and resources 
to ‘get things done’ for their communities. They rarely exercised leadership and 
undertook independent initiatives, raised funds, liaised with external organisations and 
mobilised other community members for collective action. People perceived that 
important things in their communities can mostly be done through influence, 
connections and cash. A resident in Ashnak said, “Connections are very important. In 
order to lay a single pipe, you need connections” (AK-3). Another resident in Ashnak 
was convinced that the mayor used connections to rehabilitate the potable water 
network in their village, “We rehabilitated the potable water network. We collected 
2,000 drams and contributed labour for that. And we used some connections ‘from 
above’ to make it happen” (AK-5). People perceived that even development projects 
supported by international agencies can only be “brought from above”, through 
connections or cash. A villager in Ashnak said, “Projects can be brought to the village 
only through the mayor’s connections” (AK-9). He was convinced that the 
neighbouring village was selected for the World Food Programme (WFP) supported 
Food for Work Programme as it offered a bribe to the WFP project officer. The
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respondent said, “God knows how one can bring projects into the village. You don’t 
want to get into their kitchen. Some villages have been selected three-four times. How 
come? For example, Food for Work, I know how it worked in one of the villages. Their 
project officer demanded interest from the grant money in order to bring it to the village. 
If you don’t give them money, they will not bring the project” (AK-9). Many 
respondents in the sample communities were convinced that personal connections of 
their local mayors were crucial in obtaining funding from ASIF.
The absence of grassroots orientation within the formal institutions of the state 
reinforces the old Soviet style hierarchical relations at the local level. Authorities at the 
central, regional (<marz) and local level generally do not appreciate and encourage 
grassroots participation and initiative. Ordinary community members are not regarded 
as equal partners who can have their say in the issues of local development. The 
prevailing perception is that only formal authorities should be responsible for managing 
local issues. Whilst the legal and regulatory framework by and large supports 
decentralisation (section 6.3 in Chapter Six), the existing informal practices and attitude 
of the governing institutions suppress people’s initiative. Most respondents expressed an 
opinion that if ordinary residents attempted to take an initiative to resolve a local 
problem, where co-operation of authorities would be needed, “nobody would take them 
seriously". As a resident in Ashnak put it, “It is very hard for people to get things done: 
wherever you turn, you encounter reluctant attitude [of authorities] or lack of finance” 
(AK-5). Various accounts of the respondents indicate that when people directly 
appealed to regional or central authorities, they, as a rule, were neglected and 
encountered bureaucratic resistance. In Arevadasht, a resident said that marzpetaran 
(the regional governor’s office) will not take informal leaders seriously, and the only 
person who can deal with them is the mayor, “In order to deal with marzpetaran, you 
will need a written note from the mayor; and you also need a seal. How can we go and 
get things done with them? They will not give us anything there” (AR-5). A resident in 
P Sevak said, “If we go to the marzpetaran, they will tell us - who are you? You don’t 
have a mayor? Who are we? They will never take us seriously”(PS-7).
As discussed in section 7.1 of this chapter, most residents felt frustrated with the 
insufficient support by the state and regional authorities for their problems. The weak 
financial and administrative capacity of the state constrains its ability reach out to the
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impoverished residents, engage with local communities and adequately respond to 
people’s needs. In addition, the inability and insufficient commitment of the state to 
adequately enforce the rule of law and social justice in Armenia encourage elitism and 
reinforce social polarisation. Poor people do not believe that the government is 
committed to act upon their needs and priorities and support them in difficult times. 
Instead, they feel that the government protects the new rich. This situation has produced 
distrust and disillusionment of the Armenian population with the authorities and with 
principles of democratic governance in general. A resident in Arevadasht said, “The 
situation is really bad. Nobody in the government cares about people, nobody wants to 
help and support. They just don’t care about what happens to us” (AR-13).
In all sample communities, residents had some negative experiences of dealing with the 
state institutions. There were cases when people attempted to challenge certain 
decisions, petition the government and organise protest actions. These attempts did not 
result in successful outcomes, which reinforced the general sense of powerlessness 
within the local communities. It is difficult to determine to what extent the claims of 
community members were accurate and their accusations and expectations fair and 
justified. The following three cases, however, illustrate the sense of injustice and 
helplessness as well as the negative perception of the state institutions that prevail in the 
local communities. These examples also demonstrate the significant gap that exists 
between the state and the citizens, and the lack of any meaningful attempt by the state 
institutions to engage with local communities and establish spaces where people could 
voice their needs and concerns, access information and enter into a constructive public 
dialogue. Such negative experiences produce distrust of people in the possibility of 
achieving beneficial outcomes through democratic forms of participation and collective 
action.
Case A . In Ashnak, the residents believed that government officials were distant and 
often adversary to people and their needs. The irrigation water supply in the village was 
cut for a long time. The community alleged that this was done by the marz authorities, 
in order to push farmers to pay user charges. The community perceived this unfair, as 
the majority of people were not in the position to pay, and they desperately needed 
water to irrigate their fields. Community residents organised a protest action to demand 
the central government help restore the water supply. They blocked the road and did not
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allow a delegation of important officials from Yerevan to travel to their destination area. 
The protesters complained about the lack of water, and asked the officials to help them. 
The action did not achieve any results, and the water supply in the village was not 
restored for a rather long time. The residents were convinced that the authorities 
purposefully did not restore the water supply because of their protest action. A resident 
said, “After this [the protest], they cut our water forever, as if as a punishment” (AK-7).
Case B. Residents in Arevadasht were frustrated with the lack of any support from the 
central government. A resident complained that the government sold them pesticides of 
poor quality, and he believed that “it is in their interest as they must be getting profits 
from doing that” (AR-4). During the implementation of the ASIF micro-project, some 
community members sent letters to the marz complaining about the mismanagement of 
funds and the poor quality of civil works. However, they did not receive any response. 
Community members complained that their community was marginalised and isolated, 
and the world outside did not know about their difficulties. People were excited when a 
TV crew from Yerevan visited the village to film a documentary about the social 
problems in the village. The residents “showed them around and told them everything”. 
They guided the film crew to see some of the most impoverished and marginalised 
households in the village. They were bitterly disappointed when the documentary was 
shown on the television, and it did not include the material on the impoverished 
households. A respondent in Arevadasht expressed the sense of injustice and 
powerlessness that most residents here shared, “Whom shall we go to? Whom shall we 
tell our problems? Nobody cares” (AR-10).
Case C. The villagers in Tsilkar felt the government only protected the interests of the 
rich and powerful. The former collective farm {sovkhoz) in the village was transferred 
into a joint stock company, and the farmers received their shares in bonds. Most farmers 
sold their bonds as they did not understand how to use them, and because they all 
needed cash. As a result, they had no longer control over the property of the former 
collective farm. At the same time, the residents were still reliant on the communal 
agricultural machinery in cultivating their fields. At the time of this research, the 
machinery was bought by a private entrepreneur, who did not live in the community 
himself and who was intending to take the machinery away from the community. A 
resident in Tsilkar said, “Now a rich firm from Yerevan has decided to buy all our
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machines, and we cannot counteract it. They are going to resell it for a much higher 
price, or maybe they will suggest that we go and work for him [the entrepreneur]. We 
do not have such money to buy the machinery, which means we are not only cheated 
but also left without such needed equipment. The question is how the village people are 
going to survive” (TS-3).
People in Tsilkar felt powerless to undertake anything about the situation. A resident 
said, “I feel so insulted that they can come and take it [the machinery] from my hands. 
And we don’t know how to defend ourselves” (TS-5). They complained to the marzpet 
and the prosecutor’s office, who did not attempt to offer an alternative arrangement to 
help the farmers. The residents were suspicious that if they referred to a public lawyer, 
they will be cheated and will not be provided with accurate legal advice. People were 
frightened as they thought the machinery could be seized by force, and some 
respondents said they were scared to go to the fields. This is how a resident describes 
the situation, “The problem is we cannot defend our own rights, they [the government] 
do whatever they wish. We don’t even know what a ‘bond’ is and what rights we have. 
We fear that appealing and complaining is useless. They can offer them [the 
government] money and win the case, and we will remain with nothing. Now we are 
even scared to go to the fields, as they can come and seize the equipment by force. We 
can refer to a lawyer, but even then, we don’t have any trust in their lawyer” (TS-3). 
The residents felt that they were taken advantage of because of their insufficient 
awareness about their rights. “We wish there was someone to explain our rights, we do 
not know what we are entitled to and how to fight for our rights... The farmer does not 
know anything about his rights. This is why anyone can cheat us, and we cannot defend 
our rights” (TS-7).
B ox 7.2: Macro Level Constraints to Participation in Arm enia
> The weak rule o f law and weak state capacity encourage reliance on state authorities, 
informal social networks and unofficial payments for getting things done.
>  The values and normative orientations o f authorities reinforce Soviet style hierarchical 
relations at the local level.
>  The lack of support and engagement of the state with local communities produce 
powerlessness and distrust in the possibility of solving local problems through collective 
action and democratic participation.
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7.3 Local Governance and Community Participation
The previous sections examined the constraints to participation at the national and 
regional level in Armenia (Box 7.2). It argued that the overall poor governance 
environment discouraged local residents from actively participating in communal affairs 
by joining groups and associations, organising collective action and undertaking 
leadership initiatives. The previous section argued that participation was not regarded 
by rural residents as an effective means for getting things done. At the same time, 
community members in the sample communities were not apathetic and patemalistically 
oriented. They were involved in community affairs, albeit that their participation was 
restricted in its forms and nature (Figure 7.4). This section examines the intensity of 
empowerment and the nature of people’s participation in service delivery, decision­
making and political processes in the sample communities. Section 7.5 of this chapter 
will then examine the specific forms of involvement of ordinary residents in the life of 
their communities.
The intensity of empowerment and participation of ordinary residents in the sample 
communities was found to be weak (Figure 7.2 and Box 7.4). The local mayors held the 
key decision-making power with regard to important issues in their communities. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the World Bank (World Bank 2003a: 6-7) distinguishes four 
categories of empowerment, ranging from weak to intensive: passive access, active 
participation, influence, and control. Community members in the sample communities 
had access to their leaders (‘passive access’) and opportunities to exercise their voice 
and express their demands and preferences (‘active participation’). At the same time, 
they had limited ‘influence’ in local decision-making with regard to the formulation and 
implementation of local policies and programmes and resource allocation. Community 
members had virtually no ‘control’ over local affairs, and the channels of ‘vertical’ and 
‘social accountability’ were generally weak in all of the studied communities.68 
Following the World Bank’s (World Bank 1996a: 11) categorisation of participation by 
its nature (discussed in section 2.1.1 of Chapter Two), participation in the sample 
communities was of weak intensity, and it was mostly restricted to ‘listening’ and
68 The forms of accountability described in this chapter draw on the conceptual framework on social 
accountability prepared by the Participation and Civic Engagement group of the World Bank (World 
Bank 2003b).
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‘consultation’. The examination of ASIF micro-project processes in Chapter Eight 
vividly illustrates the key role that the local mayors played in the decision-making with 
regard to the choice, design and implementation of the micro-projects and resource 
allocation in the local communities.
The local mayors dominated the local formal decision-making structures, the elected 
Councils of Elders. These bodies were designated to approve all of the key decisions 
made by the mayors and oversee that these decisions correspond to the needs of 
community members. In reality, the real power was in the hands of the local mayors. 
Most respondents considered the role of the Councils only formal.
Figure 7.2: The Intensity o f  Empowerment and Nature o f  Participation in the Sample  
Communities
Intensity Weak High
Empowerment Passive access Active participation Influence Control
Yes Yes Limited No
Participation Listening Consultation Collaborative
decision-making
Yes Yes Limited
The local mayors in the sample community had a top-down management style and 
rarely involved residents in the policy-making and management sphere. The mayors 
normally themselves defined the boundaries or ‘spaces’ for community participation in 
local policies and programmes. In all of the studied communities, local policy choices 
and initiatives were undertaken by the local mayors after consultations with community 
members, and they reflected the local needs and priorities. At the same time, the mayors 
themselves made all important decisions, and it was up to them to what extent they were 
willing to accommodate the demands and preferences of the community. Thus 
following the framework of ‘spaces’ (Cornwall 2002), spaces for community 
participation in the sample communities can be characterised as ‘closed’. The extent and 
nature of participation of community residents varied depending on the personality and 
leadership style of the local mayor (more discussion on the types of leaders follows in 
section 7.4 of this chapter). The respondents explained that only few decisions were 
taken by the community as a group. These mostly referred to the organisation of
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communal works or planning and preparation for the new agricultural season. The input 
of community members was not solicited by the local mayors in the prioritisation and 
allocation of local resources, management of local services and development 
programmes and in dealing with external institutions. All respondents of this study 
reported that their mayors were the key decision-makers in their communities. A 
resident in P Sevak said, “The mayor is the sole master and organiser here” (PS-14). 
The mayor of Khachik said, “People mostly accept what the village mayor tells and 
decides” (K-l).
Consultations with community members were conveyed through formal meetings and 
informal channels. The local mayors held meetings to inform people of planned 
initiatives, gather opinion, plan important communal activities or mobilise community 
support and contribution. Such formal meetings were not institutionalised, and they 
were mostly assembled irregularly, depending on emerging needs. The infrequent 
character of formal meetings does not imply that decisions made by the local mayors 
did not have community basis and support. In most cases, the local mayors consulted 
community residents through existing informal mechanisms. The relations between the 
mayors and community members were informal and personalised. The local mayors 
learned about everyday problems and preferences of people, as they lived in the same 
community and interacted with the villagers on a day-to-day basis. In all villages, some 
of the most active community members, mostly men, regularly gathered in the local 
government office or at the village square nearby, exchanged information and discussed 
local problems. Community residents were not afraid or reluctant to convey their voice 
to their leaders, and usually expressed their preferences and criticism during informal 
and formal meetings and in their everyday interaction with the local mayors. This does 
not necessarily mean that the local mayors were willing or able to accommodate their 
wishes and criticisms. Community meetings generally rarely served as a forum for 
collective decision-making.
In all of the sample communities, the level of transparency with regard to important 
decisions affecting the lives of community members was generally poor. The mayors in 
the sample communities did not feel obliged to share information about important issues 
with community members. They did not report to the community on the financial 
aspects of local management. Chapter Nine will demonstrate that the local mayors made
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most important decisions with regard to water allocation and distribution and the O&M 
of irrigation facilities in the sample communities. Community members did not receive 
any reports from their leaders on how user charges for irrigation and potable water were 
managed. In Arevadasht and Karin, the mayors did not inform community members of 
the precise reasons for the poor water supply in their villages. Residents were not clear 
whether the mayors turned over the management of their irrigation systems to the local 
District Water Committee (DWC) or their community was still responsible for 
managing the irrigation system. The fact that people were not provided with ample 
information left room for rumours and doubts. There were no formalised channels for 
information sharing in any of the sample communities. As will be shown in Chapter 
Eight, the management of the ASIF micro-projects by the local mayors in the sample 
communities reflected this pattern, and it was neither transparent, nor participatory.
The level of accountability of the local mayors towards their community members was 
generally low. In all of the sample communities, residents alleged that their leaders were 
involved in corruption. Many respondents believed that their mayors took advantage of 
their position and benefited from various development projects. In particular, 
respondents believed that the mayors gained personal benefits from making deals with 
contractors under donor-funded construction projects and public works programmes, 
and from managing the allocation and distribution of humanitarian aid. Residents in 
Eghegnavan, Arevadasht and Khachik alleged that water charges were arbitrarily 
waived by the local mayors for some community members. Several respondents in 
Khachik said they did not pay taxes and water charges as they were not convinced that 
these would be transferred to the central budget and would not “end up in the pocket” of 
the local mayor (K-G2). The respondents in Ashnak alleged that the head of the local 
WUA had a deal with some villagers and allowed them to draw additional water for 
cash. They also suspected that the collected water charges were not fully transferred to 
the local DWC and were misappropriated by the WUA leaders. A resident in Ashnak 
said, “It is possible that not all of the collected water charges reach the DWC. I think 
that the water distributor appropriates some of the money, for letting some people use 
water for extra time. It is easy then to say that insufficient money was collected because 
of water losses. I am not sure how the WUA relates to its superiors, but I suspect some 
illegal deals being made between them” (AK-9). A more detailed discussion of corrupt
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practices in Arevadasht follows in section 7.4 of this chapter, which examines the role 
of community leaders in local development.
The local mayors in the sample communities were in the best position to take advantage 
of existing economic and social opportunities. Due to their formal position, the local 
mayors had direct access to information and financial resources, which allowed them 
and their immediate circles to be involved in income generating opportunities. Most 
local mayors had their own businesses, or were involved in some sort of entrepreneurial 
activity. The local mayors and their families benefited most from the local infrastructure 
improvement projects. In all of the villages, it was the mayor’s house that had the most 
regular water supply. By observing living conditions of the local mayors and ordinary 
residents, it was obvious that the local mayors and their deputies were some of the 
better-off residents in their communities. In Khachik, for example, many residents were 
unable to cultivate their land plots because of the high cost of agricultural inputs. Many 
residents leased their land to the mayor, who had the financial means to invest in the 
cultivation of a total area of 70 ha. He was one of the two farmers in the village who 
were engaged in commercial farming as their main activity. He also had a cattle farm, 
where he produced cheese for sale. The mayor in Ashnak owned a shop in the village 
centre and was involved in other business activities in the region.
The existing mechanisms for exacting transparency and accountability from local 
authorities were generally weak in all of the sample communities. The election of 
village mayors by local residents as a traditional vertical mechanism of democratic 
control does not appear to be an effective instrument for accountability in Armenia. The 
fact that the mayors were elected by the local population did not necessarily make them 
more responsive and accountable to the local population. The mechanisms of social or 
bottom-up accountability were also weak. Thus, the degree of participation of local 
citizens and grassroots associations in exacting accountability from their local 
governments between the elections was very low. Community members did not attempt 
to monitor the actions of their mayors and to demand greater transparency and 
accountability with regard to policy formulation, project management and resource 
allocation and spending. In all of the studied communities, ordinary residents were not 
aware of or felt entitled to query financial aspects of local management. Community 
members in the sample communities seemed to be tolerant towards the rent-seeking
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behaviour of their mayors. Many residents did not believe in the effectiveness of 
bottom-up accountability. People realised that they had limited avenues to hold the 
authorities accountable, and some even believed that top-down accountability could be 
most effective in the circumstances of Armenia. A resident in P Sevak said, “The mayor 
should be appointed so as he fears those who appointed him and takes responsibility. 
Now he does not feel responsible, as he would give some small things to some people, 
and they will re-elect him” (PS-12).
The weak level of accountability of local leaders to their community members can be 
explained by several factors (Box 7.3). As discussed in the previous section of this 
chapter, the Soviet-style hierarchical institutional relations are still prevailing, and 
traditions of democratic participatory governance have not established roots in Armenia. 
The existing informal norms and practices of authorities at the central, regional and 
local level still reflect the autocratic traditions of the Soviet ‘command-administrative’ 
system. Local mayors do not feel the need to be accountable to local communities, and 
they are not compelled to do so by the existing formal governance structures and rules. 
The horizontal mechanisms of accountability, i.e., systems of oversight and checks and 
balances within the state itself, have not been fully developed yet (World Bank 2000e). 
Thus the existing fiscal, administrative and legal mechanisms do not encourage and 
enforce accountability and transparency within the public sector both at the national and 
local level.69
B o x  7.3: Factors Conditioning Weak Horizontal, Vertical and Social Accountability
> The existing fiscal, administrative and legal mechanisms do not encourage and enforce
accountability and transparency within the public sector both at the national and local
level.
>  Patron-client relationships between local leaders and community residents create 
dependency, limit the power base of community members and weaken formal channels of 
accountability.
>  Social embededness of local mayors and the personalised nature o f local social relations
can often restrict people from exercising their voice.
69 The World Bank’s Institutional and Governance Review (IGR) on Armenia (World Bank 2000e) 
describes in detail the existing systemic factors that contribute to the weak accountability within the 
government.
205
As discussed in section 7.2 of this chapter, the weakness of the rule of law and poor 
state capacity to deliver goods and services in Armenia encourage patron-client 
relationships at the local level. Patron-client relationships within the context of 
developing countries are usually referred to as mutually beneficial, but unequal relations 
between individuals who have power, wealth and social status, and individuals, who are
70powerless and poor. The control of patrons over critical goods and services that people 
need creates compliance on the part of clients, and may even ‘legitimise’ dependence 
(Scott 1977: 25). The key formal and informal role that local mayors in Armenia play in 
managing local development and securing livelihoods for community residents provides 
the mayors with significant discretionary control and influence. As will be demonstrated 
in further sections of this chapter, community members are almost entirely reliant on 
their leaders in their survival. Besides their formal position as elected officials, an 
important source of legitimacy of local mayors are their personal abilities and resources, 
such as social networks and access to information. As formal avenues for attracting 
resources are limited, they benefit their communities not as much by the virtue of their 
formal position and mandate, but rather due to their organisational skills, informal 
connections and sense of civic responsibility. Local mayors in their turn derive various 
benefits from their formal positions, including influence, social status and access to 
economic and social opportunities and development resources.
This dependency narrows the power base of community members and weakens formal 
channels of accountability. Community members become ‘obliged’ to their leaders for 
the benefits they derive from their leadership, and hence tolerate rent-seeking behaviour. 
Local communities are often restricted in their choice of ‘effective’ leaders, and 
residents may not choose to oust their leaders for corruption or lack of transparency, if 
the leaders at the same time effectively contribute to their communities. The extent to 
which people are prepared to tolerate corrupt leaders is largely determined by the degree 
to which the leaders support their communities. The mechanism of voting out the 
elected representatives can work when local leaders do not adequately deliver to their 
communities. For example, in Arevadasht the community’s intention was to oust the 
allegedly corrupt and ineffectual local mayor in the forthcoming local elections.
70 For a more detailed discussion on patron-client relationships see, for example, Blau (1964), Gellner and 
Waterbury (1977), and Rose-Ackerman (1999).
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The embededness of local mayors in the local communities and the personalised nature 
of local social relations can often restrict people from appealing to the regional and 
central authorities, and thus protects local leaders from upwards accountability. For 
example, a resident in Tsilkar tried to organise a petition to the marzpetaran in order to 
demand subsidised fertilisers, but most residents refused to appeal to the marzpet 
directly, as they would not want to “put their mayor on the spot”. In Karin, the mayor 
said, “They [residents] would always come to me with their problems, and they would 
not go without me to superior bodies, for example, to complain to the marz. I would sort 
their problems myself’ (K-l). As discussed in section 7.1 of this chapter, scarce 
financial resources of local governments reduce expectations of residents and also 
legitimise the weak accountability of local mayors.
B o x 7.4: The Intensity o f  Empowerment and Nature o f  Participation in the Sample
Communities
> Local mayors play key role in local decision-making with regard to the formulation and 
implementation of local policies and programmes and resource allocation.
>  Low level o f empowerment of local residents. Community members have access to their 
leaders (passive access) and opportunities to exercise their voice and express their 
demands and preferences (active participation). Community members have limited 
influence and virtually no control in local decision-making.
> Community participation is of low intensity. Participation of community members in 
decision-making is restricted to listening and consultation.
> The channels of vertical, social and horizontal accountability are generally weak. Local 
mayors exercised top-down control and little transparency in managing local development, 
and were alleged to be involved in rent-seeking activities. Community members rarely 
exact accountability and transparency from their leaders through vertical and/or bottom-up 
mechanisms.
7.4 Community Leaders and Local Development
The analysis of fieldwork data allows a distinction to be drawn between two types of
71local leaders in the sample communities: developmental and predatory (Figure 7.3). 
The most influential leaders in the local communities are local mayors and school 
directors, although informal leaders can also play a key role (Box 7.5). The section
71 The distinction between developmental and predatory community leaders adopts the classification 
made by Evans (1989) with regard to the state in developing countries. Evans uses the term 
developmental with regard to the states that attempt to promote development; and the term predatory with 
regard to the states that impede transformation and undermine people’s welfare.
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below discusses the role that the local mayors played in their communities. In particular, 
it examines how the performance and personal characteristics of local mayors affected 
important economic and social outcomes in the local communities.
7.4.1 Developmental Community Leaders
Developmental leaders played a crucial role in managing local development (Figure 7.3). 
One can characterise the local mayors in all sample communities, except Arevadasht, as 
developmental. Developmental mayors initiated and managed various small-scale 
communal works initiatives, for which they mobilised community residents to 
contribute money and labour. They raised external funds for investing in the essential 
local infrastructure and services. They often applied to donor organisations for funding 
and technical support. Most local mayors had experience of working with donor 
agencies, various NGOs and the UN agencies. Local mayors often had to lobby or 
bargain with the higher echelons of government on behalf of their communities to 
attract resources and development programmes.
All developmental mayors in the sample communities possessed strong leadership 
abilities, formal and informal authority and important social connections. Most 
developmental mayors were from the former elite, and they held influential posts in 
Soviet times. Their former positions enabled them with important experience, 
leadership and organisational skills and knowledge that helped them effectively manage 
local affairs. From their previous positions they also inherited social status and 
important contacts. Before his election in 1996, the mayor in Khachik worked as the 
director of sovkhoz and as head of the former village executive council (gyughsovet). 
His brother was the regional judge, and his brother-in-law was the regional attorney at 
the time of this research. The mayor in Eghegnavan was the regional Komsomol official 
in the 1980s, after which he held the post of mayor for twelve years. The mayor in 
Ashnak belonged to the local business elite. During Soviet times he used to work in the 
trade industry in the regional centre Talin. He was an influential businessman and had 
many contacts among the economic and political elite in the country. The deputy mayor 
in Tsilkar was the head of the local sovkhoz for 16 years. The mayor of Karin had an 
influential brother and multiple connections among political circles in Yerevan. The 
mayor of P Sevak was a ‘new comer’, as he did not hold a powerful position during
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Soviet times. He, however, was associated with Erkrapah political party, which was 
rather influential in Armenia in the late 1990s.
Using their connections, the mayors managed to attract resources and ‘bring projects’ 
for their communities. The mayor in Khachik established friendly relations with the 
marzpet. This translated into continuous support to the village by the marzpet. A 
resident said, “The marzpet comes to the village quite often and he has a very good 
attitude towards the residents” (K-7). The brother of the marzpet was a member of the 
National Assembly (the Parliament), and he helped secure funding for the rehabilitation 
of the road and renovation of the village church. As the mayor of Khachik was the 
deputy director of the regional agricultural credit bank, he helped some fifty community 
members to obtain agricultural credit. The mayor of Ashnak obtained funding from a 
Diaspora benefactor to renovate the local Culture Club and secured commitments for 
renovating the secondary school. The mayor said, “Don’t ask me how we found the 
money [for the Culture Club]. We have some friends in Yerevan, and we got together 
and had something to eat and drink and we got the project” (AK-1). Through his 
connections, the mayor arranged sales of fertilisers at a subsidised rate for the village 
residents. An employee of the local office said, “We managed this as we know people in 
marzpetaran” (AK-2). A community resident said about the mayor, “The mayor is 
trusted, and he has lots of really good connections; so it is good for the village... He 
used his contacts to get programmes for the village... Without him it would have been 
very difficult” (AK-5). The mayor in Eghegnavan was on friendly terms with the 
marzpet, who “helps with what he can”. Through his connections, the mayor organised 
rehabilitation of the irrigation pipeline and renovation of the roof of the local club. The 
mayor organised delivery of fertilisers at a subsidised price. The mayor of P Sevak 
helped fifteen community residents to become members of the local Mutual Help Bank. 
A resident in P Sevak said, “Without his intermediation it probably would not have 
worked” (PS-7).
Both connections and leadership abilities are crucial for effectively managing local 
development. The mayor of P Sevak used to be well-connected at the time when the 
Erkrapah political union was powerful. With the changes in the National Assembly, he 
had lost most of his connections. Now when he had to rely only on his personal abilities 
to get things done, he became less effective. The community did not perceive their
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leader as a very effective one. Compared to other neighbouring communities, he did not 
manage to attract external support for the village. A community member said, “He has 
to go ask and beg and get things done for us. Look at other mayors, how they care for 
their people. This one is very passive, and he cannot even cultivate his field... He has to 
help people” (PS-10). People complained that the village did not have a telephone 
communication, and the roads were in a bad condition. A community resident in P 
Sevak complained about the mayor, “They say the mayor is clever, but he is not tough 
enough, one must be tough to get things sorted” (PS-9). A resident in P Sevak said, “He 
is not very active now, yes he has his friends from Ararat [the stronghold of Erkrapah 
union], but it would be better if he was more active and tried to solve more problems” 
(PS-11). Such high expectations can often emerge from comparison with other local 
mayors, who seem to be more entrepreneurial and better connected. A female 
respondent in P Sevak said, “Our mayor is very nice, but many people are not happy 
with him. People take him for granted, they think he should be delivering all the 
time...They are always dissatisfied, once he delivers one thing, they think it was not 
enough, they want something else. They think the mayor should be sorting every single 
issue for them. But the local government does not have those possibilities, they are 
constrained by their situation” (PS-14).
The developmental leaders established good contacts with the representatives of NGOs 
and international organisations. The mayor of Khachik, for example, visited their offices 
from time to time to “chat and ask them for help” (K-l). He managed to secure funding 
from IFAD for the rehabilitation of the second irrigation pipeline on the village. He also 
collaborated with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the WFP Wood for Work 
Programme. The mayor of Karin had a long history of interaction with international 
organisations. Many organisations themselves targeted Karin as a refugee village. Thus 
Oxfam set up a revolving drug fund, renovated and furnished the medical point, and 
rehabilitated the electricity network there. WFP supported a public works programme to 
rehabilitate roads. The Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) set up green houses, 
where it employed thirteen people from the village. NRC renovated the school, and the 
Shelter programme built 110 houses. At the time of this research, the mayor of Karin 
was in the process of negotiating projects with WFP, Save the Children and Shen NGO.
210
The motives of developmental leaders can be characterised as both self-interested and 
altruistic. As described in section 7.3 of this chapter, local mayors derived personal 
benefits from their formal positions, which enabled them with access to opportunities, 
resources and influence. At the same time, developmental mayors were strongly 
embedded in the local social networks, and had a strong sense of civic responsibility. 
They were well aware of local problems, and felt responsible to support their 
communities not only as elected officials but also as co-villagers. They often referred to 
the government as ‘them’ and detached themselves from the formal structures of the 
government. The motivation of these leaders to contribute to their communities was not 
only driven by pragmatic considerations of self-interest, but also by their sense of civic 
responsibility. Thus, one can characterise developmental local mayor not only as 
‘patrons’ who delivered goods and services in exchange to personal benefits (described 
in section 7.3 of this chapter), but also as ‘social entrepreneurs’, who were enmeshed in 
local communities and committed to contribute to their communities.
B o x 7.5: Elite A lliance in a Refugee Community
Local mayors are usually the most influential leaders in Armenian communities. Sometimes, 
however, informal leaders can play an important role too. In the village of Nor Khachakap, the 
local mayor shared his power with an informal leader. After large scale violence against 
Armenians in Azerbaijan in 1989-92, the village hosted many ethnic Armenian refugees from 
various parts of Azerbaijan. The local mayor in Nor Khachakap was a refugee himself, and he 
was democratically elected by the residents. However, as he had spent most of his life outside 
Armenia, he did not have important connections and influence. In order to effectively manage 
local development, he entered into an alliance with the informal leader. The informal leader had 
numerous connections from Soviet times, including regional government officials and 
entrepreneurs. Due to his connections and leadership ability, he managed to solve some of the 
most imminent community problems. At the same time, the formal leader represented the public 
face o f the local government. As the informal leader said, the mayor is “very educated, and he 
knows how to deal with the public and listen to women”. This alliance proved to be very 
effective. The leaders allocated development benefits equally to all community members, 
including the indigenous residents and new-comers. As a consequence, the relations between 
community members were exceptionally cordial, and the residents successfully co-operated in 
solving common problems.
Based on the data that I gathered during the pilot phase of the fieldwork, June 2001.
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7.4.2 Predatory Community Leaders
In contrast to the developmental leaders, the local mayor in Arevadasht was neither 
effective nor committed. He can be described as a predatory leader (Figure 7.3).72 The 
local mayor and the local government administration were perceived by the residents as 
the main cause of their poverty. The mayor had little influence and leadership skills. He 
was unable to effectively network, obtain external resources, initiate development 
projects and manage local development. His ineffective management of the ASIF 
irrigation micro-project resulted in a failure to ensure reliable access to irrigation water 
and triggered a conflict among residents (described in detail in Chapters Eight and 
Nine).
The village of Arevadasht was extremely poor. Even visually it was strikingly different 
from the other communities visited during the research. There were objective reasons 
for this. The village is situated in a very dry area (its name Arevadasht literally means 
‘sun field’ in Armenian), where it is extremely difficult to grow fruits and vegetables. 
There was no single tree in the whole village. Poor local leadership, however, made the 
situation worse. The economic and social infrastructure in the village completely 
deteriorated. The potable water and irrigation systems were malfunctioning (more 
details on the irrigation system follow in Chapter Eight). The village did not have a 
medical point and even a grocery shop, where people could buy bread and items of first 
necessity, such as soap and basic medicines. The village used to have a revolving drug 
fund set up by Oxfam, but as the majority of residents were unable to make cash 
contributions, the drug fund was dissolved. For four years, the village did not have 
electricity supply.
It seems that the energy and efforts of the local mayor were channelled into obtaining 
personal profit. He was accused by the community residents of selling communal 
property, extorting bribes and misappropriating development aid. A resident said, “The 
village is pilfered. Aid is always coming to the village but very few people receive it. 
State property is being taken away and sold” (AIM). Another resident said,
72 Another predatory leader was the former mayor in Ashnak, who mismanaged the construction of the 
ASIF micro-project. More discussion on this follows in section 8.1.2.
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“Everything is being stolen and ‘eaten’73 here” (AR-6). The respondents alleged that the 
mayor sold the communal artesian wells and electrical wire to the rich landowners in the 
neighbouring area. The residents also accused the mayor of selling fertilisers and other 
agricultural inputs designated as aid to their village. A village resident described the 
situation, “Things like this happen very often; whenever the village receives something, 
people from other villages come and take things away; some of his [the mayor’s] close 
friends take them and sell at higher prices” (AIM). The potable water system in the 
village was renovated by the All Armenia Fund in 1998. The village, however, did not 
have potable water for two years. The mayor explained the lack of water by the fact that 
the water pump had burnt down. Community residents, however, suspected that with the 
permission of the mayor, potable water of the village was used by several rich 
individuals for irrigating their fields in the neighbouring villages. A resident said, “It is 
all their mafia, they take advantage of any aid or initiative; it is all his circles that 
benefit, nobody else” (AIM).
The mayor in Arevadasht seemed to be indifferent to the needs of the most marginalised 
families in the village. For example, a single female who did not have any income and 
who had to support her three disabled children, did not receive any social assistance 
benefits. She was unable to travel to the hospital for people with mental disabilities in 
Nubarashen to complete paperwork in order to become eligible for social assistance 
benefits. She appealed for help to the mayor several times, but he did not do anything to 
help. In reality, he could have easily helped the woman by providing his car to one of 
his staff or a community resident to travel to Nubarashen (which is about one hour drive 
away) to complete the required paperwork. She suspected that she was registered as a 
social assistance recipient, and that the money was appropriated by the marz officials.
The dire situation in Arevadasht did not just start with the present mayor, but it was 
inherited from the former mayor. The former mayor was the head of the local 
Agricultural Mutual Help Bank. According to the residents, he would only give credits 
in exchange for bribes of 10,000 drams ($20) per person or for lending him half of the 
borrowed money. Many rural residents borrowed money on those terms, which 
contributed to their impoverishment. As a respondent said, “Today everyone is indebted
73 Armenian jargon for illegal money misappropriation.
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[to him] and still pays interest” (AR-6). The present mayor served as deputy mayor for 
three years, which helped him take up the mayor’s post. A resident said, “He managed 
to become a mayor as they together [with the former mayor] made many dirty deals, and 
it was not easy to get rid of him. So they appointed him to conceal some of these deals” 
(AR-4). Local residents in Arevadasht saw the only solution to their difficulties in the 
election of a new local mayor. They were resolute not to support the present mayor 
during the upcoming elections. A female respondent said, “The only panacea for this 
village is a good leader, and until the whole staff of the local government is not replaced, 
our situation will not change” (AR-14).
7.4.3 Alternative Leaders: Schools Directors
Schools play an important role in consolidating communities in Armenia. Schools have 
traditionally been considered a pillar of the Armenian society. Historically, education 
helped Armenians to preserve their language and ethnic identity. Although the quality 
of schooling has deteriorated in the post-Soviet period, people still consider school 
education as the utmost priority for their children. Schools are important centres of 
community life because of strong values attached to education. People do not perceive a 
‘community’ without a school. Some very important social events such the graduation, 
celebration of return of army conscripts, and national holidays are typically organised at 
schools. Most respondents in this study referred to the school as the foundation of their 
community.
School directors were important leaders in the sample communities. Local mayors did 
not interfere in the school activities, and school directors retained full autonomy in 
making decisions and managing schools. For example, the local mayor in Khachik 
seemed to be involved in managing every aspect of community life, but he 
acknowledged that he was “not quite aware about the activities at the school” (K-l). 
The mayors supported their schools as needed, upon an appeal from school directors. In 
Khachik, P Sevak, Ashnak and Eghengnavan, school directors had good leadership and 
organisational skills. They raised funds from external donors for renovating school 
buildings, and mobilised local residents to contribute resources, time and labour for 
school maintenance and for extra-curricular activities and events. The school director in 
Ashnak contributed her own money when applying to the World Bank funded School
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Improvement programme. She topped up the money assembled from parents from her 
own funds in order to fulfil the ten percent community contribution requirement.
7.4.4 Maintaining and Defying Social Justice
The developmental local mayors played an important role in maintaining social justice 
in their communities. The respondents believed that their mayors were fair in their 
treatment of community residents. The mayors in Ashnak, Karin and Eghegnavan 
attempted to help some of the poorest residents by waiving their mandatory contribution 
requirement for public works and infrastructure projects financed by Save the Children, 
ASIF and Oxfam. In Eghegnavan, the mayor supported the poorest households by 
waiving land taxes and water charges, so that as he said, “they could breathe”. In Karin, 
the mayor waived all taxes for poor households. The mayor in P Sevak allowed single 
female headed households to pay water charges with delays and often waived them.
The local mayors in the sample communities played a key role in verifying eligibility of 
poor household for humanitarian aid and for the state funded social assistance (family 
benefits). Most residents thought that their mayors distributed humanitarian food aid 
fairly. Humanitarian aid was provided by the UN agencies (UNHCR and WFP under 
the Food for Work Programme), and included limited amount of flour, beans, chick 
peas and vegetable oil. The mayors complained that distribution of humanitarian aid 
was a very difficult task. As aid was limited, some households were bound to be left out. 
As a result, those who did not receive aid would start protesting and arguing with aid 
recipients and their local mayors. The mayor in Karin came up with a solution to 
distribute aid to a larger group of people in order to avoid discontent. The village 
received forty sacks of flour (50 kg each) designated for forty households. The mayor 
instead distributed half a sack per household, as a result of which some eighty 
households received aid. The respondents thought that most recipients of social 
assistance genuinely deserved it. At the same time, several respondents in Khachik and 
Eghegnavan expressed concern that some of the non-poor were also included in the 
beneficiary lists.
The refugee respondents in Karin were content with their mayor’s treatment. The mayor 
himself was not a refugee, but he was reported to be equally attentive to the needs of the
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refugee and non-refugee population of the village. A refugee woman said, “We like our 
village. For example, they were talking about merging with the neighbouring Sasounik 
as one unit, but we refused it” (KN-4). Most refugees thought that their mayor was 
“very caring,” as he knew all of them personally and he was aware of their problems. 
The residents compared him with other mayors, “who would not event talk to people 
and do not like refugees” (KN-G1). Eghegnavan and P Sevak too had some refugee 
households, who did not report any unfair treatment.
Respondents in Arevadasht reported that their mayor excluded the truly needy residents. 
According to respondents, a small group of better-off residents benefited from 
humanitarian food aid, whereas some of the poorest residents did not receive any aid. 
Over one third of the village residents were extremely poor, but most of them did not 
receive food aid (as for example, the single female with three disabled children, whom I 
mentioned earlier in this chapter). The mayor himself drew the list of persons eligible 
for food aid, and, according to the residents, the list contained the names of some 
deceased community members. Some respondents suggested that the mayor sold some 
of the food aid, as they had seen it in the market in the neighbouring village. Some 
respondents suspected that the food aid was brought to the village in a ‘secretive’ way, 
during the night, so that people would not know how much aid was received. A resident 
complained about the preferential treatment by the mayor, “A lot of people receive aid 
and other benefits, otherwise why are people with the same land next to each other so 
different? We have the same income, but all of a sudden some people turn out to be 
better-off’ (AR-9).
7.4.5 Generating and Destroying Social Capital
The extent to which leaders are embedded in local networks, endowed with leadership 
and managerial skills and committed to contribute to their communities, determines the 
level of social cohesion in local communities. Developmentally effective leaders tend to 
unite people in their communities. High levels of social cohesion and support by local 
residents in their turn enable mayors to effectively manage local development.
An example of a mayor’s influence on local social relations can be shown in the case 
study of Karin. The village of Karin was founded in 1992 to accommodate ethnic
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Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan. The refugee population of the village was 
composed of diverse social groups, with different backgrounds and educational level, 
who had come from various geographic areas of Azerbaijan. Many refugees were from 
urban intelligentsia in Baku, and they had never lived or worked in rural areas before. 
The village also accommodated some indigenous Armenian families from the 
neighbouring villages. According to the local mayor, the village was composed of an 
“eclectic mix” of people, who did not have a shared experience of living as a 
community (KN-1). The residents had a very difficult adjustment period, in which they 
were slowly getting acquainted with the new area, new neighbours and new lifestyle and 
working conditions. At the beginning, most people were atomised and isolated from 
each other. They did not attend ceremonial events, as, for example, funerals of their co­
villagers, for which the attendance by most community members is required by the 
Armenian tradition. Gradually, within ten years of living together, the community grew 
into a more cohesive entity. According to the residents, people became more united and 
more trusting of each other; they were more willing to co-operate and support each 
other with labour, money and moral encouragement.
The mayor in Karin had an important role in developing the community. He made a 
conscious effort to foster a collective spirit among local residents and unite people 
under common objectives. In order to achieve this, he often assembled community 
meetings, organised community-wide social events and mobilised people for 
community works. As a result of repeated positive interaction, the level of trust among 
residents increased. The mayor said, “Previously, people were not united here. When 
there was a funeral, nobody would leave their home, only the immediate relatives would 
attend, and not even neighbours. I would assemble everybody and explain to them that 
it is a shame, and they are all part of the same community. Gradually, within the last 
five years, the whole village has become as one fist” (KN-1). The relations among 
community members strengthened also thanks to the fair and respectful treatment by the 
mayor, who did not discriminate against the refugee population, and provided both 
refugees and local Armenians with equal opportunities.
Local leaders can also destroy the existing stocks of social capital, as it happened in the 
case of Arevadasht. Here, the lack of effective management and accountability by the 
local mayor has transferred into social cleavages and tension. As described earlier, the
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mayor reportedly allocated development resources to his immediate circles and 
excluded the poor and voiceless community members. This contributed to the division 
of the community’s residents into several factions. These included:
> The immediate friends of the mayor and local government staff, who, as 
community members alleged, entered into deals with the mayor and benefited 
from development aid and resources.
> There was a small group of local entrepreneurs who undertook voluntary 
initiatives to resolve some local problems. They managed the delivery of 
containers with potable water to the community, funded the repair of the 
irrigation water pump and organised purchase fertilisers at a reduced price. 
These entrepreneurs were the most vocal members of the community as they felt 
that the mayor and his environment stifled any initiative in the village and 
marginalised some of the poor residents. They felt that they were in a minority, 
and that they would not be supported by other community members if they 
raised their voice against the mismanagement in the village.
> Yezids,74 who constituted half of the population of the village, were reluctant to 
go against the mayor and his environment. The ethnic Armenian residents of the 
village believed that the Yezids supported the mayor as he regularly purchased 
dairy produce from them, and that “they probably get something from him” 
(AR-4). At the same time, the Yezids were as marginalised as the Armenian 
residents of the village.
> Finally, there was a group of extremely poor residents, several of them with 
severe disabilities, who were powerless and were dependent on other community 
residents in their survival.
This social division in Arevadasht translated into the inability of residents to get 
together to pursue common objectives and to demand accountability from the local 
mayor. People rarely took part in collective initiatives, as they believed that the benefits
74 Yezids (Zoroastrian Kurds) represent the largest ethnic minority in Armenia (1.5% of total population). 
They are mostly pastoralists and have been traditionally engaged in livestock breeding.
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of the collective action were going to be captured by the elite. A resident referred to the 
lack of unity in the village, “People will not support each other in this village. They are 
all by themselves; this village is very disintegrated” (AR-9). The residents described 
how an attempt to petition the government failed. After a severe drought in the region, 
the central government pledged to provide emergency aid to the village. However, the 
village never received it. Several residents got together and decided to complain to the 
marzpetaran. However, the mayor managed to turn people back. As several respondents 
alleged, the mayor promised benefits to some petitioners, and they agreed not to 
complain. A resident said, “There are people around him who are not happy with him, 
but they would not go against him, as he compensates them on little things, for example, 
he would waive them water charges or the land tax...There is no unity, the village will 
not act as a single person, there is no community in this village, they all get something 
from him and would not support us” (AR-4).
7.4.6 Inter-Community Relations
All villages in the sample had limited connections with the neighbouring communities. 
The difficulties of everyday survival forced local residents to focus on their own 
immediate needs and limited possibilities for co-operation and reciprocity with 
neighbouring communities. Often several villages in the same geographic area may be 
rivals and compete for the same scarce economic resources, such as potable or irrigation 
water. In Karin, for example, the residents complained that they had limited water 
because the neighbouring village would sometimes cut their water supply. In Karin, P 
Sevak and Ashnak, residents reported that sometimes parts of water pipelines outside 
the community boundaries were vandalised by residents of neighbouring villages.
The respondents in Ashnak described a case of informal inter-community co-operation. 
In the northern region of Armenia, where Ashnak is situated, most residents are 
descendants from the Western Armenian region Sasoun (Eastern Turkey), and they 
share a strong sense of solidarity. Often residents of Sasoun origin from several villages 
get together for ceremonial events and celebrations. In Ashnak, for example, the mayor 
once hosted a gathering of 8,000 people from all neighbouring villages.
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One example of formal co-operation was the initiative by the mayor in Eghegnavan to 
establish an Inter-Community Council -  a union of twenty communities of Ararat marz. 
According to the by-law of the Council, every community could become a member of 
the Council. The communities were represented in the Council by their mayors, and 
were obliged to pay membership duties of five dram per household. The objective of the 
Council was to provide financial support to member communities. When one 
community had an excess of money in its budget, it lent the money to the neighbouring 
community that most needed money at that time, for example, for undertaking a 
community project. As many local projects were opportunity driven, the availability of 
cash allowed communities to seize the presented opportunities. Despite the fact that 
membership was open to any community in the marz, personal connections seemed to 
determine the eligibility for credit. The Council in reality was driven by a group of 
influential local leaders who knew each other from Soviet times and used the Council to 
support each other. All members of the Council were relatively affluent communities. It 
seems unlikely that a poor community could actively participate in the work of the 
Council as it would simply not have excess money to lend to other members.
Figure 7.3: Local Leaders in the Sample Communities
Developmental Leaders
Organise community wide initiatives, mobilise 
community residents for communal works and 
raise cash contributions.
Raise external funds for investing in local 
infrastructure and collaborate with donor agencies 
and NGOs.
Maintain social justice by allocating resources in a 
relatively fair manner.
Attempt to reach out to and support the poorest 
residents.
Tend to unite people in their communities.
Predatory Leaders
Ineffective management o f local economic 
and social issues.
Tend to misappropriate communal 
resources and use public funds for their 
private interests.
Exclude the poorest and marginalised from 
development assistance.
Induce social divisions and tensions within 
community.
7.5 Community Members and Local Development
This section analyses the nature of local social capital and forms of participation of 
community residents in the sample communities (Figure 7.4). In particular, the section
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focuses on the nature of interpersonal relations, networks of mutual support and 
solidarity, participation in social life and the involvement of ordinary community 
residents in community projects and initiatives. As described in sections 7.2-7.3 of this 
chapter, the existing forms and nature of community participation in the sample 
communities were limited. At the same time, despite the existing preconceptions 
prevalent in development practice in post-Soviet countries (described in section 2.4.1 of 
Chapter Two), ordinary community members in the sample communities were not 
distrustful, apathetic and patemalistically oriented. They actively supported each other 
and were involved in the social and economic life of their communities.
7.5.1 Social Capital
‘Human relations’ have been traditionally cherished in Armenia. Armenians highly 
value informal reciprocal relations with their family members, relatives, friends and 
colleagues. Kinship ties and a sense of communal affiliation performed an important 
regulatory function in pre-Soviet rural Armenia (Box 7.7). As described in Chapter Two, 
personalised social networks played a crucial role in providing people with access to 
goods and services during Soviet times. A Soviet proverb says, “It is better to have a 
hundred friends, than a hundred roubles”. Relations of reciprocity in Armenia are often 
ascribed to long-standing traditional values. These values often require placing human 
relations above professional and other formal obligations. Thus even in the absence of 
pragmatic considerations of reciprocity, mutual help is a necessity for inclusion and full 
acceptance within a community.
The fieldwork data provides indications that the existing social relations in post-Soviet 
Armenia underwent changes after independence. On the one hand, ties between people 
have intensified due to the difficulties imposed by the collapse of the socialist economy. 
In the absence of effective state support, mutual assistance has become a crucial 
resource upon which many households can draw to survive the transition. Transition has 
also made it more difficult for people to co-operate and support each other. Often due to 
material and social deprivation, people are forced to concentrate on their own everyday 
survival needs, and have less time and resources to dedicate to their relatives, friends
75 ‘Human relations’ is a common term for describing interpersonal or social relations in the Armenian 
language.
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and fellow community members. Many respondents noted that despite their desire to 
help, it is often impossible or difficult to be helpful.
There were strong endowments of social capital in all of the studied communities (Box 
7.6). Relations of trust and reciprocity in the sample communities existed both within 
smaller groups, such as kinship and friendship networks (bonding social capital), and 
between different groups in a community (bridging social capital). As resources at the 
disposal of a household were limited, informal assistance prioritised kinship networks. 
In all studied communities, people provided support to their co-villagers who were 
outside their kinship or friendship networks, where they have available resources. The 
respondents described many instances when they would help people whom they were 
not connected with kinship and friendship ties. Relations with neighbours were no less 
important than relations with relatives and kin related co-villagers. A resident in P 
Sevak said, “It is the neighbours who come first to help you and not the relatives” (PS- 
13).
In all studied communities, people helped each other with ‘what they could’. Mutual 
help included limited cash assistance (donation and lending), in-kind assistance (food 
donation and lending, donation of clothes, donation of agricultural inputs, such as 
fertilisers and pesticides and lending machinery and spare parts), and labour assistance 
(agricultural works, e.g., harvesting, or repairing houses and taking cattle to pastures). 
People helped each other not only materially, but also offered psychological support in 
times of crisis and stress. A female respondent in P Sevak said, “My husband fell ill, 
and the whole village was in my house” (PS-14). In case of a death of a family member 
of a co-villager, the entire village would assemble money to help with the funeral 
expenses. Local leaders often assisted the poor by waiving the requirement for 
community contribution in community-based projects funded by ASIF, Save the 
Children and local NGOs. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, in all of the studied 
communities, there were some extremely poor households who were entirely reliant on 
humanitarian food assistance, state-provided social assistance benefits and material 
support by their neighbours and co-villagers.
People borrowed cash from their co-villagers, usually in small amounts, to cover the 
cost of essential needs (for example, for buying food and hygiene items and paying
222
utility bills). A female respondent in P Sevak said, “We fully trust people here; there is 
no problem with lending money, the other day I accidentally gave 5,000 drams [$10] 
extra to a co-villager, and he came to give it back to me” (PS-13). In all studied 
communities, local shops sold goods for credit. People usually repaid their debt after 
they obtained cash from selling their crops or receiving remittances from abroad or 
social assistance benefits. Many respondents said they often lend small amounts of 
money without the expectation that the money would be returned. The shopkeeper in 
Khachik said that requiring customers to pay cash at the time of purchase was not 
realistic, and the only way to continue their business was to sell goods for credit. In 
most cases, people paid back for the borrowed items, although sometimes repayment 
could take up to six months. A resident in Khachik said, “Everybody in the village is 
indebted to each other” (K-G2).
Mutual assistance networks were especially strong at schools. Schools helped some of 
the most impoverished schoolchildren by donating clothes, shoes, stationary and small 
amounts of money for renting textbooks and medical emergencies. Access to schools 
becomes limited during the winter times, as the poorest cannot afford warm clothes and 
shoes. Poor schoolchildren are usually too embarrassed to appeal to teachers themselves. 
In many schools, teachers established a monitoring system and themselves identify the 
poorest children in order to help them. Teachers often visited their pupils at home in 
case of their frequent absences. Some relatively well-to-do parents helped the poorest 
schoolchildren by donating clothes and food, paying for textbooks or subsidising the 
cost of school events for which parental contributions were required (for example, 
school excursions or graduation ceremony).
The informal relations of reciprocity and communal solidarity transfer into the formal 
sphere. The representative of the local DWC in Karin said she was successful in 
collecting water charges only because many people knew that in case of low collection 
rates, she would not receive her three percent commission. As described in section 7.3 
of this chapter, many respondents felt inappropriate to complain against their local 
leaders, as they felt it would indicate their disloyalty to their community members.
Moralistic judgement was sometimes applied towards some extremely poor persons or 
households, however, these persons or households were not denied community
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assistance in reality. In the villages studied, some negative social attitudes were 
apparent towards those households who relied on humanitarian aid and social assistance 
benefits. Some respondents thought that humanitarian food aid had created dependency 
and disincentives for work. However, such attitudes did not transfer into denial of 
access to formal or informal social assistance benefits or essential services and did not 
create social divisions. The respondents in Khachik described a household, whose 
poverty they attributed to their ‘laziness’. The community, however, offered a lamb as a 
gift to that household in order to help them start cheese production, but the household 
members declined the offer. Many villagers in the refugee village of Karin expressed 
their dissatisfaction with humanitarian aid and thought it created a dependency culture. 
They believed that some villagers were reliant on aid and did not want to make any 
effort to improve their situation. At the same time, the villagers did not blame the aid 
recipients, but were rather critical of the governmental and donor policies and 
programmes that encouraged food aid instead of providing economic opportunities to 
the poor.
The respondents often referred to the traditions of co-operation and solidarity in their 
villages by describing their communities as ‘cohesive’ or ‘united’. In Khachik, Tsilkar, 
Eghegnavan and Karin, the residents referred to their communities as ‘united’. Their 
interpretation of ‘unitedness’ referred to the extent to which people were willing to 
participate in collective activities and support each other at community-wide level. 
Residents in Arevadasht described their community as ‘divided’ and Tacking any 
cohesion’.
Social networks and relations of solidarity developed in different ways in different 
communities in the sample. An important source of social cohesion is common kinship 
ties. The residents of Ashnak, for example, originate from Sasoun region in Western 
Armenia (Eastern Turkey), and share common kinship, identity and sense of belonging 
to the same place of origin. Descendants from Sasoun are known in Armenia for their 
strong bonds and sense of solidarity. The mayor in Ashnak said, “People trust each 
other, they help each other, this village is known in the whole country as very strong 
and united. You cannot imagine what happens here during festivities and events like 
weddings, funeral, birthday, graduations; the whole village celebrates together, not only 
just relatives. We all are from Sasoun!” (AK-1). The community of Khachik descends
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from three extended kin groups, who have lived in the same village for more than one 
hundred years. The village is rather remote and difficult to access, and there was very 
little migration into the village, which helped maintain the historical social composition 
of the village. The fact that the village is on the border with Nakhichevan region of 
Azerbaijan also contributes to the cohesion of the village.
B ox 7.6: Features o f  Social Capital in Rural Arm enia
> Relations among community members are governed by pragmatic considerations of 
reciprocity, adherence to traditional norms and altruistic motives.
>  There are strong traditions of mutual assistance and reciprocity in Armenia.
>  Relations of trust and reciprocity exist both within smaller groups such as kinship and
friendship networks and across various groups within communities.
>  People have a strong sense o f solidarity and concern for the common good.
>  Economic and social deprivation constraints the ability of people to support each other and
participate in the life of their communities.
>  The degree of effectiveness and accountability of local mayors directly influences the levels 
of social cohesion in the communities.
>  Conflicts in local communities occur over economic resources, most often for sharing 
potable or irrigation water.
The lack of kinship ties does not preclude the formation of social capital. A common 
positive history of interaction is crucial for establishing trustworthy relations. The 
village of P Sevak was founded in the early 1970s by young families, who came from 
different regions of Armenia. A female respondent in P Sevak said, “Maybe one reason 
that our village is so peaceful is that we all came here as very young families, without 
our parents-in-law” (PS-14). According to her, the presence of older community 
members would have compelled them to give greater significance to the issues of 
kinship and origin of their co-residents and reinforce traditional hierarchies. There were 
three ethnic Armenian refugee families from Azerbaijan in P Sevak, and they were well 
integrated in the village life. A refugee woman said, “I love this village, and I would 
never leave this village” (PS-13). As described in section 7.4 of this chapter, 
developmental local leaders played crucial role in fostering trusting relations among 
community members by creating spaces for community interaction and maintaining 
social justice. Thus the communities in Karin and Eghegnavan composed of local
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Armenians and ethnic Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan developed a sense of 
common identity thanks to the positive experience of interaction facilitated by the 
efforts of the local mayors.
As described in section 7.4.2 of this chapter, the ineffective management and corrupt 
practices by the predatory local mayor significantly contributed to social divisions in the 
community of Arevadasht. The village was split into various factions based on the 
degree of people’s allegiance to the local elite. Such division prohibited the community 
from taking a united action against the corrupt mayor. At the same time, traditions of 
mutual assistance among community residents still persisted. A respondent in 
Arevadasht said, “People help each other with what they can” (AR-G2). Relations of 
reciprocity existed both among Armenians and between Armenians and the ethnic 
Yezidi residents of Arevadasht. Armenians and Yezids co-operated and shared food and 
resources. In the situation where the local leadership was ineffective, the informal 
networks of social assistance played a key role in keeping the community alive. In fact, 
some of the community members were able to survive only due to the assistance from 
their co-villagers.
In all of the sample communities, occasional conflicts and disagreements occurred over 
economic resources, mostly for sharing potable or irrigation water (more details follow 
in section 9.6 of Chapter Nine). Scarcity of water is a major factor causing disagreement 
and negatively affecting interpersonal relations. Conflicts occur when, for example, 
some villagers draw water above the amounts allocated to them. This often deprives 
other villagers, especially those who have fields at the tail end of the irrigation system. 
The respondents reported that during the drought in 1999-2001, when water supply in 
Armenia was especially scarce, conflicts over water were very frequent. These conflicts 
were not violent and were usually resolved peacefully by the community members 
themselves or through the intermediation of the local mayor. A resident in Ashnak said, 
“We all are neighbours here, and we don’t live just for one day. Sometimes we have 
conflicts, but they are always quickly resolved” (AK-G2). The respondents in Khachik 
said that as most people “live with each other”, they are compelled to resolve conflicts 
peacefully.
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Box 7.7: The Pre-Soviet Armenian Community
The family, the village and the Armenian Church were the main social institutions in pre-Soviet 
rural Armenia. The patriarchal family (azg) was the primary unit of pre-Soviet social 
organisation o f Armenian rural communities. In the 19th century the Eastern Armenian rural 
family was composed of twenty to fifty members related by kinship, issuing from one father by 
the descending line and its branches. Economic resources were redistributed within the family, 
and each member performed their share of communal work. Most labour in the village was 
organised according to family units. Preservation of the unity of the extended family was a 
matter of social prestige. The extended families formed a village commune. They elected the 
village headman (tanouter), who was in charge of the communal governance. Social control was 
retained by custom, conformity to which was enforced by the fear of social disapproval. There 
were no sharp class or social distinctions in the Armenian communities, although some 
traditionally better-off families (ojakh) retained privileged positions. Land, pastures and 
sometimes irrigation canals and mills belonged to the communal property. Land was distributed 
among families according to the number of family members. Certain activities, such as building 
of a house, were undertaken by the village as a whole. Community members sought to maintain 
the “solidarity and distinctiveness” of their community (p. 8). Good relations with neighbours 
were deemed important. Birth, marriage and death gathered the entire community. The 
Armenian Church was extremely significant in people’s lives, not only as a religious institution, 
but also as the intellectual centre and the source of the national identity of Armenians.
Source: Kilboume Matossian (1962)
7.5.2 Participation in Social Life
Social events, traditional celebrations and social interaction have historically played an 
important role in the life of Armenian communities. Celebrations of birthdays, 
weddings, national and religious holidays, and visits to relatives, friends and neighbours 
play a crucial role in uniting communities and strengthening social bonds. Most 
respondents believed that participation in social life was important for keeping the 
community spirit and supporting people psychologically. A resident in Ashnak 
expressed a common view, “We all participate in social events, it is important to 
support each other morally” (AK-11). A woman in P Sevak said, “We get together, 
mostly with our friends and relatives, for a birthday or a holiday celebration. We are 
still human” (PS-14).
Most respondents noted that there was a decrease in the level of their social interaction 
as compared with that in Soviet times. The complained that “life these days is not the 
same as it used to be”. They explained this by the lack of economic resources and time 
to host friends and relatives and pay the costs incurred by ceremonial events and 
festivities. At the same time, the respondents noted that compared to the times of the
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severe economic crisis in the early 1990s, their social life improved. As the overall 
economic situation in Armenia improved in the late 1990s, participation in community- 
wide social events increased.
The local mayors and school directors in the sample communities played an active role 
in organising social events by mobilising cash, managing logistical arrangements and 
involving community residents. In order to mobilise resources for social events, the 
local mayors collected money from the better-off residents, asked local shopkeepers to 
contribute cash, and contributed resources from the local government budget and often 
from their own personal savings. The poorest were often excluded from contributing, 
but were allowed to take part in the events. Community-wide events were normally 
hosted in a local club, school or at someone’s house. School directors and teachers 
organised graduation ceremonies and celebrated birthdays of schoolchildren.
Khachik and Ashnak had greater rates of participation in social life, perhaps because 
their leaders were more active in the organisation of community-wide social events. 
Khachik was the only community which had a church. It also had a cafe at the village 
square, and a local culture club, where the residents sometimes organised a discotheque. 
Khachik, Ashnak, and Eghegnavan had culture clubs, which were used for social 
gatherings and celebrations. Karin, where the refugee residents with urban background 
were especially culturally aware, did not have any cultural facilities to cater to their 
needs. The residents in Karin were longing for a local library and a culture club.
7.5.3 Participation in Communal Initiatives
In all of the studied communities, residents took part in various local initiatives and 
communal projects, initiated by the local mayors and school directors. People were 
willing to contribute time and money towards the common community good and were 
dealing with their local problems to the best they could. The mayor in Khachik said, 
“People are now accepting that they should contribute in order to get things done in 
their communities” (K-l). Community residents took part in these initiatives even when 
they did not personally benefit from the initiatives, mostly as a sign of solidarity with 
their co-villagers. People seemed to be genuinely interested in the life of their
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community, their fellow community members and the future of their communities. Most 
of them thought that the problems of their communities were their own problems.
Participation in communal activities in Arevadasht was more limited in its scope than in 
other communities. As the local mayor was rather ineffectual, there were few 
community initiatives undertaken in the village. The residents did not trust the local 
elite and they were doubtful whether their contribution would ultimately produce 
benefits for them. At the same time, community members in Arevadasht were not 
overly inactive. They, for example, contributed cash and voluntary labour for the 
ASIF’s irrigation micro-project.
The most common form of participation in the sample communities was the 
contribution of voluntary labour in community infrastructure and environmental 
maintenance initiatives. In particular, residents participated in cleaning canals, 
rehabilitating roads and potable water and irrigation pipes, collecting rubbish, planting 
trees, and improving school areas. Both men and women contributed labour, however, 
it was mostly men who were involved in physically demanding works. In many 
instances, residents themselves identified problems and faults with community 
infrastructure and undertook the required small repairs. The number of residents who 
contributed labour in these initiatives varied depending on the specific requirements of 
civil works.
Residents also contributed money for the rehabilitation and maintenance of community 
infrastructure as well as for community events and celebrations. For example, residents 
in Khachik collected 3,000 drams per household and contributed free labour for the 
rehabilitation of the internal potable water system. As a result, the new system provided 
120 villagers with access to potable water. They also worked as volunteers on the 
rehabilitation of the building for the new bakery. Mobilisation of monetary 
contributions normally had a poverty targeting element -  the poorest residents were 
exempt, and higher amounts were solicited from the relatively better-off residents. For 
example, the mayor in Ashnak collected cash from the residents in order to lay a canal 
for the livestock. The residents collected 400 dram from those who had a cow, and 100 
dram those who only had ship.
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In all studied communities, parents, children and teachers were actively involved in the 
school life. Participation of parents in school affairs had informal nature. Parents 
participated in informal Parents’ Committees, which were established in most Armenian 
schools in Soviet times. The Parents’ Committees played a key role in organising extra­
curricular activities and social and educational events, mobilising parents around 
important issues, managing school maintenance, liaising with teachers and school 
directors and helping the poorest schoolchildren.
Parents and teachers in the sample communities provided material contribution for the 
O&M of their schools. The state provision for school O&M were insufficient to cover 
even the most urgent O&M needs. The schools were compelled to raise cash 
contributions from parents and teachers to supplement their budgets. This money was 
used for small-scale repairs and renovation works. Most schools aimed not to collect 
money from parents frequently because of the material constraints most people 
experienced. Parents also provided volunteer labour for small-scale rehabilitation and 
maintenance works. By the initiative of the school directors, teachers organised regular 
‘maintenance days’ (subbotnik or shabatoryak), during which schoolchildren, parents, 
both men and women, and teachers cleaned the school territory and school buildings’ 
interiors. Section 9.4 shows that community residents actively participated in the O&M 
of the irrigation facilities.
7.5.4 Gender Participation
Rural communities in Armenia are distinguished by a highly patriarchal structure, 
which has preserved since the pre-Soviet times. Kilboume Matossian (1962) describes 
gender relations within the pre-Soviet Armenian household. The main decision-maker 
in the family was the patriarch, and there was a clear division of labour between men 
and women. Women were usually engaged in domestic work, and men performed 
agricultural and construction activities. As part of its effort to transform traditional 
institutions, the Soviet regime attempted to ‘emancipate’ women by guaranteeing equal 
constitutional rights with men, providing free access to education, encouraging them to 
take jobs outside the home, and involving them in the public sphere. Despite a 
considerable secularisation of many traditional values and practices, patriarchal
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relationships in the Armenian family and the traditional division of labour between men 
and women have survived.
Patterns of gender participation in communal initiatives in the sample villages reflected 
traditional norms, which tend to strictly prescribe roles for men and women. In all of the 
communities, the man was considered the breadwinner and head of the family, and 
woman was perceived to do housework and take care of children. Women participated 
in the public sphere, but their participation was limited to specific areas. In particular, 
women had greater involvement in school affairs, and had limited participation in ‘hard’ 
sectors such as irrigation and potable water, which were regarded as the male domain. A 
rather exceptional case was the female WUA head in Eghegnavan. She was most likely 
advanced to the post by the local mayor, with whom they were work colleagues in 
Soviet times, and who trusted her. Thanks to her experience, she had strong leadership 
qualities that helped her perform her job effectively. Section 8.2.5 of Chapter Eight 
provides analysis of the dynamics of gender participation in the ASIF micro-project 
processes.
Figure 7.4: Community Participation and Empowerment in A rm enia
Forms of Participation Nature of Participation and Intensity of 
Empowerment
Strong networks of mutual support based on 
trust and reciprocity.
Participation in community-wide 
social/ceremonial events is an important part of 
community life.
Community members take part in local projects 
and initiatives by contributing voluntary labour, 
materials and cash.
Participation is mostly informal, and there are 
very few formal groups and associations.
Community members rarely exercise leadership 
and undertake independent initiatives. They 
mostly rely on local leaders to get things done.
Local leaders (local mayors and school 
directors) play an important role in organising 
community-wide events, mobilising community 
members, liaising with external organisations 
and raising resources.
Local mayors play key role in local decision­
making with regard to the formulation and 
implementation of local policies and 
programmes and resource allocation.
The nature o f community participation is of 
low intensity, and it is restricted to listening 
and consultation.
Weak intensity of empowerment. Community 
members have access to their leaders (passive 
access) and opportunities to exercise their 
voice and express their demands and 
preferences (active participation).
Community members have limited influence 
and virtually no control in local decision­
making and resource allocation.
The channels of vertical, social and horizontal 
accountability are generally weak. Local 
mayors exercised top-down control and little 
transparency in managing local development, 
and were alleged to be involved in rent- 
seeking activities.________________________
231
Community members rarely exact 
accountability and transparency from their 
leaders through vertical and/or bottom-up 
mechanisms.
7.6 Conclusions
This chapter examined the existing local institutions and forms and nature of 
community participation in the sample communities after the ASIF micro-projects 
(Figure 7.4). It showed that ‘participation’ in the sample communities was not accepted 
as a ‘normal’ or ‘usual’ method for service delivery, problem-solving and decision­
making. The prevailing institutional arrangements for getting things done in the sample 
community were reliance on authorities, social networks and informal payments.
In particular, the research found that community members, who had limited access to 
resources and networks, were mostly reliant on local leaders in getting things done. 
Local action was induced by local leaders, who played a key role in securing benefits 
and solving problems through their position of influence and informal connections. 
Ordinary community residents took part in various local initiatives and communal 
projects, initiated by local mayors and school directors. Participation of community 
members, however, was limited to the provision of essential inputs, such as 
contributions of labour, cash and materials. There were very few formal and informal 
groups or associations established by the residents in order to pursue their objectives in 
any of the studied communities. Community members rarely exercised leadership and 
undertook independent initiatives, raised funds, liaised with external organisations and 
mobilised other community members for collective action.
The intensity of empowerment of local residents was weak. Community members had 
limited influence and virtually no control in decision-making with regard to formulation 
and design of local policies and programmes and resource allocation. The channels of 
horizontal, vertical and social accountability were generally weak in all of the studied 
communities. Community members were not active in demanding accountability and 
transparency from their leaders. Local authorities did not feel accountable to community 
members. In particular, they did not disseminate sufficient information, attempt to
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involve community residents in decision-making processes or govern local affairs in a 
transparent and inclusive manner.
The chapter suggested that the nature of governance both at the macro and micro levels 
largely affects the existing local institutions, the forms and nature of community 
participation and the intensity of empowerment in Armenia (Box 7.2 and Box 7.3). The 
formal organisations of the state in Armenia fail to effectively deliver goods and 
services and operate in accordance with the rule of law. In this situation, collective 
action and associational activity do not appear to be a viable means for getting things 
done. Ordinary community residents are often forced to rely on local leaders, who can 
attract external resources and advance the interests of their communities using their 
position of influence and personal connections. These patronage-based relationships 
between local leaders and community residents create dependency, limit the power base 
of community members and weaken formal channels of accountability. The value 
system and normative orientation of authorities at the central, regional and local level 
still reflect the hierarchical traditions of the Soviet ‘command-administrative’ system 
and reinforce top-down governance practices at the local level. In addition to the 
governance environment, the insufficient financial, organisational, human and 
psychological resources significantly constrain the ability of community members and 
local leaders to undertake local projects and initiatives (Box 7.1).
This chapter examined the role and functions that local leaders play in managing local 
development (Figure 7.3). It demonstrated that leadership and organisational skills, 
social status, informal connections and the extent of civic responsibility of local mayors 
significantly affect local institutional capacity and economic and social outcomes. The 
chapter classified local mayors as developmental and predatory. Developmental leaders 
play a key role in organising local communal works initiatives, raising development 
resources for investing in the essential local infrastructure and services, maintaining 
social justice and strengthening social cohesion in local communities. Predatory leaders 
tend to misappropriate communal resources, mismanage local affairs and exclude poor 
and marginalised households from development benefits. This negatively affects the 
level of economic development and availability of essential social services in a 
community and results in social divisions and tensions among various social groups.
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This chapter demonstrated that the limited community participation in the sample 
communities was not conditioned by the weakness of social capital and/or attitudinal 
factors. There were strong networks of mutual support based on trust and reciprocity in 
all of the studied villages (Box 7.6). They existed both within smaller groups, such as 
kinship and friendship networks (bonding social capital), and between different groups 
within a community (bridging social capital). Mutual help included cash, in-kind and 
labour assistance and psychological support. Social events, traditional celebrations and 
social interaction played an important role in the life of local residents. Community 
members were not distrustful, apathetic, and patemalistically oriented. They actively 
supported each other and participated in the economic and social life of their 
communities. They were willing to get together to take part in local projects and 
initiatives and contribute free labour, materials and cash. Despite the availability of 
strong endowments of social capital, community participation in the sample villages 
remained restricted in its forms and nature (Figure 7.4). Section 10.2.4 of Chapter Ten 
will provide a conceptual interpretation of the observed link between social capital and 
community participation.
The next chapter, Chapter Eight, analyses the service delivery outcomes of ASIF micro- 
projects and discusses the nature and patterns of community participation in the ASIF 
micro-project cycle. It examines the institutional responses and social processes 
stimulated by the micro-project interventions in the sample communities.
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Chapter Eight. ASIF’s Service Delivery Outcomes and Micro-Project Processes
This chapter discusses the service delivery outcomes and processes of the ASIF micro- 
projects in the sample communities. It is composed of two main sections. The first 
section provides information and analysis on the service delivery outcomes of the ASIF 
micro-projects in the sample communities. The second section discusses the nature and 
patterns of participation of local communities in the ASIF micro-project cycle. The 
latter section, in particular, focuses on participation of local leaders and community 
residents in the initiation, identification, preparation, implementation and management 
of the ASIF micro-projects.
By examining the micro-project service delivery outcomes and processes this chapter 
seeks to establish some of the key factors that accounted for the specific participation 
and capacity building impacts of the ASIF micro-projects. As described in section 5.1.3 
of Chapter Five, linking processes to outcomes can help better understand and explain 
the specific project outcomes. According to the theory-based evaluation method, in 
order for a project to achieve the desired outcomes, a specific phased sequence of 
causes and effects envisaged by the assumptions underpinning the project design should 
hold. By comparing these assumptions to actual developments it is possible to identify 
whether or not the intended linkages occur. This chapter examines the data on the 
micro-project service delivery outcomes and processes to establish whether the 
assumptions behind the ASIF project have been met. In particular, this chapter seeks to 
establish whether the ASIF micro-projects promoted genuine community participation, 
successful service delivery outcomes and positive experience of community interaction 
in the sample communities. This analysis has been employed to explain and interpret 
the key impacts of the ASIF micro-projects presented in Chapters Nine and Ten.
In addition, the examination of the ASIF micro-project service delivery outcomes and 
processes constitutes a case study of its own. In other words, by studying the nature of 
institutional responses and social processes stimulated by the micro-project 
interventions at various stages of the micro-project cycle we can deepen our 
understanding of the local institutional and social organisation in the sample 
communities. Thus, the analysis of community participation and the experience of
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collective action presented in this chapter complements the analysis of local institutions 
and social relations presented in Chapter Seven.
8.1 The ASIF Micro-Project Service Delivery Outcomes
This section examines how the service delivery objectives of the ASIF micro-projects 
were accomplished in the sample communities. In particular, it assesses the quality of 
construction/rehabilitation and the extent to which community residents were able to 
utilise the newly available services. An examination of the micro-project service 
delivery outcomes is important for assessing the impacts of the ASIF project on 
community participation and institutional capacity. It is assumed that positive outcomes 
of collective action are important for increasing the probability of future community 
activities (Hypotheses 2 and 5, Chapter Five). Following this assumption, the success of 
a collective action manifested in positive service delivery outcomes of the social fund 
micro-projects can be instrumental in strengthening interpersonal trust and increasing 
the willingness of community members to form associations and to get together to 
undertake new initiatives and projects in their communities. On the contrary, negative 
service delivery outcomes may discourage future endeavours and discourage local 
participation.
Prior to the ASIF micro-projects, all of the communities in the sample had irrigation 
systems in place. However, the existing systems in these communities only partially 
satisfied local demand for irrigation water. In order to improve water availability, these 
communities applied for ASIF’s funding. The irrigation micro-projects in the Ashnak 
and P Sevak dealt with the construction of irrigation pipelines to deliver water from an 
alternative source to the land plots. The micro-project in Eghegnavan supported 
construction of an irrigation canal to increase the volume of water supply. The micro­
projects in Khachik, Karin, Tsilkar and Arevadasht financed construction/rehabilitation 
of irrigation networks. The micro-project in Khachik involved rehabilitation of the 
existing drainage system, and the micro-project in Arevadasht financed the construction 
of a pump station.
One of the key objectives of ASIF in supporting these micro-projects was to rehabilitate 
the essential irrigation infrastructure in order to resume/improve people’s access to
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irrigation. An output indicator that can be used for measuring the success of the ASIF 
objectives is whether the beneficiaries regained or improved access to irrigation water 
as envisaged by the initial micro-project design. Based on the fieldwork evidence, one 
can identify two important factors that predetermined the extent of beneficiary access to 
irrigation water after the completion of the ASIF micro-projects. Firstly, the quality of 
the engineering design and civil works appeared to be instrumental in determining the 
effectiveness of the newly constructed/rehabilitated infrastructure.
Secondly, the actual service delivery outcomes depended on the availability of water 
supply from the main source. All of the sample communities reported that during the 
period of 1998-2001 they received very little irrigation water. On the occasions when 
they received water during that period, water supply was unreliable and insufficient to 
satisfy their needs. Water was provided only a few times during an irrigation season. As 
a result, the essential crops did not receive the required water intake. The situation 
changed during the irrigation season of 2002, when as a result of heavy rains and mild 
climatic conditions, the availability of water improved throughout the country. This 
section focuses on the service delivery outcomes in the summer of 2002, at the time 
when this research was conducted.
8.1.1 Positive Service Delivery Outcomes
In four of the seven ASIF communities (Eghegnavan, Tsilkar, P Sevak, and Khachik), 
the ASIF micro-projects resulted in the improvements in the essential irrigation 
infrastructure facilities and improved access of local residents to irrigation services. The 
respondents in these communities felt that the ASIF micro-project helped them solve 
their immediate priority needs. They expressed their satisfaction with the quality of 
works and the operation of the facilities. According to the IA members involved in the 
supervision of civil works and the ASIF supervision records, the quality of 
construction/rehabilitation works in these communities corresponded to the 
Construction Norms and Standards set by the Armenian government and reflected in the 
technical specifications of the micro-projects. The micro-project benefits matched the 
prior expectations of community residents. Provided there was sufficient supply of 
water from the main source, the ASIF financed facilities in these communities delivered 
water in the amounts envisaged by the initial micro-project design. At the time of this
237
research in the summer 2002, all of the four communities received irrigation water on a 
relatively reliable basis and in the amounts sufficient to satisfy local demand.
There were a number of residents in these communities who did not benefit from the 
newly constructed/rehabilitated irrigation infrastructure. This research did not observe 
cases of intentional exclusion from the ASIF micro-project benefits. As a result of 
material deprivation, some 3-4 poor households in each of these communities were 
unable to cultivate their land plots. These households were most commonly composed 
of a single mother, elderly persons living alone, and/or a disabled breadwinner. The 
members of these households were unable to perform hard physical work, and/or did 
not have enough cash to pay for the essential agricultural inputs, including water, 
fertilisers and the rent of agricultural machinery. They either did not cultivate their land, 
or sold their land as considered it a burden. There were also several households in each 
community who did not have access to land. These households did not receive land as 
they did not reside in the village at the time of the redistribution of the communal 
(kolkhoz and sovkhoz) land in 1991-1992.
8.1.2 Negative Service Delivery Outcomes
The ASIF micro-projects did not deliver the expected benefits in three communities 
(Ashnak, Arevadasht and Karin). The micro-projects in Ashnak and Arevadasht did not 
improve irrigation water availability, and the newly constructed irrigation network in 
Karin did not deliver water at all. The negative service delivery outcomes in Ashnak 
and Arevadasht were primarily conditioned by the poor quality of construction as a 
result of inadequate supervision of civil works by the local mayors (IA heads) and the 
ASIF supervisors (Figure 8.1). Section 8.2.8 of this chapter will demonstrate that the 
effectiveness of supervision and service delivery outcomes were much dependent upon 
the leadership characteristics and the governance environment in the sample 
communities (Box 8.1). In particular, the quality of construction was inadequate in the 
communities with predatory leaders (the mayor in Arevadasht and the former mayor in 
Ashnak), who were not sufficiently effective and committed to their communities. As 
community members had limited involvement in the decision-making processes during 
the micro-project implementation, they were not able to exercise effective supervision 
and influence the course of construction works. The negative service delivery outcomes
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in Karin were conditioned by the lack of water supply from the main source. The 
remaining part of this section discusses the specific service delivery outcomes in these 
communities.
Figure 8.1: Factors In fluencing Service Delivery Outcomes in 2002
Community Supervision of 
Civil Works
Construction
Quality
W ater Supply 
Availability
Service Delivery 
Outcomes
Ashnak Low Low High Low
Arevadasht Low Low Low Low
Karin High High Low Low
Eghegnavan High High High High
Khachik High High High High
Tsilkar High High High High
P Sevak High High High High
The objective of the ASIF micro-project in Ashnak was to increase water supply by 
replacing the existing open canal with a new pipeline. The contractor used old pipes, 
which were provided by the community as part of the mandatory community 
contribution. These old pipes were narrower than those required by the technical 
specifications of the micro-project. As a result, instead of increasing, water supply in 
Ashnak decreased four times. The amount of water delivered by the new pipeline was 
only sufficient for watering orchards but not the land plots. All of the respondents in 
Ashnak maintained they would have been better-off by keeping the existing canal and 
not initiating the micro-project at all. The village mayor called the micro-project the 
“misfortune of the village”76 (AK-1). A village resident said, “There is no water, this is 
the most important problem, all we need is water, as for the rest - we can manage it” 
(AK- 3). The residents were convinced that the former mayor personally benefited from 
the micro-project funds by ‘making a deal’ with the contractor and letting him use the 
old pipes.
In Arevadasht, the poor quality of the irrigation infrastructure was partially conditioned 
by the drawbacks in the engineering design. The engineering design of the micro­
project specified an obsolete model of pumps with low capacity. During the execution 
of civil works, following a petition by the IA, ASIF changed the initial specifications in
76 The ASIF micro-project was initiated and implemented by his predecessor -  the former mayor of 
Ashnak.
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the design, prescribing a model with higher capacity. The change in the technical 
specifications did not translate in a change in the overall micro-project budget. As this 
change was going to cost more money to the contractor, he purchased and installed a 
pump that was of much lower capacity than the model specified by the new design. As a 
result, the pump station did not function adequately. According to the residents, the 
newly constructed system provided only 100 cubic metres of water instead of the 
planned 250 cubic metres. In addition, the layout of the pipeline prescribed by the 
design proved to be unsuitable. Thus, when the water pressure was strong, there was 
very little water supplied into the system.
In addition, there were a number of problems related to the execution of civil works. 
The contractor used pipes that did not correspond to the technical specifications of the 
micro-project. The technical specifications envisaged that the old pipes provided by the 
community could only be used on a small segment of the whole pipeline. However, the 
contractor used the old pipes for the whole system, after repainting them to make them 
appear as new. The residents in Arevadasht complained about a number of other defects 
related to the lack of care and diligence by the contractor. The roof of the pump station 
was poorly laid, its foundation was not asphalt covered, and the automated switches of 
the pumps were not installed. Similar to Ashnak, residents in Arevadasht suspected that 
their mayor had entered into an illegal deal with the contractor, and purposefully 
ignored many of the construction faults. According to the mayor in Arevadasht, he was 
unable to obligate the contractor to redo some of the poorly executed works, as after 
receiving the final payment, the contractor ‘disappeared’.
During the month of this research, the situation with water supply in Arevadasht 
worsened because of the poor management of the irrigation system by the local mayor. 
Residents in Arevadasht complained about the mismanagement of the local irrigation 
system by the mayor. According to the new state regulation, the community was 
supposed to transfer the management of the local irrigation system to the local District 
Water Committee (DWC). The mayor delayed the transfer of the local pump station to 
the DWC. Most community members thought that the mayor hoped to receive personal 
profit by keeping control over the pump station and intermediating between the 
community and the DWC. As the mayor delayed the transfer, the DWC stopped
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supplying water to the community. The mayor did not explain this situation to the 
residents, and people only made guesses about the reasons for the lack of water.
In Karin, the negative service delivery outcomes were due to the lack of water supply 
from the main source. Between 1998 and 2001, Karin received little water because of 
the severe drought in the country, and the ASIF funded pipeline delivered water to the 
village only on a few occasions. As of June 2002, when the drought was over, the ASIF 
irrigation pipeline still did not deliver water. This time it was conditioned by the 
ineffective management of the village irrigation system by the local mayor. In the 
absence of a WUA, water delivery in Karin was organised and managed by the local 
mayor. The situation here was similar to the one in Arevadasht. The community was 
required to transfer the management of the local irrigation system to the DWC, but the 
mayor intentionally delayed the transfer. His motivation was that in case of the official 
transfer, the community would be required to pay water charges on a regular basis. As 
the collection rate of water charges in the village was extremely low, the mayor was 
convinced that the community would not be able to mobilise the required amount of 
cash in the future. He believed that the inability to pay all the required charges would 
prompt the DWC to cut the water supply of the village. In order to avoid this, the mayor 
made an informal agreement with the DWC to receive water for the community without 
the official transfer of the irrigation system. As of June 2002, the mayor was unable to 
secure water for the community through his informal arrangement with the DWC. Most 
residents themselves were not aware of this situation, and many of them believed that 
water was not supplied because the DWC was unofficially selling it to other villages.
In Karin, in addition to the problem of water supply, there was also a problem of access 
to irrigation water by different residents in the village. The village had two parts: an 
upper part, which consisted of sixty households, mostly ethnic Armenian refugees from 
Azerbaijan, and a lower part, consisting of forty households of indigenous origin. As the 
ASIF funded irrigation system did not function, the residents laid an alternative pipeline 
from the neighbouring village Sasounik. This pipeline, however, only delivered water to 
the lower part because of the low water pressure. Water supply from Sasounik was 
neither regular nor sufficient to meet the needs of the residents in the lower part itself. 
Most residents in the lower part used potable water for watering their land plots. Potable 
water was supplied once in two days for four hours per day. As of June 2002, the upper
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part had not received water (both irrigation and potable) for at least two years. The 
residents in the upper part relied on their neighbours in the lower part in obtaining 
water. When the news about water supply reached the residents in the upper part, they 
hurried to the lower part and filled their buckets from the taps in their neighbours’ 
houses.
In summary, in four of the seven ASIF communities in the sample (Eghegnavan, Tsilkar, 
P Sevak, and Khachik), the micro-projects were successful in reaching their service 
delivery objectives. In three communities (Ashnak, Arevadasht and Karin), the micro­
projects did not deliver benefits as expected. The negative service delivery outcomes in 
Ashnak and Arevadasht were primarily conditioned by the inadequate supervision of 
civil works by the local mayors. In Karin, the system malfunctioned due to the lack of 
water supply, which was initially caused by a severe drought and at a later stage by the 
poor management of the local irrigation system.
8.2 The ASIF Micro-Project Processes
This section analyses the processes of community involvement in the ASIF micro­
project cycle. In particular, it examines the patterns and nature of community 
participation and leadership roles throughout the stages of initiation, identification, 
preparation and implementation of the ASIF micro-project cycle (Figure 8.3). This 
section also examines the nature of community involvement in the IA and the dynamics 
of gender participation throughout the micro-project cycle. In addition, it explores how 
the specific patterns of participation in the implementation of civil works influenced the 
quality of construction and hence the service delivery outcomes of the ASIF micro­
projects.
The examination of micro-project processes allows establishing and explaining the 
impacts of the ASIF micro-projects on community participation and institutional 
capacity. It is assumed that participation and capacity building effects of social funds 
can occur only when community members have genuine involvement in the micro­
project cycle (Hypothesis 1, Chapter Five). In particular, community groups are 
expected to participate in the initiation, identification, preparation and implementation 
of micro-projects. Community members are also envisaged to participate in the co-
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financing of the micro-projects by providing in-kind, cash or labour contribution 
towards the micro-project’s cost. Another theoretical assumption of social funds is that 
positive experience of community interaction during the micro-project cycle is an 
important precondition to building local social capital and increasing local institutional 
capacity (Hypotheses 2 and 5, Chapter Five). This chapter seeks to establish whether 
these assumptions were realised in practice. In particular, it examines whether the ASIF 
micro-projects promoted genuine community participation and positive community 
interaction during the micro-project cycle in the sample communities.
8.2.1 Participation in the Micro-Project Initiation and Identification
ASIF’s operational procedures required beneficiary participation in the micro-project 
initiation and identification. This was to ensure that the micro-projects were demand- 
driven, i.e., that they were selected by the beneficiaries themselves and reflected their 
immediate needs. It is assumed that demand-driven investment choice induces local 
ownership and willingness to participate in the micro-project cycle. The involvement of 
community members in the participatory processes from the very beginning of the 
micro-project is also believed to ensure successful service delivery and capacity 
building outcomes.
The initiation and formulation of the ASIF micro-projects in the studied communities 
belonged to the local mayors. In all of the communities, the local mayors continued 
their active role in the micro-project management throughout the whole micro-project 
cycle. The sources of information of the local mayors about the ASIF micro-projects 
varied (Figure 8.2). In four communities (Khachik, Eghegnavan, Arevadasht and 
Ashnak), the mayors learned about ASIF from the ASIF promotion officers who visited 
the villages to carry out promotion campaign and encouraged them to apply for micro­
project funding. In Tsilkar and Karin, the mayors heard about ASIF from neighbouring 
villages, which had implemented ASIF micro-projects before, and in P Sevak - from the 
marz authorities and applied to ASIF by their own initiative.
The local mayors were the focal point for the ASIF’s promotion campaign in the first 
set of communities. The ASIF promotion officers presented to the local mayors the 
main requirements and operational procedures of ASIF, which they needed to follow to
243
obtain ASIF funding. During these discussions local leaders had an opportunity to 
formulate understanding about the possibilities and conditions for financing 
infrastructure micro-projects in their communities. The promotion officers conducted a 
‘local study’, i.e., they gathered information about the urgent needs in these 
communities and assessed the ability and willingness of the community to come up with 
a micro-project proposal. The promotion officers discussed the existing local problems 
with the local mayors and encouraged them to apply to ASIF for funding.
In all of the communities in the sample, the mayors had an important role in influencing 
the micro-project selection. In the communities that were visited by the promotion 
officers, the prioritisation and identification of the micro-projects was conducted by the 
local mayors already during their preliminary discussions with the ASIF promotion 
officers. In all of these communities, the local mayors had already made the choice of 
the micro-project to be requested before the general community meeting. As the mayor 
of Khachik said, the micro-project was decided after they “sat down and decided 
together with the guys from ASIF about what needs to be done in the village” (K-l). 
Following ASIF’s requirement, the local mayors organised a general community 
meeting in order to select a micro-project. In all of the sample communities except P 
Sevak, general community meetings were held in the presence of at least thirty percent
77of community residents, with almost half of them female. These meetings were 
envisaged as an opportunity for the community members to discuss local problems, 
make a prioritisation of alternative investment options and select a micro-project. 
However, the final choice of the micro-project in all of these communities was largely 
driven by the local mayors. The local mayors influenced the decision-making at the 
community meeting by presenting the option of their own choice as ‘optimal’ and 
advising the residents to support it.
In the three communities, where ASIF did not hold promotion meetings (Tsilkar, Karin 
and P Sevak), the local mayors applied to ASIF directly, with an already formulated 
micro-project proposal (Figure 8.2). The mayor in P Sevak said, “The idea to 
rehabilitate the irrigation system was mine, and I carried it through” (PS-1). In P Sevak,
771 verified the accuracy of community members’ recollections about their participation in the general 
community meeting through my review of ASIF’s records, containing the lists of participants of the 
general community meetings in the sample communities.
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the micro-project started before the application to ASIF. The local mayor in P Sevak 
secured financial support from the Ministry of Agriculture and from the marz 
authorities. This funding, however, was only sufficient for the construction of a small 
segment of the pipeline. In order to continue the micro-project, the village applied to 
ASIF for additional funding. In Karin and Tsilkar too, the mayors heard about the ASIF 
activities and applied to ASIF with a request to finance their irrigation systems. 
Following ASIF’s advice, they conducted formal general community meetings to seek 
the approval of the community residents for their proposals in order to be eligible for 
the micro-project financing. In P Sevak, the micro-project was approved by a 
referendum and not at a general community meeting (this procedure was acceptable by 
ASIF’s operational guidelines). The mayor organised a collection of signatures from 
half of the village population in order to have the micro-project approved by ASIF. The 
residents were not presented with several micro-project options, but were asked to 
support the option chosen and presented by the mayor.
Figure 8.2: Micro-Project Initiation and Identification
Community Source of Information Application
Initiative
Formal Micro-Project 
Identification
Ashnak ASIF promotion ASIF Community meeting
Arevadasht ASIF promotion ASIF Community meeting
Eghegnavan ASIF promotion ASIF Community meeting
Khachik ASIF promotion ASIF Community meeting
P Sevak Marz authorities Community Referendum
Tsilkar Neighbouring villages Community Community meeting
Karin Neighbouring villages Community Community meeting
All respondents perceived their community micro-projects as identified and initiated by 
their local mayors. Even when community members participated in the community 
meetings and voted for a specific micro-project, they largely attributed the merit to their 
mayor who secured the funding from ASIF. Some community members were convinced 
that the mayors managed to secure funding through their connections and influence. For 
example, several respondents in Ashnak thought that the micro-project in their 
community was possible due to the support which their mayor received from his 
acquaintance in the central government. A villager said, “The former mayor brought the 
project... he and his deputy controlled everything in the village... he managed to obtain 
the funding through his contacts in the government...” (AK-4). Another resident in
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Ashnak said, “The ASIF project was brought from above, some people in the 
government helped the village” (AK-9).
The findings of this research have been confirmed by other ASIF assessments 
(Babajanian 2002; 2003), which demonstrate that most ASIF micro-projects were 
initiated and managed by community leaders. The role of different community leaders 
in the ASIF micro-project processes varied according to the type of the micro-project. 
Normally, local mayors were influential in the irrigation and potable water sectors; 
school directors were the initiators of school micro-projects, and policlinic/hospital 
directors were in charge of policlinic/hospital rehabilitation activities. According to 
ASIF’s definition of a community, the whole village was considered to be the 
‘community’ in irrigation and potable water micro-projects, whereas, in school and 
policlinic micro-projects, the ‘community’ was confined to the immediate users and 
staff members of the school and policlinic. Thus it seems natural that local mayors 
usually assumed responsibility for the irrigation and potable water micro-projects, 
where the need for mobilisation of diverse groups on a village-wide scale required 
strong leadership skills and community-wide authority. In those communities, were 
school or policlinic directors were not sufficiently active and effective, the micro­
projects were initiated and managed by the more proactive local mayors.
The key role of local mayors in the micro-project initiation and identification (as well as 
in the micro-project preparation and implementation) processes was conditioned by the 
existing institutional environment in the local communities. As Chapter Seven shows, 
local mayors had a significant discretionary control and influence in their communities. 
Due to their leadership and organisational skills and their influence in local 
communities, local mayors were in the best position to comply with ASIF’s application 
procedures for micro-project identification and preparation.
ASIF’s implementation procedures capitalised on the important role of the local mayors 
in order to gain legitimacy and ensure a successful application process and smooth 
implementation of micro-projects once the funding is granted. Thus, ASIF viewed local 
mayors as key partners within the local communities. As described in Chapter Four, 
during their promotional activities in the local communities, ASIF’s promotion teams 
were supposed to have meetings with community leaders and community members
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representing various groups of ‘stakeholders’ (for example, with informal leaders, 
women, the elderly, refugees, and socially excluded members). In reality, the promotion
7ftteams restricted their communication to local leaders. The ASIF promotion officers 
did not attempt to reach out to diverse groups of local residents and to facilitate greater 
inclusion and participation of community residents in the ASIF micro-project initiation 
and planning activities.
The domination of the local mayors in the micro-project processes effectively implied 
exclusion of ordinary community residents from important decision-making processes. 
The following sections of this chapter show that the key decision-making role of the 
local mayors restricted participation of community members in the IA and in the micro­
project preparation and implementation processes.
Figure 8.3: The Micro-Project Cycle in the Sample Communities
Initiation Identification Preparation Implementation
ASIF promotion 
campaign and local study 
(All).
Reaching preliminary 
agreements with local 
mayors (K, AR, AK, E).
General community 
meeting to select micro­
projects (K, AR, AK, E, 
KN).
Referendum to select the 
micro-project (PS).
Obtaining formal permits 
(All).
Securing O&M 
commitments and 
preparing Sustainability 
Plans (All).
Organising bidding 
and selecting 
contractors (All).
Monitoring the 
progress and quality 
of civil works(All).
Community itself 
initiates micro-projects 
(PS, TS, KN).
Establishing IAs at 
community meetings 
(All).
Mobilising community 
contribution from 
community residents, 
local govt budget (E) or 
from external donors 
(KN).
Preparing description of 
works and tentative 
budgets with the micro­
project estimated costs 
(All).
Completing the 
application package and 
submitting the micro­
project proposal (All).
Negotiating with the 
contractor and liaising 
with ASIF (All).
Verifying the state of 
completed works and 
approving statements 
of accomplished 
works (SAW) (All).
Submitting a Request 
for Payment to ASIF 
(All).
Certifying satisfactory 
completion o f work 
by contractors (All).
Signing hand-over 
agreements 
(provisional and final) 
(All).______________
78 After establishing through the local study and their discussions with local mayors that investments were 
needed for the school or policlinic rehabilitation, ASIF promotion officers usually continued negotiations 
with the school or policlinic directors.
247
8.2.2 Demand Orientation of Micro-Projects
As it was shown above, the micro-project initiation and identification processes were 
dominated by the local mayors. At the same time, the micro-projects in all of the sample 
communities were demand-driven. Thus, the choice of the micro-projects reflected the 
most immediate needs of community members, and it was acceptable for the absolute 
majority of residents present at the general community meeting. The local mayors 
themselves were residents of their villages and closely interacted with other villagers on 
a daily basis, and hence they were well aware of the priority problems in their 
communities. All respondents reported that the selected micro-project was important for 
their community.
ASIF’s operational features did not adequately ensure the expression of a ‘true’ 
community demand. ASIF used a ‘closed menu’ approach, which restricted the types of 
micro-projects it could support. This constrained the choices of community members, 
who adjusted their ‘demand’ according to the available funding options. The investment 
options of ASIF were further limited by funding constraints. ASIF was unable to 
support complex construction projects that required significant monetary investments 
exceeding the set micro-project cost threshold of USD150,000. Also, as the funding 
allocated for specific regions decreased over time, ASIF was often unable to support 
costly micro-projects, even if they were below the required threshold (for example, 
above USD50,000). As a result, an important role in the community’s choice of the 
micro-projects was played by pragmatic considerations. When initiating micro-projects, 
local mayors were guided by ‘realistic’ objectives and proposed micro-projects that 
were more likely to be supported by ASIF because of logistical and financial 
considerations. For example, the mayor in Karin did not apply for the rehabilitation of 
the village road, a priority that was equally important for the community. As a road 
rehabilitation micro-project would have required more funding, the mayor feared that 
ASIF could reject their request. Instead, he decided to apply for the irrigation micro­
project, which was more feasible to implement, as it required less funding and hence 
was more likely to be selected by ASIF. Thus whilst proposing a ‘feasible’ micro­
project, local communities may not choose their top priority area. The ASIF’s case 
confirms findings from other social funds showing that social funds can often restrict 
local demand (discussed in section 3.2.2 of Chapter Three).
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It is thought that the demand-driven nature of community based projects can produce 
inequitable representation of needs of various groups (Schmidt and Marc 1995: 6; 
Tendler 1999: 117). Chapter Two maintains that communities are typically composed of 
various groups with different needs and preferences, and reconciling their needs and 
preferences in development projects can often be a challenging task. This was also true 
in the case of ASIF micro-projects. Community members in the sample communities 
had the opportunity to discuss various micro-project options and express their 
viewpoints and felt needs during the identification process. ASIF’s operational 
guidelines, however, considered the approval by the majority of residents as sufficient 
for providing micro-project funding. The preferences of the majority, however, may not 
be those of the minority. Even in the case of democratic prioritisation, the majority 
demand may not be the minority welfare preference. Hence there could be individuals 
whose needs and preferences may not be represented through the demand-driven 
mechanism. ASIF’s operational guidelines did not offer institutional mechanisms to 
accommodate the needs and preferences of minority residents. This is how the school 
director in Ashnak describes the micro-project identification process in her village: “I 
remember the community meeting for the ASIF micro-project. It was clear that they 
wanted to have the irrigation approved. I wanted to raise all the problems with the 
school, but I realised that irrigation was priority as well, so I didn’t. The village dreamt 
of that pipeline. And they [the local mayor] presented so as if irrigation was the most 
important. Then I thought, we’d better get a project done, it is better than nothing” (AK- 
10). Thus ASIF’s demand-driven mechanism was not sufficiently adaptable to reflect 
and reconcile the diversity of interests and preferences in beneficiary communities.
8.2.3 Participation in the Implementing Agency (IA)
As part of its participation and capacity building objective, ASIF required establishment 
of an informal community-based entity -  the Implementing Agency (IA). The IA was 
designed to provide a space for community participation in the micro-project 
preparation, implementation and management on behalf of the beneficiary community. 
It was envisaged that after the micro-project completion, I As would remain as 
institutional structures and serve as vehicles for further community activities.
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In all sample communities, the IAs were elected by the majority of community residents 
during the general community meeting (Figure 8.4). In P Sevak, where the micro­
project was selected through a referendum, a community meeting was summoned to 
elect an IA. The IAs were composed of four members, except Karin, where the local 
mayor was the only IA member. IA members in the sample communities included a 
local government accountant or finance specialist, an engineer or a person who had 
some understanding of construction, and one or two ordinary community residents who 
were chosen because of their personal qualities and popularity among villagers. 
Following ASIF’s requirement, all of the IAs (except Karin) had one female member, 
who was a member of the local government staff (accountant or secretary).
Figure 8.4: Form al Involvement o f  Local M ayors in the IA s
Community IA Head Established Number of IA 
Members
Ashnak Local mayor Community meeting 4
Arevadasht Local mayor Community meeting 4
P Sevak Local mayor Community meeting 4
Karin Local mayor Community meeting 1
Tsilkar Deputy local mayor Community meeting 4
Khachik Local mayor (initially) 
Community resident*
Community meeting 
♦Appointed by mayor
4
Eghegnavan Community resident Community meeting 4
The IAs in all of the communities were dominated by the local mayors (Figure 8.4). In 
Ashnak, Arevadasht, P Sevak and Karin, the local mayors were also the IA heads. In 
Karin, the local mayor was the only IA member. In Tsilkar, Khachik and Eghegnavan, 
where the local mayors were not the formal IA heads, they were still influential in 
managing the IA work and micro-project processes. In Tsilkar, the IA head was the 
deputy village mayor, who immediately reported to the mayor on the micro-project 
management progress. In Khachik, the local mayor was initially selected as the LA head, 
but he later resigned and became local supervisor for the micro-project. The mayor 
designated a community member (engineer) to replace him as the IA head. The newly 
elected IA head had very little involvement in the micro-project, and the local mayor 
continued to be in charge of the micro-project management. In Eghegnavan, the IA head 
was a community resident who did not have any formal authority or leadership skills. In 
reality, all of the important micro-project management functions were performed by the
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local mayor. The IA head did not take part in the micro-project supervision or 
organisation of micro-project activities. As he said, his “main function was to sign the 
statements of accomplished works” (E-3). The IA head was not even aware that the 
micro-project contractor was hired through competitive bidding, and he was convinced 
that the contractor was “brought by the mayor” (E-3).
After the micro-project identification, the local mayors continued playing a key role 
throughout the preparation and implementation stages of the micro-project cycle. 
During the preparation stage, they obtained formal permits necessary to initiate 
construction works, prepared sustainability plans, mobilised community contribution 
from community residents and from external donors (Karin), and prepared and 
submitted micro-project proposals to ASIF. The local mayors took a lead in the micro­
project implementation, which included monitoring of civil works, negotiating with 
contractors, certifying completion of works and liaising with ASIF.
As the local mayors dominated the micro-project preparation and implementation 
processes, the role of the elected IA members throughout the micro-project cycle was 
limited. The local mayors were reluctant to delegate significant discretionary authority 
and responsibilities to the IA members. The mayor in Eghegnavan said, “To be honest, 
the IA is useless, and it only adds extra logistical effort” (E-l). The IAs mostly carried 
out monitoring during the micro-project execution and other logistical tasks assigned by 
the IA heads. There was no clear division of functions and responsibilities among the IA 
members. The IA members rarely came up with their own initiatives or attempted to 
influence the micro-project management processes. So little was their involvement, that 
the local mayors in Khachik and P Sevak had difficulty remembering the names of the 
IA members. In Ashnak, the mayor called the IA “fictitious” (AK-1).
Most IA members acknowledged that their role in the micro-project was rather formal 
and limited. As the IA members associated the micro-project preparation and 
management with the local mayors, they saw the establishment of the IA as a formality 
meant to satisfy ASIF’s requirement. They did not view the IA as a vehicle through 
which they could represent community interests and preferences and influence micro­
project processes on behalf of the community residents. Most of the IA members were 
farmers who were already overwhelmed by their everyday work and quest for survival,
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and they did not have much time or energy to invest in the micro-project preparation 
and management. ASIF did not provide any special training and capacity building to the 
IA members in order to enable them to take a more pro-active role in the micro-project 
processes and enhance their capacity for successful micro-project preparation and 
management (Box 10.1; more discussion follows in section 10.2.6 of Chapter Ten).
The respondents of this study were convinced that participation of their local mayor in 
the micro-project was crucial for its success. According to the respondents, the 
leadership and organisational skills, formal authority and informal connections of their 
local mayors allowed them to effectively solve problems related to the micro-project 
preparation and management. In particular, the local mayors managed to quickly obtain 
construction permits and speed up the paperwork, mobilise the required community 
contribution and effectively negotiate with ASIF and contractors. Even though the IAs 
were elected by the community residents during the general community meetings, most 
respondents did not view the IAs as institutions acting on their behalf and representing 
their interests. As local mayors performed most of the important micro-project 
management functions, community residents identified the IA in their community with 
the mayor who secured and managed the micro-project.
8.2.4 Participation in the Micro-Project Implementation
As discussed in section 3.2.1 of Chapter Three, the direct involvement of ordinary 
community residents (non-IA members) in social fund micro-projects becomes more 
limited after the identification stage, when a group of community representatives - the 
IA - is selected to represent and act on behalf of the beneficiary community. The IA 
takes up most of the micro-project implementation management tasks, hence limiting 
the role of the members of the greater community. In the ASIF micro-projects, the IAs 
were formally responsible for the micro-project preparation and implementation. Hence 
whilst the majority of community members took part in the identification meeting, the 
number of residents involved in the implementation processes was expected to decrease.
Nevertheless, as discussed in section 4.2.2 of Chapter Four, ASIF’s design features 
presupposed that community members (non-IA) would continue their participation onto 
the micro-project implementation stage. In particular, community members were
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expected to provide support to the IA in the execution and supervision of the micro­
project. It was also expected that community members would exact accountability from 
the IA, the local government officials and the contractors. The involvement of 
community members in the micro-project processes was thought to be achieved through 
information dissemination and regular community-wide consultation meetings. ASIF 
stipulated the IAs to provide systematic information to the community on the progress 
of the micro-projects and the allocation of the micro-project funding. In order to do that, 
the IAs were required to assemble a community meeting for at least once a month and 
maintain a public board with announcements and important micro-project documents in 
the community. This was believed to help establish institutional channels for 
community residents to participate in the implementation processes and convey their 
voice to the local leaders and LA members.
In all of the sample communities, the involvement of ordinary community residents in 
the micro-project implementation phase was limited (Figure 8.5). The respondents 
believed that the micro-project implementation processes were managed either by their 
mayors, or by the ASIF supervisors. A villager in Ashnak said, “It was all done and 
controlled by the mayor” (AK-4). In Khachik, the residents said that the micro-project 
was managed and controlled by “them” [local leaders and ASIF]. The response in P 
Sevak was that “it was the mayor’s office that dealt with the micro-project”. A 
respondent in Arevadasht said, “We would not know about the micro-project... it was 
all their own kitchen” (AIM).
The local mayors did not attempt to involve community members in the micro-project 
management and decision-making processes. In none of the beneficiary communities, 
did the local mayors make a conscious effort to inform community members about the 
progress of civil works and financial status of the micro-projects. Despite ASIF’s 
requirement, the local mayors did not organise consultation and information meetings to 
inform community residents, or post micro-project documents in public areas. The 
mayors assumed that as the community members were receiving information about the 
micro-projects through informal channels, formalising information sharing was 
unnecessary.
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Participation of community members was limited to the contribution of labour, 
materials and/or cash, and occasional support to the IA in the monitoring of civil works 
and its everyday logistical tasks. Community members rarely interfered in the micro­
project processes, and mostly relied on the mayor to manage the processes and make 
important decisions. They did not inquire how the micro-project funding was spent and 
whether the resources were spent efficiently. The residents did not ask the IA members 
and local mayors to demonstrate micro-project related administrative and financial 
paperwork. The respondents saw the requirements about community participation as a 
“formality”, as they perceived the micro-project management as the responsibility of the 
mayor’s office. The mayor in P Sevak said, “The community was of course interested in 
the outcome and progress [of the micro-project], but they did not interfere as they 
considered that the mayor was dealing with it” (PS-1).
In all communities, there were community members who helped the IA as volunteers 
during the execution of civil works. For example, community members in P Sevak 
provided the labourers with free housing, food and drink; in Khachik, the local engineer 
shared his knowledge of the local terrain with the contractors; and in Arevadasht, a local 
resident worked as a night guard at the construction site. In P Sevak and Tsilkar, 5-7 
community members worked as volunteers on the construction, as part of the 
community contribution requirement. There were 2-3 community members in each 
village who inquired about the micro-project processes and outcomes by visiting the 
micro-project sites and monitoring the course of civil works, conversing with 
contractors and the IA members.
In Eghegnavan, Arevadasht and Ashnak, a number of residents took part in the 
execution of civil works on a paid basis (as unskilled labourers). In Ashnak, the 
residents were happy that they had a chance to take part in the civil works. Although 
their remuneration was very low, and the construction works lasted only for four 
months, their participation provided important short-term material support to their 
households. In Arevadasht, participation in civil works proved to be a negative 
experience. Community members complained that they were cheated by the contractor. 
The villagers worked very hard to earn some money; however, the contractor 
disappeared without paying them their salaries. The respondents said that they had 
given up any hope that they would ever receive their wages. The contractor also
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borrowed construction materials from the villagers and never paid for them. This 
seriously undermined their faith in the credibility of ASIF and the local mayor, who was 
unable to hold the contractor accountable.
All of the respondents were aware of the ASIF micro-projects in their communities. 
Community residents were interested in the progress and final outcome of the micro­
projects. They received information about the micro-projects through informal contact 
with the local mayor, the IA members, the contractor and community residents. The 
residents who were involved in the monitoring or in the execution of civil works also 
disseminated information to the rest of the community. The information available to the 
community was often inadequate. People were left to guess as what happened to the 
micro-project funds. Often they had serious suspicions that the funds were 
misappropriated. A villager in Ashnak said, “We did not have much information about 
the micro-project... the mayor did it himself... we don’t know what they stole, and 
what kind of dark deals they made” (AK-9). The residents in Arevadasht were in doubt 
whether the money that they had contributed was actually used for the micro-project 
needs.
The attempt by the community members in Arevadasht to exercise voice and demand 
accountability failed to achieve any effect. The problems with the construction works in 
Arevadasht - described earlier in this chapter - became apparent already during the 
execution phase. A community member conveyed his dissatisfaction about the micro- 
project works to the IA and the contractor. He was one of the labourers involved in the 
construction works, and hence was well aware of the existing problems. The resident 
submitted two petitions to ASIF, a letter to the marzpetaran and a letter to the Ministry 
of Agriculture. In these letters, he suggested that the construction works were not held 
in accordance to the standard technical requirements and the micro-project 
specifications. A special committee from the marz visited the village in response to the 
letters, and after investigating the situation concluded that his assumptions were not 
justified. According to the respondents, the contractor in Arevadasht boasted that he 
could do “whatever he wished” and that the residents were not in a position to hold him 
accountable. The inaction of the authorities further reinforced the general sense of 
powerlessness that prevailed in the village.
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Figure 8.5: Forms and Nature of Participation in the Micro-Project Cycle
Social Funds Assumptions Evidence from Sample Communities
Community identifies a micro-project 
that reflects its immediate priority 
demand.
Local mayors were instrumental in making the micro­
project selection. The micro-projects reflected 
community priorities.
Community members elect the IA. Community members elected the IAs. The IAs in all 
communities were dominated by local mayors.
Community provides in­
kind/cash/labour contribution.
Community contribution was provided by residents in 
all communities, except Eghegnavan and Karin.
The IA is delegated with the tasks of 
micro-project preparation and 
implementation.
Local mayors continued played dominant role 
throughout the preparation and implementation stages 
of the micro-project cycle.
Ordinary community residents 
effectively participate in the micro­
project preparation and 
implementation.
Participation of community residents was limited to the 
provision of community contribution and physical 
involvement in the execution of civil works 
(paid/unpaid labour and occasional support to IA).
Community participates in decision­
making processes.
Most decisions about the micro-project management 
and resource allocations were made by local mayors. 
Both the IA and ordinary residents were excluded from 
decision-making processes.
Community members hold the IA, 
local leaders and contractors 
accountable.
The LA is required to regularly consult 
community residents (non-IA) and 
report on micro-project progress and 
financial status.
The experience of community’s 
interaction during the micro-project 
cycle.
Residents in most communities did not attempt to exact 
accountability from the IA, local leaders and 
contractors accountable. In Arevadasht, the attempt by 
residents to intervene in the micro-project processes 
and demand accountability failed.
The LA did not regularly consult community residents 
(non-IA) and report on micro-project progress and 
financial status.
The experience of community interaction in Ashnak 
and Arevadasht was negative, as it revealed the lack of 
accountability of the local mayor, and reinforced the 
sense of powerlessness o f local residents.
8.2.5 Gender Aspects of Participation
One of the objectives of ASIF was to increase participation of women in development 
activities in Armenia. ASIF‘s operational procedures required female participation in 
the micro-projects. Thus, the micro-project appraisal criteria required that women 
participated in the identification of the micro-projects and in the selection of the I A.
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ASIF also stipulated that every IA included female representatives. These measures 
were thought to increase the role of women in decision-making within their 
communities (World Bank 1995: 94). ASIF monitored women’s participation through 
quantitative indicators, which included the percentage of women participating in the 
general community meeting and the number of female IA members.
In all of the communities in the sample, women were involved in the general 
community meetings and took part in the micro-project identification and the IA 
selection (Figure 8.6). As mentioned earlier, all of the IAs (except Karin) had female 
representatives. The role of women selected as IA members in the irrigation micro­
projects was mainly formal. Female members of the IAs perceived their roles as formal 
and did not attempt to use their position to participate in the decision-making processes.
The limited role of women was conditioned by the dominant role of the local mayors in 
the micro-project processes. As described earlier in this chapter, the local mayors 
excluded both male and female community members from the micro-project decision­
making and management.
In addition, participation of women in the micro-project cycle reflected the traditional 
norms of the Armenian society. As described in section 7.5.4 of Chapter Seven, rural 
communities in post-Soviet Armenia have maintained patriarchal gender relationships 
and the traditional division of labour between men and women. As irrigation is 
considered a ‘male’ domain, the main responsibility for the implementation of irrigation 
micro-projects was carried out by men. It was mostly men who were involved in 
volunteer work, monitoring and information dissemination. All of the female 
respondents said that it was the men’s responsibility to deal with the micro-project.
Despite their limited involvement in the irrigation micro-projects, women were equally 
interested in the micro-project progress and outcomes. Many female respondents had 
good knowledge of the key micro-project related issues and problems. They mostly 
received information about the micro-project activities from male household members, 
neighbours and other community members.
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Other ASIF assessments (Babajanian 2002; 2003) show that women were much more 
active in the ASIF micro-projects in ‘softer’ sectors, such as education and health 
(Figure 8.6). In fact, many IA heads and most of the IA members in the ASIF school 
and health clinic micro-projects were female. Female respondents in the sample 
communities of this study had much greater awareness than men about local education 
and health services in their communities.
Figure 8.6: Participation o f  Women in the Micro-Projects
Irrigation and Potable 
W ater Sectors
School and Health 
Sectors
General community meeting Present Present
Representation in the IA Passive Active
Micro-project cycle Passive Active
8.2.6 Involvement in Community Contribution
ASIF’s operating procedures required beneficiary communities to provide mandatory 
cash, in-kind or labour contribution of ten percent of the micro-project cost. This was 
thought to ensure that the micro-projects were truly demand-driven, and that the 
community had a stake in the investment choice. Community contribution was also 
thought to engender a sense of ownership over the micro-projects, contribute to 
successful micro-project and service delivery outcomes and motivate community 
members to participate in the O&M of the newly constructed facilities.
All of the sample communities provided the required contribution of ten percent of the 
total micro-project cost (Figure 8.7). The contribution was provided by the local 
residents in cash (Arevadasht, Khachik and Tsilkar), in-kind (Arevadasht, Ashnak, 
Khachik, and P Sevak), and in the form of voluntary labour (P Sevak and Tsilkar). The 
contribution in the refugee populated Karin was provided on behalf of the community 
by the UNHCR. The contribution in Eghegnavan was funded from the local government 
budget. Community contribution in cash and materials was mobilised by the local 
mayors and collected by the IA members. Usually, all households were asked to 
contribute as much as they could afford and were willing to. The amount of cash that
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people contributed varied, and it usually depended on the level of the household’s 
income. In Khachik, the amount of contribution was determined by the local mayor, in 
proportion to the size of the land holding of the residents. In-kind contribution included 
provision of pipes and pumps that there were left in the communities from Soviet times. 
In all of the communities, the poorest households were exempt. The community leaders 
did not apply any fines or other penalty measures to those households who did not 
contribute.
Most residents were willing to contribute in order to have their essential infrastructure 
rehabilitated and services restored. In all of the villages in the sample, community 
residents also contributed money, labour and/or materials for other development 
projects that were carried out in their communities before and after the ASIF micro­
projects. Due to the high levels of material deprivation, most respondents found it 
extremely difficult to make contributions in cash. They preferred labour contribution, 
but they said they would be willing to pay cash, provided they had the needed resources. 
All of the mayors were confident that community residents would be willing to provide 
contribution for a second ASIF micro-project. The residents in Arevadasht said they 
would be reluctant to provide a contribution in the future. As the ASIF micro-project 
here did not deliver the expected benefits and the micro-project funds were not handled 
in a transparent manner, the residents doubted that the money they had contributed was 
used towards the micro-project needs.
In Ashnak, Arevadasht and Khachik, the in-kind community contribution had a direct 
negative impact on the service delivery outcomes. In Ashnak and Arevadasht, the 
residents contributed pipes that were available in their communities from Soviet times. 
These pipes were of substandard quality and did not match the micro-project technical 
specifications of the micro-projects. In Khachik, the community provided a drawing 
(engineering design) of the local irrigation network that it had obtained long before the 
micro-project initiation. The drawing had serious technical flaws and caused problems 
during the execution of civil works. It is doubtful whether in-kind contribution could 
directly engender a sense of ownership within these communities. In-kind contribution 
did not have a cost to beneficiaries as residents mostly contributed materials that they 
had found in storages or removed from non-functioning parts of old systems.
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This research did not establish a link between the community contribution and the level 
of sustainability of the rehabilitated infrastructure. Community contribution in Karin 
and Eghegnavan was not provided by the residents themselves. The provision of the 
contribution by an external donor in Karin and by the local government in Eghegnavan 
on behalf of the community enabled these communities to undertake the micro-projects. 
This, however, undermined the significance of ASIF’s participatory operating 
procedures designed to promote involvement of community residents in the micro­
project processes. At the same time, the fact that residents did not provide the 
contribution themselves did not have any observable adverse effect on the extent of 
local ownership and O&M arrangements in those communities. Residents in all sample 
communities contributed money and voluntary labour towards the O&M of the newly 
rehabilitated facilities. It was difficult to establish any link between community 
contribution and the level of the O&M in the communities, where the residents 
themselves provided contribution in cash or labour. More detailed discussion on the 
existing O&M arrangements will follow in Chapter Nine.
Figure 8.7: The A m ount, Form, Source and Im pact o f  Community Contribution
Community Amount Form Source Impact
Ashnak 11% In-kind* Community members ♦Negative service 
delivery outcomes
Paruyr Sevak 11% In-kind
Voluntary labour
Community members No observable impact
Eghegnavan 10% Cash Local government* ♦ASIF’s participatory 
procedure not fulfilled
Khachik 21% In-kind*
Cash
Community members ♦Problems in the 
execution of civil works
Karin 9% Cash UNHCR* ♦ASIF’s participatory 
procedure not fulfilled
Tsilkar 12% Cash
Voluntary labour
Community members No observable impact
Arevadasht 10% In-kind*
Cash
Community members ♦Negative service 
delivery outcomes
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8.2.7 Contractor Selection
According to ASIF’s operational guidelines, beneficiary communities themselves were 
responsible for the contractor selection. However, the procedure of contractor selection 
through competitive bidding was quite complex, and in order to speed up micro-project 
implementation, the ASIF staff played a dominant role in the preparation and 
organisation of bidding for building contracts. The IA heads disseminated bidding 
packages prepared by ASIF and registered the applicants. ASIF made bidding 
announcements in the regional media and disseminated information through the 
regional governor’s office. The IAs were given printed advertisements to disseminate 
within the community and its neighbouring areas. ASIF organised pre-bidding 
consultations with contractors in order to explain to them ASIF’s requirements and 
procedures. The actual bidding and analysis of bids were conducted by the ASIF staff in 
the presence of the IA heads. In some communities (Khachik, P Sevak and Tsilkar), a 
number of community members were present at the actual bidding.
Most IA heads and IA members in the sample communities were aware of the 
requirements for competitive bidding and procedures for contractor selection. In all 
communities, except Arevadasht, beneficiaries perceived the selection of contractors as 
fair. The respondents in Arevadasht maintained that the choice of the contractor was not 
fair and that it was externally driven. They claimed that the winning company won the 
bid only because it was supported by a senior government official. Many residents were 
not sure whether there was any bidding held in the village. In Eghegnavan, the IA head 
was not well aware of the contracting procedure and thought the contractor “was 
brought by the mayor” (E-3).
8.2.8 Supervision and the Quality of Works
The IAs were responsible for the supervision of the micro-project implementation 
progress and the quality of civil works. The key aspect of supervision was to monitor 
whether the contractors abided by the Construction Norms and Standards set by the 
Armenian government and reflected in the technical specifications of the micro- 
projects, and whether the civil works were executed according to the approved design, 
time-frame and technical specifications of the micro-projects. As mentioned in Chapter
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Four, the IAs were able to ensure the contractor’s compliance thanks to their authority 
to certify accomplished works and approve instalment payments to the contractor. The 
IA also had the right to fine the contractor for not complying with the contract. A 
representative of the LA was required to take part in the Hand-over Committee to certify 
satisfactory completion of construction works.
The local mayors played the most active role in the supervision of civil works in the 
sample communities. Their functions included regular monitoring of the progress and 
quality of civil works, dealing with the contractor and liaising with ASIF with regard to 
problems occurring during construction. The IA members regularly monitored the 
course of civil works and reported to the local mayors.
The ASIF supervisors also had an important role in the micro-project supervision. They 
made the final approval of payments to the contractor and hence had the authority to 
exert leverage on the contractors as needed. The ASIF supervisors regularly visited the 
construction sites, discussed the progress of works with the contractors and IAs and 
were available to discuss issues and problems arising during micro-project 
implementation. The IA members could also visit the ASIF office in Yerevan to discuss 
and clarify issues and ask for support.
Effective supervision had an immediate positive effect on the quality of civil works. As 
described in section 8.1 of this chapter, in the communities with developmental leaders, 
who exercised sufficient control and managed to hold the contractors accountable, the 
quality of civil works was generally good (Khachik, Eghegnavan, P Sevak, Karin, and 
Tsilkar). At the same time, the lack of rigorous and consistent supervision of the micro­
projects resulted in the poor quality of civil works and poorly functioning irrigation 
systems in communities with predatory leaders (Ashnak and Arevadasht). The analysis 
of the fieldwork data allows drawing several factors that determined the extent of the 
effectiveness of micro-project supervision by the local mayors (Box 8.1).
Firstly, the effectiveness of supervision depended on the experience, leadership skills 
and personality of the local mayors. The mayors in Khachik and Eghegnavan were 
effective in managing the execution of civil works and demanded the contractor to 
deliver adequate quality of works. The mayor in P Sevak felt that he had been given
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sufficient power to make the contractor accountable, “When the community is 
responsible for and signs under the project, it changes a lot of things... the community’s 
involvement makes the contractor more accountable and more dependent, and the result 
more effective” (PS-1). On the contrary, the mayor in Arevadasht was not an effectual 
leader and did not manage to organise regular and rigorous supervision of civil works. 
As there was no adequate supervision, the contractors did not conduct works with 
appropriate honesty, diligence and care.
Secondly, the effectiveness of supervision depended on the extent to which the local 
mayors were accountable to their communities and transparent in handling micro­
project funds. In communities with predatory leaders (Arevadasht and Ashnak), the 
contractors were able to use materials and equipment of sub-standard quality, which did 
not correspond to the technical specifications of the micro-projects. The mayors were 
aware of these problems, but did not require the contractors to improve the quality of 
works. In order to ensure the contractors’ compliance they could refuse to authorise 
payments and to sign off ‘the completion of works’ certificates. As mentioned in section
8.1.2 of this chapter, the residents in these communities thought that their mayors 
intended to benefit from the micro-project funds and “closed their eyes” to many 
technical faults. The villagers alleged that the mayors had an informal deal with the 
contractor and pocketed the money saved from using cheap materials and equipment. 
The mayor in Ashnak said, “We don’t know why they [the former mayor] did this, they 
probably had their own guys as contractors, and they split some money over this deal” 
(AK-1). It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which the allegations of the community 
members were substantiated. Nevertheless, such perceptions are indicative of deep 
mistrust between the local leaders and ordinary residents, caused by the weak channels 
of accountability within these communities.
Thirdly, as community members had limited involvement in the decision-making 
processes during micro-project implementation, they were not able to exercise effective 
supervision and to influence the course of construction works. Residents in Arevadasht 
and Ashnak did not have sufficient power to demand transparency and accountability 
from their leaders in managing micro-project funds and to exert leverage on the 
contractors to deliver better quality of works. As described earlier in this section, the 
attempt by the community members in Arevadasht to exercise voice and demand
263
accountability failed to achieve any effect. The mismanagement of the micro-project 
funds and the poor service delivery outcomes had a negative impact on the local social 
and interpersonal relations in these communities (more detailed discussion follows in 
section 9.1 of Chapter Nine).
Fourthly, the effectiveness of ASIF’s supervision significantly affected the quality of 
civil works. The respondents in communities with positive service delivery outcomes 
mentioned that due to ASIF’s effective supervision many problems appearing during 
construction were eliminated. The ASIF engineers were able to observe technical faults, 
which the IA members with their lack of appropriate technical knowledge had 
overlooked. At the same time, the ASIF engineers in Ashnak and Arevadasht did not 
exercise rigorous supervision. ASIF did not have any follow-up procedures to monitor 
the situation and undertake action in the micro-projects communities, where the 
contractors still had pending obligations.
B o x  8.1: Factors A ffecting the Effectiveness o f  Com munity's Supervision
> The level of experience, leadership skills and personality of local mayors.
>  The extent to which local leaders are accountable to their communities and transparent in 
handling micro-project funds
>  The ability of community members to participate in decision-making processes and hold 
their leaders and contractors accountable.
>  The effectiveness of the ASIF engineers and ‘local supervisors’ in exercising supervision.
Finally, the local supervisors, whom ASIF hired to monitor the execution of civil works, 
were not effective. ‘Local supervisors’ were independent experts, who were required to 
ensure everyday presence at the construction sites and carry out impartial monitoring of 
civil works and the performance of the IAs and the ASIF supervisors. The local 
supervisors in all of the sample communities did not seem to be effective in their 
supervision. Most community members were not clear about their status and referred to 
them as the “ASIF’s person”. In Khachik, the local mayor himself served as a local 
supervisor. In Arevadasht, residents were convinced that the local supervisor was the 
“mayor’s person”, as he had never flagged any problem issues and had always reassured 
local residents that the micro-project was on the ‘right’ track.
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8.3 Conclusions
The findings of this chapter are important for understanding the impacts of the ASIF 
micro-project presented in Chapter Nine. According to the theory-based evaluation 
method, in order for a project to achieve the desired outcomes, a specific phased 
sequence of causes and effects envisaged by the assumptions underpinning the project 
should hold. This chapter sought to establish whether the theoretical assumptions 
behind the ASIF project were realised in practice. In particular, the chapter examined 
whether ASIF promoted genuine community participation, successful service delivery 
outcomes and positive experience of community interaction in the sample communities 
(Figure 8.5). According to the main assumptions underpinning social fund projects, 
these conditions are important for increasing the probability of future community 
activities and community participation.
This chapter showed that the ASIF interventions did not alter the existing local 
institutions, which determined the existing forms and nature of participation and 
problem-solving mechanisms in the sample communities. The existing local institutions 
themselves determined the processes and service delivery outcomes of the ASIF micro­
projects. In all of the sample communities, the local mayors took the lead in the 
initiation, identification, preparation and implementation of the ASIF micro-projects. As 
Chapter Seven shows, the local mayors had significant discretionary control and 
influence in their communities. Due to their position of authority and their leadership 
and organisational skills, they naturally assumed a central role in the micro-project 
cycle. ASIF’s implementation procedures capitalised on the important role of the local 
mayors in order to gain legitimacy and ensure successful micro-project outcomes.
This dominant role of the local mayors in the micro-project processes reinforced rather 
than challenged the existing power structures in the local communities. Local mayors 
did not involve community members in the micro-project management and decision­
making processes. The mayors did not view the micro-project identification and 
implementation processes as an opportunity to build community capacity and empower 
community residents. Instead, they quite pragmatically ‘used’ the ASIF micro-projects 
as a means to obtain funding for the rehabilitation of local infrastructure. The IAs were
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established for satisfying ASIF’s formal requirement and were mostly driven by the 
local mayors. Community residents, who were elected as members of the IAs, had 
limited discretionary power and perceived their role in the micro-project processes only 
as formality. Participation of community residents (non-IA) in the micro-projects was 
restricted in its scope and nature and was limited to the contribution of labour, materials 
and cash, occasional monitoring of civil works and small logistical tasks. Community 
residents had limited opportunities to influence important decision-making and demand 
accountability and transparency from the local mayors and contractors. At the same 
time, despite the fact that the micro-project processes were dominated by the local 
mayors, the choice of the micro-projects was demand-driven and reflected the most 
immediate needs of community members.
This chapter discussed the micro-project service delivery outcomes in the sample 
communities. It demonstrated that the ASIF micro-projects resulted in both positive and 
negative service delivery outcomes. The service delivery outcomes were positive in the 
communities with developmental leaders. In four of the seven ASIF communities 
(Eghegnavan, Tsilkar, P Sevak, and Khachik), the micro-projects were successful in 
reaching their service delivery objectives. In three communities (Karin, Ashnak, and 
Arevadasht), the micro-projects did not deliver benefits as expected. In Karin, this was 
due to the lack of water supply from the main source. The poor service delivery 
outcomes in Ashnak and Arevadasht were primarily conditioned by the inadequate 
supervision of civil works by the local mayors. Both Ashnak and Arevadasht had 
predatory leaders, who were not accountable and transparent in managing the micro­
project funds.
The experience of community interaction in the communities with predatory leaders 
proved to be negative. Community members in Ashnak and Arevadasht suspected that 
the local mayors had entered into an illegal deal with the contractors, and purposefully 
ignored many of the construction faults. The residents, however, did not have sufficient 
power to demand transparency and accountability from their leaders in managing micro­
project funds and to exert leverage on the contractors to deliver better quality of works. 
The attempt by the community members in Arevadasht to exercise voice and demand 
accountability failed to achieve any effect. The information available to the community 
members during the micro-project cycle was often inadequate, and people were left to
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guess as what happened to the micro-project funds. Community members in Arevadasht 
doubted that the money they had contributed was used towards the micro-project needs. 
In addition, participation in civil works in Arevadasht proved to be a negative 
experience. Community members who took part in civil works as paid labourers were 
not paid their salaries by the contractor.
The next chapter, Chapter Nine, analyses the impact of the ASIF micro-projects on 
community participation and institutional capacity building in the sample communities. 
It uses the analysis of micro-project processes and service delivery outcomes presented 
in this chapter to explain and interpret the specific impacts of the ASIF micro-projects.
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Chapter Nine. ASIF’s Impact on Community Participation and Local Institutional 
Capacity in Rural Armenia
This chapter discusses the impact of the ASIF micro-projects on community 
participation and local institutional capacity in the sample communities. The chapter 
comprises six sections. The first three sections examine the impact of the ASIF micro­
projects on social capital, skills and abilities of community residents, the intensity of 
empowerment and the nature and forms of participation in the sample communities. The 
remaining three sections discuss the impact of the ASIF micro-projects on the local 
institutional capacity for managing communal irrigation systems. In particular, these 
sections focus on the O&M arrangements, capacity building of WUAs and the 
organisation of water allocation and distribution in the sample communities.
Chapter Seven explored in detail the existing local institutions, forms and nature of 
community participation, the intensity of empowerment of local residents, social capital, 
and institutional capacity in the sample communities after the ASIF micro-projects. 
This chapter complements Chapter Seven and examines the extent to which the ASIF 
micro-projects influenced these variables.
This chapter uses the analysis of the micro-project service delivery outcomes and 
processes presented in Chapter Eight to explain and interpret the key participation and 
capacity building impacts of the ASIF micro-projects. Social fund projects assume 
participation and capacity building effects of social funds can occur only when 
community members have genuine involvement in the micro-project cycle (Hypothesis 
1). Another theoretical assumption of social fund projects is that positive service 
delivery outcomes and positive experience of community interaction during the micro­
project cycle are important preconditions to building local social capital and increasing 
local institutional capacity (Hypotheses 2 and 5). Therefore, I employed the analysis of 
the micro-project service delivery outcomes (Figure 8.1) and the extent and nature of 
community participation in the micro-project decision-making and implementation 
processes (Figure 8.5) in explaining and interpreting the ASIF micro-project impacts in 
the sample communities.
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9.1 Social Capital Impact
This section examines the impact of the ASIF micro-projects on social capital in the 
sample communities (Figure 9.1). As described in Chapter Five, social fund projects 
presume that frequent positive interactions among community members and positive 
service delivery outcomes can reinforce trusting relations and attitudes of co-operation 
(cognitive social capital) and can result in strengthening of old and creation of new 
formal and informal groups, associations and partnerships (structural social capital) 
(Hypothesis 2).
The participatory features and orientation of the ASIF micro-projects did not have an 
observable social capital building effect in the communities with developmental leaders 
(Khachik, Eghegnavan, P Sevak and Tsilkar). The improved access to irrigation had an 
important role in decreasing conflicts over water and improving co-operation in sharing 
water resources (more details follow in section 9.6 of this chapter). This was due to the 
successful service delivery outcomes of the micro-projects and the availability of water 
supply from the main source in these communities.
The absence of a positive impact on social capital in these communities can be 
explained by two factors. Firstly, the strong bonds of trust and reciprocity and traditions 
of solidarity and mutual assistance, described in section 7.5 of Chapter Seven, existed in 
the sample communities before the initiation of the ASIF micro-projects. All 
respondents in communities with developmental leaders said that the relations among 
residents in their communities have always been based on trust and reciprocity. 
Secondly, as discussed in Chapter Eight, the involvement of community residents in the 
micro-project processes was restricted in its scope and nature, and the micro-projects 
provided little space for community interaction and networking (Figure 8.5). Hence the 
opportunities for building and strengthening social capital in these communities were 
limited.
At the same time, the ASIF micro-projects did not have a negative impact in these 
communities either. As shown in Chapter Eight, smooth management of the micro­
project processes by the local mayors resulted in successful service delivery outcomes. 
The experience of community interaction during micro-project preparation and
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implementation was positive. The respondents were generally satisfied with the micro­
project in their community. They valued the ASIF micro-projects, which helped 
improve access to irrigation services in their communities.
The ASIF micro-projects strengthened the position of developmental leaders in those 
communities where the micro-project processes were positive and service delivery 
outcomes were successful. The local mayors in these communities were driven by 
strong communitarian motives and were determined to contribute to people’s well-being 
in their communities. They enjoyed the trust and respect of the community members 
before the ASIF interventions. The ASIF micro-projects provided the local mayors with 
an opportunity to strengthen their position by giving them control over resources and 
decision-making with regard to local infrastructure development. Most community 
members perceived their micro-projects initiated and managed by their mayors. The 
ability of the mayors to secure benefits through external agencies was perceived as their 
personal contribution to their communities and strengthened their reputation. The ASIF 
micro-projects strengthened people’s trust of their mayors, who worked hard and 
demonstrated commitment during the micro-project preparation and execution.
The ASIF micro-projects had a negative impact on local social relations in the 
communities where the micro-project service delivery outcomes and the experience of 
community participation were negative (Ashnak and Arevadasht). These were 
communities with predatory leaders. In particular, the micro-projects widened the gap 
existing between the local leaders and local residents in these communities. As the local 
mayor in Arevadasht and the ex-mayor in Ashnak were not accountable and dedicated 
to the residents, the ASIF micro-projects undermined their reputation and authority even 
further. Most respondents in these villages alleged that the poor micro-project outcomes 
resulted from the illegal deals between the contractors and their mayors, who personally 
benefited from the micro-project funds. They believed that a more rigorous and 
demanding supervision by the local mayors could have helped ensure better quality of 
construction and successful micro-project outcomes. When community residents 
attempted to influence the course of the micro-project implementation in Arevadasht, 
they encountered resistance from the contractor and inaction from the local mayor and 
regional authorities. As discussed in Chapter Eight, participation of community 
members in the execution of civil works in Arevadasht also proved to be a negative
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experience. The negative experience of participation in the micro-project processes 
reinforced the residents’ mistrust of authorities and the sense of powerlessness in 
Ashnak and Arevadasht. As several respondents said, it was frustrating for them to see 
that a significant investment of money, including their own contribution, did not result 
in any improvement in their living standards. The respondents in both communities 
were very cynical about development projects funded by external agencies, as they were 
convinced that these projects mostly benefited the local elite and not common residents.
In addition, the ASIF micro-projects further reinforced the existing social tensions and 
divisions among community residents in the communities with predatory leaders. The 
ASIF micro-projects did not serve as a vehicle for building social cohesion and 
reconciling the existing tension and disagreements between various groups. As 
described in Chapter Seven, as a result of the poor management by the local mayor, the 
community of Arevadasht was divided into various factions. The residents here were 
unable to reconcile various interests and get together to demand accountability and 
transparency from the local mayor. The failure to achieve collective action to ensure 
successful micro-project implementation in Arevadasht reinforced the mistrust and 
division existing between various factions in the community. It created a belief among 
the residents that they could not rely on their co-villagers in pursuing important 
common objectives. Both in Ashnak and Arevadasht, where the micro-projects did not 
improve access to water supply, conflicts over water persisted and were a constant 
source of social tension (more detailed discussion follows in section 9.6 of this chapter).
The micro-project in Karin indirectly contributed to the tension among community 
members. The lack of water in Karin after the construction of the irrigation pipeline 
under the ASIF micro-project was due to the poor water supply from the source. 
Although this was not attributable to the micro-project as such, the fact that the long- 
awaited micro-project did not result in any benefits for the community contributed to 
the general sense of pessimism and despair prevailing in the village. As described in 
section 8.1.2, due to the poor supply of water, the upper part of the village did not 
receive any water, whilst residents in the lower part received water from an alternative 
source. Many residents of the upper part expressed their readiness to give up their land 
plots and houses and move to flats in urban areas if they had the opportunity. The 
exclusion of the residents in the upper part resulted in the tension between the residents
271
in the two parts of the village. Although the residents in the lower part co-operated and 
shared water, the residents in the upper part felt excluded and deprived. A resident said 
with bitterness, “Unlike some of the residents in the lower area, we do not have nice 
green orchards” (KN-4).
The ASIF micro-projects did not have any impact on the existing level of structural 
social capital in the sample communities. There were no formal and informal groups 
and associations established by and for community members as a result of the micro­
projects. The IAs established for the implementation of the ASIF micro-projects ceased 
to function shortly after the micro-project completion in all of the sample communities. 
As discussed in section 7.2 of Chapter Seven, community residents rarely organised into 
informal groups in order to undertake development initiatives or petition authorities. 
The respondents did not perceive formal associations as a viable means for achieving 
successful outcomes in their communities. They were primarily reliant on the local 
leaders in getting things done. The improvements in the irrigation infrastructure and the 
subsequent availability of water in the irrigation systems increased the capacity of the 
WUA in P Sevak to organise an effective system for water allocation and distribution. 
Sections 9.5 and 9.6 of this chapter discuss in more detail the effects of the ASIF micro- 
projects on the WUAs and local self-governance procedures in the sample communities.
Figure 9.1: Social Capital Impact
Micro-Project Impact
Social Fund Communities Communities
Hypothesis (Khachik, Eghegnavan, P Sevak and (Ashnak, Arevadasht and Karin)
Tsilkar)
Hypothesis 2. Positive experience of community Negative experience of community
Participation in the interaction during micro-project interaction during micro-project
micro-project cycle preparation and implementation preparation and implementation (AK
builds positive social (All). and AR).
capital.
Positive service delivery outcomes Negative service delivery outcomes
(All). (AK, AR and KN).
Stocks of social capital unchanged. Negative impact on local social and
No negative impact on local social interpersonal relations (AK, AR and
and interpersonal relations (All). KN).
Water conflicts successfully resolved Water conflicts persisted due to poor
due to the successful service delivery service delivery outcomes (AK and
outcomes (All). AR).
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Strengthened position of local Weakened position of local mayors
mayors and positive impact on and negative impact on relations
relations between local mayors and between local mayors and
community members (All). community members (AK and AR).
No formal and informal social No formal and informal social
networks, groups, associations and networks, groups, associations and
partnerships (All). Strengthened 
WUA due to water availability (PS).
partnerships (AK, AR and KN).
No impact on associational No impact on associational
membership (All). membership (AK, AR and KN).
9.2 ‘Learning by Doing’ Effects
This section examines whether the ASIF micro-projects helped improve skills, 
knowledge and abilities of community members and local leaders in the sample 
communities (Figure 9.2). Social fund projects assume that local capacity building can 
be induced by the ‘learning by doing’ effect of social fund micro-projects. In particular, 
it is believed that participation in a social fund micro-project can enhance community’s 
access to information and experience and help develop new technical, organisational 
and administrative knowledge and skills (Hypothesis 3). People may come to realise the 
benefits of a collective action and learn new ways and methods of tackling local 
problems. They may then utilise their knowledge and experience in other activities in 
their community.
Community residents (both LA and non-IA) who took part in various stages of the 
micro-project cycle in the sample communities did not report improvements in their 
skills, abilities and knowledge. The only respondent who reported a learning effect was 
a member of the IA in Khachik. He mentioned that he acquired specialist technical 
skills. In particular, he learned how to carry out construction works in a difficult terrain. 
Chapter Eight shows that participation of community members in the micro-project 
cycle was restricted to the provision of community contribution and voluntary labour 
(Figure 8.5). Consequently, community members had little opportunity to develop their 
organisational and leadership skills, knowledge and abilities.
Community members did not perceive ASIF’s method of service delivery to be 
especially useful or innovative. For the respondents of this research, the ASIF micro­
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project approach was not any different from other institutional instruments that used 
traditional, top-down service delivery arrangements. They did not regard the 
participatory, community-based mode of ASIF as an opportunity to promote their 
interests and get involved in local issues. The respondents were not aware of ASIF’s 
vision of the IA as a vehicle for future collective action. None of the respondents 
mentioned that they in any way benefited from the participatory orientation of ASIF. 
There was little sense of individual or collective identification with the ASIF’s 
participatory objectives and mode of operation.
ASIF’s approach helped reinforce the notion that provision of community contribution 
is an essential prerequisite to attracting resources and programmes from external donors. 
As the mayor of Khachik said, “People realise that in order to get things done for their 
community they should contribute money or labour” (K-l). As discussed in section 
8.2.6 of Chapter Eight, the respondents in communities with successful micro-project 
outcomes expressed their willingness to contribute labour, materials and cash (when 
available) towards the cost of rehabilitation of other important community facilities.
The ASIF micro-projects were an important learning experience for most local
70mayors. For the mayor in P Sevak, the micro-project was a chance to ‘prove himself 
and gain self-confidence. The mayor said, “The whole project was very important for 
me. Nobody thought it would be possible to accomplish. It was very difficult, but at the 
end we managed, and it is a great satisfaction” (PS-1). The mayors in Khachik and 
Karin admitted that their participation in the ASIF micro-project was an opportunity to 
learn fund-raising skills and improve their ability to deal with donors. The mayor in 
Karin said that working with ASIF was important for him as he realised that 
transparency in working with donor organisations can help attract more investments in 
the future. The mayor said, “I have learned a lot from ASIF. In order to receive future 
benefits you have to work with honesty and transparency, otherwise they [donors] will 
not work with you again. I worked hard to make sure the micro-project works out as 
needed” (KN-1). The mayor in Arevadasht also perceived his involvement in the micro­
project as a learning experience. He said he had realised that he could have been more
79 The former mayor of Ashnak who initiated and managed the ASIF micro-project was not available for 
the interview during the fieldwork.
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demanding with regard to the quality of construction, and that next time he would be 
able to better exercise his power.
The local mayors were not convinced in the importance or usefulness of ASIF’s 
participatory approach. As discussed in Chapter Eight, they all considered the ASIF 
micro-projects in purely instrumental terms, and did not think that their communities 
could ultimately benefit from its participatory processes.
All mayors had already had a prior experience of dealing with donors and external 
agencies before the ASIF micro-projects. Their interaction with ASIF was not their first 
encounter with a donor agency. As described in section 7.4 of Chapter Seven, local 
mayors were active in their communities even before the ASIF interventions. Most local 
mayors believed that they had learned a lot from working with various donor agencies 
and organisations. Many of these organisations, for example, Save the Children and 
Oxfam as well as a number of local NGOs developed a community-based mode of 
operation, similar to the one of ASIF. In particular, they all required local communities 
to identify their own problems, contribute cash, materials and/or labour and take part in 
project implementation and management.
Figure 9.2: Learning by Doing E ffect
Social Fund Hypothesis Micro-Project Impact
Community Members Community Leaders (except A K )
Local mayors acquired useful 
skills and experience.
Local mayors did not perceive 
ASIF’s method of service delivery 
to be important or useful.
The history of interaction with 
donors contributed to the capacity 
building of local mayors.
Through numerous interactions with donor agencies the local mayors learned how to 
write proposals, manage application process in order to raise funds for local projects and 
effectively deal with the paperwork and reporting requirements of funding agencies.
Hypothesis 3. 
Participation in the micro­
project cycle enhances 
community’s access to 
information and 
experience and helps 
develop new knowledge 
and skills (‘learning by 
doing’).
Community members generally did 
not acquire new skills, knowledge 
and experience.
Community members did not 
perceive ASIF’s method of service 
delivery to be especially useful or 
innovative.
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The mayor in Khachik said, “The ASIF micro-project was not the only lesson for me, as 
I had looked for funding before” (K-l). The mayor in Karin thought that “ASIF has 
obviously had its impact, although I would not attribute my actions solely to ASIF” 
(KN-1). From his experience of interaction with various donors, he, for example, 
learned to send ‘thank you’ letters to all organisations he was in contact with, even if 
they refused funding. Participation in the ASIF micro-projects further contributed to the 
improvement of the skills and experience of the local mayors.
9.3 Empowerment and Participation Impact
This section examines the empowerment and participation impacts of the ASIF micro­
projects in the sample communities (Figure 9.3). As discussed in Chapter Five, social 
fund projects assume that participation in the social fund micro-project can empower 
community members, and produce changes in attitudes and behaviour (Hypothesis 4). 
As a result of a positive experience of collective action, people can become more self- 
confident and more willing to exercise voice. It is also thought that participation in the 
micro-project cycle can enhance community participation in the local development. In 
particular, it is assumed that participation in the micro-project cycle can help build 
social capital (Hypothesis 2), enhance people’s knowledge and experience (Hypothesis 
3), and produce attitudinal changes (Hypothesis 4), as a result of which, individuals may 
more willing and able to participate in local development in order to solve community 
problems (Hypothesis 5). Chapter Seven discussed in detail the intensity of 
empowerment of local residents and the existing forms and nature of community 
participation in the sample communities after the ASIF micro-projects (Box 7.4). This 
section examines the extent to which the ASIF micro-projects influenced the intensity 
of empowerment and the forms and nature of participation in these communities.
The research did not establish any empowerment impact of the ASIF micro-projects on 
the local residents in the sample communities. Section 7.2 of Chapter Seven shows that 
respondents did not feel they had the power and resources to get things done for their 
communities. People perceived that goods and services in their communities could 
mostly be obtained through influence, connections and informal payments. This 
research did not identify any cases whereby the micro-project ‘activated’ previously
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passive or socially excluded residents.80 The marginalised community residents 
identified in this research did not have any involvement in the ASIF micro-project 
processes.
As discussed in Chapter Eight, in the communities with predatory leaders (Arevadasht 
and Ashnak), the negative experience of participation and poor service delivery 
outcomes further reinforced the sense of powerlessness among community residents. It 
is likely that this negative experience adversely affect the willingness of community 
members to contribute cash/labour or materials in these communities. For example, as 
mentioned in section 8.2.6, several respondents in Arevadasht said they would be 
reluctant to provide cash contribution for future community initiatives.
The poor service delivery outcomes in Karin reinforced the sense of pessimism 
dominant in the village. As discussed in Chapter Eight, the ASIF funded irrigation 
system in Karin did not function because of shortage of water supply from the source. 
The residents of Karin did not have any hope that the irrigation infrastructure would 
bring them any benefits and considered their investment ‘useless’. As the irrigation 
system did not deliver any water, local residents vandalised the newly constructed 
pipeline (more detailed discussion on the O&M follows in section 9.4). Most 
respondents in Karin were frustrated with their situation and did not see any immediate 
prospects for change.
As Chapter Seven demonstrated, local residents in the sample communities generally 
were not found to be apathetic and patemalistically orientated. In all sample 
communities, the majority of local residents took part in various village-wide initiatives. 
They contributed voluntary labour, cash and materials for various community initiatives, 
including locally initiated actions and projects funded by external agencies. Their 
participation can hardly be attributed to the ASIF micro-projects. The respondents who 
were involved in the micro-project processes reported that they and many of their co­
villagers had participated in other community initiatives before the ASIF micro-projects. 
The respondents stated that the existing traditions of participation had existed in their
80 As it was mentioned in Chapter Five, the small sample size and the limited time frame of this research 
may not allow capturing the individual experiences of those community members who participated and/or 
benefited from the ASIF micro-project, but who were not identified and interviewed during the fieldwork.
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communities before the ASIF micro-projects (“our village has always been like this”). 
As mentioned in Chapter Five, the qualitative methodology used in this research 
restricted my ability to examine the scope of community participation in the sample 
communities. Thus, I was unable to empirically estimate a possible change in the 
number (or proportion) of community residents involved in local initiatives before and 
after their participation in the ASIF micro-projects.
The research findings indicate that the existing forms and nature of participation of 
community members in development activities and the intensity of empowerment of 
local residents remained unchanged after the ASIF micro-projects. The local mayors 
were dominant in managing all important aspects of community life. They remained the 
main initiators of local initiatives and development projects for community 
improvement after the ASIF micro-projects. This research did not identify any cases of
O 1
involvement of ordinary residents or the former IA members in the initiation and 
leadership of any activities and projects in the sample communities after the micro­
project completion. As prior to the ASIF micro-projects, participation of community 
residents in community-wide activities was limited to ‘physical’ participation, i.e., to 
contribution of labour, cash and materials. Chapter Seven shows that community 
residents were able to exercise voice, but their ability to influence and control local 
decision-making was limited (Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.4). The ASIF micro-projects did 
not increase the ability of local residents to participate in policy formulation and 
resource allocation in their communities. They were not effective and active in exacting 
accountability and transparency from their leaders.
There were a number of development projects undertaken in all of the studied 
communities after the completion of the ASIF micro-projects. These projects and 
initiatives, however, were not a direct consequence of the ASIF micro-projects. Some of 
the development projects were driven by donor agencies, who targeted these 
communities themselves. Other initiatives were initiated by the local mayors, who had 
been active in their communities before the ASIF micro-projects. As discussed in 
section 7.4 of Chapter Seven, the active role of the local mayors in their communities 
after the micro-project was not driven by their participation in the ASIF micro-project,
81 The exception was the LA head in Tsilkar (the Deputy Mayor), who was active in the community both 
before and after the ASIF micro-project.
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but was rather preconditioned by their prior experience, skills and social connections. 
As discussed in section 9.2 of this chapter, the experience of participation in various 
donor supported initiatives had significant capacity building outcomes for the local 
leaders. The ASIF micro-projects in their turn contributed to strengthening the 
reputation and abilities of developmental local mayors.
Figure 9.3: Empowerment and Participation Impacts
Social Fund Hypotheses Micro-Project Impact
The research did not establish any empowerment impact.
Increased sense of powerlessness in communities with predatory leaders 
(AR and AK) and where service delivery outcomes were poor (KN).
Residents in the sample communities were not apathetic and 
patemalistically orientated. They had participated in community 
initiatives even before the ASIF micro-projects.
The research did not establish any impact on the ability of community 
members to exercise influence and control over decision-making and 
resource allocation and hold leaders accountable.
The research did not establish any impact on the existing forms and 
nature o f participation in local development. It is likely that the micro­
project in AR have a negative impact on the willingness of residents to 
participate.
It was not possible to assess the change in the scope of participation in 
local projects.
New local projects and initiatives were not a direct consequence of 
participation in the ASIF micro-projects.
ASIF did not have a transformative effect on local leaders, although it 
helped strengthen their capacity.
The absence of a positive impact of the ASIF micro-projects on empowerment and 
participation in the sample communities can be explained by analysing the breaches in 
the theoretical assumptions underlying the ASIF project. In particular, community 
participation in the micro-project decision-making and implementation processes was 
limited, and hence it did not translate into successful participation and empowerment 
outcomes, as it was expected by the main assumptions of social funds. Chapter Eight 
shows that the local mayors played the key role in the decision-making with regard to 
the choice, design and implementation of the micro-projects and resource allocation in
Hypothesis 5.
Participation in the micro­
project cycle enhances 
community’s participation 
in local development.
Hypothesis 4.
Participation in the micro- 
project cycle empowers 
community members.
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the local communities (Figure 8.5). Consequently, community members did not have a 
chance to benefit from the ASIF micro-projects and the learning experience they offered. 
There was little space for community interaction and networking, through which 
community members could receive new information, skills and experience, strengthen 
their relations with other community members and develop new networks and 
associations. Community residents were excluded from the important decision-making 
processes with regard to the management and resource allocation of the micro-project. 
As a result, the ASIF micro-projects did not have a positive impact on the intensity of 
empowerment and the existing forms and nature of participation of community 
members in local development.
9.4 Participation in the Operation and Maintenance (O&M)
The sustainability and effectiveness of an irrigation system over time depend on the 
efficient management of the flow of water it produces and the regular maintenance of 
the facilities that provide that flow. Effective management and maintenance of irrigation 
is especially difficult considering its nature as a public good (Tang 1992: 3-6; Kahkonen 
1999: 3). Irrigation services have the characteristics of common pool goods. Thus, 
irrigation services are rival: as the flow of water available at any one time is limited, 
consumption of water by one user reduces the amount available to others. This implies 
that in the absence of a fair and transparent water allocation system, conflicts among 
competing farmers are unavoidable. Irrigation services are also non-excludable: it is 
costly and technically complicated to exclude farmers from using the irrigation system. 
As the farmers cannot be easily excluded from the use of the system, they can draw 
more water than the allocated amount; and they have no incentives to contribute to 
maintenance and pay for services. The combination of these two characteristics -  rivalry 
and non-excludability -  can lead to conflicts in water allocation, inefficient use of 
irrigation water and depreciation of the irrigation facilities from the lack of 
maintenance.
This section examines to what extent the ASIF micro-projects influenced the local 
capacity to support the sustainability of the rehabilitated irrigation systems (Figure 9.4). 
As shown in Chapter Five, social fund projects assume that participation in the micro­
project cycle can help ensure the O&M of the newly constructed/rehabilitated
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infrastructure. It is assumed that the demand-driven nature of micro-projects and 
participation of community residents in the micro-project cycle can engender local 
ownership and willingness of residents to participate in the O&M (Hypothesis 6). 
Strengthened stocks of social capital can increase the likelihood of establishment and 
acceptance of rules and procedures for the O&M and facilitate their enforcement.
The research shows that access to the benefits of the newly constructed/rehabilitated 
infrastructure had a direct impact on the level of the O&M in the sample communities. 
In the communities where residents had access to irrigation water, effective O&M 
arrangements were in place. In Ashnak and Arevadasht, the ASIF micro-projects did not 
result in improved access to water; however, as the facilities in these communities still 
delivered water, local residents were committed to their O&M. As mentioned in section 
9.1, in Karin, where the micro-project supported irrigation facility did not deliver water 
between 1998 and 2002, local residents vandalised the newly constructed pipeline. They 
dismantled parts of the irrigation pipeline and used them as materials in the construction 
of the communal potable water network. The residents also broke some of the valves on 
the irrigation pipeline.
The formal responsibility for the O&M of the irrigation systems in the studied 
communities lied with the local Water Users Associations (WUAs) and District Water 
Committees (DWCs). At the time of this research, WUAs existed in P Sevak, 
Eghegnavan, Khachik, and Ashnak. The WUA staff members were required to organise 
allocation and delivery of water, monitor the condition of the irrigation system, collect 
water charges, conduct maintenance works on the system and manage water allocation 
and distribution. The O&M budget, including remuneration of the WUA staff and 
funding for maintenance works, was supposed to be funded from the collected water 
charges. Thus, twenty percent of collected water charges were designated for the O&M 
expenses. In 2001, irrigation users were required to pay 6 drams per cubic meter of 
water, 1.8 drams (30 percent) of which were to be allocated for the O&M.
In Arevadasht, Karin and Tsilkar, the existing WUAs were abolished, and these 
communities were in the process of transferring the management of their irrigation 
systems to DWCs. As described in section 6.3.3 of Chapter Six, this transfer was 
stipulated by a governmental decree, which presupposed abolition of all WUAs in the
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communities with ‘unsatisfactory’ collection rates. In these communities, the respective 
local DWCs were put in charge of carrying out the O&M and managing water 
distribution through their locally appointed staff.82
The nature of participation in the O&M of the newly constructed/rehabilitated facilities 
was consistent with the dynamic of participation in other community activities and 
projects. In all of the sample communities, the local mayors assumed primary 
responsibility for initiating and managing the O&M. The local mayors mobilised 
collection of cash or materials, assigned responsibilities for rehabilitation and 
maintenance works and oversaw their implementation. In organising the O&M, the 
local mayors worked with the WUAs (where they existed). In most cases, the WUAs 
implemented decisions made by the local mayors. Only in P Sevak, the WUA was 
relatively independent in its actions (more detailed discussion follows in sections 9.5- 
9.6). In the communities where the WUAs were abolished, the local mayors managed 
the maintenance of the irrigation systems through the local distributors hired by the 
DWCs. The WUA staff and local distributors regularly supervised the condition of the 
irrigation system in order to undertake timely repair of breakdowns in the system. 
Community residents actively participated in the O&M activities by contributing free 
labour for small-scale rehabilitation and maintenance works (such as minor repairs, 
cleaning canals, purchase of spare parts, etc.). Community residents periodically 
monitored the condition of the irrigation systems and reported problems to the WUA or 
the mayor.
The importance of irrigation in sustaining rural livelihoods created immediate 
incentives for community members to sustain the micro-project investments. As 
discussed in Chapter Eight, the irrigation micro-projects in the sample communities 
reflected the most immediate priorities of local residents. The fact that the micro-project 
choice in all of the sample communities was demand-driven contributed to the 
willingness of residents to ensure the O&M.
The ASIF participatory design features did not have an instrumental role in the 
establishment and acceptance of rules and procedures for the O&M in the sample
82 The O&M expenses were supposed be financed through user charges, but the DWCs were now 
responsible for funding the staff salaries.
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communities. The fieldwork data indicates that all of the sample communities had 
established institutional mechanisms for the O&M of essential communal infrastructure 
before the ASIF micro-projects. The absence of effective and reliable provision and 
delivery of essential services by the state contributed to the increased self-reliance of 
local communities. As the government was unable to adequately support the O&M of 
important economic and social infrastructure, community residents and local leaders 
assumed responsibility for the O&M of many local services vital for their livelihoods. 
This research found that even before the ASIF micro-projects, local residents had 
participated in the O&M of communal infrastructure (schools, clinics, roads, potable 
water networks, etc.) and that the local mayors had assumed leadership roles in the 
management of the O&M arrangements. As Chapter Eight demonstrates, the 
involvement of community residents in the ASIF micro-projects was limited, and it was 
unlikely to have contributed to the existing O&M arrangements of the irrigation 
infrastructure in the sample communities.
As discussed in section 4.2.2 of Chapter Four, ASIF required beneficiary communities 
to submit formal Sustainability Plans with O&M commitments, which were thought to 
increase the likelihood of the micro-project sustainability. All of the sample 
communities submitted standard Sustainability Plans to ASIF as part of their micro­
project proposal package. In the Sustainability Plans, local governments expressed their 
commitment to the future O&M of the irrigation infrastructure after the micro-project 
completion. The Sustainability Plans also specified a tentative budget necessary for the 
O&M and indicated the funding source for the future O&M (for example, local 
government budget, community contributions, or state or marz budget financing). 
ASIF’s requirement for submission of Sustainability Plans was important for 
accentuating the importance of future O&M of the ASIF supported infrastructure. The 
Sustainability Plans, however, did not serve as effective guarantees for ensuring 
adequate O&M. As material resources available at the disposal of local communities 
were limited, the formal O&M commitments were not always observed.
All of the sample communities experienced serious problems with funding the O&M 
expenses of their irrigation facilities. Section 7.1.4 of Chapter Seven described the 
impact of fiscal constraints and material deprivation on the ability of local communities 
to mobilise resources for collective initiatives. The extreme level of material deprivation
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made it very difficult for the residents to pay the required water charges. Most 
respondents said they were willing to pay water charges in order to have a reliable water 
supply. However, as most of them were impoverished, they had difficulties in raising 
the required contributions. The average annual collection rate of water charges 
throughout the country stayed at around 30 percent between 1999 and 2001.83 As the 
collection rate of water charges was low, local communities were not able to withhold 
funding for the O&M expenses, and were compelled to transfer all of the collected 
' money to the local DWCs.
Figure 9.4: Participation in the Operation and M aintenance (O&M)
Social Fund Hypothesis M icro-Project Impact
O&M arrangements were found to be in place in communities where the 
facilities delivered benefits. In Karin, where the micro-project supported 
irrigation facility did not deliver any water, local residents vandalised the 
newly constructed pipeline.
Community residents actively participated in the O&M activities by 
contributing free labour and cash and monitoring the condition of 
irrigation systems.
The ability of communities to ensure adequate O&M was limited due to 
material and fiscal constraints.
The demand-driven choice of micro-projects induced willingness to 
participate in the O&M.
The formal Sustainability Plans required by ASIF did not serve as 
effective guarantees for adequate O&M.
The existing rules and procedures for the O&M and their enforcement 
mechanisms were not conditioned by the ASIF micro-projects, but had 
existed in the communities before the micro-projects.
In order to finance O&M expenses, the local mayors sometimes contributed money 
from the local government budget or even from their personal funds (for example, in 
Khachik). The mayors also mobilised cash from the residents, for example, when a 
major accident happened to the system. Community contributions in cash and voluntary 
labour were only sufficient for simple small-scale repairs, for example, for cleaning 
canals, or for welding works. The WUA staff members often conducted maintenance 
works without payment. Most commonly, the WUA staff received their salaries in
83 Data provided by the Irrigation Rehabilitation Project Unit, Ministry of Agriculture, Yerevan.
Hypothesis 6. 
Participation in the micro­
project cycle enables 
individuals to effectively 
carry out their roles and 
responsibilities with 
regard to the O&M.
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autumn, when, with the sales of the agricultural produce, the collection rates of water 
charges temporarily improved. The respondents reported that their communities were 
not able to carry out the needed relatively complex maintenance works that required 
significant investments and technical solutions. The 1999 Social Assessment of the 
ASIF communities (Oganessian 1999: 22-26) found that the key factors that negatively 
affected the sustainability of the ASIF supported facilities were the limited financial 
capacity of local governments and the inability of community residents to provide cash 
contributions.
9.5 Water User Associations (WUAs)
This section examines the impact of the ASIF micro-projects on the capacity of WUAs 
in the sample communities (Figure 9.5). In order to ensure that the beneficiary 
communities could use the micro-project benefits in the long run, ASIF’s operational 
guidelines stipulated strengthening the capacity of local groups in charge of the O&M 
of the rehabilitated infrastructure. In particular, following the recommendations of the 
World Bank’s supervision team, ASIF committed to co-operate with the WUAs and 
build their capacity to ensure high levels of future sustainability of the rehabilitated 
infrastructure. ASIF pledged to establish partnerships with the sectoral agencies 
responsible for the irrigation development in Armenia (the Ministry of Agriculture and 
the World Bank supported Irrigation Rehabilitation Project Unit) in order to co-ordinate 
capacity building efforts and effectively respond to the specific needs in the local 
communities. These objectives became the explicit goals of ASIF after the irrigation 
reform of 1998, which decentralised management of local irrigation to community- 
based WUAs.
The ASIF micro-projects did not have a direct observable impact on enhancing the 
capacity of the WUAs.84 ASIF did not make sufficient effort to involve the WUAs in 
the micro-project processes and build their capacity. For example, ASIF did not require 
participation of WUA members in the IA, or the involvement of the WUAs in the O&M 
of the newly rehabilitated facilities. There were no training workshops conducted with
84 This refers to the micro-projects in Khachik, Eghegnavan and Arevadasht, where WUAs already 
existed at the time o f the micro-project initiation. The micro-projects in P Sevak, Ashnak, Tsilkar and 
Karin commenced before the summer of 1998, when the Law on WUAs was not yet effective.
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the WUA committee members in the sample communities.85 ASIF did not establish 
partnership links with the Irrigation Rehabilitation Project Unit for a more focused and 
effective capacity building of communities with irrigation micro-projects. At the same 
time, ASIF had an indirect positive impact on the organisation of water allocation and 
distribution and contributed to the reduction in water conflicts by improving access to 
irrigation water (more detailed discussion follows in section 9.6).
The local institutional and political environment of the local communities largely 
determined the organisational characteristics and the role of the WUAs in the sample 
communities. The WUAs in Eghegnavan, Khachik and Ashnak were mostly controlled 
and managed by the local mayors and had little discretionary authority. The mayors 
themselves appointed the WUA heads, and the WUA heads regarded themselves 
accountable to the mayors. In Ashnak, the WUA head was the deputy mayor, and most 
of the decision-making was shared between him and the local mayor. The mayors made 
most important decisions with regard to water allocation and distribution and the O&M 
of the irrigation facilities and tertiary canals. The WUA staff members implemented 
these decisions, for example, they collected water charges, monitored water distribution 
and mobilised residents for labour or material contribution.
There was little attempt by the local mayors to involve community members in the 
WUA decision-making and management. Formal meetings with the irrigators were rare. 
Thus in Ashnak and Khachik, only one community-wide meeting to discuss irrigation 
related matters was conducted during the preceding year. In Egheganvan, no meetings 
were held with the irrigators during that year. Participation of farmers was solicited only 
when there was a need to carry out maintenance works or mobilise cash. The WUA 
head in Ashnak thought that in order to be effective the WUA must operate in a top- 
down manner. He said, “It is absurd that people can get organised themselves. We often 
have to be tough and even rude to be effective” (AK-2). The mayor in Khachik thought 
that a private operator would be in a better position than the farmers themselves in 
organising a fair system of water distribution. The mayor thought that community 
participation could actually undermine the effective management of the system. At the 
same time, the local mayors took into account wishes and demands of community
85 Workshops on O&M of irrigation, potable water and school micro-project communities were 
conducted by ASIF in several other communities.
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residents in managing the WUA work. As described in Chapter Seven, the mayors were 
well aware of important issues and problems of their communities through their 
informal interaction with local residents.
The WUAs did not provide a common forum for communication, negotiation and 
organised action for the community members in the sample communities. The 
involvement of the community in decision-making and organisational activities was 
minimal, and farmer participation was limited to the payment of water charges. 
Residents in the sample communities did not view the WUAs as vehicles through which 
they could co-operate to solve their problems, influence important decision-making 
processes and advance their interests. Paul (1994: 31) maintains that WUAs must be 
viewed as the “voice” of farmers. They are established to bring farmers together, allow 
them to exercise voice, claim their rights and influence policies and budget allocation 
affecting local irrigation services. Local residents in the studied villages rather 
perceived the WUAs as organisations established to collect water charges, monitor 
water distribution and co-ordinate the maintenance of tertiary canals. Although all 
irrigators were formally considered to be WUA members, they had little ownership and 
sense of individual responsibility for the functioning of the group. They associated 
WUAs with the WUA staff members, who received salaries (usually, the WUA head 
and two to four water distributors) and who had a formal responsibility for the WUA 
activities. Thus, the WUAs were viewed by local residents as yet another formal 
institution of the state, and not as an entity organised and managed by the farmers and 
for the farmers.
The involvement of the local mayors in the WUA work was justified in the eyes of the 
community members. The reliability of water supply in the sample communities was 
largely influenced by the informal connections of the mayors. For example, the mayor 
in Khachik managed to build strong ties with the local DWC, and consequently his 
village received water on a regular and stable basis. I was present at an informal 
meeting of the mayor with the head of the DWC, who said that he “would make sure 
this village receives water whenever it needs it”. Some respondents in Eghegnavan 
thought that water conflicts in their village stopped thanks to the local mayor’s 
involvement. A resident said, “It is mostly due to the village mayor, he managed to 
introduce order” (E-7).
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The intermediation of the local mayors helped solve problems, but undermined the 
participatory basis of WUAs, as farmers themselves did not have a direct contact with 
the respective DWCs to discuss their pressing problems and exercise immediate 
influence. Paul (1994: 31) maintains that direct frequent meetings of farmers through 
their representative WUA committees with service providers can increase people’s 
voice and promote transparency in the processes of water allocation and distribution and 
in the WUA relations with service providers. This situation was also typical of other 
WUAs in Armenia. The WUAs generally had little influence upon the actions of service 
providers, and their relations with the respective sectoral agencies were characterised as 
‘mistrustful’ (Melikyan 2002: 33).
The WUA in P Sevak was more participatory than the WUAs in other sample 
communities. The mayor in P Sevak was relatively hands-off with regard to the WUA 
activities. The mayor was still involved in the important decision-making with regard to 
local irrigation issues. The mayor said, “It is important that the mayor is involved in the 
WUA work; when the farmers have problems with the WUA, they immediate come to 
me, and I would sort their problems” (PS-1). At the same time, the WUA staff had more 
autonomy in their day-to-day work, and according to the villagers, the mayor “trusts the 
WUA to do the job” (PS-8).
The WUA in P Sevak was genuinely grassroots-based and had the support of the whole 
community. The WUA head was elected by the community at a community meeting, 
where about seventy percent of the community members were present, including 
women. The community residents were eager to select someone knowledgeable and 
accountable as they were extremely dissatisfied with the work of the former WUA head. 
The new WUA team members worked hard to manage water allocation and distribution, 
and to maintain the irrigation system. They were respected by the villagers and 
perceived by most residents as ‘honest’. The WUA made an effort to co-operate with 
the community residents. There was a farmers’ committee comprised of some active 
villagers, who were elected by the community. The committee occasionally got together 
with the WUA staff to discuss the irrigation needs of the farmers. Community-wide 
meetings with the irrigators were organised at the beginning and end of each 
agricultural season to discuss common problems. The mayor liaised with the local DWC
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together with the WUA staff members. Section 9.6 of this chapter will provide more 
detail on the WUA’s involvement in the management of water allocation and 
distribution in P Sevak.
Figure 9.5: WUAs in the Sample Communities
Participatory WUA (PS)
WUA head elected at an open 
community meeting.
Regular meetings with 
community residents.
WUA makes the important 
decisions with regard to water 
allocation and distribution.
The local mayor is involved in 
decision-making, but not 
dominant.
Farmers’ access to DWC is 
intermediated by the mayor 
and WUA staff.
Non-Participatory WUAs 
(K, AK and E)
WUA head appointed by 
mayors.
Community meetings infrequent, 
although informal consultations 
with farmers are held.
The main function of WUA is to 
collect water charges and 
supervise water distribution.
Local mayor makes the 
important decisions with regard 
to water allocation and 
distribution.
Farmers’ access to DWCs is 
intermediated by mayors.
DWC Management
(AR, KN and TS)
Irrigation management is 
transferred to DWCs. Transfer to 
DWCs incomplete (AR and KN).
Community meetings infrequent, 
although informal consultations 
with farmers are held.
Local water distributors hired by 
DWCs collect water charges and 
supervise water distribution.
Local mayors make the important 
decisions with regard to water 
allocation and distribution.
Farmers’ access to DWCs is 
intermediated by mayors.
9.6 Governing Local Irrigation
Irrigation management must address two important issues: the allocation of irrigation 
water (the assignment of water rights and contingency of delivery) and its provision (the 
physical distribution) (Subramanian et al 1997: 17). As section 9.4 discussed, the 
common pool characteristics of irrigation services (rivalry and non-excludability) can 
lead to conflicts in water allocation and to inefficient use of irrigation water. As 
discussed in Chapter Two (section 2.1.5), the literature on collective action maintains 
that by drawing on social capital, farmers can establish a fair and transparent water 
allocation and distribution system, or ‘self-governance rules’, which can help reduce 
conflicts among competing farmers and increase the efficiency of services.
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This section examines the impact of the ASIF micro-projects on the allocation and 
distribution of irrigation water in the sample communities (Figure 9.6). Social funds 
presume that participation of community members in micro-project activities can 
increase social capital and enhance the community’s propensity for collective action. In 
particular, it can increase the likelihood of establishment and acceptance of rules and 
procedures for governing irrigation systems and facilitate effective enforcement of these 
rules and procedures (Hypothesis 7).
This research shows that the improvements in the irrigation infrastructure and the 
subsequent availability of water in the irrigation systems significantly increased the 
ability of the local communities to co-operate and effectively organise allocation and 
distribution of water. As it was discussed in section 9.1 of this chapter, this research 
did not establish any positive changes in the existing stocks of social capital as a result 
of participation in the ASIF micro-projects. The ASIF micro-projects had a positive 
impact on local social relations more as a result of the successful service delivery 
outcomes of the micro-projects than of participatory procedures of ASIF. The water 
distributor in Arevadasht said, “The most important thing is water, if you have water, 
you will have order” (AR-3). In the communities, where ASIF successfully constructed 
or rehabilitated irrigation infrastructure and where there was a relatively adequate and 
reliable water supply, farmers stopped to draw water excessively and started to co­
operate (Eghegnavan, Tsilkar, Khachik and P Sevak). As a result, according to the 
residents in these communities, water conflicts in their communities came to an end. 
The impact of the ASIF supported irrigation services was especially notable in P Sevak, 
where the WUA successfully organised an effective system for water allocation and 
distribution.
In the communities with inadequate water supply (Ashnak and Arevadasht), many 
residents continued to tamper with the system and to draw water above the allocated 
amount, which gave rise to constant arguments among the villagers. In Arevadasht, the
86 It is suggested that there is an inverted-U relationship between water scarcity and effectiveness of 
collective action (KShkOnen 1999: 11). When water supply is abundant and irrigation needs are met, 
farmers have little reasons to organise. Moderate water scarcity may improve farmers’ ability to co­
operate and deliver water. As water becomes scarcer, farmers are more willing to act collectively to be 
able to acquire and distribute it. When water supply is extremely scarce (e.g., during severe drought), 
even well-organised co-operative action cannot alleviate the water shortage, and thus the benefits from 
co-operating are low.
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residents at the head end of the irrigation system ‘stole’ most water, often leaving 
people at the tail end without water. The local water distributor said, “There is little 
consideration for each other, whoever gets first, he gets the water” (AR-3). In Ashnak, 
the mayor said, “There are conflicts because of the water shortage, people are not happy, 
they come to me all the time and complain constantly” (AK-1). The local government in 
Ashnak imposed a fine of 3,000 drams (6 USD) for illegal water drawing. The fine, 
however, did not prove to be effective. Although most households in Ashnak and 
Arevadasht established informal ‘rotation plans’ for sharing water, not everybody co­
operated. Most respondents in these communities reported that because of water 
shortage, villagers were preoccupied with their own survival. The respondents believed 
that neither strict penalties nor consideration for their co-villagers’ welfare would stop 
people from taking more water. Thus, in the conditions of scarce water supply, the 
mechanisms of both hierarchical and social control proved to be ineffective.
The improved co-operation and decreased conflicts over water in Eghegnavan, Tsilkar 
and Khachik were primarily due to the increased availability of water and reliable water 
supply. There were no institutional arrangements in place to encourage participation and 
active co-operation of residents in the process of water allocation, distribution and 
monitoring in these communities. The allocation and distribution of water in these 
communities was largely driven by hierarchical control and managed by the WUA 
water distributors and the local mayors. The irrigation systems in these communities 
still maintained a socially-based nature. The farmers’ daily interactions and knowledge 
of each other played an important role in regulating water distribution. The local mayors 
in these communities did not effectively use and did not support the existing social 
control mechanisms, and instead they introduced strict monitoring and sanctioning 
procedures to achieve the compliance of community members who did not wish to co­
operate. The villagers thought it was mainly thanks to the involvement of their local 
mayors that they could effectively share water and minimise conflicts.
Even though ASIF did not explicitly build the capacity of the WUAs, the improved 
access to irrigation water as a result of the ASIF micro-project contributed to the 
strengthening of the WUA and the existing social control mechanisms in P Sevak. As 
described in section 9.5, the WUA in P Sevak was more autonomous and grassroots- 
based than the WUAs in other sample communities. This enabled the WUA in P Sevak
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to successfully organise an innovative system of water allocation and distribution and 
establish an effective institutional framework for fostering the existing traditions of trust 
and co-operation.
The WUA staff members in P Sevak came up with an initiative to install water meters at 
each individual land plot. The water meter allowed to measure with a relative precision 
the amount of water consumed by an individual land plot and hence charge the farmer 
according to his consumption. According to the respondents, this initiative was not 
practised elsewhere in the country. The WUA head said, “In many WUAs, they do not 
want to use water meters as it is very difficult for water distributors to install them and 
carry them around” (PS-3). Other communities in the sample used a ‘per hectare’ 
method of measuring irrigation water intake, whereby farmers requested amounts of 
water depending on the size of their land plot and the specific crop requirements. This 
method did not allow measuring the exact amount of water consumed, as farmers were 
charged according to the fixed amount of water they requested. Hence farmers could 
consume more water than they actually paid for. According to the mayor in Khachik, 
“The actual amount of water consumed by a household cannot be measured [through the 
‘per hectare’ method]. In reality it is very difficult to obstruct someone from drawing 
more water” (K-l). Alternatively, farmers could often be charged for more water than 
they actually consumed.
This innovation in P Sevak strengthened local self-governance mechanisms and 
contributed to the establishment of an effective and transparent system for water 
allocation and distribution. The introduction of water meters deterred farmers from 
drawing water excessively as they now had to pay for the actual amount of water they 
consumed. The new system made it easier for the WUA distributors to establish 
whether farmers drew more water than they were allocated. As everyone paid water 
charges according to the actual consumption, farmers were no longer worried that they 
could be charged more for what they consumed, or that their neighbours could ‘steal’ 
communal water, thus depriving other co-villagers. As illegal water drawing halted, 
farmers were confident that they would receive water in the amount sufficient for 
covering their needs. This increased the willingness of farmers to actively co-operate 
and participate in managing water distribution. The WUA head said, “The good thing is 
people know that we cannot charge them for more water than they actually use, and they
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are relaxed” (PS-3). The respondents maintained that the WUA “put an end to an era of 
chaos and lack of ownership in the village” (PS-G2). According to the villagers, the 
situation significantly improved compared with the previous years, when the mayor 
arbitrarily allocated water to some residents, and when “there was no control and people 
would steal water” (PS-G2). A village resident said, “Now, with the WUA, there is 
order and control, it used to be chaos previously. Now people know that they are in an 
equal position to receive water, whereas previously people had to rely on their 
connections to get water” (PS-8). The representatives of the WUA in P Sevak were 
convinced that strict monitoring and penalties were not sufficient to organise effective 
water distribution. Previously, the WUA imposed fines for excessive water drawing, 
which, however, did not prove to be an effective measure. The mayor’s past attempts to 
control water distribution by using his position of authority were not successful either.
The system of water allocation and distribution in P Sevak was organised in the 
following way. The amount of water allocated per each farmer was based on individual 
requests. Each irrigation line served several land plots, and only one person at a time 
was allowed to water his land plot. Farmers on each line took turns to water their land 
plots. Water was provided to four lines at one time. Farmers agreed with each other on 
the watering schedule beforehand. Thus, they all knew in advance how much time their 
neighbours would require for irrigating their plot. Each farmer closed his tap at an 
agreed time so as his neighbours could start watering their plots. The WUA head said, 
“This works well, farmers agree with each other on taking turns. They know that their 
neighbours need water too, so they are very responsible. If one needs water for an extra 
hour, he usually agrees with the neighbour” (PS-3). Most farmers were considerate of 
their co-villagers and preferred ‘short watering’, so that all of the people in the line 
could manage to take their turn before the water is cut. The WUA water distributors 
monitored water distribution by recording the time of the beginning and the end of 
watering. The WUA water distributors were residents of the same village and managed 
to build trusting relations with the community members. When farmers were absent 
from their land plots, the WUA distributors themselves would water their fields so as 
not to let them miss the opportunity. The farmers were not worried that in their absence 
the WUA distributors could overestimate the watering time and push up their charges.
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Figure 9.6: Water Allocation and Distribution in the Sample Communities
Effective
Participatory management 
(PS)
Effective
Non-participatory management 
(E, K and TS)
Ineffective
Non-participatory management 
(AR, AK and KN)
Adequate and reliable water 
supply.
Water allocation based upon 
individual requests.
Water distribution is regulated 
by mutual agreement and co­
operation among irrigators. In 
addition, WUA water 
distributors monitor the 
system.
Co-operation is supported by 
WUA.
WUA engages with 
community members through 
meetings and consultations.
Water meters (farmers charged 
according to the actual amount 
consumed).
Adequate and reliable water 
supply.
Water allocation based upon 
individual requests.
Social control mechanisms exist, 
but water distribution relies on 
strict monitoring and control by 
WUA/water distributors and 
local mayors.
Residents co-operate, but co­
operation is not supported by 
institutional arrangements.
Little engagement with 
community members.
‘Per hectare’ measuring method 
(farmers charged according to 
fixed amount of water).
Inadequate and unreliable water 
supply due to poor micro-project 
service delivery outcomes (A R , 
AK) and poor water supply 
(A R , KN).
Water allocation based upon 
individual requests.
Social control mechanisms exist, 
but water distribution relies on 
strict monitoring and control by 
water distributors and local 
mayors.
Residents co-operate, but co­
operation is not supported by 
institutional arrangements.
Little engagement with 
community members.
‘Per hectare’ measuring method 
(farmers charged according to 
fixed amount of water).
Distribution of water is fair 
and transparent.
Decreased water conflicts due 
to availability o f water and 
effective self-governance.
Distribution of water is not fair 
and transparent.
Decreased water conflicts due to 
availability of water.
Distribution of water is not fair 
and transparent.
Water conflicts persist due to 
scarcity of water.
The respondents in P Sevak valued the WUA as a means for achieving individual 
benefits, and did not perceive it as a vehicle for pursuing their objectives and assisting 
collective action. As in other sample communities, despite the grassroots base of the 
WUA, the irrigators in P Sevak had little sense of personal or collective identification 
with the WUA. The WUA was perceived as an organisation established to act on behalf 
of the community, and there was little sense of individual responsibility for the WUA
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operations by the WUA members. Such perceptions and identification of community 
members were indicative of the overall institutional environment in P Sevak. In the 
situation when ordinary community members had little power to get things done, 
collective action and associational membership were not perceived as feasible and 
effective mechanisms for improving community well-being and pursuing common 
interests in the long run.
9.7 Conclusions
The research findings presented in this chapter indicate that the intensity of 
empowerment and the existing forms and nature of participation of community 
members in development activities remained unchanged after the ASIF micro-projects. 
This chapter showed that the ASIF interventions did not induce a change in the existing 
institutional service delivery, problem-solving and decision-making mechanisms in the 
sample communities. As prior to the ASIF micro-projects, participation of community 
residents in community-wide activities was limited to ‘physical* participation, i.e., to 
contribution of labour, cash and materials. There were no formal and informal groups 
and associations established by and for community members as a result of the micro­
projects. The IAs established for the implementation of the ASIF micro-projects ceased 
to function shortly after the micro-project completion in most communities. The micro­
projects did not have an impact on the ability of community members to exercise 
influence and control over decision-making and resource allocation and hold leaders 
accountable. In fact, they reinforced the sense of powerlessness in communities where 
service delivery outcomes were negative and where local leaders were not accountable 
to the residents.
The ASIF micro-projects helped strengthen and reinforce the existing local institutions 
and social relations in the sample communities. Although the micro-projects had no 
significant impact upon the nature and forms of participation of community members in 
local development, they reinforced the positions of local leaders. In particular, the ASIF 
micro-projects strengthened the position of local mayors in those communities where 
the micro-project processes were positive and outcomes were successful. These were 
communities with developmental leaders, who had strong communitarian motives and 
were determined to contribute to people’s well-being. These leaders had played a
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dominant role in the management of the local communities even before the ASIF micro­
projects.
The ASIF micro-projects had positive effects on building the capacity of the local 
mayors in several ways. Firstly, participation in the ASIF micro-projects helped many 
local mayors acquire useful experience of working with Western donors and managing 
small-scale community based construction projects. Secondly, ASIF micro-projects 
strengthened the reputation of the local mayors. By taking full control over the 
management of the important infrastructure rehabilitation activities, the mayors had an 
opportunity to demonstrate their hard work and commitment to their communities. This 
greatly contributed to the increased positive perception of the local mayors by the 
community members. These findings are consistent with the results of the ASIFII 
impact assessment, which showed that the ASIFII micro-projects helped improve 
managerial and organisational skills of local leaders and strengthened their position in 
their communities (Babajanian 2002).
This research did not establish any changes in the existing stocks of social capital that 
were due to the participatory orientation of the ASIF micro-projects. The positive 
impact on local social relations was due to the successful service delivery outcomes of 
the micro-projects in the communities with developmental leaders (Khachik, 
Eghegnavan, P Sevak and Tsilkar). The improved access to water had a significant role 
in decreasing conflicts over water and improving co-operation in sharing water 
resources. The ASIF micro-projects had negative impact on local social relations in the 
communities where the micro-project service delivery outcomes and the experience of 
community participation were negative. These were the communities with predatory 
leaders (Ashnak and Arevadasht). As these leaders were not accountable and dedicated 
to the residents, the ASIF micro-projects undermined their reputation and authority even 
further. The ASIF micro-projects reinforced the existing tensions and divisions among 
residents in these communities. As the micro-projects did not improve availability of 
water in these communities, conflicts over water persisted and were a constant source of 
social divisions.
The importance of irrigation in sustaining rural livelihoods created immediate 
incentives for people to sustain the micro-project investments. The irrigation micro-
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projects in the sample communities reflected the most immediate priorities of the 
communities. This ensured a high level of local ownership and the willingness of local 
residents to maintain the newly rehabilitated infrastructure. In the communities with 
access to irrigation water, relatively effective O&M arrangements were in place. In 
Karin, where the micro-project supported irrigation facility was not functional, local 
residents vandalised the newly constructed pipeline. The shortage of financial resources 
and skills (rather than lack of farmer motivation) was the key reason for the inability of 
local communities to ensure adequate O&M of irrigation systems.
The ASIF micro-projects did not have a direct impact on enhancing the capacity of the 
WUAs. Although the ASIF did not explicitly build the capacity of the WUAs, the 
improved access to irrigation water as a result of the ASIF micro-project contributed to 
the strengthening of the WUA in P Sevak. The improvements in the irrigation 
infrastructure and the resulting availability of water enabled the WUA in P Sevak to 
design effective governance arrangements and secure grassroots co-operation in sharing 
water resources.
The analysis of micro-project service delivery outcomes and processes presented in 
Chapter Eight enables us explain the specific impacts of the ASIF micro-projects. In 
particular, community participation in the micro-project decision-making and 
implementation processes was limited, and hence it did not translate into successful 
participation, empowerment and capacity building outcomes, as it was expected by the 
main assumptions behind social funds.
The next chapter, Chapter Ten, provides interpretations and explanations of the research 
findings and implications for policy and practice. This chapter discusses the relevance 
and effectiveness of the social fund bottom-up model in promoting community 
participation and capacity building in the sample communities. It examines the key 
factors that influenced the specific participation and capacity building impacts of the 
ASIF micro-projects in the sample communities.
297
Chapter Ten. Conclusions: Key Findings and Reflections on Theory and Practice
This final chapter synthesises and interprets the critical findings of the research, relates 
these findings to the wider literature and discusses implications for policy and practice. 
It discusses the relevance and effectiveness of the ASIF project and its bottom-up 
development model in promoting community participation and capacity building within 
the social, political and institutional context of post-Soviet rural communities in 
Armenia. The chapter maps out the key factors that influenced the processes and 
participation and capacity building impacts of the ASIF micro-projects in the sample 
communities. In light of the research findings, the chapter reflects on the literature 
which framed the research and draws conceptual and analytical lessons. It then critically 
examines the implications of the specific participation and capacity building outcomes 
of the ASIF micro-projects for local development in Armenia. Finally, the chapter 
discusses some of the implications of the research findings for development policies and 
practice.
10.1 Key Findings
The key finding of this research is that the ASIF micro-projects did not change the 
nature of the existing local institutions and social organisation in the sample 
communities. On the contrary, as shown in Chapter Eight, the formal rules and 
principles of the ASIF micro-projects themselves became subordinated to the informal 
‘rules of the game’ dictated by the local environment. The existing local institutions 
determined the processes and consequently the outcomes of the ASIF micro-projects. In 
particular, the ASIF micro-projects were used by the local mayors according to their 
own ‘rules of the game’. As the ASIF development interventions from the very 
beginning became co-opted into the existing institutions, they did not contribute to the 
establishment of new types of institutions. On the contrary, the ASIF interventions 
helped strengthen and reinforce the existing local institutions and social relations in 
these communities.
The dominant position of the local mayors throughout the micro-project cycle resulted 
in the ‘capture’ of participatory and capacity building processes and outcomes of the 
ASIF micro-projects. As Chapter Eight discussed, community residents were excluded
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from participation in the important decision-making during the micro-project 
implementation. The local mayors played the key role in the decision-making with 
regard to the choice, design and implementation of the micro-projects and resource 
allocation in the local communities. Consequently, community members did not have a 
chance to benefit from the ASIF micro-projects and the learning experience they offered. 
The local mayors alone received an opportunity to receive new knowledge, improve 
their skills and gain more experience.
As Chapter Nine discussed, the ASIF micro-projects did not enhance participation and 
capacity of community residents. At the same time, they reinforced the positions of the 
developmental local mayors by helping them obtain new skills and experience and 
strengthening their reputation. The existing power relations in these communities 
remained unchanged. In communities with predatory leaders, who were not committed 
and accountable to the residents, the ASIF interventions undermined their reputation 
and authority even further. The ASIF micro-projects reinforced the existing tensions 
and divisions in these communities, and contributed to the sense of powerlessness of 
local residents.
The findings of this research are consistent with the findings from a number of other 
studies, which question the effectiveness of the social fund model in promoting genuine 
community participation. The social impact assessment of the Jamaican social fund 
found that most micro-projects were designed and implemented in a top-down way, and 
that the decision-making processes were dominated by a small group of ‘motivated’ 
individuals (Rao and Ibanez 2003). The study of social funds in Zambia and Malawi by 
the World Bank’s Operations Evaluations Department (OED) suggests that social funds 
generally “operated as users rather than producers of social capital” (OED 2002: 43). 
The success of social fund micro-projects largely depended on the role that key local 
leaders and influential persons (‘prime movers’) played in preparing proposals, 
mobilising community contributions and managing micro-project implementation. The 
OED study suggests that micro-projects were often decided by the ‘prime movers’ even 
before the first community meeting (White 2002: 3). Although community residents 
were involved in the identification and implementation of micro-projects, their 
participation was ‘shallow’, as they were excluded from important decision-making 
processes.
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Based on her study of the social fund in Northeast Brazil, Tendler (1999; 2000: 118- 
119) argues that the social fund micro-projects were ‘supply-driven’ as the community 
demand was often heavily influenced by various intermediaries, such as politicians, 
local leaders and government staff, building contractors, equipment suppliers, and 
project design firms. In many cases, decisions about micro-project choices were made 
by community leaders without consulting the community (Tendler 1999: 56). Similarly, 
the review of fifteen BAs of eight social fund projects in various countries revealed that 
in many instances, different actors including local government officials, local 
politicians, social fund promoters and contractors had influence on micro-project 
choices (Owen and Van Domelen 1998: 23-24).
10.2 Interpreting the Key Findings
Weiss (1998: 128) suggests that explanations for a project’s performance can be related 
to the project’s design and project’s implementation. Based on the research findings, 
this section first examines the relevance of the main assumptions underpinning the 
ASIF project. In particular, it explores the assumptions behind ASIF’s bottom-up 
development model, and how they translated into the observed micro-project processes 
and impacts. Project design has been analysed in this thesis on two levels. First, this 
section analyses how the design of the ASIF project reflected and addressed the local 
institutional, political and socio-economic context of Armenia (sections 10.2.1 and 
10.2.2). Secondly, it analyses how the key variables of the social fund model - 
participation, empowerment, social capital and social inclusion - were understood and 
conceptualised in the ASIF project (sections 10.2.3-10.2.5). In addition to project design 
related factors, this section also examines the key project implementation related issues 
that accounted for the observed participation and capacity impacts of the ASIF micro­
projects. In particular, it discusses to what extent ASIF’s implementation methodologies 
supported the objectives of participation and capacity building (section 10.2.6).
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10.2.1 Promoting Participation and Capacity Building: Changing Culture or 
Structure?
Why did the ASIF micro-projects not succeed in promoting community participation 
and local capacity at a community-wide level? The World Bank’s (200le) evaluation 
found that ASIF’s implementation procedures and methods were not adequate to 
promote participation throughout the whole micro-project cycle and facilitate 
information dissemination by the local leaders (more detailed discussion follows in 
section 10.2.6 of this chapter). Can project implementation related factors alone explain 
the processes and outcomes of the ASIF micro-projects? Even if ASIF’s implementation 
procedures and methods were adequate to support participation throughout the micro­
project cycle, it is questionable whether institutional arrangements based on the bottom- 
up social fund model could successfully promote institutional change within the specific 
social, institutional and political context of post-Soviet Armenia. It is doubtful that 
community participation within the boundaries of the ASIF micro-projects could 
transfer into civic participation beyond the micro-project life and become 
institutionalised. The remaining part of this section critically examines the conceptual 
and theoretical foundations of ASIF’s bottom-up development model in the view of the 
research findings.
ASIF as well as many other community-driven projects is based on conceptual and 
empirical fallacies about the substance, origins and limits of the existing forms of civil 
society and community participation in the former Soviet Union. As discussed in 
section 2.4 of Chapter Two, the prevailing conceptions about civil society in post-Soviet 
countries have been centred around the Western or neo-liberal model of civil society. 
The weak associational life in most Soviet countries has been interpreted as reflecting 
the weakness of civil society in general. It is thought that the Soviet regime produced 
passive and atomised citizens, reliant on the state and unable to undertake collective 
action to solve their problems. These assertions have been formed without 
anthropological insights about social processes and reality at the local level. They have 
been grounded upon logical or intuitive inferences, rather than rigorous exploration of 
causal links through investigation of empirical data. For instance, the assertion that the 
domination of the Communist Party ‘killed’ the civic arena in the Soviet Union allows
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some analysts make logical inferences about the ‘weakness’ of post-Soviet civil society 
as a ’natural’ legacy of the communist era.
The existing forms of community participation in post-Soviet societies have been either 
overlooked or considered ‘uncivic’. Post-Soviet local institutions are mostly referred to 
as ‘social networks’. These social networks are often viewed in negative terms because 
of their informal and often exclusive nature. The prevailing interpretations of post- 
Soviet networks do not distinguish between the parochial, elite or power networks, and 
the bottom-up networks that help citizens pursue their welfare needs and express their 
identities. The prevalence of informal social networks (and limited civic participation) is 
attributed to the cultural legacies or to the so called ‘Soviet mentality’ of people at the 
local level. The informal networks are viewed as a ‘problem’ of individuals rather than 
those of structures, without an attempt to understand the roots and sources of informal 
networks and behavioural patterns of individuals. It is thought that the persistence of 
‘private friendship networks’ among ordinary citizens prohibits the development of a 
genuine civil society (Howard 2004). This thesis shows that such views confuse cause 
and effect, as they fail to recognise that informal networks at the micro level are 
produced and reinforced by the macro level institutions.
The ASIF project and other community-driven interventions in the region do not 
explicitly recognise the need for institutional change. The conceptualisation of civil 
society in the discourse and practices of development agencies is based on the notion of 
‘rupture’ (term used by Bruszt and Stark (1998)), i.e., the assumption that the collapse 
of the Soviet Union resulted in a break-down of the existing institutions and social order. 
The local sphere is viewed as institutional vacuum that needs to be filled in by building 
local organisations. Mandel (2001: 282), for example, notes that the main belief 
underlying civil society projects in Central Asia is that “a postsocialist civil society 
needs to be constructed from scratch, since in the Soviet landscape this social and 
political space simply did not exist”. The informal social networks in post-Soviet 
countries are regarded as the ‘inertia effect’ of the Soviet past and not as institutional 
‘path-dependency’. The failure to recognise the existing social networks as ‘institutions’ 
precludes development practitioners from the explicit recognition of the need for 
institutional change, placing importance on individual change.
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ASIF’s bottom-up development model reflects the ‘cultural’ perspective described in 
Chapter Two and Chapter Three, which presumes that societal change can be achieved 
b y . changing social and interpersonal relations, removing ‘mentality’ barriers and 
improving human capabilities at the local level. The perceived lack or weakness of 
community participation is thought to be the result of cognitive orientation of 
individuals and the lack of appropriate skills and knowledge at the local level. Social 
fund projects assume that the main obstacles to participation are the existing cultural 
attitudes and social norms that govern relations among individuals at the local level. It is 
assumed that by providing a forum for participation, social fund micro-projects can 
change the existing cognitive norms and behavioural patterns of community members. 
Thus it is believed that participation in common activities can promote a change in the 
existing ‘paternalistic orientation’ of community residents and improve the levels of 
trust, and hence enhance the willingness and ability of community residents to 
undertake and participate in local development. It is also believed that social fund 
micro-projects can help build local capacity by helping improve people’s skills and 
knowledge and demonstrating innovative approaches to problem-solving.
ASIF’s bottom-up development model overlooks the importance of the broader 
structural and institutional constraints that predetermine how institutions at the local 
level develop and operate and affect people’s decisions to participate. It mainly focuses 
on interpersonal relations and norms that affect people’s decisions to co-operate. 
People’s ability to act as ‘active citizens’ is highly dependent on structural factors that 
determine the ability of individuals to realise their potential and become active agents. 
The limits to participation are not due to cultural or behavioural factors at the local level. 
The extent of local participation in Armenia is determined by the broader institutional, 
socio-economic and political context within which communities live and function. It is 
the overall contextual environment that enables local norms to develop and influences 
social structures of a society. In order to modify the nature of the existing networks, 
development interventions need to address the existing structural and institutional 
barriers.
Chapter Seven of this thesis demonstrates that the limited levels of community 
participation in rural Armenia is not conditioned by the weakness of social capital and 
attitudinal factors. The thesis shows that community participation does indeed exist in
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post-Soviet Armenia, although its forms and manifestations are different from the 
commonly accepted Western notion of civil society. Ordinary community residents in 
rural Armenia are not apathetic or patemalistically oriented. They participate in the 
public sphere, by providing support to each other and contributing to the economic and 
social well-being of their communities. In all of the studied villages residents were 
willing to contribute their time, money and labour towards the common community 
good and were dealing with their local problems the best they could. The existing strong 
relations of trust and reciprocity provided a basis for various forms of mutual assistance 
and collective action.
As discussed in Chapter Seven, the limits to civic participation in Armenia are rooted in 
the governance environment conditioned by the weak capacity of the central 
government and the prevailing institutional, legacies of the socialist system. 
Participation is not perceived by ordinary people as a viable means for obtaining 
benefits and solving problems in rural Armenia. In a situation when access to external 
resources and social and economic opportunities is determined by social status, access 
to influential networks and formal authority, ordinary citizens are not effective in 
attracting external resources and advancing the interests of their community. They are 
forced to rely on local leaders in getting things done. Such dependency narrows 
citizens’ power base and the extent of influence and control they can exercise with 
regard to local decision-making. In addition, authorities at the central, regional and local 
level do not appreciate and encourage grassroots participation and initiatives. These 
institutional constraints significantly restrict the forms and nature of community 
participation in the country.
10.2.2 Participation and Poverty
Chapter Seven showed that the lack of material resources, time, and limited technical 
capacity significantly constrain the ability and willingness of community members and 
local leaders to undertake collective initiatives and effectively operate and maintain 
local infrastructure. The state budget has limited financial resources, and has been 
unable to support local communities financially. Most local governments receive little 
funding from the state and have limited local revenue base. The limited financial 
resources and weak administrative capacity significantly constrain the ability of the
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state to reach out to the citizens and support grassroots initiatives. Local governments 
too experience tremendous financial and administrative constraints, and are unable to 
support local initiatives. Local infrastructure is often maintained mostly due to the 
financial and labour contribution of community members. People’s contribution can 
only provide limited solutions. In a situation of severe economic and social deprivation, 
people do not have sufficient cash, time and energy for involvement in community-wide 
activities.
The expectations of many community-driven projects concerning how much 
participation can occur within the economic and social context of Armenia are not based 
on realistic assessments. Whilst the scope and extent of poverty in Armenia has been 
established through research and surveys, there are still misconceptions about the actual 
extent of poverty in development practice. The lack of realistic assessment of local 
capacity often translates into the assertions about the passivity and paternalistic 
expectations in local communities. Thus based on the observations of the poor state of 
local infrastructure, it is often assumed that community members are not willing to 
sustain it because of mentality constraints. These views do not take into account the 
constraints imposed by the high levels of poverty for most rural people in Armenia.
The state of material deprivation in the local communities in Armenia raises the 
question of appropriateness of ASIF’s community contribution requirement. Section 
8.2.6 of Chapter Eight shows that residents in the sample communities had difficulties 
in contributing cash or materials for the micro-projects. Only residents of two 
communities were able to provide cash contributions. In the remaining communities, 
residents contributed already existing materials, which did not incur a monetary cost for 
them, or the contribution was provided on their behalf by the local government or an 
external donor.
10.2.3 Conceptualising Participation
The concepts of ‘empowerment’ and ‘participation’ were conceptualised in the ASIF 
project in de-politicised terms. ASIF as well as many other community-driven projects 
understand empowerment in terms ‘psychological’ empowerment. Thus assuming that 
the main obstacle to participation is in people’s mentality, development projects
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propagate the need for psychological empowerment, with an objective to uproot the 
‘culture of dependency’. This view prescribes enhancing the economic and 
psychological assets of individuals as a means to empowerment. Midgley (1986b: 9) 
notes that “powerlessness is often conveniently interpreted as passivity and indifference 
but the real problem is the lack of opportunity for their [people’s] direct involvement”. 
Such conceptualisation ignores complex structural and social processes and conditions 
that influence positions of individuals, and which cause and reinforce psychological 
disempowerment. As this research shows, the main constraints to people’s participation 
in rural Armenia were rooted in their political capabilities and power resources.
ASIF failed to address the informal, highly politicised nature of local institutions in 
post-Soviet Armenia, and largely ignored issues of local accountability, representation 
and voice. One can conceptualise existing power relations in the Armenian communities 
through the framework of ‘spaces’ for participation described in Chapter Two (Figure 
10.1). The ‘spaces’ for participation during the micro-project cycle belonged to and 
were controlled by the local elite, and they were only temporarily ‘borrowed’ by ASIF. 
ASIF translated the existing ‘closed’ spaces into ‘invited’ spaces, where community 
residents were invited to participate. These spaces retained their ‘closed’ nature as they 
were made available by the powerful local leaders on their own terms. These leaders 
allowed only limited community influence and independent interaction. Acknowledging 
the structural constraints to participation implies accentuating the political and relational 
dimensions of empowerment. Political empowerment is primarily concerned with 
building political assets of individuals to enable them with influence and control. 
Cornwall (2004) argues that empowerment is about enabling people to exercise their 
agency and choose and claim their own ‘spaces’ for participation.
Figure 10.1: ‘Spaces’fo r  Participation in the Sample Communities
Spaces Closed Invited Claimed or created
Community All communities ASIF micro-projects WUA in P Sevak
The research findings indicate that the objective of ‘self-reliance’ obscures the notion of 
empowerment. The concept of self-reliance has an instrumental objective, and it is 
concerned with collective well-being from a top-down perspective (Figure 10.2). Thus,
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as long as the community is able to sustain itself, the objective of self-reliance is 
achieved. This by default devalues the significance of participation in its empowerment 
sense. Achieving ‘self-reliance’ does not necessitate broad and inclusive participation; 
nor does it require the involvement of the poor and marginalised in important decision­
making. Self-reliance can be achieved thanks to developmental leaders and limited 
participation of local residents confined to contribution of labour and resources. This 
instrumental conceptualisation of participation translated into the ASIF’s operational 
procedures and monitoring and evaluation indicators. The ASIF micro-projects were not 
concerned about who participates and how. Local communities were viewed as 
homogenous entities, without an attempt to distinguish between elite participation and 
participation of ordinary residents. As a result, as this research indicates, the objective 
of promoting self-reliance may reinforce the existing inequalities and implicitly 
encourage patronage-based relations.
This instrumental, or neo-liberal view of participation can be contrasted with the 
empowerment view, which considers participation as a tool for redistribution of 
opportunities in a society and for facilitating institutional change. The outcome of 
empowerment in the latter approach is seen in the ability of people to break away from 
the existing economic dependence and to exercise their rights over important issues that 
affect their lives.
Figure 10.2: Objectives o f  Participation
Objective Instrumental (Neo-Liberal) Transformative
Participation in Projects Improved Project Outcomes Empowerment
Improved Institutional Capacity
Participation in Development Improved Service Delivery Participation as a Citizenship
Outcomes Right
Increased Local Self-Reliance
ASIF did not have in-built operational procedures and micro-project evaluation 
indicators for assessing the nature of participation. As Chapter Four shows, ASIF’s 
appraisal criteria (Box 4.4) and monitoring indicators (Box 4.5) assessed participation 
based on quantitative indicators (for example, the number of community residents
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present at the general community meeting, percentage of women present at the general 
community meeting, or number of women represented in the IA). These quantitative 
indicators did not provide a sense of the depth and the quality of community 
participation in the micro-projects. They did not capture the intensity of participation of 
residents and their inputs into participatory processes (e.g., extent of participation of 
men and women in decision-making, leadership roles, etc.). ASIF did not have any 
participatory evaluation and monitoring procedures. The ASIF’s BAs were based on 
quantitative surveys and provided little information about the ASIF’s impact on 
people’s lives. Qualitative monitoring of ASIF’s impact was introduced in the ASIFII 
project.
10.2.4 Participation, Social Capital and Collective Action
Social funds presume that by enhancing social capital - building social networks and 
strengthening interpersonal relations - social fund interventions can induce co-operation 
and promote participation in local development. The framework places strong emphasis 
on the normative orientations that govern interaction between individuals.
This research shows that the framework of social capital at the heart of the bottom-up 
model does not adequately address the factors that affect people’s decisions to 
participate (or not to participate). High levels of social capital may not necessarily 
translate into civic participation. As Chapter Seven shows, community participation in 
Armenia is constrained not so much by the nature of interpersonal relations, but rather 
by the broader institutional and structural factors. Interpersonal relations in all of the 
communities in the sample were based on strong norms of trust and reciprocity. At the 
same time, the existing stocks of social capital did not translate into intensive forms of 
participation in local development. Community participation was mostly leader-driven, 
and it was restricted to the contribution of physical inputs. Ordinary residents did not 
organise into groups and associations, undertake independent collective action 
initiatives, and mostly relied on local leaders in getting things done.
The theories of social capital are not adequate for analysing conditions affecting civic 
participation, but mainly suggest a framework for analysing co-operation. Cognitive 
variables such as norms of trust and reciprocity governing interpersonal relationships
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represent mechanisms through which co-operation is built and optimised to produce 
mutually beneficial outcomes. Relations based on shared norms of trust and solidarity 
are more likely to produce co-ordinated action and resolve collective action problems by 
reducing opportunistic behaviour. Shared norms, values, knowledge and understanding 
are necessary for collective action to succeed and sustain. They determine the ability of 
individuals to organise and govern themselves to obtain continuing joint benefits when 
all face temptations to ffee-ride, shirk, engage in rent-seeking, or otherwise act 
opportunistically (Ostrom 1992).
This research demonstrates that social capital is situational, and it can change its 
manifestation and forms depending on a particular contextual environment. In his 
research on Russia, Rose (1998) suggests that the choice of social networks and tactics 
upon which individuals rely depends on the incentives and constraints affecting how 
‘things can get done’ in a given situation. This thesis demonstrates that the lack of 
formal groups and associational activity in rural Armenia does not indicate a weakness 
of social capital. People choose to join those networks that are most conducive to the 
production of goods and services and strategies that are most likely to succeed under 
particular social, economic and political circumstances. Thus, the existing relations 
based on trust and reciprocity in Armenia have been manifested in mutual support 
networks, communal initiatives and social participation. This finding questions the 
accuracy of currently popular measures and indicators of social capital based on 
associational activity and membership. As mentioned in Chapter Two, these measures 
still remain a mainstream tool for assessing the level of social capital and civil society in 
post-socialist countries.
The findings of this research indicate that development interventions designed to invest 
in social capital may not enhance local participation and institutional capacity. Many 
development projects in post-Soviet and developing countries have a social capital 
building objective. Social capital is often defined in these projects as an end in itself. It 
is important that development interventions address the specific factors that affect the 
willingness and ability of communities to participate in local development and organise 
to deliver local goods and services. This research shows that it is not the availability of 
social capital, but rather how it is used that can make a difference. The availability of 
norms (e.g., trust and reciprocity) and networks (formal and informal groups and
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partnerships) by itself does not necessarily imply that they can facilitate collective 
action and serve developmentally beneficial outcomes. Norms and networks are 
important as far as they serve the objective of enhancing the ability of communities to 
organise for the delivery of essential goods and services. It is important that 
development projects define social capital in relation to the outcomes it produces. In 
particular, the outcome indicators of social capital can be defined in terms of the ability 
of communities to undertake development initiatives and projects, derive benefits from 
networks, raise funds, and operate and maintain local infrastructure.
The findings of this research demonstrate that social capital has not only situational and 
temporal, but also fluid nature. As shown in Chapter Seven, the existing strong 
networks of mutual support and solidarity played a crucial role in the ability of local 
communities to survive at difficult times. At the same time, even in the communities 
with strong social capital, illegal water drawing and conflicts persisted at the times of 
acute water scarcity. Co-operation and opportunistic behaviour, social solidarity and 
interpersonal conflicts co-existed and constituted an integral part of the social fabric in 
these communities. ASIF had an indirect positive impact on local social relations by 
making available the much needed water resources. The improvements in the irrigation 
infrastructure and the resulting availability of water created an enabling environment for 
the existing relations of trust to translate into co-operation in sharing water resources. 
The situational nature of social capital, however, implies that the strengthened stocks of 
social capital may not necessarily be sustainable over time. For example, once the 
irrigation facilities stop providing benefits or water supply becomes scarce, the existing 
relations of co-operation and solidarity may reverse to conflicts and opportunistic 
behaviour.
This implies that in order to harness social capital, a certain combination of 
developmental inputs and contextual factors is required. Material factors are important 
for enhancing social capital and social cohesion. This research shows that scarcity of 
economic resources can suppress relations of trust and provoke conflicts and 
disagreements even in communities with strong endowments of social capital. 
Economic difficulties produce social cleavages and contribute to social exclusion of 
certain households. Material hardship also affects relations between various
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communities. In the situation when communities compete for scarce resources, building 
bridging social capital becomes difficult.
The governance environment has an important role for shaping trusting relations among 
community members. As this research shows, communities with developmental leaders 
were more cohesive than communities with predatory leaders. The case of P Sevak 
demonstrates that the ASIF investments proved to be especially effective for fostering 
co-operation under the effective WUA governance framework designed by the 
community residents themselves. These conclusions resonate with Krishna’s (2001) 
findings from his research on social capital in India. Krishna (2001: 937) argues that 
social capital only represents “a potential”, which needs to be harnessed in order to 
achieve “high development performance”. In particular, he found that development 
outcomes were most effective in the villages where high stocks of social capital were 
combined with high leadership (or ‘agency’) capacity.
As discussed earlier, development agencies often see the key aspect to fostering social 
capital in strengthening interpersonal relations by bringing people together in 
development projects. Development projects and policies may not be able to enhance 
social capital in the absence of an enabling environment and contextual ingredients 
necessary for interpersonal relations to sustain beyond the frame of these projects and 
translate into mutually beneficial outcomes.
10.2.5 Social Inclusion
ASIF did not adequately address the issue of social inclusion. CDD policies and 
projects normally define a community as a potential or actual group of people who share 
commonality of interests and felt needs (Narayan 1997: 9). Community in this 
definition can be geographically defined; but it can also refer to other entities such as a 
‘school community’, or farmers working together and organising to pursue common 
interests. As described in Chapter Seven, the Armenian community overlaps with the 
geographic boundaries of a village. The challenge is how the interests of various groups 
within the community can be reconciled and whose interests should prevail in choosing 
a micro-project.
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As discussed in Chapter Eight, ASIF’s demand-driven mechanism favours the interests 
of the majority of the community. This has implications for equitable representation of 
various ‘interest’ communities within the larger community (i.e., the village). The 
demand-driven mechanism may not address the needs and preferences of individuals 
who were in minority during the micro-project prioritisation and identification. It may 
not benefit some of the marginalised community members who are unable to articulate 
their needs and preferences and form coalitions of interest with other residents. ASIF 
did not have effective tools to identify, include and support socially marginalised and 
impoverished community members. ASIF’s formal operating procedures and 
implementation methods did not stipulate identification and inclusion of previously 
excluded residents in the micro-project processes.
The mandatory community contribution requirement can exclude from development 
assistance poor communities that are unable to provide the contribution. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, the demand-driven mechanism of social funds can leave out the poorest 
communities, which have inadequate resources and technical and organisational skills. 
At the same time, the correlation between community contribution and the micro­
project’s quality and sustainability has not been established empirically (Owen and Van 
Domelen 1998: 25). This research did not establish any positive impact of community 
contribution with regard to micro-project quality and sustainability. The fact that 
residents did not provide the contribution themselves did not have any observable 
adverse effect on the extent of local ownership and O&M arrangements in those 
communities.
ASIF did not have an effective strategy for inclusion of women in the micro-project 
cycle. ASIF encouraged participation of women by setting gender quotas. The ASIF’s 
requirement for women’s participation in the general community meetings and 
representation in the IAs was to ensure that women were not excluded from 
participation and had a voice in the micro-project activities (Box 4.4 and Box 4.5).
Requiring consultations during community meetings and representation of women in 
committees does not automatically ensure gender inclusion (Cornwall 2000: 27). It is 
the social context that shapes and determines the roles that men and women choose to
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perform. Formal inclusion of women may not imply meaningful participation if such 
participation is not encouraged by the existing social norms and local institutions.
Chapter Eight shows that participation of women in the irrigation micro-projects was 
only formal. Women did not perceive irrigation as a ‘female’ domain and did not 
attempt to intervene in the micro-project processes. As women are traditionally 
responsible for children’s education, they were found to be especially active and vocal 
in the school micro-projects supported by ASIF. It is important that the social roles of 
men and women are accurately understood within the context of a project. Kuehnast 
(2003: 10) suggests that “setting gender quotas without understanding the social norms 
and expectations is not productive” for encouraging the participation of women in social 
fund micro-projects.
10.2.6 ASIF’s Implementation Methods
This chapter demonstrated that the design of the ASIF project did not adequately 
support the goals of participation and capacity building. In particular, ASIF’s bottom-up 
development model did not adequately address the existing institutional context in 
Armenia. In addition, ASIF project was based upon a narrow conceptualisation of 
participation. This section examines the implementation methods that accounted for the 
limited participation and capacity building outcomes of the ASIF micro-projects.87
The processes of community mobilisation and micro-project implementation by ASIF 
were not adequate to promote the goal of participation and capacity building on a 
community-wide level. ASIF employed limited implementation methodologies to 
support community participation throughout the micro-project cycle. ASIF’s outreach 
effort can be characterised as an ‘extension’ approach, as described in Chapter Two. 
The ASIF promotion officers mainly provided information and technical advice on 
ASIF’s goals and procedures, the micro-project cycle, and the roles and responsibilities 
of the community. They did not invest sufficient time and effort in community 
mobilisation, conscientisation and awareness building, and inclusion of marginalised 
members. ASIF relied on the existing local leaders in conducting its activities.
87 This section draws on the fieldwork data, my interviews with the ASIF and World Bank staff.
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Channelling funds through local leaders in most communities ensured smooth micro­
project processes and successful outcomes. This, however, limited the involvement of 
ordinary community members in the micro-project processes. ASIF in its turn did not 
attempt to facilitate the greater inclusion and participation of community residents. The 
ASIF promotion officers made limited attempt to meet with diverse groups of local 
residents and make them aware of the ASIF activities. During micro-project preparation 
ASIF did not organise joint planning of micro-project activities. ASIF was not effective 
in ensuring that local leaders and the IA members shared information about micro­
project progress and financial status with the local residents.
Project group meetings, discussions and workshops are viewed as important features of 
participatory project design. Oakley (1991: 218), for example, suggests that community 
meetings are not “merely arenas for debate” but also “vehicles for taking action”. He 
stresses that an important aspect of community meeting is to create a sense that “not 
only is change necessary but also that the people can make it possible” (Oakley 1991: 
222). Participatory meetings in the ASIF micro-projects mostly served the purpose of 
communicating information about the micro-project to local residents and instructing 
them how to participate. Meetings did not have the purpose of developing the process of 
participation and did not serve as a basis for community action. In particular, 
community meetings were not used by ASIF as a forum for increasing community 
awareness of issues, sharing of experiences and developing common approaches to 
solving local problems. The fact that the general community meeting was summoned 
with a specific purpose, i.e., to discuss possible micro-project investments, determined 
the nature of the meeting. Thus, the general community meetings in the ASIF micro­
projects were set with a specific task to produce a specific outcome (as opposed to 
‘open-ended’ meetings). These meetings were structured and driven by local leaders and 
ASIF staff. As local leaders predetermined the choice of micro-projects, there was little 
room for locally-driven solutions. The hierarchical relationship between local leaders 
and local residents was preserved at the community meetings.
ASIF did not invest much effort in strengthening the IAs as a community-based group 
and improving their capacity to organise and manage micro-project activities. As the 
local mayors were dominant in the micro-project processes, the role of the IAs was 
mostly formal. ASIF in its turn did not challenge the existing power relations and did
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not use the IAs as a space for community involvement in local decision-making. Oakley 
(1991: 185-186) distinguishes between two approaches to working with local groups in 
development projects: groups as ‘social action’ and groups as ‘receiving mechanisms’. 
Whilst the first approach emphasises the process of building trust and confidence 
between group members, the second views groups as vehicles for project 
implementation. ASIF mostly regarded the IAs as structures for facilitating project 
execution.
Meanwhile, ASIF could strengthen the IAs in several ways. ASIF could conduct 
intensive outreach work with the IA members to make them fully aware of their rights 
and responsibilities and the mechanisms through which they could exert control over 
micro-project processes (for example, the IAs could withhold payments to contractors 
and refuse to certify satisfactory completion of works). ASIF could encourage the IA 
members to assign specific roles, responsibilities and reporting requirements for micro­
project management to each IA member. ASIF could identify training needs of the IAs 
and community residents (non-LA) involved in the micro-project activities and prepare 
and carry out training programmes in response to these needs. ASIF provided the IAs 
with on-the-job support during the planning and preparation of proposals and micro­
project implementation. At the same time, ASIF delivered little special training and 
capacity building assistance to the IAs and community residents (Box 10.1).88
B ox 10.1: Training and Capacity Building Assistance Delivered by A S IF
> Community meetings to explain ASIF’s objectives and procedures.
>  Support to IAs in proposal planning and preparation.
>  Pre-bidding conferences to contractors and IAs.
>  Workshops on sustainability (limited).
The inadequate implementation methods of ASIF were primarily conditioned by ASIF’s 
narrow conceptualisation of participation and inadequate understanding of the local 
contextual environment, discussed earlier in this chapter. Oakley (1991: 237) notes that 
“[PJrojects which view participation in a more limited manner and restrict it largely to
88 Staffed with only two people, the ASIF’s Institutions Support Unit only became operational by the end 
of the first project year. It mainly organised pre-bidding conferences for potential contractors and IAs to 
explain the procurement process, roles and responsibilities. It was only in late 1998 when the Unit 
organised a series of participatory workshops to discuss maintenance and sustainability issues in several 
districts.
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participation in project benefits or periodic consultations will, correspondingly, employ 
equally limited methodologies in its promotion”.
The lack of ASIF’s participatory orientation also reflected objective constraints. The 
constraints in time, money and human resources significantly affected the scope of 
ASIF’s participatory activities. The ASIF staff members were under pressure to deliver 
good quality micro-projects within a limited time frame. The ASIF promotion officers 
had to cover a great number of communities identified as poor in the target regions, and 
they could only spend one or two days in each community. Most of the energy and time 
of the ASIF appraisal and follow-up engineers involved in the micro-project cycle was 
consumed by everyday organisational and construction related tasks, which left little 
time for focusing on the issues of community participation. One can question the 
effectiveness of projects that aim to address technically and logistically complex 
construction and rehabilitation goals and combine them with even more complex social 
objectives. The ASIF’s case points out to a clear conflict between the need to produce 
immediate outcomes and the need to emphasise the process of participation. Oakley 
(1991: 206) argues that “projects which promote participation must be flexible and 
willing to experiment and must not allow the demands of immediate, quantifiable 
impact to undermine or overwhelm the process of participation”.
The independent status of ASIF restricted ASIF from contributing to capacity building 
of the state agencies. ASIF was considered a governmental agency. However, due to its 
autonomous status, special relations with donor agencies and its mode of operation, 
ASIF in reality operated outside the government. Meanwhile, it is suggested that the 
engagement of social funds with central government can help building the technical 
capacity and participatory orientation of relevant line ministries (OED 2002: 35-36).
10.2.7 Conclusions
This section presented the key factors that accounted for the specific participation and 
capacity building impacts of the ASIF micro-projects in the sample communities. 
Firstly, the section argued that the design of the ASIF project did not adequately address 
the local institutional, political and socio-economic context of Armenia. Thus, ASIF’s 
bottom-up development model, based on the cultural view of institutional change,
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overlooked the importance of the broader structural and institutional constraints that 
shaped local institutions and affected people’s decisions to participate. Secondly, the 
section argued that the concepts of participation, empowerment, social capital and social 
exclusion were not adequately understood and operationalised in the ASIF project. 
Thirdly, in addition to project design related factors, ASIF’s implementation 
methodologies did not adequately support the objectives of participation and capacity 
building.
10.3 Promoting Participation and Capacity Building: Implications and Challenges
This section discusses some of the implications and challenges for policy and practice 
raised by this research. In particular, it first examines the implications of the 
participation and capacity building impacts of the ASIF micro-projects for the local 
development in Armenia. It then discusses some of the conceptual and practical 
implications and challenges of the research findings for development policies and 
practices.
10.3.1 Implications for Local Development: Developmental or Predatory Capture?
The specific impacts of the ASIF micro-projects have important implications for local 
development. Strengthening the role of local leaders can have a positive contribution for 
local economic and social development. Providing opportunities and resources to local 
leaders can bring about improvements in the welfare of local communities. Most leaders 
in the studied communities were ‘developmental’, as they had a strong sense of civic 
duty, and felt responsible to support their communities. As was shown section 7.4 of 
Chapter Seven, these leaders had a key role in attracting external resources, maintaining 
important infrastructure, and strengthening social capital and social cohesion in their 
communities. The strengthened position of developmental leaders is likely to contribute 
to improved economic and social outcomes in these communities. Based on their 
findings in Jamaica, Rao and Ibanez (2003: 21) maintain that domination of local 
leaders during social funds micro-project cycle undermines participatory processes, but 
can have a positive developmental impact on communities. In particular, dominant 
leaders who have “communitarian motives” can benefit their communities by obtaining
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funds for projects that meet the priority needs of the majority of community members. 
Rao and Ibanez characterise this as “benevolent capture”.
As this research demonstrated, depending on the existing institutional and social 
relations in local communities, social fund investments can reinforce the entrenched 
economic and social inequalities in local communities. Channelling funds through local 
leaders may not always help improve economic and social outcomes, but it can open 
opportunities for ‘predatory’ capture. When local leaders are not accountable and 
committed to their communities, the lack of community-wide participation may create 
the potential for misappropriation of developmental benefits by the elite or various local 
factions. For example, local leaders can manipulate the identification and selection of 
investments to implement micro-projects that would benefit them than the community 
as a whole. Furthermore, the risk of damaging local social relations in these 
communities is rather high. As Chapter Nine showed, the lack of accountable and 
transparent micro-project management may induce tensions and conflicts in local 
communities.
The role of ‘communitarian’ leaders in local development may be ‘predatory’ in the 
long run. Strengthening local leaders without empowering ordinary community 
residents reinforces the existing power structures. In their essence, patron-client 
relationships are asymmetrical, and one party has more power than the other (Waterbury 
1977: 329). Even if local leaders seek to contribute to the social and economic 
development of their communities, the existing balance of power makes the 
opportunities for empowerment of community residents limited and hence restricts the 
prospects for institutional change. As power relations remain unchanged, community 
members remain vulnerable to corruption and mismanagement. Earle (2005a) makes a 
distinction between strong leadership and individual domination. She maintains that 
strong leadership is necessary to mobilise the community for common goals, however, 
if community-based groups are to flourish, these leaders must not dominate 
participatory processes.
There are a number of other negative effects of relations based on patronage. Migdal 
(1988: 255) maintains that ‘weak states’ can often be ‘captured’ by local ‘strongmen’, 
who use the state resources to offer strategies of survival to the population. As these
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leaders have local bargaining power, they can distort policies and regulations and 
misuse state resources. Such activity, according to Migdal, undermines the nature of a 
modem state, in which the rule of law and jurisdiction must be uniform across the 
country. The strongmen seek to maintain their own mles and their own criteria for the 
allocation of goods and services. These mles can often be exclusive and discriminatory, 
and not necessarily universal. Although they can have a positive role in ensuring 
livelihoods of rural people and hence “advance the state”, they also undermine the 
purpose of the state. Kabeer (2002: 23) argues that informal relations based on 
patronage represent an obstacle to claiming and exercising citizenship rights and 
reproduce social inequalities. Dependence on patronage networks in obtaining access to 
resources implies that individuals may choose not to exercise and claim their rights, 
fearing the consequences for their livelihoods. As a consequence, the public domain 
remains privatised and imbued with inequalities and hierarchies that exist in the private 
domain. There are arguments that although informal networks provide a source of 
livelihoods for the poor, the ‘cost of informality’ is very high, as it restricts poor people 
from many economic, social and political opportunities (De Soto 1989).
Relations of patronage that exist in many poor communities create a dilemma for 
development practitioners. Leadership abilities, personal attributes and position of 
authority of local leaders can be critical to a project's successful implementation. 
Channelling funds through local leaders can help ensure smooth project performance 
and improve economic and social outcomes. At the same time, it is also prone with risks 
of local capture. This poses the challenge of identifying institutional mechanisms for 
maximising the developmental outcome of investments whilst minimising the risk of 
local capture. Midgley (1986a) notes the existing tension between the objectives of 
successful project implementation and participatory development. Thus, in order to 
succeed, development projects need to integrate the existing leaders in decision-making 
processes and build local coalitions. On the other hand, “although inspirational 
leadership may mobilize people and resources effectively, the emergence of strong and 
enduring collective institutions is retarded” (Midgley 1986a: 32).
The failure to recognise the existing social structures in local communities can have 
significant repercussions for designing development programmes and policies. It can 
translate into tension between the existing social structures, which are more effective
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and socially adjusted, and the newly designed forms, which may not represent 
contextually appropriate or feasible options of social organisation. There has been 
increasing donor attention towards utilising the existing social structures in promoting 
civil society in post-Soviet countries. In Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, some 
donors explicitly attempt to tap into existing social structures -  through the use of ashar 
and mahalla committees, and local leaders -  aksakals (Babajanian et al 2005). The 
Central Asian cases suggest that channelling resources through existing informal 
structures and institutions can enhance the effectiveness of policies and programmes 
and contribute to local development (Stevens 2005; Freizer 2005; Earle 2005a). For 
example, Earle (2005a) suggests that the use of local social structures (ashar and 
aksakals) had a positive impact on levels of community mobilisation and project 
delivery outcomes in Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, Earle argues that channelling 
resources through local leaders (aksakals) resulted in the exclusion of marginalised 
residents and women from development benefits. Earle argues that external 
interventions in Central Asia tend to solidify the positions of the more educated and/or 
powerful sectors of village society, without challenging local power relations.
10.3.2 Implications for Development Policy and Practice
This thesis argued that social participation is indeed a highly political process. The 
existing structural constraints determine the ability of individuals to participate in social 
and economic development. Effective social participation requires political capital, 
which implies the ability of the people to effectively convey their voice, demand 
accountability and participate in the formulation of important public policies. 
Community-driven policies and projects that de-link social and political aspects of 
participation may not be effective in addressing the existing structural constrains and 
the objective of empowerment. It is important that development projects and policies 
make explicit conceptual linkage between political and social forms of participation. 
Following Gaventa (2004), this thesis argues that participation must be conceptualised 
as an inclusive concept, which would integrate the political notion of democratic 
participation with the concept of community (or social) participation adopted in 
development theories and practice.
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One way to conceptualise this inclusive concept of participation is through the term 
‘civil society’. This thesis argued that the term civil society can be applicable not only 
to associational (political) but also communal (social) spheres of citizen participation. 
However, the usage of the term civil society can be problematic. As described in 
Chapter Two, the usage of this term in the post-Soviet context has been ambiguous and 
inconsistent, which has popularised the narrow understanding of the term as 
associational life and NGO sector. In addition, as mentioned in Chapter Two, the 
function of civil society in post-Soviet countries has been mainly seen in providing a
OQ
counterbalance to the state.
Whilst the concept of civil society needs to be rehabilitated, the concept of ‘citizen 
participation’ suggested by Gaventa (2004) seems more suitable as an inclusive concept 
of participation that can be used across various disciplines and sectors. The term citizen 
participation helps bridge the conceptual gap between the notions of ‘community 
participation’ and ‘civil society’. Thus it helps bringing together the communal and 
anthropological connotations of the term community development and the political 
meaning of the term civil society. Citizen participation is a more dynamic term than 
civil society, as it helps to focus on processes through which individuals relate to each 
other, organise into groups and pursue their objectives. This term does not emphasise 
community as the main unit of participation and recognises the importance of individual 
rights.
In practical terms, politicising participation implies strengthening political capabilities 
of individuals. One way to invest in political capabilities of individuals is to strengthen 
channels for citizen participation. Linking participation to the political sphere implies 
rethinking the existing practices of participation in development (Gaventa and 
Valderrama 1999; Gaventa 2002). This implies a shift from direct forms of participation 
(for example, in development projects) to indirect forms of participation. Such indirect 
participation includes not only traditional forms of participation through elected 
representatives but also new approaches to governance, which combine direct forms of 
participation with representative forms (‘participatory governance’).
89 The usage of the term ‘civil society’ in Armenian (kaghakatsiakan hasarakutyun) and Russian 
(grazhdanskoye obshestvo) languages (translated literally as ‘citizens’ society’) has a much broader 
connotation than the English term in its international usage. It does not have the antagonistic ‘society vs. 
state’ notion often attached to civil society in the Western political analysis of the region.
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Building political capabilities also includes strengthening civil society organisations that 
can enable individuals convey their voice. Civil society groups can achieve their goals 
through political manoeuvring, building coalitions and alliances, convincing important 
stakeholders and pushing their agenda through a process of negotiation and bargaining. 
Power structures are not static, and they can be reconfigured and renegotiated. The case 
in P Sevak shows that creating spaces for participation can induce local empowerment. 
Such empowerment in P Sevak was restricted within specific temporal and spatial 
boundaries. In particular, the empowered participation of community members within 
the WUA framework did not translate into broader community participation in the 
public arena. At the same time, this case shows that ‘invited’ spaces can translate into 
‘claimed’ spaces. Thus, the hands-off management of the local mayor who preferred not 
to get heavily involved in the WUA management opened up a space for community 
participation. Later this space was ‘claimed’ by the residents, who used it for pursuing 
their objectives on their own terms. Thus, the process of empowerment should 
inevitably involve negotiation and bargaining with those who ‘own’ public spaces. One 
implication for development policies and projects is that empowerment is possible to 
achieve on a smaller scale, by carving niches for local action once opportunities emerge. 
These spaces may transcend their boundaries and may eventually translate into broad- 
scale movements and bring about greater agendas.
It is important to acknowledge that politicising development is prone to risks. White 
(1996: 15) warns that challenging the patterns of dominance and giving voice to the 
excluded, implies bringing about some conflict. Cleaver (2004: 275) points out to the 
danger of high costs of radical participation to the marginalised, “In the short term, the 
disadvantages to them of confronting unequal relations on which they depend, may 
simply overweigh the costs of acquiescence”. Within the post-Soviet context, the radical 
political approach may jeopardise people’s livelihoods, and contribute to fragmentation 
of local communities.
The findings of this research question the effectiveness of the ‘project approach’ for 
promoting institutional change. This approach sees development “as series of precise 
and sequential, usually sectoral, outside interventions called ‘projects’ (Stiefel and 
Wolfe 1994: 217). Korten (1980) suggests that the project approach to development is
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constrained by its nature. Projects emphasise up-front, detailed planning, need to adhere 
to fast disbursement and implementation schedules and to predetermined project 
outcomes. He calls for a “flexible, sustained, experimental, action-based capacity- 
building style of assistance” (Korten 1980: 484). As Oakley and Marsden (1984: 18) 
note participation must be viewed as a “process” and not a “static end product of 
development”. Analysing the relationship between the project and a process of 
participation, Oakley (1991: 273) remains sceptical as to whether “a process which 
seeks to tackle basic psychological, cultural, and political aspects of people’s exclusions 
and build an authentic basis for their participation can really be encapsulated within the 
framework of a development project”. Strengthening capabilities of men and women 
requires time and cannot be solved through short-term external interventions. Hickey 
and Mohan (2004: 159) based on their review of a selection of participatory initiatives 
and programmes maintain that participatory approaches are more likely to achieve 
transformation when they “seek to engage with development as an underlying process 
of institutional change rather than in the form of discrete technocratic interventions”.
Civil society cannot be actively fostered in the absence of a conducive governance 
environment. Bottom-up civil society building initiatives, even if they are politicised, 
need to be combined with top-down efforts to democratise formal institutions of the 
state. Bottom-up capacity building represents an attempt to “establish ‘islands of 
democracy’ within an overall undemocratic environment,” 90 and it is questionable 
whether such approach is feasible and whether these ‘islands’ can survive on their own. 
Thus, it is important that the state institutions support and actively enforce the rule of 
law and democratic freedoms. The state itself must support citizen participation in the 
public arena and encourage an active public debate around the key public policy issues.
Bottom-up capacity building interventions alone may not be effective in fostering strong 
civic networks in the absence of capable state institutions that can actively support civil 
society. The ability of the state to engage with local communities can be crucial for 
building state-society synergies. Midgley (1986c: 151) argues that state-driven 
community participation may sound as a “contradiction in terms” because of the 
ideological origin of the term participation. Thus, bottom-up development emerged as a
90 Interview with Emma Kajoyan, IFAD, 2 August 2002, Yerevan.
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tool to avoid the bureaucratic inefficiency and top-down methods of service delivery. 
The involvement of the state in community development may be perceived as a return to 
the statist approach which can undermine people’s autonomy and ‘neutralize authentic 
participation’. The existing evidence, however, shows that direct engagement of central 
and regional government in local programmes can motivate local officials and 
community members and create opportunities for effective local partnerships (Evans 
1997; Tendler 1997).
This thesis argued that the capability of the state to effectively deliver public goods and 
services can affect patterns of local social and institutional organisation. Thus, the 
inability of the Armenian state to effectively provide essential services and enforce the 
rule of law contributed to the emergence and strengthening of clientelistic networks and 
informal channels for allocation of scarce resources. The role of the state is especially 
important considering the growing structural inequalities and social exclusion in post- 
Soviet countries. It is important that the resources critical for meeting people’s be 
distributed (and re-distributed) as a matter of right, and not based on discretionary and 
clientelistic terms, or inequitable allocation through market mechanisms.
Donor supported CDD policies and projects in post-Soviet countries are based on a 
postulate about economic self-sufficiency, self-reliance and individual responsibility 
derived from the neo-liberal ideology. It is assumed that the Soviet welfare state created 
a culture of dependency. Thus, participation becomes a means to reduce this 
dependency by mobilising local residents to relieve pressures for scarce government 
resources, and by creating a culture of individual responsibility. Such policies in reality 
‘dump’ the responsibility to local communities, without accentuating the responsibilities 
of the state. Whilst it is important to develop local institutional capacity, this goal 
should not obstruct the need for building capable state institutions which would take an 
important role in the provision of welfare and social rights.
The limited role of the state in the low-income post-Soviet countries is conditioned by 
the lack of resources and administrative capacity. It is argued that neo-liberal policies in 
post-socialist countries were necessitated by the excessive state involvement in the 
socialist economies and severe budget constraints (Kovacs 2002: 176). These policies 
attempt to bring the state ‘back to normalcy’ by adjusting the levels of welfare provision
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to the actual economic capacity of the new democracies. It is argued that the 
‘Americanisation’ of the welfare regimes has remained “a rhetorical exercise rather than 
a powerful economic strategy” in the EU accession countries of East Central Europe 
(Kovacs 2002: 176). The anti-welfare state rhetoric and neo-liberal policies have not led 
to “uncompromising liberal models” (Wagener 2002: 159). The EU accession countries 
seem to be moving away from residual social policies and evolving towards one or 
other variants of a West European welfare state.
Strengthening the role of the state and a rights-based agenda in the low-income post- 
Soviet countries is a challenging task. Effective enforcement of social rights is the 
prerogative of a relatively affluent state. There are also political economy 
considerations. As long as public resources are scarce and government capacity weak, a 
rights-based agenda would put more strain on the government. Thus, policies that 
stimulate economic growth and expand the resource base of the state are crucial 
preconditions for a rights-based state. At the same time, it is important that the key role 
of the state in shaping human welfare be recognised ideologically, and that the design of 
anti-poverty policies seek to enhance and not undermine the role and effectiveness of 
state institutions. In Armenia, public debate about the role of the state is absent, and 
reduction of the role of the state is not accompanied with a strategic vision and 
conceptions about the future of the Armenian state. Without such vision, abandoning 
neo-liberalism, as it would be happening in East Central Europe, may be a much more 
challenging task.
There is growing recognition of the importance of good governance and state-driven 
development among development agencies. The ‘participatory governance’ approach is 
gaining increasing popularity among development agencies. This approach includes 
various activities, such as participatory budgeting and participatory planning exercises, 
citizen monitoring committees, various forms of citizen-state partnerships for 
implementation and management of public services (Schneider 1999; World Bank 
2002b; Gaventa 2004). Gaventa (2004) suggests that participatory governance 
programmes open new possibilities for citizen empowerment and improving 
governance. The World Bank is currently actively promoting anti-corruption
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programmes in many countries, including the transition countries of Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia.91
The World Bank’s CDD framework was revamped to address issues of governance 
through building partnerships and promoting an enabling environment (Dongier et al 
2003: 22-23). It encourages collaboration and partnerships between the state, local 
governments, service providers, NGOs and local community groups. The most recent 
Local Development Strategy proposed by the World Bank (2004) makes a case for an 
integrated approach to local development, which would promote greater links between 
communities, local governments and sectoral agencies. The strategy also acknowledges 
the need for increasing the role of central governments and improving national 
governance to support local development.
The new generation of social funds attempts to place social fund operations in a more 
holistic institutional framework. In particular, social funds have been increasingly seen 
as instruments for supporting decentralisation policies and local governance (Parker and 
Serrano 2000). In several countries (Chile, Honduras, Bolivia, and Zambia) social funds 
provide support to local governments in order to build their capacity to effectively 
identify and manage local level investments and to facilitate their interaction and 
partnerships with the local communities. Better sectoral integration is also posited as a 
means to increase the state-society interaction in social funds. In many countries, social 
funds are integrated with national anti-poverty strategies in Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs) across various sectors (Schmidt 2002).
The CDD approach to governance represents the ‘state-society’ partnership view 
described in Chapter Two. It is assumed that through improvements and reforms in the 
legal and regulatory framework, sectoral policies and institutional arrangements, it is 
possible to improve governance environment to support community participation. One 
can doubt whether a ‘policy reform approach’ and ‘project approach’ can bring about 
institutional change. The link of CDD with the issues of political and social rights,
91 See, for example, the World Bank’s Anti-Corruption Strategy in transition countries (World Bank 
2000f). The effectiveness of the World Bank anti-corruption programmes has been questioned (Klein 
Haarhuis and Leeuw 2004; Michael 2004). Thus Klein Haarhuis and Leeuw (2004) assert that although 
the anti-corruption activities are based on theoretically valid presumptions, they do not address specific 
contextual factors that influence policy choices and corruption levels.
326
representation, transparency and accountability is weak. It is not clear why the central or 
regional governments should be more accountable to local communities once they enter 
into partnerships with communities. The experience of the ASIF and ASIFII projects 
demonstrates that state-society partnerships can be formed on unequal terms, and that 
collaboration does not necessarily imply better accountability or responsiveness. This 
conceptualisation of participation within the governance framework still ignores the 
importance of power structures in affecting participation outcomes. This view does not 
explicitly incorporate the need for building political capabilities of communities, and 
remains in its essence apolitical and de-politicised. To date, there is little evidence to 
conclude whether CDD policies and programmes can improve public institutions, 
empower poor people and reduce social exclusion.
There is an inherent difficulty in identifying and designing effective mechanisms for 
establishing a democratic institutional environment and improving governance patterns. 
Turning weak and indifferent institutions into capable and responsive bodies in post- 
Soviet countries requires profound changes in historically established institutional 
norms and practices. Thus it requires changes not only in formal laws and public sector 
rules, but also in informal social norms and values within formal institutions. Formal 
laws will not ensure the rule of law without strong ‘ethical’ norms that restrict self- 
interested behaviour within the governmental institutions (North 1990). Changes in 
governance require a concerted action, which would go beyond the scope of individual 
projects, sectoral interventions or reforms. Most importantly, they require a genuine 
willingness and commitment of national elites to promote democratic development and 
establish progressive institutions. Rose-Ackerman (1999: 199) asserts that “reform will 
not occur unless powerful groups and individuals inside and outside government 
support it”. In my opinion, institutional change in Armenia can be possible thanks to 
‘enlightened leaders’, who would genuinely believe in the principles of justice and 
equity, and who would be able to mobilise people’s support for political and economic 
reforms.
10.4 Conclusions
This thesis examined the effectiveness and relevance of the social fund community- 
driven development model in promoting community participation and enhancing local
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institutional capacity within the social, political and institutional context of post-Soviet 
rural Armenia. More generally, it set out to contribute to the understanding of the 
community-driven development paradigm currently promoted by development agencies 
as an effective poverty reduction, empowerment and capacity building tool. This 
research was also driven by the need to fully understand and map out the existing 
institutional and social relations in post-Soviet rural Armenia.
In addressing these objectives, the research used the case study of the Armenia Social 
Investment Fund (ASIF) project. The research found that ASIF was not successful in 
promoting community participation and institutional capacity at a community-wide 
level. It benefited the rural elite, and hence contributed to the perpetuation of the exiting 
power structures and inequalities in the local communities. The research demonstrated 
that the forms and nature of participation and local institutional capacity in Armenia are 
determined by the broader institutional, social and political context within which 
communities live and function. In particular, participation and local capacity are 
constrained by the governance environment at the macro and micro levels and high 
levels of material and social deprivation in local communities.
The thesis concludes that ASIF was conceived in apolitical terms, and ignored the 
important structural and institutional factors that constrained community participation in 
post-Soviet Armenia. The research findings question the effectiveness and relevance of 
the social fund bottom-up development model. The bottom-up model is based on the 
cultural view of institutional change, presuming that participation and local capacity 
could be promoted through changing interpersonal relations, normative orientation of 
individuals and improving people’s skills and abilities. The research concludes that 
community-driven interventions may not be effective in fostering sustainable civic 
institutions without addressing structural factors that determine the ability of individuals 
to realise their potential and become active agents. Promoting civic participation 
requires enhancing political capabilities of citizens to claim and exercise their rights, 
and strengthening state institutions to engage with citizens, ensure social rights and 
promote democratic development.
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Annex 2. Interview Guides
Interview Guide 1: Social Capital, Local Institutions and Governance
1. Mutual Help and Co-operation
Do people in this community help their co-villagers when they are in a difficult 
situation? Are there situations where people would not help? If yes, what types of 
situations? Who would normally be willing to help ?
Are there some extremely poor people in the community that rely on other people’s 
generosity to survive? What causes them to be so poor?
Do people care about the common problems of their community, or they are only 
concerned about their individual welfare? For example, if a community project does not 
directly benefit someone but has benefits for others in the community, would that 
person contribute time or money for this project? Why, or why not?
2. Social Norms and Interpersonal Relations
How cohesive is this community?
Compared to the situation before the ASIF micro-project, has the level of cohesion 
among community members changed?
Do people trust each other in this community?
Compared with the situation before the ASIF micro-project, how has the level of trust 
among community members changed?
Compared with the situation before the ASIF micro-project, have the relationships 
among people in this community changed?
Are there any disagreements in the community, what are they?
Compared with the situation before the ASIF micro-project, is there more or less 
disagreements/conflicts in this community? What kind of conflicts?
What are the most important ways in which people get together with other households 
in this community today?
3. Local Institutions and Governance Issues
What are the most imminent problems in this community?
How does the community solve its problems?
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What does it take to get things done (i.e., solve local problems)?
If there are problems in the community, or if  people are dissatisfied with the services 
provided, how do they communicate this to their leaders?
What role is the local mayor playing in solving local problems?
How effective is the local mayor to solving the problems of this community? What are 
the tangibles results?
How effective is the local mayor in solving the problems of this community as 
compared to the closest neighbouring community?
How accountable is the local mayor? How well does he respond to the local 
demand/needs?
Are there meetings of the community from time to time? How many meetings have 
there been this year? Do people in the community take much interest in such meetings?
What was discussed and decided at the most recent meetings?
Is information on the composition of the budget and the statement of expenditures 
shared with members of the community? If so, how is this information distributed?
Is information on important local issues shared with community members?
Has the role of the local mayor changed since participation in the ASIF micro-project?
Has the level of community’s interaction or relations with the local mayor changed after 
participation in the ASIF micro-project?
How would people describe the role of their school in the community’s life?
What are the obstacles to local government’s ability to solve problems?
What kind of assistance do local government need from regional/central governments?
Have the local governments collaborated with regional/central governments? In which 
areas?
Has the community receives any support from regional/central authorities?
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Interview Guide 2: ASIF Micro-Project Service Delivery Outcomes and Processes
2. Relevance and importance o f the micro-project and its benefits
In what way is the ASIF micro-project important for the community?
How has the condition/quality of the facility changed as a result of the ASIF micro­
project?
What is the quality of renovation/rehabilitation?
To what extent does the community use the facility compared to before the ASIF micro­
project?
Are there people in the community who do not receive the benefits of the micro-project 
(e.g., no access to schooling/medical help or no access to water)? Why do they not get 
access to the micro-project? What were the main reason that not all people benefit from 
these services?
2. Micro-project Initiation and Identification
To whom did the initiative to apply to ASIF belong?
Did the community have a meeting to discuss the selection of micro-project?
How did they find out about the meeting? Who attended?
What role did the community play in the micro-project identification process?
How much influence did the authorities and informal leaders have in identifying the 
micro-project?
Extent of agreement in the community that the micro-project chosen is a priority 
investment?
At the time when the micro-project was initiated, how and why was it important it for 
the community?
Did the choice reflect the needs of the whole community, some groups or the local 
government?
Who had the most important role in the decision of what type of project to apply for? 
What was the decision-making process?
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3, Proposal Preparation
Who conducted the proposal preparation? How much of the work was actually done by 
ASIF on behalf of the community?
How difficult was it to obtain permits? Did it involve using connections or influence of 
the leadership?
How difficult was it to obtain O&M commitments from authorities?
4, Community Contribution
Did the community make the contribution? How much? In which form?
What were the main sources of the contribution (e.g., user charges, local government 
budget; other donors)?
Who mobilised the community contribution? How?
Were people in general willing to contribute? Why/why not?
Were there any households exempt from the contribution? Which households?
What purpose does the contribution play? (created incentive of commitment?)
How will the community residents feel about making a contribution for another 
important project for your community in the future? Why?
5, Micro-project Implementation
Who had the most important role in managing the implementation and completion of 
the project?
Who was most active in supervising the construction works?
What was the main source of community’s information about the project progress? How 
did they learn about the progress?
Were they satisfied with the level of information you received on the progress of the 
project? Why or why not?
How did the IA provide information about the progress of the project and financial 
status to the community?
How was the contractor selected?
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Which households made contributions (unpaid labour, cash or materials) during the 
construction? Were there any households exempt from the contribution? Why these 
households?
How were local government involved?
What was the pattern and nature of community participation (IA and non-IA) in the 
micro-project procurement, execution and supervision?
Were the community/IA control mechanisms effective?
How well were they aware of contract provisions?
What is the nature of local government involvement in the micro-project?
6, Implementing Agency
How was the IA selected? Who were the IA members? Why these particular members?
Was there a committee (Implementing Agency) to oversee and co-ordinate the 
construction of the micro-project?
Who was on the IA?
Who was most active in the IA? What were the respective roles and functions of 
individual IA members?
Was the local mayor part of the IA? What was the role of the local government ?
Did the IA receive any kind of assistance/training during the project cycle on a specific 
issue (e.g., proposal preparation, O&M, quality control, contractor selection and 
bidding, community mobilisation, supervision, pre-tender conference, etc.)?
Did each IA member have real control and authority in performing their tasks (or the IA 
was dominated by a leader)?
What was the extent of accountability and transparency of IA (reporting to community; 
willingness to share account books, etc.)?
Was the IA leadership participatory oriented, i.e., consulted the community? On which 
occasions?
Did community members have a chance to take part in decision-making processes and 
provide feedback/discuss implementation?
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Interview Guide 3: Assessing the Impact of the ASIF Micro-Projects on 
Community Participation and Local Institutional Capacity
1, Community Participation
In the last [months/years] after the ASIF micro-project, have the community residents 
got together to address a common issue (e.g., clean up communal space; put up a fence; 
lay a water pipe; repair canal; etc.)? How often? Who were these people?
During the [months/year] before the ASIF micro-project, did the community residents 
get together to address a common issue (clean up communal space; put up a fence; lay a 
water pipe; repair canal; etc.)? How often? Were these the same people as before?
In the last [months/years] after the ASIF micro-project, have people in the community 
provided cash or in-kind contribution for solving a common problem? How often? Who 
were these people?
During the [year/month] before the ASIF micro-project, did people in the community 
provide cash or in-kind contribution for solving a common problem? How often? Were 
these the same people as before?
Who was the most active in initiating and organising these collective initiatives/projects 
before the ASIF micro-project?
Who is the most active in initiating and organising the collective initiatives/projects in 
this community after the ASIF micro-project?
How often have members of this village got together and jointly petitioned regional 
authorities or central government with village development issues as their goal?
Are there more people in the community who participate in collective initiatives as 
compared to before the ASIF micro-project (e.g., contribution of labour and time, 
money and materials; participation in collective initiatives)?
Did ordinary community members initiate any actions before the ASIF micro-project 
(e.g., community members initiate small projects, take leadership over an important 
issue, mobilise other residents, petition government, etc.)?
Have ordinary community members initiated any actions after the ASIF micro-project 
(e.g., community members initiate small projects, take leadership over an important 
issue, mobilise other residents, petition government, etc.)?
Did the community undertake any development projects (funded by external donors, 
central or local government) before the ASIF micro-project? Ask to describe them. Who 
initiated those projects? Who participated?
Have there been any development projects after the ASIF micro-project? Ask to 
describe them. Who initiate them? Who participated in them?
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Are there any other organisations/groups/associations in this community? Ask to 
describe them. Who are their members/leaders? How/when were they initiated? How 
useful are they for solving the problems of the community? Have there been an increase 
in the number or membership of these groups since the ASIF micro-project?
2, Empowerment
Are there any individuals from previously socially excluded groups participate in local 
development after the ASIF micro-project?
Are any previously passive individuals who participate in initiatives after the ASIF 
micro-project?
Community members’ perceptions of the importance of participation.
Community members’ perceptions of their role and influence.
3. New Skills and Experience
Has the level of ability or skills of community residents improved as a result of 
participation in the ASIF micro-project? (e.g., technical, organisational and 
communication skills, fund raising, proposal writing, working with contractors, ability 
to work with donors and foreign organisations, etc.).
Community perceptions about the benefits of ASIF’s method of service delivery.
New community-based practices and projects where people used/or intend to use their 
new experience and skills.
4. New Networks and Associations
Were there any new networks or partnerships formed as a result of participation in the 
micro-project?
Increased circle of friends and acquaintances, other useful connections acquired (both 
inside and outside community).
The Implementing Agency (or some of its core members) continues to be active after 
the micro-project completion.
Extent to which new social networks are broad-based and inclusive.
Establishment of formal and informal groups, associations and partnerships, possibly 
with the involvement of local/regional authorities and other officials.
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5. Operation and Maintenance
Physical condition of facilities
What is the current level of maintenance of the facility?
How is the level of upkeep and maintenance of the facility now compared to before the 
ASIF project?
Who is performing system upkeep and maintenance (e.g., facility staff, community 
members, special maintenance committee, etc.)?
How is the facility staffed? Is this sufficient?
Is there an annual or monthly O&M plan/schedule? What does it outline? Who is 
responsible for overseeing it?
Who is providing funding for cleaning, repairs and general maintenance (e.g., user fees, 
local government maintenance fund/budget, central government?)
Do people pay user charges for irrigation water?
How easy or difficult is it for you to collect user charges?
How does the rate of collection of user charges compare to the situation before [the 
ASIF micro-project]?
What are the main obstacles for ensuring adequate O&M?
Do people in the community provide unpaid labour for the facility upkeep and 
maintenance? What kind?
Did people in the community provide unpaid labour for the facility upkeep and 
maintenance before the ASIF micro-project? What kind?
Is there any more or less vandalism as compared with the time when you did not have 
the ASIF micro-project?
6. Governing Local Irrigation
What is the basis for establishing boundaries (hydraulic, village, etc.)?
Who has right to draw water and who does not? Who actually receives water and who 
does not?
What are the procedures for allocation and distribution of water (who decides? who 
receives? how much? what criteria used? how fair and transparent? -  now and before 
ASIF)?
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Do people draw water illegally? How does it compare with before ASIF?
Who monitors that water is not drawn more than the allocated amount?
Are there penalties or sanctions for drawing more than the allocated amount?
Are there any water conflicts in the community?
How does community deal with conflicts (now and before ASIF)?
Is the WUA important to users? How and why is it important?
How satisfied are users with the performance and quality of the irrigation system (e.g., 
water adequacy, reliability o f water supply, equity and fairness in water distribution)? 
How satisfied were users before ASIF?
Do they think that having a WUA helps to solve problems?
How would they evaluate the performance of the WUA (now and before ASIF)?
What are the main problems to WUA’s functioning?
How would they make the WUA more effective?
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Annex 3. Poverty in Armenia
Table 1: Arm enia Poverty Indicators in 1998/99 and 2001
Extreme (Food) Poverty Line
(8,730 drams in 98/99)
(7,979 drams in 2001)
General Poverty Line
(12,276 drams in 98/99) 
(11,221 drams in 2001)
Incidence Gap Severity Incidence Gap Severity
Total
98/99 26.8% 6.0% 2.0% 54.8% 16.2% 6.5%
2001 20.0% 4.6% 1.6% 48.3% 13.0% 5.1%
Urban
98/99 32.9% 7.8% 2.6% 61.4% 19.3% 8.1%
2001 21.9% 5.0% 1.7% 48.5% 13.7% 5.5%
Rural
98/99 18.7% 3.7% 1.2% 46.1% 12.1% 4.5%
2001 17.0% 4.0% 1.5% 47.9% 12.1% 4.6%
Source: World Bank (2003c), based on ILCS 1998/99 and 2001.
Poverty incidence is the share o f the households whose income (or consumption) falls below the poverty 
line. Poverty depth or poverty gap shows how far off households are from the poverty line. It captures 
the mean aggregate consumption (or income) deficit relative to the poverty line. Severity o f poverty 
captures the inequality among the poor by giving more weight to households that are further away from 
the poverty line.
Table 2: Overall Poverty and Extrem e Poverty Incidence by Regions in 1998/99 and 2001
Region Population Extreme poverty incidence Overall Poverty incidence
98/99 2001 98/99 2001
Aragatzotn 138,301 27.0% 22.8% 57.5% 60.3%
Ararat 272,016 17.8% 9.3% 51.3% 39.8%
Armavir 276,233 13.7% 21.1% 37.3% 52.0%
Gegharkunik 237,650 14.6% 24.6% 45.7% 56.8%
Lori 286,408 35.9% 21.8% 62.6% 54.7%
Kotayk 272,469 32.1% 16.3% 60.8% 38.0%
Shirak 283,389 43.0% 21.4% 78.2% 54.9%
Syunik 152,684 27.3% 2.0% 51.6% 15.1%
Vayots Dzor 55,997 16.0% 19.3% 34.7% 50.5%
Tavush 134,376 14.9% 44.0% 28.0% 70.7%
Yerevan 1,103,488 30.7% 20.2% 57.7% 44.7%
Other urban 962,665 34.9% 23.4% 64.8% 52.0%
Rural 1,146,858 18.7% 17.0% 46.1% 47.9%
Total 3,213,011 26.8% 20.0% 54.8% 48.3%
Source: World Bank (2003c), based on ICLS 98/99 and 2001. 
The population figures are based on the Census 2001, NSS.
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Annex 4. Composition of Local Budgets in Sample Communities: Selected 
Indicators
Table 1: PSevak
Local Government Revenues 1999 2001
(in thousand drams) planned actual % planned Actual %
Tax income, including: 1853 261 14 2964 491 9
Property tax 348 254 73 569 491 86
Land tax 1410 0 2394 0 0
Non-tax income, including: 550 1130 250 2079 821 40
Land lease 450 1130 250 1498 821 55
State transfers 650 325 50 1721 1721 100
Total Revenues 3053 1717 56 6766 3034 45
Source: Ministry o f Finance o f Republic o f Armenia
Table 2: Eghegnavan
Local Government Revenues 1999 2001
(in thousand drams) planned actual % planned actual %
Tax income, including: 11117 5758 52 11177 4152 31
Property tax 1052 607 58 2649 321 12
Land tax 9932 5114 51 8527 3831 45
Non-tax income, including: 7377 7600 103 9156 5781 63
Land lease 6277 7154 114 7056 5574 79
State transfers 301 301 100 858 857 100
Total Revenues 18834 12698 67 22918 13987 61
Source: Ministry o f Finance o f  Republic o f Armenia
Table 3: Tsilkar
Local Government Revenues 1999 2001
(in thousand drams) planned actual % planned actual %
Tax income, including: 5362 872 16 3344 536 16
Property tax 305 170 56 150 86 57
Land tax 4982 694 14 3194 450 14
Non-tax income, including: 1075 302 28 1632 299 18
Land lease 1075 302 28 1075 302 28
State transfers 91 91 100 271 188 69
Total Revenues 6528 1323 20 5296 1074 20
Source: Ministry o f Finance o f Republic o f Armenia
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Table 4: Ashnak
Local Government Revenues
(in thousand drams)
1999
planned actual %
2001
planned actual %
Tax income, including: 4272 1307 30 1350 1078 80
Property tax 997 400 40 550 385 70
Land tax 3117 866 28 800 692 86
Non-tax income, including: 731 0 0 660 116 17
Land lease 496 0 0 100 116 116
State transfers 223 223 100 2694 2694 100
Total Revenues 8331 1537 18 4949 4119 83
Table 5: Arevadasht
Local Government Revenues 1999 2001
(in thousand drams) planned actual % planned actual %
Tax income, including: 10746 180 1.6
Property tax 60 81 135
Land tax 10685 99 1
Non-tax income, including: 28 0 0
Land lease 22 0 0
State transfers 373 259 69
Total Revenues 85794 14571 17 11127 447 4
Source: Ministry o f Finance o f  Republic o f Armenia
Table 6: Khachik
Local Government Revenues 1999 2001
(in thousand drams) planned actual % planned actual %
Tax income, including: 2552 380 15 2753 280 10
Property tax 897 365 40 704 280 40
Land tax 1635 9 0.5 2049 0 0
Non-tax income, including: 350 0 0 30 17 56
Land lease 350 0 0 30 17 56
State transfers 2034 126 6 2929 1690 57
Total Revenues 4946 515 10 5726 2002 35
Source: Ministry o f Finance o f Republic o f Armenia
Data on Karin not available.
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Annex 5. Community Asset Mapping
Community: P Sevak, Ararat district, Ararat Marz 
Population: 120 households (730 residents)
Social composition: Local Armenians of mixed kinship and origin, and 3 ethnic Armenian refugee 
households from Azerbaijan. Village established in the early 1970s.
Dimension of 
Poverty/Well-Being Characteristics of the Community
Geographical Assets:
Physical Assets:
Financial Assets and 
Substitutes:
Access to Economic 
and Social Services:
Health Assets:
Education Assets:
=> Poor climatic condition for agriculture (arid area)
=> Borders with Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan)
=> Poor quality o f land
=> Land plots are rather remote from the village (up to 8 km to walk)
=> Unable to cultivate most o f the privatised land as it is in the 
conflict area and partially mined. Only cultivate 160 ha from the 
total o f 1000 ha
=> Limited access to agricultural inputs (fertilisers, pesticides, and 
machinery)
=> Inadequate housing conditions (mostly refugees)
=> Subsistence agriculture predominant
=> Low/seasonal income from commercial farming (watermelons, 
wheat).
=> Barter widespread
=> Reliance on coping strategies: remittances and transfers from 
migrant relatives (often irregular and o f low value); mutual help 
(cash, in-kind, lending and borrowing)
=> Some households are entirely reliant on humanitarian food 
assistance, social benefits o f low value and mutual help
=> Local leaders often waive taxes, water charges and community 
contribution for the poorest
=> Irrigation system, both internal and external renovated (ASIF and 
PIU; WFP). Good project outcomes and water supply from the 
source. Adequate availability o f water.
Potable water available to most households (restricted supply)
=> Electricity available
=> Poor roads
=> Poor transport links with the regional centre and Yerevan 
=> No telephone connection 
=> Village shop
=> Health point with a nurse
=> Hospital in the regional centre is often difficult to access because 
of the lack of transport and poor road condition
:=> Secondary school newly renovated by a US-based NGO 
=> School absenteeism because o f lack o f  clothes in winter 
=> Decreased performance and disincentives for secondary education 
=> Kindergarten closed down due to lack o f funding
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Social Assets: => Social vulnerabilities: the elderly whose families migrated, single 
female headed households and refugees
=> High levels o f out-migration
Reliance on mutual support networks for survival
Restricted participation in social life
Community Organisations: Water User Association and School 
Board
Security Assets: => Sense o f insecurity in the border zone
Psychological Assets: Distrust in the central government
=> Some people are nostalgic for Soviet past
Community: Khachik, Eghegnadsor district, Vayots Dzor Marz 
Population: 264 households (1150 residents)
Social composition: Local Armenians o f 3 kinship groups. Village established in the late 19th century.
Dimension of 
Poverty/Well-being Characteristics of the Community
Geographical Assets:
Physical Assets:
Financial Assets and 
Substitutes:
Access to Economic 
and Social Services:
Borders with Azerbaijan
Village is difficult to access as it is surrounded by mountains, in 
winter months access is especially difficult
Most households have land (2 ha each on average)
Land plots are in the border proximity, and they are hard to 
cultivate because o f occasional gun fire
Limited access to agricultural inputs (fertilisers, pesticides and 
machinery)
Agricultural inputs are expensive, many households rent out their 
land
Adequate housing conditions 
Subsistence agriculture predominant
Low/seasonal income from commercial farming (wheat, apple, 
walnuts; cheese, butter and honey, sales o f livestock)
Access to credit/start-up capital: 50 residents received credit from 
Agrobank; 50 women received micro-credit from an NGO
Reliance on coping strategies: mutual help (cash, in-kind, lending 
and borrowing)
Some households are entirely reliant on humanitarian food 
assistance, social benefits o f low value and mutual help
Local leaders often waive taxes, water charges and community 
contribution for the poorest
Irrigation system rehabilitated (ASIF). Good project outcomes and 
water supply from the source. Adequate availability o f water.
Potable water available to 120 households only; the internal 
network needs rehabilitation
Electricity available
Poor roads
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Health and 
Demographic Assets:
Education Assets:
Social Assets:
Security Assets: 
Psychological Assets:
Poor transport links with the regional centre and Yerevan 
Telephone connection available, but not to all households 
Village shop
Health point with a doctor and a nurse, newly renovated by Oxfam 
Revolving drug fund
Regional hospital is difficult to access due to the lack o f transport 
and remoteness of the village
Decreased birth and marriage rates
Secondary school newly renovated by NRC
School has a honey production unit funded by the School 
improvement Program (WB); football team;
High levels o f attendance and good performance; high rates o f  
graduates with secondary education
Social vulnerabilities: households with many children; single 
female headed households
Reliance on mutual support networks for survival
Active participation in social life
Church in the village centre
Culture Club
Cafe
Community Organisations: Water User Association and School 
Board
Sense o f insecurity in the border zone 
Many people willing to emigrate
Community: Karin, Ashtarak district, Aragatzotn Marz 
Population: 136 households (700 residents)
Social composition: Local Armenians and ethnic Armenian refugees mostly from urban areas in 
Azerbaijan. Village established in the early 1990s.
Dimension of 
PovertyAVell-Being
Geographical Assets:
Physical Assets:
Characteristics of the Community
Close to the regional centre and Yerevan 
Poor climatic condition for agriculture (arid area)
Close to Yeravan
Most households have land 
Poor land quality
Limited access to agricultural inputs (fertilisers, pesticides, 
irrigation water and machinery)
Many residents with urban background find it difficult to engage 
in agricultural activities
Adequate housing (110 newly built houses by Shen programme 
for refugees); others live in poor conditions
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Financial Assets and 
Substitutes:
Access to Economic 
and Social Services:
Health Assets:
Education Assets:
Social Assets:
Psychological Assets:
Subsistence agriculture predominant
Relatively high income from employment in the ADRA funded 
Tree Project (15 people)
Restricted access to credit/start-up capital
Reliance on coping strategies: mutual help (cash, in-kind, lending 
and borrowing)
Many households (40) are entirely reliant on humanitarian food 
assistance, social benefits and mutual help
Free dinners offered for the poorest households in the regional 
centre
Local leaders often waive taxes, water charges and community 
contribution for the poorest
Irrigation system rehabilitated (ASIF). Good project outcomes, but 
limited water supply from the source. Inadequate water 
availability.
Potable water (also used for irrigation) available to lower part o f  
the village, supplied once in 2 days for 4 hours, not accessible to 
all 40 households in the lower part
Electricity available
Good roads
Poor transport links with the regional centre and Yerevan
Easy access to Yerevan and the regional centre because o f good 
roads and proximity
Telephone connection available, but not to all households 
Health point newly renovated by Oxfam 
Revolving drug fund
Secondary school newly renovated by NRC 
High concentration o f people with higher education
Social vulnerabilities: households with many children; single 
female headed households and refugees with urban background, 
who find it difficult to adjust to rural lifestyle
Reliance on mutual support networks for survival
Restricted participation in social life
Organise cultural events (e.g., free tickets to theatre or New Year’s 
performance for children in the regional centre)
Lack o f adequate educational and cultural facilities (such as a 
library and a club), which are much needed by the residents with 
urban background
Community Organisations: School Board, but no Water User 
Association
General stigma attached to the refugee status 
Many people willing to emigrate
Strong sense o f helplessness and desperation among the refugee 
population
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Community: Eghegnavan, Ararat region, Ararat Marz 
Population: 760 households (1670 residents)
Social composition: Local Armenians and ethnic Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan. Village 
established in the early 1990s.
Dimension of 
Poverty AV ell-Being
Characteristics of the Community
Geographical Assets:
Physical Assets:
Financial Assets and 
Substitutes:
Access to Economic 
and Social Services:
Health Assets:
Education Assets:
Close to the regional centre and Yerevan 
Situated in the fertile Ararat Valley 
Bordering with Turkey
Most households have land o f relatively good quality
Pesticides provided by the brandy factory free; subsidised 
fertilisers arranged through marzpetaran. Despite this, many 
farmers investment in agricultural inputs is still costly, and as a 
result some 120 ha o f land not cultivated
Adequate housing
Subsistence agriculture predominant
Relatively high seasonal income from commercial farming (wheat 
and fruits; producing grapes for the Cognac factory)
Access to credit/start-up capital: member o f ACBA, but many 
farmers prefer not to take loans, as they find it difficult to repay 
them
Reliance on coping strategies: transfers from migrant relatives and 
mutual help (cash, in-kind, lending and borrowing)
Few social benefit recipients, and no humanitarian aid available
Local leaders often waive taxes, water charges and community 
contribution for the poorest
Irrigation system rehabilitated (ASIF). Good project outcomes and 
water supply from the source. Adequate water availability.
Potable water available to most households (restricted supply)
Electricity and gas available
Good roads
Poor transport links with the regional centre and Yerevan 
Telephone connection available, but not to all households
Health point with a doctor and a nurse 
Revolving drug fund
Secondary school, good condition 
Kindergarten
Extra-curricular activities (dance classes) funded by local budget
Social Assets: Social vulnerabilities: households with many children; single 
female headed households and the elderly who have been left 
alone
Reliance on mutual support networks for survival 
Active participation in social life 
High migration
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=> Shop 
=> Culture Club
=> Community Organisations: Water User Association and School 
Board
Psychological Assets: :z> Many people willing to emigrate
Community: Arevadasht, Baghramian region, Armavir Marz 
Population: 90 households (120 residents)
Social composition: Local Armenians and Yezids (about 30 households).
Dimension of  
Poverty/Weil-Being
Characteristics o f the Community
Geographical Assets:
Physical Assets:
Financial Assets and 
Substitutes:
Access to Economic 
and Social Services:
Health Assets:
Poor climatic condition for agriculture (arid area)
In the vicinity o f the atomic power station (which makes some 
negative health effects possible)
Poor quality o f land
Limited access to agricultural inputs (fertilisers, pesticides, 
irrigation water and machinery)
As inputs are expensive, the majority o f farmers work as hired 
agricultural labourers
Inadequate housing conditions for most residents 
Subsistence agriculture predominant
Some commercial farming among the better-off residents (wheat, 
fruit, livestock)
Barter widespread
Access to credit/start-up capital: ACBA credits, but many people 
have difficulties repaying them
Reliance on coping strategies: mutual help (cash, in-kind, lending 
and borrowing)
Some households are entirely reliant on humanitarian food 
assistance, social benefits o f low value and mutual help
Preferential waiver o f taxes and water charges
Irrigation system rehabilitated (ASIF). Poor project outcomes and 
limited water supply from the source. Inadequate water 
availability.
Potable water network renovated by All Armenia Fund, but water 
not available; reliance on community members to bring water in 
cisterns
Electricity not available
Poor transport links with the regional centre and Yerevan 
No telephone connection 
Village shop not available
Health point not available
Revolving drug fund suspended because o f non-payment o f fees 
Hospital in the regional centre, often difficult to access because of
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the lack o f transport
Education Assets: => Secondary school in poor condition
=> School absenteeism because o f lack o f  clothes in winter
Social Assets: => Social vulnerabilities: single elderly, persons with disabilities, and 
single female headed households
=> High levels o f migration (120 households left)
=> Reliance on mutual support networks for survival
=> Social divisions
=> Culture club not available
=> Restricted participation in social life
=> Community Organisations: no Water User Association
Psychological Assets: Distrust in the central, regional and local government
=> Sense o f isolation and powerlessness
=> Pessimism and uncertainty in the future
Community: Ashnak, Talin region, Shirak Marz 
Population: 429 households (1450 residents)
Social composition: Local Armenians of Sasoun origin.
Dimension of  
poverty/well-being Characteristics of the community
Geographical Assets: 
Physical Assets:
Financial Assets and 
Substitutes:
Access to Economic 
and Social Services:
=> Harsh winters
=> Most households have land
=> Limited access to agricultural inputs (fertilisers, pesticides, 
irrigation water and machinery)
=> Subsidised fertilisers arranged through marzpetaran
=> Agricultural inputs are expensive, many households rent out their 
land
=> Adequate housing conditions 
=> Subsistence agriculture predominant
=> Low/seasonal income from commercial farming (wheat, fruit; 
cheese, sales o f livestock)
=> Access to credit/start-up capital: 15 residents received micro-credit
=> Reliance on coping strategies: mutual help (cash, in-kind, lending 
and borrowing)
=> Some households are entirely reliant on humanitarian food 
assistance, social benefits o f low value and mutual help
=> Local leaders often waive taxes, water charges and community 
contribution for the poorest
=> Irrigation system rehabilitated (ASIF). Poor project outcomes and 
limited water supply from the source. Inadequate water 
availability.
=> Potable water network rehabilitated, but irregular supply o f water 
=> Electricity available 
=> Good roads
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Health and 
Demographic Assets:
Education Assets:
Social Assets:
Psychological Assets:
Poor transport links with the regional centre and Yerevan 
Telephone connection available, but not to all households 
Village shop
Health point with 3 nurses, needs rehabilitation 
Regional hospital is relatively easy to access
Secondary school needs rehabilitation
School received funding from the School improvement Program 
(WB)
Social vulnerabilities: households with many children; single 
female headed households, persons with disabilities
Some 25 extremely poor households
Reliance on mutual support networks for survival
Active participation in social life
Culture Club
Community Organisations: Water User Association and School 
Board
Many people willing to emigrate 
Distrust in the central government 
Sense o f powerlessness
Community: Tsilkar, Aragats region, Aragatzotn Marz 
Population: 138 households (540 residents)
Social composition: Local Armenians and some ethnic Armenian refugees form Azerbaijan
Dimension of 
PovertyAVell-Being
Characteristics o f the Community
Geographical Assets:
Physical Assets:
Financial Assets and 
Substitutes:
Harsh winters
The village is not considered vulnerable by the donor 
community/NGOs as it is neither in the border zone, nor in the 
refugee populated areas. As a result, it did not attract many 
programs and external investments.
Most households have land
Limited access to agricultural inputs (fertilisers, pesticides and 
machinery)
Agricultural inputs are expensive, many households rent out their 
land. Fertilisers even at subsidised prices are not affordable, and 
only 15 people could afford them.
The reserve land funds are rented by rich landowners.
Inadequate housing conditions
Subsistence agriculture predominant
Low/seasonal income from commercial farming (potato, wheat)
Access to credit/start-up capital: 13 people received ACBA credit, 
but these are mostly better-off residents (as the credit is based 
requires a collateral and costly procedures)
Reliance on coping strategies: mutual help (cash, in-kind, lending
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Access to Economic 
and Social Services:
Health and 
Demographic Assets:
and borrowing)
Some households are entirely reliant on humanitarian food 
assistance, social benefits o f low value and mutual help
Local leaders often waive taxes, water charges and community 
contribution for the poorest
Irrigation system rehabilitated (ASIF). Good project outcomes and 
water supply. Adequate water availability.
Potable water available from a spring
Electricity available
Relatively good roads
Poor transport links with the regional centre and Yerevan 
Telephone connection not available 
Village shop
Health point with 1 nurse
Regional hospital is relatively easy to access
Education Assets: :z> Secondary school needs rehabilitation
Social Assets:
Psychological Assets:
Social vulnerabilities: households with many children; single 
female headed households, single elderly
Reliance on mutual support networks for survival
Restricted participation in social life
Community Organisations: no Water User Association
Many people willing to emigrate 
Distrust in the central government 
Sense o f powerlessness
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Annex 6. Glossary
Index kev:
A: Armenian R: Russian T: Tajik K: Kyrgyz U: Uzbek
Aksakal (T, K) 
Avakani (A):
Avlod (T):
Azg (A):
Bards (R):
Blat (R):
Domik (R):
Domkom (R): 
Gortskom (A):
Gyughsovet (A):
Hamaynk (A):
Hamaynkapet (A): 
Haymankapetaran (A): 
Hashar (T), Ashar (K):
Haykakan dzev (A):
Jrogtagortsoghneri 
miutyun (A):
1. Chief or elder; 2. Administrator of a city or 
village.
The Council of Elders - an elected council, which 
together with the local mayor, is in charge of local 
decision-making.
Patriarchal extended family in Tajikistan.
Extended family in Armenia.
Popular poets and singers who wrote songs outside 
the establishment, often protesting against the 
Soviet way of life.
Informal networks used by people to gain access to 
benefits in the Soviet Union.
Temporary housing in the earthquake area in 
Armenia.
Housing committee.
Local bodies representing the executive power in 
Soviet Armenia.
Village Council, the main legislative body at the 
village level in Soviet Armenia (same as sovet).
Community. 1. Refers to a village or urban 
neighbourhood as an administrative unit in post- 
Soviet Armenia; 2. Indicates ‘social community’ in 
a wider sense.
Head of the rural or urban community (local 
mayor) in post-Soviet Armenia.
Local community administration in post-Soviet 
Armenia.
Communal labour or co-operative work. Collective 
effort by volunteers to assist a person in need in the 
community.
The ‘Armenian way’. Refers to informal ways for 
obtaining benefits.
Water Users Association
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Kinbazhin (A): 
Kollektivi (R):
Kolkhoz (R): 
Komsomol (R):
Mahalla (T, U):
Marz (A):
Marzpet (A): 
Marzpetaran (A):
Nomenklatura (R):
Ojakh (A):
Obshestvennie 
organizatsii (R):
Partkom (A, R):
Sovet (A, R):
Sovkhoz (R):
Subbotnik (R), 
Shabatoryak (A):
Shrjan (A): 
Tanouter (A):
Women’s committee in Soviet Armenia.
Collective units at work places (factories, 
collective farms, schools, and hospitals).
Collective farm.
Youth committee in the Soviet Union. Youth aged 
14-28 joined following the approval of a local 
Komsomol committee. Disbanded in 1991.
Neighbourhood associations often run by local 
elders.
Administrative region in post-Soviet Armenia.
Regional governor in post-Soviet Armenia.
Regional governor’s administration in post-Soviet 
Armenia.
Member of the governmental administration in the 
Soviet Union.
Traditionally better-off and influential families in 
pre-Soviet Armenia.
Voluntary or public organisations.
Local Party Committee in Soviet Armenia.
Elected councils (in practice appointed by the Party 
committees), representing the legislative power in 
Soviet Armenia.
State farm. Unlike in kolkhoz, sovkhoz property did 
not belong to the sovkhoz members but to the state.
Voluntary community work (often carried out on 
Saturdays -  thus linked to Russian subbota or 
Armenian shabat).
Former administrative districts in Soviet Armenia. 
The term is still informally used to refer to specific 
geographic areas.
Elected village headman in pre-Soviet Armenian 
community.
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Annex 7: Interview Codes
Khachik P Sevak Ashnak Arevadasht Eghegnavan Karin Tsilkar
Interview 1 K -l PS-1 AK-1 AR-1 E -l KN-1 TS-1
Interview 2 K-2 PS-2 AK -2 AR-2 E-2 K N-2 TS-2
Interview 3 K-3 PS-3 AK-3 AR-3 E-3 KN-3 TS-3
Interview 4 K-4 PS-4 AK -4 AR-4 E-4 K N -4 TS-4
Interview 5 K-5 PS-5 AK-5 AR-5 E-5 K N-5 TS-5
Interview 6 K-6 PS-6 AK -6 AR-6 E-6 K N -6 TS-6
Interview 7 K-7 PS-7 AK -7 AR-7 E-7 KN-7 TS-7
Interview 8 K-8 PS-8 AK-8 AR-8 E-8 KN-8 TS-8
Interview 9 K-9 PS-9 AK -9 AR -9 E-9 K N -9 TS-9
Interview 10 K-10 PS-10 AK -10 A R -10 E-10 K N -10 TS-10
Interview 11 K--11 PS-11 AK-11 AR-11 E=ll KN=11 TS=11
Interview 12 K -12 PS-12 AK -12 A R -12 E-12 K N -12 TS-12
Interview 13 K-13 PS-13 AK-13 AR-13 E-13 KN-13
Interview 14 K -14 PS-14 AK -14 A R -14
Group 1 (Female) K -G l PS-G1 AK-G1 AR-G1 E -G l KN-G1 TS-G1
Group 2 (Male) K-G2 PS-G2 AK-G2 AR-G2 E-G2 K N-G 2 TS-G2
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